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they	unfold,	of	one	story	leaning	on	another	story	leaning	on	another.	The	stories	are	of	two	of	my	most	loved	and	hated	words,	which	have	leaned	on	one	another	quite	a	lot:	‘religion’	and	‘science.’		While	 this	 dissertation	 was	 prepared	 in	 partial	 completion	 of	 a	 PhD	 in	 the	comparative	 study	 of	 religion,	 I	 hope	 that	 this	will	 be	 read	 as	 a	 new	 foundation	 for	 the	structure	of	academic	subjects—not	strictly	methodology	of	religious	studies.	‘Topics’	can	be	thought	of	anew	as	relational	networks	of	meaning	that	cut	across	disciplinary	lines.	In	fact,	in	many	ways	I	am	rejecting	the	category	‘religion’	or	any	category	for	that	matter	as	able	to	be	 independently	 conceptualized.	 Concepts,	 I	 argue	 thoroughly,	 are	 relational.	 The	 only	structure	 I	 offer	 is	what	 I	 believe	 to	 be	 the	 very	 basis	 of	 knowledge—relationalization.	 I	suggest	a	way	to	analyze	relationships	and	use	relations	for	analysis	and	thus	depart	from	
how	we	think	relationally	to	analyze	what	we	think	of	relationships.	‘Relationality	analysis’	makes	it	quite	clear	that	the	‘how’	actually	creates	the	object,	and	in	tackling	‘religion’	and	‘science’	prior	to	relations	we	have	put	the	cart	before	the	horse.	First,	we	need	to	know	how	we	create	the	objects	before	we	can	analyze	them.	And,	indeed,	such	an	approach	seems	to	suggest	that	the	only	enduring	way	we	can	analyze	them	is	by	examining	those	constructive	processes	themselves.	Relationality	analysis	can	be	thought	of	as	a	field	of	study,	as	subject	matter,	a	research	perspective,	and	as	a	methodology.	It	does	not	fit	neatly	into	discourse	analysis,	the	sociology	of	knowledge,	or	historical	ontology—though	closely	related	to	these	views—or	 any	 other	 research	 perspective	 because	 what	 I	 have	 done	 (so	 I	 hope)	 is	 to	restructure	perspective.	In	examining	the	religion-science	relation,	the	question	is	often	raised	which	‘religion’	and	which	‘science.’	What	do	these	terms	mean?	I	problematize	this	exact	issue.	However,	it	may	serve	to	give	an	overview	here	of	the	‘religion’	and	‘science’	covered	in	this	work.	After	positioning	 the	 project	 in	 the	 discipline	 (Chapter	 One)	 and	 introducing	 my	 theory	 and	method	(Chapter	Two),	I	turn	to	my	case	studies,	which	range	from	approximately	the	1800s	to	 the	 contemporary	 era.	 I	 focus	 on	 discourses	 emerging	 in	 the	 European	 and	 North	American	 context,	 but	 involving	 groups	 from	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 backgrounds.	 Since	 my	emphasis	 is	 on	 the	 English	 language	 terms	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 and	 their	conceptualization,	this	context	is	desirable,	as	is	the	point	that	the	sources	are	largely	English	or	English	translations,	the	latter	of	which,	of	course,	become	part	of	the	discourse	present	
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in	the	English	language.	However	the	terms	have	been	used,	whether	to	explain	a	German’s	or	a	Tibetan’s	point	of	view,	the	important	point	is	the	focus	on	how	these	English	language	terms	are	understood.	Further	justification	for	this	context	rests	in	the	fact	that	it	is	the	main	source	for	the	discourse	on	the	religion-science	relationship.	Even	in	the	context	of	religions	that	 originated	 outside	 of	 Europe	 and	 America,	 the	 religion-science	 relationship	 is	 still	formulated	within	this	same	discourse.	This	is	partially	because	early	histories	of	science,	of	religion,	and	of	the	religion-science	relationship	almost	exclusively	drew	from	the	European	and	American	context,	setting	the	backdrop	for	later	discussions.	The	result	was	that	even	when	alternative	contexts	were	discussed,	they	were	discussed	in	the	specific	framework	of	counter-examples	 as	 counter-examples,	 situated	 in	 response	 to	 the	 above-mentioned	discourse.		My	 first	 case	 study	 in	 Chapter	 Three	 deals	 mainly	 with	 the	 nineteenth-century	general	 profession	 of	 ‘science’	 (rather	 than	 a	 specific	 discipline)	 and	with	 Christianity—although,	 regarding	 the	 latter,	 I	 do	 not	 say	 as	much.	 This	 is	 because	 early	 work	 on	 the	religion-science	relationship	abstracted	a	general	concept	of	that	relationship	by	drawing	upon	 the	 example	 of	 Christianity,	 and	 less	 so,	 Judaism.	 This	 abstraction	 was	 then	subsequently	 used	 in	 comparing	 other	 religions	with	 science.	 Since	 this	 is	 an	 account	 of	conceptualization,	 even	 though	 strictly	 speaking	 the	 ‘religion’	was	 Christianity,	 for	 those	doing	 the	 conceptualizing	 Christianity	 represented	 a	 larger	 concept—‘religion.’	 Chapter	Four	examines	the	development	of	the	scientific	object	of	religion	from	the	early	nineteenth	century	to	the	present	day,	with	the	history	culminating	in	the	cognitive	science	of	religious	experience.	Chapter	Five	looks	at	a	particular	take	on	the	scientific	worldview—scientism—and	how	it	has	been	compared	to	‘religion’	generally	construed	in	an	analysis	of	some	of	the	first	 religions	 of	 science,	 such	 as	 the	 nineteenth-century	 Saint-Simonism	 and	 Comtian	religion.	The	following	case	study	in	Chapter	Six	explores	the	plethora	of	religions	of	science	that	 developed	 in	 the	 1860s	 to	 1940s,	 which	 aligned	 a	 general	 ‘religion’	 with	 a	 general	‘science.’	Chapter	Seven	deals	with	the	construction	of	Buddhism	as	scientific,	from	around	the	1860s	to	the	present	day.	The	last	case	study	in	Chapter	Eight	examines	the	construction	of	quantum	physics	 as	 religious,	 often	as	 ‘mystical,’	 from	 the	1920s	 to	 the	 contemporary	period.	These	case	studies	are	representative	of	certain	ways	religion	and	science	have	been	put	 in	 relative	perspective—as,	 respectively,	mutually	 exclusive,	 religion	as	 reductively	 a	
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scientific	object,	science	as	reductively	religion,	mutually	inclusive,	religion	having	scientific	character,	and	the	religious	character	of	science.	The	case	studies	act	both	as	an	explanatory	tool,	as	well	as	an	exploratory	means,	of	relationality	analysis—to	illustrate	how	the	various	relations	 translate	 to	 specific	 beliefs	 and	 practices	 and,	 above	 all	 else,	 how	 relations	structure	the	meaning	of	the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘science.’	I	fully	realize	that	this	project	is	in	many	ways	overly	ambitious,	a	frequent	fault	of	mine	that	my	mentors,	friends,	and	family	can	firmly	attest	to.	In	being	overly	ambitious,	I	am	bound	to	fail	in	some	regard,	but	I	am	also	bound	to	push	limits,	and	that	is	all	I	ask	for.	And	 as	 my	 colleagues	 point	 out	 my	 failures	 (assuming	 anybody	 reads	 this	 damn	abomination),	it	will	only	push	me	to	push	more,	and	develop	this	line	of	thinking	further	past	those	limits	in	a	more	refined	way.	I	am	acutely	aware	that	the	theory	and	method	is	abstract	 and	 terminologically	 challenging.	 Some	 may	 find	 this	 to	 be	 an	 unnecessary	distraction,	 as	 this	 book	 can	 also	 be	 read	 as	 a	 collection	 of	 case	 studies	 complicating	simplified	 religion-science	 relationships.	 This	 latter	 reading	works	 because	 this	 is	 also	 a	book	 about	 how	 religion	 and	 science	 are	 understood	 in	 practice,	 practice	 by	 religious	advocates,	by	scientists,	by	academics	 from	various	backgrounds,	and	by	specialists.	 I	am	attempting	to	connect	theory	with	practice	in	such	a	way	so	that	each	can	inform	the	other.	More	specifically,	I	am	attempting	to	connect	how	we	theorize	and	conceptualize	with	the	practice	of	communication	via	discourses	in	specific	social,	cultural,	and	historical	contexts.	This	connection	between	theory	and	practice	is	the	best	way	to	understand	how	we	reify	concepts,	which	is	inherently	an	abstract	to	practical	relational	process.	As	such,	I	deemed	the	above-mentioned	challenges	unavoidable.	I	have	attempted	to	address	both	specialists	and	generalists	in	a	variety	of	fields.	This	is	 particularly	 daunting	 when	 considering	 the	 broad	 array	 of	 disciplines,	 themes,	 and	discourses	addressed.	I	have	also	attempted	to	develop	the	subfield	of	method	and	theory	in	the	study	of	religion	and	science,	as	well	as	discourse	analysis,	in	order	to	apply	some	of	the	best	available	research	to	the	study	of	the	religion-science	relation.	To	do	justice	to	all	the	topics,	themes,	and	historical	time	periods	I	touch	upon	in	this	book	requires	not	only	a	level	of	talent,	but	also	a	level	of	knowledge,	to	which	I	make	no	pretensions.	My	approach	is	a	specialization	 in	 a	 topic,	 rather	 than	 a	 discipline,	 but	 as	 such	 I	 must	 also	 advance	 my	arguments	beyond	my	area	of	expertise.	That	 I	 am	proposing	a	new	methodology	 that	 is	
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interdisciplinary	requires	that	I	play	my	own	game.	Moreover,	I	am	not	simply	cutting	across	disciplinary	boundaries,	 I	am	cutting	up	the	boundaries	themselves	which	requires	me	to	tread	into	unknown	waters	that	no	particular	program	of	study	can	prepare	one	for.	Breadth	is	also	necessary	to	demonstrate	the	depth	of	the	processes	of	relational	conceptualization—it	shows	how	deeply	ingrained	these	processes	are	in	human	thinking	across	a	wide	array	of	conceptualizations.	Even	with	all	the	breadth	and	depth	involved	in	this	study	and	even	with	the	 interdisciplinary	 approach,	 this	work	 could	 still	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 reconnaissance—a	preliminary	 investigation	 to	 gain	 information	 on	 recurring	 and	 dominant	 relational	constructs	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 and	 a	 prefatory	 examination	 of	 the	 applications	 of	relationality	analysis.	The	 expansiveness	 of	 this	 work	 acknowledged,	 one	 thing	 that	 was	 regrettably	undertreated	was	relational	sociology,	which	has	been	developing	in	the	last	two	decades	or	so.	Certainly,	relational	sociology	has	some	ideas	that	are	applicable	here,	with	a	focus	on	the	primacy	 of	 relations	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 social	 facts,	 but	 it	 is	 too	 large	 a	 field	 to	 discuss	extensively	here.	And	despite	the	variety	of	topics	touched	upon	in	this	work,	there	are	so	many	more	that	could	have	been	included	as	well.	Regrettably,	there	is	not	sufficient	space	to	include	all	that	is	relevant.	The	impact	of	the	Enlightenment	on	such	important	identity	makers	 like	autonomy	versus	authority	were	 left	aside,	even	 though	this	certainly	 is	also	discursively	entangled	with	the	religion-science	relation.	I	also	failed	to	discuss	the	role	of	esotericism	during	the	Enlightenment	and	instead	focused	on	particular	narratives	that	were	operative	in	the	case	studies	at	hand.	And	the	influence	of	Romanticism	on	religion-science	relations	was	sorely	undertreated.	The	transcendentalist	and	environmentalist	debates	in	late	nineteenth-century	America	could	have	been	explored	as	well,	which	would	have	shown	the	cultural	reach	of	religion-science	relations.	Though	I	touched	on	Theosophical	thinkers	here	and	there,	there	is	no	doubt	that	Theosophy	had	a	much	larger	impact	on	the	relations	between	religion	and	science	than	implicated	here.	Instead	of	focusing	on	all	movements	that	were	instrumental	in	the	construction	of	the	religion-science	relation—which	is	outside	the	scope	of	a	single	book	anyway—I	tried	to	focus	on	perspectives	that	were	particularly	salient	across	 the	case	studies.	Different	case	studies	could	have	been	selected	as	well.	Scientific	materialism	 alone	 would	 have	 been	 a	 sufficient	 case	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 science	 is	sometimes	reduced	to	religion,	but	this	has	been	addressed	several	times	already	(though	
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with	different	analytical	perspectives).	The	relations	between	religion	and	ecology	would	have	made	for	a	beautiful	example	of	the	religiosity	of	science,	but	this	is	such	a	large	topic	as	 to	 deserve	 a	 book	 of	 its	 own.	 And	 the	 scientificity	 of	 religion	 could	 also	 have	 been	thoroughly	demonstrated	with	virtually	any	Eastern	religion.	I	chose	Buddhism	because	it	is	arguably	the	most	influential	in	the	contemporary	age.	The	case	studies	were	chosen	based	on	a	couple	of	other	factors	as	well.	For	one,	I	tried	to	stick	to	my	area	of	expertise:	on	the	side	of	religion,	that	includes	the	philosophy	of	religion,	East	Asian	religions,	and	Asian	religions	 in	 the	West;	on	 the	side	of	science,	 that	includes	the	philosophy	of	science,	cognitive	science,	and	physics.	I	also	chose	case	studies	that	seemed	to	me	to	be	understudied	or	undervalued.	Quantum	mysticism	and	the	religions	of	science	are	cases	in	point.	Finally,	the	case	studies	are	particularly	effective	because	they	show	 a	 continuity	 even	 as	 the	 perspectives	 of	 religion-science	 relations	 change.	 This	 is	partially	due	to	the	relational	content	 in	the	case	studies,	but	also	because	their	histories	overlap.	As	such,	the	case	studies	can	also	be	read	in	terms	of	a	new	history	of	religion	and	science,	 tracking	 changes	 from	 when	 religion	 and	 science	 were	 first	 put	 in	 relative	perspective	to	our	contemporary	age.	Each	case	is	placed	in	the	context	of	at	least	some	of	the	other	case	studies,	giving	some	continuity,	as	would	be	expected	in	a	historical	account.	The	persons,	 topics,	 and	 texts	utilized	 in	my	case	 studies,	 as	well	 as	 the	historical	accounts,	were	primarily	chosen	for	their	exhibition	of	specific	relations	that	have	displayed	endurance	over	the	years,	not	to	suggest	that	the	cases	are	ultimately	influential.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	the	specific	cases	that	are	of	central	interest,	so	much	as	the	wider	perspective	they	represent.	The	volatility	of	the	religion-science	relation	makes	it	difficult	to	say	which	case	studies	will	remain	important	within	the	field.	The	source	material	does	not	necessarily	hold	 a	 privileged	 place	within	 its	 position	 on	 the	 religion-science	 relation,	 as	 the	 lack	 of	consensus	on	these	positions	makes	this	impossible.	As	such,	I	have	surveyed	a	large	set	of	texts	to	serve	as	the	core	material	for	each	case	study,	as	a	glance	at	my	bibliography	will	show.	The	selection	of	sources	has	been	chosen	by	a	wide	sweep	over	the	available	literature,	of	which	I	have	familiarized	myself	with	over	approximately	the	last	ten	years.	These	case	studies	were	also	arrived	at	by	cross-referencing	specialized	literature	in	the	academic	field	of	religion	and	science,	especially	the	‘classic’	authors,	including	John	William	Draper	(1811–1882),	Ian	Barbour	(1923–2013),	John	Hedley	Brooke,	and	others,	as	well	as	daily	readings	
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of	 internet	 news	 to	 feel	 the	 current	 pulse	 of	 the	 religion-science	 scene.	 Hopefully,	 this	approach	 has	 led	 to	 a	 somewhat	 comprehensive	 selection	 of	 the	 main	 religion-science	relations.	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 relational	 construct	 analyzed	 in	 each	 case	 study	certainly	does	not	exhaust	the	perspectives.	Put	differently,	the	relations	are	examples	of	the	case	studies;	the	case	studies	are	not	examples	of	the	relations.	For	instance,	‘scientism’	is	not	always	constructed	in	terms	of	the	reduction	of	science	to	religion,	which	is	the	relation	I	discuss.	That	relation	constitutes	only	one	example	of	how	scientism	is	conceptualized.	We	must	always	remember	that	the	case	studies	are	not	conclusively	one	relation	or	another.	This	is	a	reflection	of	relationality	analysis,	as	it	is	my	attempt	to	shift	our	focus	away	from	the	concept	as	a	reified	thing	and	examine	the	ways	in	which	relations	give	rise	to	novel	ideas.	The	relational	act	produces	the	entities,	not	the	other	way	around.	What	‘scientism’	is	in	one	instance	or	another	depends	on	the	relation	applied.	There	will	be	no	perfect	case	of	any	relational	 construct,	 no	 true	 exemplar.	Whether	 a	 given	 case	 is	 regarded	 as	 ‘science’	 or	‘religion’	or	both	will	depend	not	on	the	concept	or	term	employed	(here	‘scientism’),	but	on	the	relation	utilized.	The	case	studies	should	be	read	in	light	of	the	other	relational	constructs	discussed	 here,	 which	 demonstrate	 contending	 histories,	 struggles	 over	 legitimizing	knowledge,	and	a	complexity	of	religion-science	relations.	Besides	the	individual	case	studies,	the	work	as	a	whole	could	be	looked	at	as	a	case	study	of	religion	and	science	for	my	wider	purpose	of	relationalizing	concepts.	As	such,	this	work	could	have	been	entitled	Relationality	Analysis,	to	emphasize	the	fact	that	this	is	mainly	a	 contribution	 to	 theory	 and	 method	 in	 the	 academic	 treatment	 of	 concepts	 and	 their	definitions.	Besides	for	the	reasons	of	my	own	personal	interest,	I	chose	religion	and	science	because	 in	 my	 view	 they	 are	 the	 two	 major	 knowledge	 systems	 that	 have	 guided	 our	philosophies,	 in	 a	 much	 deeper	 and	 wider	 way	 than	 the	 limits	 of	 their	 institutions.	Philosophy	 is	 central	 to	human	 thought,	whether	or	not	 it	 is	 critically	 reflected	upon—it	underlies	every	utterance,	whether	a	joke,	a	vulgar	remark,	or	even	nonsense.	All	speech	and	materializations	 of	 speech	 both	 embody	 and	 construct	 how	 we	 see	 the	 world,	 how	 we	understand	comprehensibility	and	the	processes	of	communicating	meaning.	Philosophies	of	religion	and	science,	then,	are	ubiquitous,	 though	not	always	easily	recognizable.	From	
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interpreting	 the	 significance	 of	 a	 polyp	 to	 a	 particle,	 religion	 and	 science	 define	 the	perimeters	of	and	parameters	for	many	of	our	concepts.	Though	I	have	discussed	the	case	studies	in	terms	of	religion-science	history,	I	not	only	 trace	relations	 in	 their	historical	dimensions,	but	also	and	mainly	 in	 their	discursive	ones.	 (On	 a	 related	 note,	 this	 means	 that	 all	 periodizations	 herein	 are	 heuristic.)	 This	produces	two	chronologies,	the	historical	chronology	and	the	discursive	chronology.	Both	chronologies	are	part	of	the	history	we	are	interested	in—the	relational	history	of	discourses	of	 religion	 relative	 to	 discourses	 of	 science.	 The	 discursive	 chronology	 is	 sometimes	ahistorical—or,	in	a	Foucauldian	sense,	genealogical—as	many	authors	supply	anachronistic	traces	 of	 thought,	 applying	 their	 present-centered	 views	 on	 the	 past.	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 the	historiographical	issues	in	doing	so.	Certainly,	‘science’	as	a	profession	was	not	established	prior	to	the	nineteenth	century	and	the	early	histories	of	science	drew	a	grand	narrative,	taking	 the	 best	 elements	 of	 the	 past	 to	 argue	 for	 a	 ‘tradition’	 that	was	 in	 reality	 a	 novel	undertaking,	but	these	are	not	the	issues	here.	I	treat	authors’	views,	including	those	of	the	historians,	 as	 data	 not	 as	 facts.	 From	 a	 discursive	 perspective,	 history	 and	 the	 telling	 of	history	are	effectually	similar—both	contribute	to	the	discourse	and	construct	the	concepts	in	 question.	 ‘Bad	history’	 can	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 clue	 rather	 than	 a	 target.	 These	 ahistorical	histories	 provide	 a	 window	 to	 the	 inner	 workings	 of	 past	 and	 present	 convictions,	 the	underlying	motivations	and	aims	for	constructing	history	as	it	was.	Discourse	also	lays	the	foundation	 for	how	 tradition,	 continuity,	 and	 change	are	 constructed.	Despite	 the	 lack	of	historical	‘truth’	in	some	instances,	these	discourses	lead	to	real	results,	shaping	social	and	cultural	institutions	and	practices.	In	this	analysis	of	conceptual	development,	both	the	truth	and	the	tale	are	equally	telling.	The	 note	 of	 the	 ‘two	 chronologies’	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 when	 critically	examining	my	sources.	When	I	invoke	Friedrich	A.	von	Hayek	(1899–1992),	for	example,	to	justify	the	inclusion	of	Henri	Saint-Simon	(1760–1825)	and	Auguste	Comte	(1798–1857)	as	part	 of	 the	 story	 of	 scientism,	 I	 am	 not	 presenting	 Hayek	 as	 evidence	 of	 history,	 but	 as	evidence	of	discourse.	From	a	historical	perspective,	dating	scientism	to	the	time	of	Comte	is	questionable.	The	term	‘scientism’	had	not	yet	emerged.	But	since	in	historical	accounts	of	Comte	 scientism	 is	 present	 (or,	 more	 accurately,	 presented),	 this	 history	 is	 part	 of	 the	discourse.	 Along	 the	 same	 lines,	 because	 I	 am	mainly	 interested	 in	 discourse,	 what	 are	
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	In	 the	 field	 of	 religion	 and	 science,	 the	 typical	 approach	 in	 determining	 the	 association	between	 the	central	concepts	has	been	 to	define	 ‘religion,’	define	 ‘science,’	and,	based	on	these	definitions,	conclude	a	relationship	between	the	two.	Despite	the	general	uniformity	of	this	definitional	approach	in	the	academic	field	of	religion	and	science	(and	academia	at	large),	identifying	the	religion-science	relationship	is	still	a	major	point	of	contention.	The	questions	of	definition,	essentialism,	explanation,	and	understanding	have	for	decades	been	“deadlocked	because	of	a	lack	of	clarification	concerning	the	exact	meaning	of	the	key	terms	being	employed.”2	Only	a	few	scholars	have	directly	engaged	with	the	issue	even	though	it	is	clearly	 recognized	as	 centrally	 important.3	This	 can	be	confirmed	by	a	quick	overview	of	works	in	the	field,	in	which	you	will	be	hard	pressed	to	find	an	introduction	that	does	not	highlight	the	problem	of	definition.4	As	historian	Norman	Hampson	(1922–2011)	argued,	for	instance,	there	is	no	point	in	offering	general	definitions,	as	“such	a	definition	would	have	to	include	 so	many	 qualifications	 and	 contradictions	 as	 to	 be	 virtually	meaningless,	 or	 else	prove	so	constricting	that	logic	would	continually	be	trying	to	debar	what	common	sense	insisted	on	including.”5		
																																																						1	Watson	(1996),	140.	I	have	attempted	to	include	birth	and	death	dates	for	all	people	discussed	in	this	work.	My	reason	for	doing	so	is	so	that	readers	can	historically	contextualize	quotes,	comments,	and	analyses.	Since	I	treat	even	scholarly	work	as	data,	such	information	is	relevant	to	the	overall	research	here.	For	individuals	of	whom	I	do	not	provide	dates,	they	are,	to	my	knowledge,	still	living	at	the	time	of	the	finalization	of	this	work.	If	they	are	not	still	living,	but	dates	are	not	available,	I	denote	this	by	“n.d.”	2	Penner	&	Yonan	(1972),	107.	3	 One	 exception	 includes	 Ingman	 et	 al	 (2016),	 an	 anthology	 surrounding	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 definition	 of	religion	and	secularity	with	a	focus	on	relational	dynamics.		4	E.g.,	on	‘religion,’	see	Clouser	(1991),	9–16;	and	on	‘religion’	and	‘science,’	see	Brooke	and	Cantor	(1998),	43–72.	5	Hampson	(1968),	10.	While	Hampson’s	comments	are	in	regard	to	defining	‘the	Enlightenment,’	I	think	his	observations	are	spot	on	for	the	problem	of	definition	at	large.	
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determined,	 as	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 following	 chapter.	 Developing	 a	 theory	 and	methodology,	 and	 accompanying	 analytical	 categories,	 that	 can	 capture	 the	dynamism	of	conceptual	constructs	is	thus	the	purpose	of	this	research.	The	incentive	of	this	work	is	to	delineate	a	way	to	talk	about	analytical	terms	without	defining	them.	I	suggest	this	can	be	accomplished	through	‘relationality	analysis,’	which	I	will	discuss	in	detail	in	the	following	chapter.		 It	is	the	aim	of	this	work	to	test	this	hypothesis	and	to	demonstrate	its	usability	for	analyzing	discursive	change	generally	and	for	the	study	of	religion	and	science	specifically,	with	an	ultimate	goal	to	formulate	a	meta-model	that	puts	our	various	models	in	perspective.	Before	 turning	 to	 my	 specific	 research	 questions	 and	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 these	 aims,	 it	 is	important	to	first	make	clear	the	position	of	my	project	in	the	discipline,	which	requires	a	preliminary	exploration	 into	 the	history	of	 the	academic	 field	of	 religion	and	science	and	other	applicable	 research	perspectives.	The	central	 research	 inquiry	at	hand	can	 then	be	made	clear.	The	sub-questions	directing	the	work	at	this	moment	are:	what	approaches	to	the	 religion-science	 relationship	 have	 been	 used	 in	 the	 past	 and	 what	 problems	 are	associated	with	them?	Are	there	alternatives	that	address	these	issues?	How	can	we	proceed	to	analyze	fluid	concepts	within	a	stable	analytical	structure?		
2 Past	Approaches		There	are	at	least	four	main	academic	theses	of	the	religion-science	relationship,	including	the	warfare	thesis,	the	conflict	thesis	(though	many	scholars	do	not	distinguish	between	the	two),	 the	 complexity	 or	 contextualist	 thesis,	 and	 what	 might	 be	 called	 the	 ‘dynamism	thesis.’12		 The	‘beginning’	of	the	field	is	often	traced	to	the	work	of	John	William	Draper	(1811–1882),	History	of	the	Conflict	Between	Religion	and	Science	(1874).13	According	to	Draper,	the	
																																																						12	This	section	is	largely	based	on	the	publication	Vollmer	&	von	Stuckrad	(2017).	13	Distribution	may	not	have	been	until	1875,	however	I	could	not	confirm	this	date	as	the	original	publishing	year,	as	the	primary	source	dated	publication	in	1875,	but	noted	that	it	entered	in	the	Library	of	Congress	in	1874.	Although	I	will	be	historicizing	the	field,	it	is	good	to	keep	in	mind	that	my	definition	of	its	‘beginnings’	is	a	 pragmatic	 one,	 necessitating	 vagueness.	 Periodization	 is	 always	 arguable	 and	 the	 literature	 supports	 the	‘beginnings’	ranging	over	a	century	from	the	mid-1800s	to	the	mid-1900s.	Discourse	builds	momentum	and	
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history	of	science	is	a	narrative	of	religion-science	conflict.14	Draper	supported	the	theses	of	Andrew	 Dickson	White	 (1832–1918)—his	 main	 work	 being	 A	 History	 of	 the	Warfare	 of	
Science	with	Theology	in	Christendom	(1896),	in	which	conflict	was	also	emphasized.15	The	thought	of	 these	 two	 individuals	has	been	 joined	 in	what	 is	 known	as	 the	 ‘Draper-White	thesis’	or	 the	 ‘warfare	 thesis.’16	Though	alternative	views	emerged	alongside	 the	Draper-White	 thesis,	 it	 continued	 to	hold	 sway,	 particularly	with	 the	work	of	 Stephen	 Jay	Gould	(1941–2002)	 in	 the	 late	 twentieth	 century,	 who	 characterized	 the	 religion-science	relationship	as	“non-overlapping	magisteria”	of	“natural	antagonists.”17			 While	conflict	has	certainly	occurred,	many	specialists	today	note	that	this	has	been	the	exception,	not	 the	rule.18	 Ian	Barbour	(1923–2013)	rejected	the	warfare	thesis	as	 the	only	applicable	model	of	religion-science	relations	and	some	claim	his	book	Issues	in	Science	
and	Religion	(1966)	marked	the	emergence	of	the	specialized	field	of	religion	and	science.19	This	 periodization	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 from	 the	 1960s	 to	 the	 1980s	 academic	research	 institutions	 and	 journals	 for	 the	 study	 of	 religion	 and	 science	were	 established	across	the	world.20	Barbour	was	also	among	the	first	to	set	out	a	typology	of	relationships:	conflict,	 independence,	 dialogue,	 and	 integration.21	 Though	 he	 critiqued	 the	 widespread	application	 of	 the	warfare	 thesis,	 his	 approach	was	 later	 criticized	 as	 assuming	 inherent	
conflict	by	 treating	the	two	concepts	as	 fundamentally	distinct	 that	“forces	an	ontological	
																																																						thus	I	will	discuss	periods	where	there	was	 little	discussion	of	 the	academic	 field	of	religion	and	science	to	demonstrate	 the	 building	 blocks	 and	 growth	 of	 the	 discussion.	 For	 introductions	 to	 the	 academic	 field	 of	religion	 and	 science	 and	 related	 considerations	 of	 periodization,	 see	 Brooke	 (2003),	 749;	 van	 Huyssteen	(2003),	vii;	Clayton	(2006),	1–2;	and	Vollmer	&	von	Stuckrad	(2017).	On	the	history	of	religion	and	science,	as	opposed	to	the	academic	field,	see	Grant	(2004);	and	Olson	(2004).		14	Draper	(1875),	vi–vii.		15	 Ferngren	 (2000),	 xiii;	 and	White	 (1896).	 I	 could	not	 confirm	 this	 date,	 as	 the	 text	 is	 elsewhere	 listed	 as	published	in	1895,	1897,	and	1898.	Consultation	of	the	text	itself	could	not	clarify	the	publication	year,	as	later	editions	do	not	state	the	original	publication	date.	On	the	context	of	which	Draper	and	White	were	asserting	such	claims,	see	Principe	(2015),	45–48;	and	Fleming	(1972),	123–125.		16	The	Draper-White	 thesis	 is	 sometimes	 referred	 to	as	 the	 ‘conflict	 thesis,’	 but	better	differentiated	as	 the	‘warfare	thesis,’	another	common	epithet,	since	the	‘conflict	thesis’	is	sometimes	used	to	refer	to	the	notion	of	‘inherent	conflict,’	according	to	Cantor	&	Kenny	(2001).	17	Gould	(1999),	passim;	and	Gould	(1977),	141.	See	also	Wilson	(2000),	4	and	8.		18	Brooke	(2003),	749;	and	Russell	(1997),	48.	19	E.g.,	Peters	(2005),	8191.	20	Peters	(2005),	8185	stated	that	this	occurred	in	the	1970s,	but	the	major	institutions	were	founded	across	a	larger	time	span.	21	Barbour	(1990).	
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separation,”	 which	 has	 not	 always	 been	 present	 in	 the	 history	 of	 ideas.22	 So	 despite	 his	contextualized	typology,	for	some,	Barbour	became	the	scholar	associated	with	the	‘conflict	thesis.’			 Meanwhile,	 alternative	 religion-science	 theses	 continued	 to	 emerge,	 including	 the	‘complexity	thesis’	found	in	John	Hedley	Brooke’s	influential	work	Science	and	Religion:	Some	
Historical	Perspectives	(1991).	However,	several	intellectuals	had	already	problematized	the	warfare	thesis	based	on	observations	of	the	complexity	and	interconnectedness	of	religion-science	 histories,	which	was	 sometimes	 found	 to	 exhibit	 positive	 relations.	 For	 instance,	Edwin	A.	Burtt	(1892–1989)	in	Metaphysical	Foundations	of	Modern	Physical	Science	(1924)	and	Alfred	North	Whitehead	(1861–1947)	in	Science	and	the	Modern	World	(1926)	traced	the	 theological	 foundations	 of	 science.	 In	 the	 early	 1970s,	 other	 academics	 revisited	 the	matter	 of	 the	 religious	 foundations	 of	 science,	 such	 as	 Reijer	 Hooykaas	 (1906–1994)	 in	
Religion	and	the	Rise	of	Modern	Science	(1972)	and	Stanley	L.	Jaki	(1924–2009)	in	Science	
and	Creation	(1974).	Still,	Brooke’s	work	was	of	central	importance,	as	it	brought	to	light	the	problem	of	the	definitional	approach	when	he	noted	the	variant	uses	of	the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘science,’	including	the	shifting	boundaries	between	the	two	knowledge	systems,	which	led	to	his	emphasis	on	context.23	Brooke’s	observations	have	become	salient	in	the	field	of	the	history	of	science	and	among	religion-science	specialists.24			 What	might	be	 called	 the	 ‘dynamism	 thesis’	 has	been	developed	 in	 such	works	as	Mikael	Stenmark’s	How	to	Relate	Science	and	Religion	(2004).	Like	the	complexity	thesis,	this	approach	 treats	 ‘religion’	and	 ‘science’	as	dynamic	concepts.	However,	 it	differs	 in	 that	 it	takes	 into	 account	 previous	 situations	 so	 that	 restriction	 and	 expansion	 of	 terms	 are	contextualized,	demonstrating	changes	in	the	relationship	through	time.	Thus,	 it	does	not	
																																																						22	 Cantor	 &	 Kenny	 (2001),	 769,	 777,	 and	 passim.	 Peter	 Harrison	 claimed	 that	 the	 conflict	 thesis	 has	 been	generally	rejected	by	all	historians	and	characterized	it	as	a	“myth”	that	was	“invented”	by	Draper	and	White.	However,	this	overlooks	the	fact	that	religion	and	science	have	and	continue	to	conflict	in	some	circumstances.	Harrison	 later	 offhandedly	 stated	 there	 are	 atypical	 occurrences	 of	 conflict,	 but	 claimed	 this	 was	 not	representative	of	a	larger	historical	picture.	See	Harrison	(2010),	4–5.	However,	if	conflict	does	occur,	it	would	not	be	appropriate	to	refer	to	this	model	as	a	“myth.”	It	seems	to	me	that	what	he	wants	to	deny	is	inherent	conflict,	while	recognizing	the	presence	of	extrinsic	conflict,	but	he	does	not	make	this	explicit.	23	Brooke	(1991),	16	and	321.	24	Ferngren	(2000),	xiii.	
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3.1 Discourse	Analysis	Discourse	 analysis,	 in	 its	 various	 manifestations,	 is	 an	 effective	 way	 to	 expose	 the	contingencies	 of	 knowledge	 formation	 and	 thus	 the	 changes	 of	 meaning	 through	 time.	Discourse	 analysis	 is	 exceedingly	 helpful	 in	 analyzing	 fluid	 concepts	 within	 a	 stable	analytical	structure.	Since	my	own	analysis	departs	from	many	observations	present	in	the	field	 of	 discourse	 analysis,	 a	 discussion	 of	 this	 research	 perspective	 and	 of	 the	 relevant	concepts	is	needed	to	lay	the	theoretical	groundwork.31		 Though	there	are	several	methods	for	approaching	discourse	analysis,	I	use	the	term	‘discourse’	in	the	tradition	of	Michel	Foucault	(1926–1984)	and	others	who	apply	the	term	beyond	a	linguistic	context	to	that	of	cultural	studies.32	Discourse	is	defined	as	follows:		[P]ractices	 that	 organize	 knowledge	 in	 a	 given	 community;	 they	 establish,	 stabilize,	 and	 legitimize	systems	of	meaning	and	provide	collectively	shared	orders	of	knowledge	in	an	institutionalized	social	ensemble.	Statements,	utterances,	and	opinions	about	a	specific	topic,	systematically	organized	and	repeatedly	observable,	form	a	discourse.33	Discourses	“are	to	be	treated	as	practices	which	systematically	form	the	object	of	which	they	speak.”34	To	give	a	simple	example,	imagine	farmland	that	goes	barren	and	is	repurposed	as	a	 soccer	 field:	 the	object	 in	question	changes	depending	on	how	we	 talk	about	 it	 (fertile,	barren,	 or	 recreational)	 and	what	 practices	 are	 associated	with	 it	 (farming,	 lying	 fallow,	sports).	Even	‘land’	can	be	changed	depending	on	the	context,	say	into	a	crude	parking	lot,	showing	not	even	material	changes	are	needed	in	the	formation	of	a	new	object.	As	discourses	change,	so	does	what	is	taken	for	knowledge.	In	a	Foucauldian	sense,	‘knowledge’	is	all	kinds	of	meanings	attributed	by	people	to	interpret	reality,	derived	from	
																																																						31	 On	 some	 of	 the	 guiding	 assumptions	 of	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	 (not	 all	 of	 which	 I	 abide	 by),	 see	Hammersley	(1997).	32	 This	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	Hans	G.	 Kippenberg	who	discusses	 the	 discursive	 study	 of	 religion	 in	 reference	 to	speech-act	theories.	See	Kippenberg	(1983).	See	also	von	Stuckrad	(2003),	266,	for	an	explanation.		33	von	Stuckrad	(2013a),	10.	An	alternative	definition	of	discourse	is:	“[A]n	institutionally	consolidated	concept	of	 speech	 inasmuch	as	 it	determines	and	consolidates	action	and	 thus	already	exercises	power.”	Quoted	 in	translation	in	Jäger	(2001),	34.	Original	quote	from	Link	(1983),	60.	See	also	Wodak	(2001a),	66:	“‘Discourse’	can	thus	be	understood	as	a	complex	bundle	of	simultaneous	and	sequential	interrelated	linguistic	acts,	which	manifest	themselves	within	and	across	the	social	fields	of	action	as	thematically	interrelated	semiotic,	oral	or	written	tokens,	very	often	as	‘texts’,	that	belong	to	specific	semiotic	types,	that	is	genres.”	34	Jäger	(2001),	39,	quoting	Foucault	in	translation.	See	also	Foucault	(1989),	74.	
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the	respective	discursive	context.35	Put	differently,	discourse	supplies	the	concepts	and	the	knowledge	used	to	carve	up	reality	into	the	‘shape’	we	understand	it	as.	Scholar	of	religion	Kocku	 von	 Stuckrad	 incorporated	 these	 notions,	 concluding	 ‘knowledge’	 is	 “the	 cultural	response	to	symbolic	systems	that	are	provided	by	the	social	environment	[…]	produced,	legitimized,	communicated,	and	transformed	as	discourses.”36	This	means	that	knowledge	is	socially	and	historically	constructed.37			 The	historical	dimension	comes	in	with	the	fact	that	discourses	have	historical	roots	and	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 “the	 flow	 of	 knowledge	 […]	 throughout	 all	 time.”38	Discourses	evolve	as	a	result	of	historical	processes,	with	no	individual	or	group	determining	its	course.	In	this	way,	it	is	an	independent	process,	even	though	all	individuals	contribute:	discourse	is	‘super-individual.’	 Thus,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 societal	 knowledge	 on	 specific	 topics,	 like	religion	and	science,	a	reconstruction	of	its	genealogy	is	necessary.39	‘Genealogy’	is	defined	by	Foucault	as	“a	form	of	history	which	reports	on	the	constitution	of	knowledge,	discourses,	fields	of	objects,	etc.,	without	having	to	relate	to	a	subject	which	transcends	the	field	of	events	and	occupies	it	with	its	hollow	identity	throughout	history.”40	Words	or	subjects	are	‘hollow’	and	as	such	a	genealogy	must	avoid	resorting	to	an	essential	 factor	as	the	thread	holding	together	history	and	instead	examine	the	tapestry	and	its	accompanying	patterns	of	change	and	continuity.	This	can	 involve	a	 focus	on	particular	 ‘discourse	strands’	or	 “thematically	uniform	 discourse	 processes.”41	 Discourse	 strands	 have	 both	 synchronic	 and	 diachronic	dimensions,	so	unlike	contextualism,	there	is	something	like	enduring	subject	matter	in	the	tapestry	that	can	be	utilized	for	historical	comparison,	but	without	resorting	to	essentializing	the	threads	nonetheless.	The	 social	 dimension	must	 be	 attended	 to	 further	 as	well.	 Discourse	 analysis	 can	involve,	for	instance:	
																																																						35	Jäger	(2001),	33.	36	von	Stuckrad	(2013a),	4.	37	See	Foucault	(1980),	discussed	in	relation	to	the	discursive	study	of	religion	in	von	Stuckrad	(2013a).	See	also	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966);	Wodak	(2001b),	9;	and	van	Leeuwen	(1993).	38	Jäger	(2001),	34,	quoting	himself,	from	Jäger	(1993).	See	also	Wodak	(2001b),	9.	39	Jäger	(2001),	37.	40	Quoted	 in	 translation	 in	 Jäger	 (2001),	 37–38.	 See	 also	 Foucault	 (1978),	 32.	On	 other	methods	 for	 doing	discourse	analysis	in	historical	perspective,	see	Jäger	(2001),	52.	41	Jäger	(2001),	47.	
Forgetting	Words	
	 10	
[T]he	relationship	among	communicational	practices	and	the	(re)production	of	systems	of	meaning,	or	 orders	 of	 knowledge,	 the	 social	 agents	 that	 are	 involved,	 the	 rules,	 resources,	 and	 material	conditions	that	are	underlying	these	processes,	as	well	as	their	impact	on	social	collectives.42		Social	 practice	 is	 considered	 a	 form	of	 knowledge,	 represented	by	 discourse	 or,	 in	 other	words,	the	things	said	about	social	practices.43	Moreover,	subjects	and	their	actions	‘bring	knowledge	into	play,’	connecting	discourses	with	reality.44	For	instance,	‘discursive	events’	“influence	 the	direction	 and	quality	 of	 the	discourse	 strand	 to	which	 they	belong.”45	The	Scopes	Trial	on	the	teaching	of	evolution	in	American	schools	was	a	major	discursive	event	relative	to	religion	and	science,	as	it	resulted	in	public	debates,	polemics,	educational	reform,	and	new	laws,	having	a	major	impact	on	the	perception	and	direction	of	the	religion-science	relationship.	 Some	 suggest	 that	 this	 discourse	 event	 symbolized	 a	 political	 transition	 of	power	from	religion	to	science.46	In	this	way,	social	actions	embody	knowledge	and	thus	we	can	see	this	connection	between	discourse	and	the	real	world.		 So	while	texts,	speech,	and	other	forms	of	linguistics	often	set	the	scene	for	discursive	negotiations	of	and	struggles	over	meaning	structures,	discourse	also	manifests	in	signs	and	symbolic	actions	as	well,	in	addition	to	other	extra-linguistic	processes.47	Discourse	analysis,	then,	must	 also	 take	 into	 account	 ‘dispositives,’	 or	 “the	 totality	 of	 the	material,	 practical,	social,	 cognitive,	 or	 normative	 ‘infrastructure’	 in	 which	 a	 discourse	 develops.”48	 This	includes	 activities	 and	 materializations,	 such	 as	 research	 programs,	 professional	institutions,	media,	the	Internet,	television,	or	educational	systems.49	As	von	Stuckrad	noted,	
																																																						42	von	Stuckrad	(2013a),	10.	See	also	Jäger	(2001),	33:	“Discourse	analysis	[…]	aims	to	identify	knowledge	(valid	at	 a	 certain	 place	 at	 a	 certain	 time)	 of	 discourses	 […]	 to	 explore	 the	 respective	 concrete	 context	 of	knowledge/power	and	subject	it	to	critique.”	43	Wodak	(2001b),	9,	said	according	to	the	perspective	of	van	Leeuwen	(1993).	44	Jäger	(2001),	45.	45	Jäger	(2001),	48.	Cf.	Keller	(2011),	53–54,	who	described	discursive	events	as	the	material	form	of	which	discourse	appears.	46	Thomas,	Peck,	&	De	Haan	(2003),	387–388;	Flory	(2003),	401;	and	Smith	(2003b),	passim.	47	von	Stuckrad	(2003),	263–265;	and	Wodak	(2001b),	11.	48	von	Stuckrad	(2013a),	10.	On	dispositive	analysis,	see	Jäger	(2010);	and	Bührmann	&	Schneider	(2008).	For	more	 literature,	 see	 von	 Stuckrad	 (2013a).	 Jäger	 (2001),	 56–58,	 seems	 to	 hold	 a	 very	 different	 view	 of	dispositives	 than	 von	 Stuckrad,	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 triangulation	 between	 discursive	 practices,	 non-discursive	practices,	and	materializations.	Cf.,	also,	Keller	(2011),	56.	49	While	‘discursive	practices’	can	be	thought	of	as	“speaking	and	thinking	on	the	basis	of	knowledge,”	‘non-discursive	practices’	 include	acting	on	the	basis	of	knowledge,	while	 ‘materializations’	of	knowledge	are	the	product	of	acting/doing.	See	Jäger	(2001),	33.	
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“data	can	be	 found	 in	all	 forms	of	 communication	 that	are	operative	 in	 the	attribution	of	meaning.”50			




what	we	‘know’	is	based	on	our	perception	of	‘reality’	and	that	perception	is	based	on	what	we	‘know.’	“The	product	acts	back	upon	the	producer.”			 How	does	 this	 dialectic	 occur?	Berger	 and	Luckmann	argued,	 “Society	 is	 a	 human	product.	 Society	 is	 an	 objective	 reality.	 Man	 is	 a	 social	 product.”54	 The	 first	 statement,	“society	 is	 a	 human	 product,”	 means	 that	 human	 beings	 engage	 in	 activities,	 producing	objects—a	 house,	 for	 example—in	 a	 process	 known	 as	 ‘externalization,’	 since	 they	 are	externalizing	 their	 inner	 expressions	 into	 outer	 behaviors	 and	 objects,	 which	 make	 up	society.	Now	the	house,	once	built,	stands	on	its	own	so	to	speak,	existing	independently	of	the	people	who	built	it.	It	becomes	an	objective	reality	and	thus	is	known	as	‘objectification.’	This	house	becomes	a	 ‘frame	 for	human	activity.’55	The	architecture	and	 functions	of	 the	house,	for	instance,	direct	how	the	household	interacts	with	it.	The	house	becomes	a	center	of	 the	 family	 unit,	 a	 social	 gathering	 place,	 and	 is	 attributed	 loving	 and	 memorable	connotations,	for	example.	These	things	affect	the	people	living	in	it,	whereby	the	meaning	of	 the	 house	 becomes	 a	 subjective	 reality	 for	 its	 members,	 and	 thus	 is	 known	 as	‘internalization.’	This	 in	turn	affects	the	inhabitants’	expressions	and	actions,	 for	example	passing	on	the	‘family	house’	to	the	next	generation	or	turning	the	house	of	a	historical	figure	into	a	museum,	externalizing	the	house	anew,	and	thus	the	process	goes	full	circle.	It	is	an	ongoing,	reciprocal	process	whereby	society	 is	a	human	product	and	human	beings	are	a	product	of	society.			 The	sociology	of	knowledge	influenced	the	branches	of	study	known	as	the	sociology	of	science	and	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge,	which	make	many	of	the	same	claims	except	 that	 they	 take	 the	 observations	 of	 the	 sociology	 of	 knowledge	 to	 their	 logical	conclusion	 and	 apply	 it	 to	 the	 sciences,	 including	 logic,	 mathematics,	 and	 technology.56	Science	is	a	process	open	to	sociological	analysis	“to	no	lesser	degree	than	those	in	other	
																																																						54	Both	quotes	on	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966),	61.	55	Furseth	&	Repstad	(2006),	58.	56	See,	e.g.,	Varcoe	(2010),	517–519;	Tsekeris	(2010),	520–521;	and	Pinch	&	Bijker	(1984),	339–441.	Prior	to	the	 emergence	 of	 these	 fields,	 science	was	 often	 perceived	 as	 immune	 to	 social	 influence—in	 some	 sense	‘outside	of	society.’	See	Varcoe	(2010),	518;	and	Knorr-Cetina	(2005),	548.	Even	early	sociologists	of	knowledge	excluded	 the	 natural	 sciences	 from	 consideration,	 such	 as	 Karl	 Mannheim	 (1893–1947)	 and	 Max	 Scheler	(1874–1928).	See	Mannheim	(1936);	and	Scheler	(1924).	
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areas	of	social	life,”	as	well	as	open	to	discourse	analysis	and	the	methodology	I	propose	in	the	following	chapter.57		 If	 one	were	 examining	 ‘science’	 from	 this	 perspective,	 the	 focus	would	 be	 on	 the	‘negotiation’	of	scientific	knowledge	through	expressions	and	activities—for	example,	peer	review,	falsification,	writing	practices,	laboratory	standards,	etc.—through	which	a	scientific	‘object’	can	be	said	to	be	identified.58	The	pattern	of	these	activities	is	then	apprehended	as	‘science.’	 These	 practices	 are	 not	 purely	 objective	 and	 all	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 social	phenomena.	 ‘Truth’	 and	 ‘objectivity’	 are	 “managed”	 and	 “creatively	 enacted,”	 as	 well	 as	‘evidence’	 and	 ‘experiment.’59	 There	 is	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 ‘interpretive	 flexibility’	 in	determining	 the	 ‘results’	 of	 experiments,	 as	 “the	 closure	 which	 stabilizes	 ‘knowledge’	 is	brought	about	by	a	range	of	social	factors	rather	than	something	in	the	data.”60	‘Hard	facts’	do	not	escape	this	assessment,	which	are	regarded	as	“thoroughly	understandable	in	terms	of	 their	 social	 construction.”61	 Thus,	 scientific	 activities	 are	 better	 understood	 as	constructive,	rather	than	descriptive.62			 These	 patterns	 of	 activities	 develop	 into	 institutions,	 which	 are	 habitualizations	applied	to	actions	involving	social	relationships.63	Different	roles	involve	differential	access	to	and	distribution	of	the	social	stock	of	knowledge.	Knowledge	is	‘directed’	by	institutions	and	this,	moreover,	involves	a	level	of	social	control.	This	social	control	does	not	necessarily	take	the	form	of	mechanisms	or	a	system	of	control,	as	control	also	occurs	through	defining	in	the	first	place	whether	a	form	of	knowledge	is	regarded	as	a	legitimate	domain	of	inquiry	or	not.		
																																																						57	Knorr-Cetina	(2005),	547.	On	some	of	the	successes	of	the	sociological	approach	to	scientific	knowledge,	see	Shapin	(1982).	 I	do	not	discuss	religion	here,	as	social	 influence	 is	more	widely	known	and	accepted	in	the	study	of	religion.	For	an	introduction	to	the	sociology	of	religion,	see,	e.g.,	Turner	(2005).	58	Varcoe	(2010),	517–519.	59	Tsekeris	(2010),	520;	Shapin	(1994);	Harvey	(1981);	Restivo	(1983);	and	Daston	(1991).	60	Varcoe	(2010),	518.	61	 Latour	&	Woolgar	 (1986),	 107.	 See	 also	 Fleck	 (1979);	 and	 Poovey	 (1998).	 Replication	 of	 results	 is	 also	problematized,	as	this	depends	on	what	are	regarded	as	significant	variables	in	the	experiment.	See	Collins	&	Pinch	 (1998),	 11,	 25,	 98,	 and	 passim.	 The	 laboratory	 itself	 has	 also	 been	 analyzed	 as	 a	 social	 construct—formulated	as	a	theoretical	notion	rather	than	simply	a	physical	place	where	science	is	done.	E.g.,	 ‘nature’	is	modified	in	a	laboratory,	so	that	‘raw’	nature	is	not	even	confronted,	but	rather	transformed	into	miniaturized	and	 remodeled	 forms	 and	 thus	 is	 subject	 to	 ‘social	 overhauls.’	 See	 Knorr-Cetina	 (2005),	 549.	 On	 the	construction	of	knowledge	in	the	laboratory,	see	also	Knorr-Cetina	(1981).	62	See	Knorr	(1977);	Knorr-Cetina	(1981);	Latour	&	Woolgar	(1986);	and	Eriksson	(2010),	519.	63	The	Society	for	Social	Research	(n.d.).	
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Institutions	[…]	by	the	very	fact	of	their	existence,	control	human	conduct	by	setting	up	predefined	patterns	of	conduct,	which	channel	it	in	one	direction	against	the	many	other	directions	that	would	theoretically	be	possible	[…]	this	controlling	character	is	inherent	in	institutionalization	as	such.64		We	 can	 see	 this	 in	 the	 example	 of	 how	 habitualizations	 are	 maintained	 by	 social	relationships,	 involving	techniques	such	as	discrediting	(sometimes	eminent)	scientists—which	can	be	purely	based	on	social	factors—or	simply	the	intimidation	stemming	from	this	possibility	should	one	attempt	to	go	against	the	grain.65	“Quackery”	is	controlled	through	“a	whole	body	of	professional	knowledge	that	offers	them	‘scientific	proof’	of	the	folly	and	even	wickedness	of	such	deviance.”66	We	can	also	point	to	the	obvious	social	factors	involved	in	the	institutionalization	of	science,	such	as	funding	opportunities	determined	by	economic	interests	for	example,	and	political	influences,	such	as	policy	decisions	that	can	open	up	or	effectively	close	down	research	projects	like	stem	cell	research.	Other	actions	of	control	can	include	assertion	of	authority,	the	deployment	of	sanctions,	positive	reinforcement	through	recognition	 and	 awards,	 etc.	 “[Scientific]	 knowledge	 is	 dependent	 on,	 and	 shaped	by,	 the	contexts	in	which	it	is	created.”67		 ‘Knowledge,’	is	also	formulated	according	to	a	particular	worldview.	In	order	to	direct	knowledge,	institutions	must	supply	legitimization	for	doing	so.	“Legitimation	justifies	the	institutional	order	by	giving	a	normative	dignity	to	its	practical	imperatives.”	Legitimization	implies	 both	 knowledge	 and	 values.	 One	 way	 this	 is	 done	 is	 by	 placing	 the	 institution,	knowledge,	and	associated	actions	“in	a	comprehensively	meaningful	world.”68	Politics	and	governance,	for	example,	are	grounded	in	a	cosmic	order	of	power,	justice,	law,	etc.	In	the	same	way,	science	is	located	in	a	world	of	natural	knowledge,	truth,	and	order,	for	instance.69	
																																																						64	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966),	55.	65	Discrediting	of	scientific	results	also	sometimes	occurs	due	to	other	social	factors,	like	loss	of	interest	in	the	topic,	death	or	discrediting	of	investigators,	or	because	more	‘interesting,’	but	similar	issues	arise.	See	Knorr-Cetina	(2005),	551;	and	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966),	85–92.	66	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966),	88.		67	Eriksson	(2010),	519.	See	also	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966),	62.	On	the	relations	between	scientific	knowledge,	awards,	and	institutionalization,	see	Merton	(1968),	56;	Merton	(1973a);	and	Latour	&	Woolgar	(1986),	192–194.	68	Berger	&	Luckmann	(1966),	61,	92–97,	and	103.	69	On	the	legitimization	of	science	via	institutional	values,	see	Merton	(1973b).	Merton	finds	that	four	sets	of	institutional	 imperatives	 direct	 the	 scientific	 ethos:	 universalism,	 communism	 (meaning	 the	 collective	ownership	of	scientific	knowledge),	disinterestedness,	and	organized	skepticism.	See	ibid.,	270–278.	See	also	Merton	(1973a),	in	which	originality	is	also	emphasized.	How	expansive	the	influence	of	a	scientific	ethos	is	and	the	Mertonian	approach	in	general	have	been	challenged	by	several	individuals.	For	the	critiques	of	the	Mertonian	approach	and	several	references,	see	Cameron	&	Edge	(1979),	23	and	25–26	n.13.	
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Religion	is	sometimes	located	in	science’s	frame	of	reference	of	‘knowledge’	about	a	natural,	explicable	 world.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 would	 be	 inappropriate—a	 normative	statement—to	 treat	 religion	 as	 a	 source	 of	 supernatural	 knowledge.	 The	 ultimate	legitimization	 for	 how	 to	 treat	 religion	 ‘correctly’	 in	 the	 natural	world	 order	 is	 ‘located’	within	the	natural	cosmology	and	the	community	and	accompanying	practices	of	science.		 Knowledge	is	also	socially	controlled	via	the	ordering	of	history	that	occurs	within	symbolic	 universes,	 linking	 past,	 present,	 and	 future	 in	 a	 “meaningful	 totality.”70	 This	 is	particularly	evident	in	revisionist,	specifically	positivist,	history	of	science,	where	elements	of	the	‘occult’	and	‘superstitious’	practices	were	weeded	out	from	scientific	histories	or	at	the	least	differentiated	from	what	counts	as	‘science,’	even	though	to	do	so	is	to	distort	how	‘occult	 science’	 was	 viewed	 at	 the	 time—that	 is	 as	 ‘science’	 as	 such.71	 Science	 then	 is	sometimes	 represented	 as	 a	 red	 thread	 through	 time,	weaving	 and	winding	 around,	 but	ultimately	avoiding,	‘pseudoscience,’	thus	telling	a	tale	of	progress	and	truth.72	Needless	to	say,	this	tale	was	around	when	‘occult	science’	was	thought	of	as	‘science’	as	such	as	well.	The	 previously	 undifferentiated	 branches	 astronomy/astrology,	 alchemy/chemistry,	 etc.	came	 to	be	polemically	 separated	 through	 time.	And	 it	was	not	until	 the	period	between	about	1500	and	1800	that	there	was	an	increasing	articulation	of	‘true	science’	in	contrast	to	‘pseudoscience,’	thus	what	presently	falls	into	the	category	of	‘genuine	science’	is	historically	and	socially	situated	as	well.73	As	such,	the	sociology	of	knowledge	approach	to	discourse	analysis	can	show	the	processes	that	led	to	the	fundamental	distinction	between	religion	and	science	present	 in	many	 religion-science	 relationship	 theses.	 It	 can	also	demonstrate	 the	porous	 boundaries	 of	 concepts	 like	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science,’	 boundaries	 of	 which	 are	constructed	 via	 institutionalization,	 habitualizations,	 worldviews,	 and	 the	 ordering	 of	history.	It	shows	that	science	is	just	as	much	constructed	as	the	rest	of	society	and	open	for	analysis.	





Outline		Discourse	analysis	and	the	sociology	of	knowledge	confirm	the	mutable	boundaries	between	systems	 of	 knowledge.	 These	 perspectives	 provide	 a	 way	 to	 examine,	 in	 a	 highly	contextualized	and	socially	situated	discourse,	meanings	and	their	contingencies.	They	can	situate	discourse	stands	relative	to	a	larger	tapestry	of	meaning,	which	allows	for	historical	comparison.	All	of	these	factors	are	beneficial.	However,	there	are	some	challenges	to	these	approaches	as	well.	For	one,	despite	the	many	analytical	tools	discussed,	discourse	analysis	is	 commonly	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 research	 perspective,	 rather	 than	 a	 methodology,	 and	 the	sociology	of	knowledge	is	also	more	theory	than	method,	and	thus	we	still	need	some	further	direction	for	our	analysis	of	religion	and	science.74	Nonetheless,	as	this	work	will	examine	the	historical	 transformation	of	 discourses	of	 ‘religion’	 relative	 to	discourses	of	 ‘science,’	taking	 into	 account	 social	 factors	 in	discursive	 change,	 it	 can	 certainly	be	 situated	 in	 the	sociology	 of	 knowledge	 approach	 to	 historical	 discourse	 analysis,	 while	 also	 offering	 an	innovative	approach.	This	approach	is	relevant	to	the	second	major	challenge	to	discourse	analysis.	
																																																						74	 Berger	 &	 Luckmann	 (1966),	 14.	 Although	 there	 is	 more	 emphasis	 on	 perspective,	 various	 theoretical	approaches	 and	 methodologies	 have	 been	 proposed	 for	 these	 research	 programs.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Jäger	 (2001),	containing	 rather	 specific	 processes	 for	methodology	 and	 analysis;	 and	Wodak	 (2001a)	 for	 an	 alternative	approach	based	on	four	levels	of	context	analysis.	
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understand	the	how	of	meaning,	we	can	forget	the	definitions	of	words,	which	are	in	constant	flux	anyway.		In	the	following	chapter,	it	is	my	intent	to	first	justify	analyzing	relations	apart	from	the	relata—made	possible	via	a	perspective	known	as	‘relationalism.’	I	will	then	turn	to	how	relationalism	 can	 be	 utilized	 for	 analysis	 of	 meaning	 making.	 I	 will	 also	 discuss	 how	 a	relational	theory	and	method	provides	nuance	to	the	processes	of	discursive	change,	as	well	as	how	it	answers	the	challenges	of	definition.	Once	I	have	developed	a	relational	theory	and	method	in	Chapter	Two,	I	turn	to	the	question	of	‘how	have	discourses	of	the	term	“religion”	developed	relative	to	discourses	of	the	term	“science”	and	vice	versa?’	This	constitutes	a	sort	of	Foucauldian	genealogy,	but	differs	in	setting	relational	parameters	to	analyze	the	concepts	at	 hand.	While	 this	will	 be	 discussed	 in	much	more	 detail	 in	 the	 following	 chapter,	 it	 is	important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	 such	 an	 analysis	 is	 that	 it	 can	 explicate	 the	underlying	processes	of	meaning	attribution	in	the	development	of	discursive	change.	This	will	 involve	an	 in-depth	examination	of	 ‘relational	constructs’	 from	the	 third	 through	 the	eighth	chapter,	situated	in	specific	case	studies.	What	we	will	see	is	that	the	various	relational	constructs	unfold	in	a	dialogic	manner.	The	order	of	discussion	of	the	various	constructs	is	somewhat	 chronological,	 although	 there	 are	 some	 constructs	 that	 developed	contemporaneously.	 Thus,	 these	 chapters	 can	 also	 be	 read	 as	 an	 in-depth	 and	 critical	historical	 account	 of	 the	 development	 of	 perspectives	 on	 the	 religion-science	 relation.	 I	discuss	the	interdiscursive	and	historical	relations	among	the	various	relational	constructs,	putting	the	relational	constructs	in	perspective	and	discussing	continuities	and	change	in	the	intellectual	 trends	 involved.	 I	 examine	 context	 situated	 in	 the	 totality	 and	 bring	 to	 light	obscure,	 yet	 pervasive,	 ideologies.	 This	 includes	 explicating	 contending	 histories,	understudied	histories,	and,	 in	a	manner	of	speaking,	alternative	histories	of	the	religion-science	relation.			 The	concluding	chapter	will	critically	reflect	on	my	own	construct	of	relationalism	as	a	 product	 of	 relational	 construction,	 situating	 the	 perspective	 in	 the	 context	 of	 larger	intellectual	movements.	I	will	also	discuss	some	future	directions	for	research,	and	examine	the	wider	applicability	of	relationality	analysis	within	and	beyond	the	field	of	religion	and	science.		
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is	simply	that	we	can	make	‘relation’	itself	the	primary	object	of	analysis.	By	‘relation’	I	mean	a	qualifying	aspect	that	gives	expression	to	two	or	more	things	in	relative	perspective.	As	I	have	 been	 problematizing	 definitions,	 this	may	 seem	 self-contradictory.	 The	 philosopher	Jacques	Derrida	(1930–2004),	among	others,	argued	that	we	cannot	get	beyond	the	limits	of	language.	 However,	 the	 issue	 of	 language	 ever	 failing	 to	 transcend	 itself	 is	 based	 on	 the	notion	that	the	problem	is	language	itself.	Instead,	this	problem	can	be	resituated	into	the	conceptualization	 of	 language	 use.	 Language	 is	 perfectly	 capable	 of	 communicating	 new	conceptualizations.2	 As	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 problem	 of	 definition	 is	 a	problem	of	 focus	on	words	over	meaning.	Making	 relation	 the	primary	object	of	analysis	provides	 a	 means	 of	 ‘defining’	 terms	 based	 on	 their	 relational	 content	 that	 leaves	 the	specifics	open	and	yet	structured.	This	allows	us	to	discard	traditional	definitions	and	focus	on	how	concepts	develop	in	the	act	of	relation.	This	means	that	we	do	not	need	to	eliminate	the	use	of	definitions	entirely,	just	of	definitions	of	the	non-relational	kind,	which	involves	significant	changes	in	typical	language	use.	Relational	definitions	are	definitions	on	a	higher	level	 of	 abstraction,	 defining	 the	patterns	 in	which	definitions	 emerge,	 thus	 emphasizing	meaning	making	over	words.			 If	I	deny	inherent	meaning	and	the	existence	of	independent	concepts,	how	can	the	continued	use	of	the	terms	be	justified?	For	one,	justification	lies	in	the	fact	that	people	use	these	terms	and	thus	we	must	also	if	we	want	to	take	the	data	seriously.	The	intent	of	my	analysis	is	to	make	sense	of	how	these	terms	are	used	in	all	their	variety	and	transformations.	Still,	some	of	the	problems	of	language	are	continuous	and	unavoidable.	When	I	use	the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘science’	it	can	appear	at	times	that	these	are	independent	concepts.	However,	using	them	as	such	 is	a	means	to	show	how	the	terms	are	relationally	entangled.	We	can	conceptualize	 this	 relational	 language	 use	 by	 putting	 it	 in	 relative	 perspective	 to	 non-relational	 use.3	 The	 continued	 use	 of	 essentially	 misleading	 terminology	 can	 still	 make	
																																																						2	 Derrida,	 and	 his	 follower	 Paul	 de	 Man	 (1919–1983),	 argued	 that	 texts	 always	 ‘deconstruct’	 themselves,	meaning	that	language	use	subverts	the	content	of	what	is	being	attempted	to	communicate.	See	Rorty	(1995),	172–173.	However,	if	the	failure	to	achieve	its	ends	can	be	detected,	then	there	must	be	some	understanding	of	what	those	ends	were	in	order	to	identify	failure.	This	means	that	there	must	be	understanding,	not	failure,	making	it	a	self-refuting	position.	3	In	the	concluding	chapter,	I	will	put	the	theory	in	perspective	relative	to	other	dominant	modes	of	intellectual	thought	 and	 discuss	 conceptualizing	 the	 underlying	 theory	 of	 ‘relationalism’	 in	 a	 relational	way	 (i.e.,	 as	 in	contrast	 to	 non-relational	 ways	 of	 thinking).	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 theory	 accounts	 for	 itself	 by	 showing	 that	relationalism	is	itself	relationally	constructed.	
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meaningful	contributions,	by	demonstrating	a	different	perspective.	 In	ordinary	 language	use,	 the	 terms	 are	 primarily	 used	 as	 independent	 concepts.	 And	 we	 must	 use	 this	 as	 a	departure	point	to	explain	an	alternative	perspective.	For	example,	to	explain	religion	and	science	as	non-distinct	in	the	medieval	worldview,	we	have	to	take	note	that	the	two	terms	were	 conceived	 as	 one,	 even	 though	 this	 formulation	 is	 historically	 inaccurate.	 The	description	of	‘religion	and	science	as	one’	is	actually	a	fact	(as	per	our	perspective)	that	is	completely	 obscure	 to	 medieval	 thinkers,	 exactly	 because	 they	 were	 not	 distinct.	 The	phraseology	is	for	the	benefit	of	our	perspective	to	conceptualize	alternative	perspectives,	not	 to	 claim	 that	 ‘religion	 and	 science	 as	 one’	was	 how	 the	 historical	 actors	would	 have	described	 their	 own	 activity.	 Rather,	 medieval	 thinkers	 would	 not	 even	 apply	 such	categories.	 However,	 we	 cannot	 demonstrate	 this	 to	 our	 own	 perspectives	 without	entangling	what	we	today	understand	as	distinct	domains	‘religion’	and	’science.’	Thus,	by	the	 very	 nature	 of	 discussing	 alternative	 perspectives,	 a	 utilization	 of	 terms	 regarded	 as	ultimately	misleading	must	still	be	used.	But	by	bringing	this	awareness	to	language	use,	new	approaches	can	be	explained.			 From	a	relational	perspective,	concepts	can	no	longer	be	conceptualized	independent	of	 one	 another.	 To	 describe	 such	 a	 thing,	 though,	 requires	 juxtaposing	 the	 terms	 use	 as	independent	concepts	to	relational	concepts,	explained	via	contrast	to	ordinary	use.	This	is	to	relationalize	the	relational	use	of	language	relative	to	non-relational	usage.	This	is	much	like	 the	above	example	of	explaining	medieval	 religion-science	non-distinction	 to	current	day	thinkers.	Any	way	that	relational	conceptualization	can	be	described	must	depart	from	an	understanding	of	how	the	terms	are	primarily	taken	in	a	non-relational	manner.	This	is	not	a	necessary	evil;	it	is	just	necessary	when	we	consider	that	all	is	situated	in	perspective.	Rather	than	treating	it	as	something	to	avoid,	we	need	to	embrace	what	this	perspectivalism	is	telling	us	about	the	nature	of	meaning	making	and	use	it	to	our	analytical	advantage.	And	what	 it	 tells	 us	 about	meaning	making	 is	 that	 discursive	 change	 is	 through	 a	 process	 of	comparison	and	contrast	to	pre-established	meanings,	whether	it	 is	between	religion	and	science	or	a	relational	and	non-relational	perspective.		 Details	of	 relational	definitions	and	 the	 relational	 construction	of	 concepts	will	be	discussed	extensively	in	this	chapter,	however	first	I	will	turn	to	the	most	common	objection	to	making	relation	the	primary	object	of	analysis.	It	is	frequently	argued	that	relationship	is	
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derived	from	the	relata	and	thus	it	 is	not	possible	to	analyze	relation	independent	of	that	which	 is	 being	 related.	 However,	 I	 contend	 that	 relations	 are	 basic	 and	 relata	 are	derivative—a	perspective	known	as	‘relationalism,’	which	constitutes	the	underlying	theory	of	 this	work.	Even	 if	 I	cannot	convince	the	reader	of	 this	point,	 it	 is	only	necessary	that	 I	establish	 the	 lesser	 claim	 that	 a	 relational	 perspective	 has	 merit	 for	 discourse	 analysis,	specifically	that	relations	contribute	to	the	construction	of	concepts.	After	expounding	on	this	 theoretical	 framework,	 I	 will	 turn	 to	 relationality	 analysis—the	 methodology	 of	analyzing	relations	as	primary	and	relata	as	derivative.			 Before	 turning	 to	 this	 task,	 a	 tangent	 on	 terminology	 is	 in	 order.	 What	 is	‘relationalism’?	There	 is	no	unified	 idea	of	 ‘relationalism,’	but	 rather	 the	 term	refers	 to	a	general	theoretical	position	in	which	relations	are	primary.	This	could	include	one	or	all	of	the	 following	 assertions:	 relations	 are	 the	 basic	 building	 blocks	 of	 reality,	 existentially	and/or	 structurally;	 the	 identity	and	properties	of	 entities	are	defined	by	 their	 relations;	knowledge	 is	 enabled	 by	 relating	 objects/concepts;	 and	 cognizance	 of	 beings	 arises	 by	relational	 perception,	 in	 a	 dichotomous	 fashion	 of	 ‘this’	 and	 ‘not	 this.’4	 I	 use	 the	 term	‘relationalism’	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 theory	 that	 relations	 generate	 meaning	 and	 ‘independent’	concepts	(i.e.,	the	relata)	emerge	in	the	act	of	relation.	As	regards	discourse	analysis	and	the	sociology	of	knowledge,	this	means	that	the	relational	configuration	of	concepts	structures	the	construction	of	knowledge	and	discursive	change.	Which	relational	construct	applied	is	determined	by	discourse,	society,	and	history,	but	how	the	concepts	in	question	generate	and	change	meaning	are	in	a	relational	perspective.		 Based	on	my	proposed	definition,	I	could	limit	the	discussion	to	relational	theories	of	meaning,	 but	 I	 think	 the	 argument	 carries	 more	 weight	 when	 we	 look	 at	 relational	metaphysics	as	well,	since	such	a	position	supports	the	view	that	it	is	possible	to	identify	an	entity	based	on	relations	alone.	








relation	itself	as	the	relation	between	Being	and	beings.	Put	differently,	we	might	say	that	relation	is	thought	of	as	the	very	thing	that	connects	them,	all	relata	aside.	In	contrast,	in	the	history	of	Western	philosophy,	identity	is	typically	thought	of	as	unity	of	a	thing	with	itself.	But,	from	Heidegger’s	perspective,	identity	is	a	relation	of	belonging	together,	meaning	“the	relation	first	determines	the	manner	of	being	of	what	is	to	be	related	and	the	how	of	this	relation.”11		 For	centuries	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	entities	have	been	regarded	as	basic	and	relations	 as	 derivative,	 dating	 back	 to	 Plato	 (ca.	 428–347	 BCE)	 and	 on	 through	 Gottfried	Wilhelm	von	Leibniz	(1646–1716),	among	others.12	Aristotle	(384–322	BCE),	 for	example,	suggested	 that	 relations	are	 simply	ways	of	 talking	about	what	 is	ultimately	 reducible	 to	basic	entities	or	their	monadic	properties.13	Put	simply,	the	thought	is	that	there	must	be	a	distinct	 and	 identifiable	 ‘thing’	 first	 before	 this	 thing	 can	 ‘enter	 into’	 relations,	 making	relations	secondary.	In	analytical	metaphysics,	for	long	the	strongest	current	centered	on	the	assertion	that	there	exist	basic	entities	that	‘have’	properties,	while	the	issue	of	what	is	the	basic	structure	of	these	properties	and	of	relations	had	not	been	given	as	much	attention	in	the	past.	However,	these	issues	cannot	be	ignored,	as	the	idea	of	entities	being	basic	has	been	extremely	problematic—the	main	issue	in	philosophy	being	what	are	the	 individuals	that	have	properties	and	how	are	they	individuated?14	This	brings	us	back	to	the	questions	raised	in	relational	metaphysics.	Moreover,	if	things	are	the	basic	units	of	reality,	how	can	relations	be	‘between’	them?	It	is	impossible	for	relations	to	lay	between	realities,	for	relations	must	either	 be	 nothing	 or	 be	 realities	 themselves.	 And	 if	 relations	 are	 realities	 it	 cannot	 be	
																																																						11	Quote	on	Heidegger	(1969),	12.	Quote	by	Stambaugh	in	the	introduction	of	Heidegger’s	work.	See	also	ibid.,	8.	12	Although	Leibniz	 did	 give	 a	 crucial	 role	 to	 relations,	 he	 still	 viewed	 them	as	 reducible	 to	 the	 relata.	 See	Rescher	(2013),	68–91,	esp.	71–76.	Nonetheless,	Leibniz	is	often	credited	with	certain	observations	that	led	to	relational	metaphysics.	See	Oliver	(1981),	18–24.	13	 Dipert	 (1997),	 348–349.	 Though	 Aristotle	 believed	 that	 relations	 were	 secondary,	 he	 still	 attributed	importance	to	them	in	the	conceptualization	of	phenomena.	For	instance,	Aristotle	argued	that	“Comparison	and	 definition,	 not	 similitude,	 described	 nature	 exhaustively	 and	 unambiguously.”	 Aristotle	 suggested	 an	exhaustive	 definition	 required	 “the	 identification	 of	 the	 closest	 genus	 and	 the	 specific	 difference.”	 See	Funkenstein	(1986),	35.	On	the	classical	conception	of	relations,	see	Cavarnos	(1975).	On	later	conceptions	of	relations,	see	Oliver	(1981),	101–130.	On	a	philosophical	explanation	of	properties,	see	Swoyer	&	Orilia	(2015).	14	Dipert	(1997),	331–332,	335–337,	and	349.	For	issues	of	individuating	entities	based	on	properties,	see	also	Lowe	(2009).	On	the	same	issue,	explicitly	addressed	in	reference	to	relational	metaphysics,	see	Zaidi	(1973),	412–437.	
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between	 things,	 but	 must	 be	 a	 thing	 itself.15	 These	 problems	 have	 given	 momentum	 to	relational	views.		 Already	in	1903,	philosopher,	logician,	mathematician,	and	Nobel	laureate	Bertrand	Russell	 (1872–1970)	made	a	convincing	argument	 that	 relational	 terms	are	 ineliminable,	which	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 relations	 are,	 at	 least	 possibly,	 ontologically	 fundamental.16	Further	 substantiating	 this	 view,	 philosopher	 and	 logician	 of	 relations	 Randall	 R.	 Dipert	argued	that	the	distinctness	of	relata	can	be	established	via	relations	alone.17	This	means	that	what	is	basic	need	not	be	monadic	and	strongly	supports	the	view	that	likely	nothing	basic	is	monadic,	but	rather	dyadic	relations	are	“necessary	and	sufficient	for	describing	the	structure	 of	 the	world.”	 It	may	 seem	 counterintuitive,	 but	 a	 small	 example	may	 serve	 to	restore	intuition.	Dipert	stated,	“to	perceive	an	object,	to	consider	a	thing	as	an	object,	is	to	notice	 or	 attribute	 contrasts	 of	 various	 perceivable	 ‘properties’	 against	 a	 background.”18	Dipert	 used	 the	 example	 of	 an	 apple.	We	 identify	 ‘apple’	 based	 on	 its	 outline	against	 its	surroundings,	based	on	its	redness	compared	with	the	green	grass,	and	on	its	separability,	as	we	 can	 move	 it	 from	 the	 tree.	 Contrast,	 comparison,	 and	 separability	 are	 relational	phenomena.	From	this	perspective,	relata	arise	due	to	‘bi-perspectival	viewing,’	a	perception	of	a	relation	 that	naturally	 lends	 itself	 to	bifurcation	 in	 the	perceiving	process.19	 In	other	words,	if	one	inspects	a	relation,	then	‘this’	and	‘not	this’	become	manifest.	While	we	perceive	the	apple	and	the	tree	as	independent	relata,	that	perception	is	contingent	on	bi-perspectival	viewing	or	‘relationalization,’	as	I	refer	to	it.	Furthermore,	what	properties	are	assigned	will	depend	on	what	is	cast	in	relief.	For	instance,	if	an	apple	is	held	to	a	mirror,	then	‘shiny’	will	not	be	a	likely	candidate	for	description,	while	an	apple	on	a	dirt	floor	may	provoke	such	a	portrayal.	It	is	the	same	for	many	of	our	analytical	terms,	like	‘religion’	and	‘science,’	which	are	understood	in	terms	of	their	relational	stance.	
																																																						15	Zaidi	(1973),	417;	and	Heil	(2012),	139–141.	16	Russell	(1903),	218–226;	and	Heil	(2012),	135–137.	17	Dipert	(1997),	349.	Other	important	contributors	to	the	development	of	this	theory	are	Ludwig	Feuerbach	(1804–1872),	Martin	Buber	(1878–1965),	and	Syed	Zaidi.	See	Oliver	(1981),	133–151,	for	a	discussion	of	these	individuals	and	their	contributions	to	relational	metaphysics,	as	well	as	references	to	the	relevant	literature.	18	Quotes	on	Dipert	 (1997),	339	and	350.	Emphasis	original.	For	 further	development	of	Dipert’s	 ideas	and	notions	related	to	relational	metaphysics,	see	Bird	(2007),	esp.	138–145.	As	a	challenge	to	the	view	of	graphical	structuralism	(of	Dipert	and	Bird),	see	Oderberg	(2011).	In	response	to	Oderberg,	see	Shackel	(2011).	19	Oliver	(1981),	156–157.	
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thinking—thinking	reducible	to	the	relational	roles	of	things,	rather	than	the	properties	of	those	things—has	been	argued	to	be	a	basic	feature	of	perception	and	cognition	or	even	the	very	foundation	of	human	thought,	acting	as	a	building	block	for	more	complex	reasoning	abilities.40	In	the	psychology	of	language	and	cognition,	such	as	in	relational	frame	theory	for	example,	there	is	also	the	observation	that	“derived	stimulus	relations	constitute	the	core	of	verbal	 behavior.	Verbal	 behavior	 is	 the	 action	 of	 framing	 events	 relationally”	 and	 “Verbal	
stimuli	are	stimuli	that	have	their	effects	because	they	participate	in	relational	frames.”41			 From	metaphysics	 to	cognitive	science,	 relationalism	 is	on	 the	rise.	Still,	 relational	metaphysics	 is	 far	 from	 producing	 a	 consensus	 in	 the	 field.42	 And	 there	 are	 numerous	theories	of	cognition	and	semantics.	Furthermore,	I	am	not	suggesting	that	these	individuals	and	the	philosophies	discussed	here	support	my	view	of	relationalism	exactly.	Rather	I	am	showing	how	relationalism	captures	the	mood	of	the	age	by	thinking	about	the	world	in	a	certain	way.	The	main	point	here	is	that	we	need	not	identify	the	properties/variables	of	the	realities,	 knowledge	 systems,	 and	 concepts	we	 are	 discussing	 in	 order	 to	 say	 something	meaningful	 and	 analyzable	 about	 them.	 We	 can	 forget	 the	 entities,	 the	 properties,	 the	‘beings,’	and	instead	examine	relations	themselves.	One	need	not	be	convinced	on	the	point	of	the	ontological	primacy	of	relations	to	entertain	the	idea	of	relata	as	derivative.	And	one	need	not	sympathize	with	this	view	either	to	grant	nonetheless	that	relations	can	contribute	to	the	construction	of	concepts.			
																																																						40	Andrews	&	Halford	(2002);	Gentner	&	Rattermann	(1998);	Goswami	(2001);	and	Goswami	&	Brown	(1990).	See	also	Krawczyk	(2012),	15.	To	provide	some	specific	examples,	relational	thinking	has	been	found	to	be	the	cornerstone	of	the	ability	to	comprehend	visual	scenes;	to	learn	and	implement	rules;	comprehend	analogies	between	things,	situations,	and	knowledge	systems;	to	understand	and	engage	in	language,	science,	art,	and	mathematics;	 and	 to	 detect	 basic	 perceptual	 similarities.	 Biederman	 (1987);	 Green	 &	 Hummel	 (2004);	Anderson	&	 Lebiere	 (1998);	 Lovett	 &	 Anderson	 (2005);	 Gentner	 (1983);	 Gentner	 (1989);	 Gick	 &	Holyoak	(1980);	Gick	&	Holyoak	(1983);	Holyoak	&	Thagard	(1995);	and	Medin,	Goldstone,	&	Gentner	(1993).	Relational	thinking	 has	 also	 been	 found	 to	 be	 the	 foundation	 of	 progress	 from	 similarity-based	 to	 structure-based	cognition.	See	Gentner	(2003);	Gentner	&	Rattermann	(1991);	and	Halford	(2005).	41	Hayes,	Barnes-Holmes,	&	Roche	(2001),	43–44.	Emphasis	original.	42	 On	 the	 lack	 of	 consensus,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Ainsworth	 (2010).	 Moreover,	 relational	 metaphysics	 remains	underdeveloped.	 Few	 philosophers	 have	 dealt	 with	 the	 ideas.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Russell	 (1903);	 Russell	 (1984);	Bergmann	(1992);	Hochberg	(1987);	Fine	(2000);	Fine	(2007);	MacBride	(2007);	and	Leo	(2008).	
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2.1 Terminology	As	for	the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘science,’	the	question	of	their	meaning	is	exactly	what	will	be	unpacked	throughout	this	work.	Throughout	the	remainder	of	this	research,	when	I	refer	to	‘religion,’	I	mean	the	term	or	concept	‘religion’	and	usually	nothing	more,	since	I	treat	terms	as	inherently	empty.	The	same	goes	for	‘science.’	I	have	no	definitions	in	mind	other	than	the	concepts	 themselves,	with	one	exception.	The	only	 framework	 for	demarcating	the	terms	under	consideration	will	be	done	in	a	relational	setting,	such	that	how	‘religion’	is	related	to	‘science’	and	vice	versa	constitute	the	parameters	for	the	meaning	of	the	terms	in	question.	Any	exceptions	to	this	relational	usage	will	be	noted.	Such	parameters	create	what	we	might	call	a	‘relational	definition’	that	is	strictly	‘other-referential.’	‘Religion’	means	‘that	which	the	term/concept	“religion”	means	relative	to	the	term/concept	“science”’;	and	‘science’	means	‘that	which	“science”	means	relative	to	“religion.”’	Relational	definitions	are	monistic	in	that	the	two	concepts	are	always	treated	as	a	unit,	meaning	that	if	something	is	said	of	science,	it	necessarily	speaks	of	religion	as	well.	This	also	means	that	a	change	in	relations	is	a	change	in	what	is	related.	This	is	not	to	define	the	terms’	relationship	to	one	another,	but	rather	this	is	the	terms	relationally	defined.			 Still,	 if	within	 the	relevant	data	 ‘religion’	 is	 likened	to	 ‘theology’	or	 ‘morals,’	 then	I	consider	that	fair	game.	Whatever	is	interpreted	as	‘religion’	or	‘science’	is	what	I	will	refer	to	as	‘religion’	or	‘science.’	For	instance,	in	the	following	chapter	I	state,	“By	the	1830s,	there	was	 increasing	discontent	about	 the	usage	of	 the	word	 ‘science,’	and	several	 intellectuals	voiced	their	opinions	that	the	word	should	exclude	morals,	theology,	and	other	terms	related	to	 religious	 considerations.”	 What	 I	 mean	 by	 ‘religious	 considerations’	 is	 those	 things	identified	as	religious	by	these	intellectuals,	which	in	this	case	included	morals	and	theology,	among	other	things.	Put	differently,	what	is	considered	‘religion’	is	that	which	the	sources	link	 to	 the	 terms	 ‘religion/religious,’	 relative	 to	 science,	 here	 specifically	 as	 ‘that	 which	excludes	 science.’	 This	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 tacit	 definition,	 but	 of	 explicit	 discursive	construction,	which	will	become	clear	in	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies.	
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	 Throughout	this	work,	 I	will	often	speak	of	 ‘signifiers’	of	religion	and	of	science.	A	‘signifier’	is	what	is	interpreted	within	the	source	material	as	describing	or	defining	‘religion’	or	 ‘science’	 in	a	specific	 instance,	with	the	above	quote	suggesting	 ‘morals’	and	 ‘theology’	signify	 religion	 since	 the	 texts	 themselves	 draw	 these	 connections.	 Signifiers	 could	 be	anything,	 as	meaning	 is	 fluid.	 Just	 as	with	 the	 signified	 terms	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science,’	 all	signifiers	are	constructed	relationally	and	thus	when	I	refer	to	something	as	a	signifier	of	science,	for	instance,	that	is	not	to	say	this	is	the	definition	of	science	in	my	analysis.	I	am	making	the	claim	that	this	is	what	is	understood	as	representative	of	science	in	the	context	of	my	data,	even	though	it	is	not	always	explicit	in	some	instances.	For	example,	within	the	argument	that	religion	can	be	science-like	because	religion	is	natural	is	also	the	implicit	claim	that	‘natural’	signifies	science.	If	‘natural’	were	not	thought	to	signify	science,	the	argument	would	be	nonsensical.	Signifiers	help	us	determine	how	terms	are	relationally	constructed,	as	in	the	case	here,	‘religion	as	natural’	suggests	religion	is	likened	to	science.	It	is	important	to	keep	 in	mind,	however,	 that	when	 I	 refer	 to	 signifiers,	 they	will	 vary	 from	example	 to	example	and	we	are	not	so	much	interested	in	the	signifiers	themselves	as	what	they	tell	us	about	the	religion-science	relation.	Nonetheless,	some	signifiers	are	particularly	salient	in	the	discourse	and	their	recurrences	are	notable,	as	will	be	discussed.		 	‘Relationship’	refers	to	connections	between	things.	I	will	use	the	term	‘relationship’	from	time	to	time	to	refer	to	how	others	perceive	the	religion-science	interaction.	However,	I	 am	 primarily	 interested	 in	 describing	 ‘relational	 constructs,’	 a	 term	 I	 use	 to	 refer	 to	qualifying	aspects	that	give	expression	to	two	concepts	in	relative	perspective.	Relationships	compare	pre-established	meaning;	relational	constructs	establish	meaning	as	it	arises	in	the	act	 of	 putting	 concepts	 in	 relative	 perspective,	 or	what	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 ‘relationalization’	 or	‘relational	construction.’	Sometimes	I	refer	to	the	religion-science	‘relation’	as	a	short	hand	way	 of	 referring	 to	 religion	 and	 science	 in	 relative	 perspective.	 I	 prefer	 to	 use	 the	 term	‘relation’	over	‘relationship’	in	most	cases	in	order	to	emphasize	process	over	stasis.			 To	 relationalize,	 one	 must	 engage	 in	 particular	 ‘relational	 processes.’	 ‘Relational	constructs’	 refer	 to	 relatively	 stable	 (though	 contingent)	 structures,	 while	 ‘relational	processes’	refer	to	more	 fluid	actions.	By	 ‘relational	processes’	 I	mean	to	make	the	relata	different	or	alike.	I	will	refer	to	‘differentiation,’	in	the	strict	sense	of	‘to	make	different,’	and	‘liken’	as	‘to	make	similar,’	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	constructive	aspect	of	the	action.	
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Put	differently,	differentiating	and	likening	are	not	to	observe	differences	and	similarities,	but	to	create	them.	The	relevant	differentiations	and	likenings	mainly	include	to	make	unlike	religion,	 to	 make	 unlike	 science,	 to	 make	 religion-like,	 and	 to	 make	 science-like.	 Since	‘religion’	and	‘science’	are	fluid	terms,	I	do	not	mean	to	say	that	to	make	‘science-like,’	for	instance,	will	be	done	in	the	same	way,	as	what	‘science’	means	will	change	in	these	acts	of	comparison	and	contrast.	To	make	‘science-like’	is	really	about	a	claim	to	the	name	and	so	the	definition	of	science	will	vary	in	most	cases.	This	is	because	a	relational	process	is	not	to	make	science-like	so	much	as	the	process	of	making	science	(or	religion).		 The	 relational	 constructs	 include	 ‘mutual	 exclusivity’—religion	 and	 science	 as	 a	mutually	exclusive	dichotomy;	 ‘inclusivity’—religion	and	science	as	a	non-exclusive,	non-oppositional	pair;	 ‘identity’—religion	as	reductively	identical	to	science	or	vice	versa;	and	‘representation’—a	 non-reductive	 similarity	 between	 religion	 and	 science.	 Degrees	 of	commonality	aside,	it	is	either	the	case	that	religion	and	science	are	the	same	or	different,	conceptually	speaking.	If	different,	their	difference	most	often	appears	in	the	discourse	as	either	 oppositional	 (mutual	 exclusivity)	 or	 non-oppositional	 (inclusivity).	 If	 they	 are	 the	same,	 they	 are	 usually	 constructed	 as	 either	 reductively	 the	 same	 (identity)	 or	 non-reductively	similar	(representation).	These	constructs	can	overlap	in	important	ways	that	lead	to	new	constellations	of	meaning,	as	I	will	discuss.			 These	 constructs	 are	 not	 exhaustive.	 But	 I	 cannot	 go	 into	 detail	 about	 additional	relational	processes	and	constructs	here.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	relationality	analysis	could	also	look	at	triadic	relations	and	the	role	of	super-	and	sub-ordinated	concepts.	I	chose	to	focus	on	 these	 processes	 and	 constructs,	 as	 upon	 examining	 how	 discourses	 of	 ‘religion’	 have	evolved	relative	to	discourses	of	‘science,’	I	found	that	these	constructs	constitute	the	most	salient	ways	that	religion	and	science	have	been	relationalized,	though	the	representation	construct	in	particular	has	had	little	treatment	by	scholars.	I	also	chose	to	focus	on	these	four	constructs	since,	as	some	of	the	most	basic	constructs,	they	provide	some	first	steps	in	the	development	of	a	relational	methodology.	I	want	to	make	clear	that	the	relationality	analysis	offered	here	 is	not	meant	 to	be	definitive,	but	 rather	 reflects	 the	way	 that	 a	 theoretician	might	proceed	in	finding	an	alternative	to	the	traditional	definitional	approach.		
Forgetting	Beings	
	 38	
Now	that	I	have	discussed	the	most	relevant	terminology,	 I	will	demonstrate	what	relationality	analysis	entails	by	providing	an	overview	of	the	case	studies.	The	point	of	the	case	studies	is	to	show	how	relationality	analysis	is	applied	in	order	to	test	the	method	and	theory	 that	 I	 propose	 here.	 Being	 an	 overview,	 I	 will	 speak	 in	 some	 generalities	 below,	though	everything	will	be	discussed	and	demonstrated	in	much	more	detail	throughout	the	remaining	 chapters.	 The	 overview	 also	 acts	 as	 a	 reader’s	 guide	 in	 that	 the	 thrust	 of	 the	individual	chapters	is	much	clearer	from	the	perspective	of	the	work	as	a	whole.		Each	case	study	has	a	focus	on	one	of	the	four	relational	constructs	listed	above.	A	conversation	of	sorts	can	be	seen	between	these	constructs	that	enables	the	identification	of	how	we	get	 from	one	 to	 the	other,	 that	 is,	how	relational	 constructs	 structure	discursive	change.	This	means	that	each	chapter	provides	a	crucial	piece	to	the	overall	argument.		









2.3 Identity		Now	with	 the	 concepts	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 clearly	 differentiated,	 comparison	 became	possible.	If	my	hypothesis	that	relational	constructs	structure	discursive	change	is	correct,	then	we	would	expect	that	to	make	‘science-like’	in	the	act	of	comparison	will	reflect	what	‘science’	means	in	the	context	of	the	relational	construct	of	mutual	exclusivity	and	that	the	same	will	go	for	 ‘religion.’	And	that	 is	exactly	what	we	see	occur.	Religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	and	the	likening	of	religion	and	science	employ	the	exact	same	signifiers,	listed	above	 like	 naturalism/supernaturalism	 and	 rationalism/superstition	 and	 these	 signifiers	retain	their	relational	content	as	oppositional	dichotomies.			 The	signifiers	only	effectively	liken	religion	and	science	because	they	were	once	used	to	differentiate	religion	and	science.	For	instance,	if	religion	and	science	are	considered	in	opposition	 because	 of	 a	 supernaturalism-naturalism	 dichotomy,	 then	 to	 counter	 the	argument,	 religion	 can	 be	 constructed	 as	 natural	 to	 liken	 it	 with	 scientific	 ideas.	 This	 is	simply	and	only	because	naturalism	is	already	framed	as	a	defining	feature	of	science	and	of	religion-science	 opposition.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 pre-existing	 relational	 construct	 sets	 the	parameters	for	discursive	change.			 Mutual	exclusivity	not	only	provides	the	signifiers	of	which	to	work	with,	it	also	gives	rise	 to	 how	 this	 likening	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 will	 be	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 new	relational	construct.	Since	religion	and	science	are	taken	as	opposites,	to	make	the	two	alike	will	 in	 this	 case	 lead	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 it	 excludes	 the	other	domain	and	one	will	be	reduced	 to	 the	 other.	 Such	 a	 reduction	 to	 a	 single	 framework	 of	 meaning	 can	 only	 be	conceptually	 coherent	 if	 one	 grants	 that	 the	 two	 frameworks	 in	 question	 are	 mutually	
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exclusive,	 otherwise	 the	multiplicity	of	narratives	would	 remain	 intact.52	Thus,	 reduction	breaches	the	relational	construct	of	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity,	while	at	the	same	time	reinforcing	it.			 In	the	case	of	the	identity	construct,	‘religion’	is	relationally	defined	as	‘nothing	more	than	science,’	reducible	to	scientific	frameworks	of	meaning.	‘Science,’	in	turn,	is	relationally	defined	as	reducibly	‘religion.’	According	to	this	relational	construct,	one	concept	can	explain	away	 the	 other,	 so	 that	 the	 secondary	 concept	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 the	 primary	 one.	Whether	‘religion’	or	‘science’	acts	as	the	primary	framework	of	meaning	results	in	two	very	different	views,	thus	I	propose	two	subcategories—the	‘scientification	of	religion’	and	the	‘religionization	 of	 science.’	 I	 sometimes	 refer	 to	 ‘scientificated	 religion’	 and	 ‘religionized	science,’	respectively,	to	express	‘religion’	and	‘science’	as	per	the	identity	construct.53	I	will	discuss	 each	 of	 these	 subcategories	 in	 turn	 before	 turning	 to	 the	 third	 major	 relational	construct	of	representation.		 	
2.3.1 The	Scientification	of	Religion	Von	Stuckrad	described	 the	 ‘scientification	of	 religion’	 as	 “The	discursive	organization	of	knowledge	 about	 religion	 in	 secular	 environments.”	 I	 further	 limit	 it	 to	 the	 framework	outlined	above—that	is,	religion	reductively	constructed	as	a	scientific	object.	One	reason	for	doing	so	is	because,	as	von	Stuckrad	noted,	according	to	his	view	of	the	scientification	of	religion,	one	could	also	speak	of	the	‘religionization	of	science’	to	refer	to	the	same	process.	I	would	 like	 to	differentiate	between	 these	processes.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 scientification	of	religion	 and	 the	 religionization	 of	 science	 involve	 the	 same	discursive	 entanglements,	 as	noted	by	von	Stuckrad,	as	both	the	terms	‘scientification’	or	‘religionization’	indicate	a	re-
																																																						52	That	is	not	to	say	that	it	is	always	the	case	that	reduction	is	structured	by	mutual	exclusivity.	For	instance,	both	 religion	 and	 science	 could	 be	 reduced	 under	 a	 super-ordinated	 concept	 like	 knowledge,	 making	 the	relational	construction	of	religion-to-science	a	unique	one.	However,	in	the	cases	examined,	what	we	see	is	that	mutual	exclusivity	is	used	to	justify	reduction,	exemplified	in	such	arguments	as	 ‘since	religion	is	natural,	 it	cannot	be	supernatural,	therefore	everything	there	is	to	religion	is	accounted	for	by	science.’	In	this	generalized	argument,	mutual	exclusivity	is	structuring	the	discursive	change	to	the	identity	construct.	If	one	does	take	a	mutually	exclusive	position	and	likens	religion	and	science,	then	reductionism	will	necessarily	result.	53	As	a	side	note,	I	sometimes	use	‘scientification’	as	a	shorthand	way	to	refer	to	the	‘scientification	of	religion,’	‘exclusivity’	for	‘religion-science	mutual	exclusivity,’	etc.	However,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	for	purposes	of	future	directions	of	research	that	these	constructs	are	not	restricted	to	their	relations	with	religion,	as	we	will	see	particularly	in	the	last	chapter.	A	relational	analysis	could	be	applied	to	any	two	terms	so	long	as	they	have	some	history	of	being	understood	relative	to	one	another.	
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constellation	of	religion	and	science	relative	to	one	another.54	However,	the	scientification	of	 religion	 and	 the	 religionization	of	 science	 could	 also	 be	used	 to	 express	 asymmetrical	relationships	between	these	discourses	and	thus	would	then	not	be	exchangeable	from	this	perspective.	In	asymmetrical	relationships,	which	side	of	the	perspective	one	is	on	can	result	in	a	whole	different	view.	Thus,	I	use	the	term	‘scientification’	not	only	to	express	a	focus	on	the	‘environment’	of	science	as	does	von	Stuckrad,	but	also	to	emphasize	the	perspective	of	scientific	understandings	of	the	world	and	meaning-making	involved	in	the	construction	of	religion—an	 asymmetrical	 relationship	 whereby	 the	 meaning	 of	 religion	 is	 guided	 by	scientific	 frameworks.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 religionization	 of	 science	 suggests	 the	meaning	 of	‘science’	is	guided	by	religious	frameworks,	according	to	how	I	use	the	terminology,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	subsection.		 To	exemplify	the	scientification	of	religion,	I	examine	the	case	of	religion	constructed	as	 a	 scientific	 object	 in	 the	 natural	 scientific	 study	 of	 religion	 in	 Chapter	 Four.	 The	progression	of	the	scientification	of	religion	reaches	across	many	fields,	however	I	focus	on	their	convergence	in	contemporary	cognitive	science	of	religion—a	relatively	new	field	that	continues	to	largely	hold	to	reductionist	assumptions,	whereas	many	other	disciplines	have	moved	 toward	 more	 interdependent	 and	 holistic	 models.	 Similar	 to	 how	 scientific	knowledge,	 the	 history	 of	 science,	 and	 the	 profession	 of	 science	 were	 constructed	 in	opposition	to	religion	in	the	case	of	mutual	exclusivity,	knowledge	of	religion,	the	history	of	religion,	and	the	study	of	religion	were	constructed	as	reducibly	scientific.	In	making	religion	science-like,	 these	 aspects	 of	 the	 concept	 ‘religion’	 were	 subsumed	 under	 scientific	knowledge	and	naturalistic	approaches	in	both	the	academic	and	natural	scientific	study	of	religion.	In	making	religion	science-like,	‘science’	is	treated	in	terms	of	its	signifiers	as	per	
																																																						54	Above	quote	and	observations	on	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	180.	The	terminology	‘scientification	of	religion’	and	related	notions	have	been	used	elsewhere,	in	a	slightly	different	way.	Knut	Aukland,	defines	the	‘scientization	of	religion’	as	the	process	of	appealing	to	science,	including	using	scientific	models	and	experiments,	in	thinking	and	communicating	about	religion.	Aukland	(2014).	See	also	Aukland	(2016).	Similarly,	Mette	Buchardt	uses	the	term	‘scientification’—without	explicitly	defining	it—to	express,	on	the	one	hand,	presenting	religion	on	the	 basis	 of	 scientific	 results	 in	 education,	while	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 term	 is	 used	 to	 describe	 religious	individuals	using	science	as	a	means	of	legitimization	in	society	in	order	to	appear	objective.	Buchardt	(2013),	128,	and	130–131.	Using	science,	scientific	terminology,	and	scientific	methods	as	a	legitimization	strategy	is	also	termed	‘scientification’	by	Olav	Hammer	and	James	R.	Lewis.	Hammer	&	Lewis	(2010),	8	and	20.	According	to	 Stephanie	 Gripentrog,	 ‘scientification’	 is	 the	 process	 of	 ‘taking	 over’	 religious	 concepts	 of	 abnormal	phenomena	to	be	replaced	by	psychological	ones.	Gripentrog	(2014).	
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mutual	exclusivity.	The	most	important	signifier	that	comes	into	play	here	is	 ‘naturalism,’	which	 is	 discursively	 entangled	 and	 often	 conflated	 with	 physicalism,	 materialism,	 and	localizationism.	Since	these	signifiers	are	thought	to	exclude	supernaturalism	and	religion	as	per	mutual	exclusivity,	the	only	framework	of	meaning	left	is	that	of	science	and	the	result	is	that	religion	is	reduced	to	science.			 This	means	that	with	the	reduction	of	religion	to	science,	religion	loses	many	of	its	pre-established	and	conventional	meanings	(meanings	as	per	mutual	exclusivity).	This	is	not	only	because	signifiers	of	science	exclude	signifiers	of	religion,	but	also	because	to	liken	the	two	concepts	in	any	way	is	to	take	away	their	primary	mode	of	distinction—their	contrast	to	one	another.	If	indeed	religion	and	science	are	primarily	constructed	as	mutually	exclusive	concepts,	 then	 to	 make	 them	 alike	 will	 necessarily	 make	 the	 terms	 ambiguous.	 These	ambiguities	lead	to	questions	about	what	‘religion’	means	in	the	context	of	science,	such	as	‘Is	the	scientific	object	religion	“really”	religion?’	and	‘Does	the	explanation	of	the	scientific	object	of	religion	suggest	religion	is	illusion/false/insignificant?’	The	doubt	exhibited	in	such	ontological	questions	is	a	product	of	the	assumptions	of	mutual	exclusivity.	 In	contrast,	 if	religion	were	 framed	as	 like	mysticism,	 this	will	not	raise	the	question	of	 if	 it	can	still	be	considered	religion—because	religion	and	mysticism	are	not	thought	of	as	oppositional.	So,	why	 should	 religion	 as	 science-like	 say	 anything	 about	 truth	 or	 falsity?	 That	 is	 only	 a	question	 if	 you	 already	 consider	 the	 domains	 to	 be	 mutually	 exclusive	 in	 some	 way,	suggesting	the	central	role	of	relational	construction.				 Since	 these	 questions	 are	 products	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 we	 can	 expect	 that	 the	answer	 will	 reinforce	 held	 assumptions.	 In	 response,	 religion,	 apart	 from	 the	 scientific	framework,	has	often	been	suggested	to	be	pathological	delusion	or	just	plain	false,	meaning	the	only	‘true’	religion	is	the	scientific	object	which	is	decidedly	fixed	in	brain	structures	and	functions,	 devoid	 of	 any	 significant	 meaning.	 Reduction	 is	 more	 than	 identifying	 with	signifiers	of	science	to	the	exclusion	of	religion;	it	is	the	exclusion	of	religion	to	such	a	degree	that	even	its	ontological	status	is	thrown	into	question.	The	adoption	of	the	assumptions	of	mutual	 exclusivity	 in	 the	 development	 of	 this	 identity	 construct	 shows	 how	 relational	constructs	structure	discursive	change,	determining	signifiers	for	likening	and	structuring	how	 likening	will	 be	 interpreted,	 resulting	 in	 a	 new	 relational	 construct.	 This	 relational	construct,	in	turn,	gives	rise	to	new	signifiers	for	the	term	‘religion’	apart	from	signifiers	of	
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science	as	per	mutual	exclusivity,	namely	religion	as	ontologically	demoted	and	with	little	significance	at	the	level	of	the	individual	and	society.	This	relational	construct	also	gave	rise	to	 new	 signifiers	 for	 the	 term	 ‘science,’	 specifically	 that	 science	 is	 about	 the	 physical,	material,	and	localizable	and	that	science	is	signified	by	reductionism.	These	new	signifiers	of	religion	and	science	later	come	into	play	in	subsequent	discursive	developments,	which	will	further	establish	that	relational	constructs	structure	discursive	change.	
	
2.3.2 The	Religionization	of	Science	About	two	dozen	articles	use	the	term	“religionize”	and	approximately	fifty	publications	use	the	term	“religionization,”	most	in	passing,	without	explaining	the	meaning	of	the	term.	The	related	term	‘religionation’	has	been	little	used.	The	broadest	use	of	the	term	I	found	is	to	refer	 to	 “the	 general	 task	 of	 developing	 a	 theory	 of	 religion.”55	 The	 overall	 sense	 of	 its	common	 usage	 is	 to	 ‘make	 religion-like.’56	 Eric	 L.	 Saak	 defined	 ‘religionization’	 as	 “a	descriptive	term	for	the	evolution	in	the	definitions	and	expressions	of	‘being	religious.’”57	There	is	also	a	distinct	sense	of	religion	expanding	beyond	its	borders	in	many	instances.58	According	to	how	I	use	the	term,	‘religionization’	refers	to	the	reduction	to	religion.			 As	stated,	the	scientification	of	religion	resulted	in	science	being	closely	associated	with	reductionism,	not	only	 in	regard	 to	 its	analysis	of	 religion,	but	more	generally	 in	 its	worldview.	The	 reductionism	of	 science	became	a	major	 identity	marker	 for	 science	 and	many	critics	arose	who	were	discontent	with	this	intellectual	hegemony.	Reductionism	was	associated	 with	 science	 expanding	 beyond	 its	 domain,	 since	 it	 was	 under	 this	 umbrella	interpretation	that	all	domains	of	life	were	accounted	for.	The	idea	of	science	as	the	ultimate	framework	of	knowledge	was	labeled	‘scientism,’	a	dogmatism	or	ideology	that	was	likened	to	and	reduced	to	religion	in	many	cases	and	in	many	ways.	For	instance,	scientism	has	been	
																																																						55	Larson	(1995),	308	n.99.	See	also	ibid.,	166–177,	199,	and	281–283.	Similarly,	David	Tracy	described	the	verb	to	“religionize”	as	“developing	a	philosophical	understanding	of	religion.”	Tracy	(1994),	306.		56	See,	e.g.,	Herberg	(1962)	44–45.	57	 Saak	 (2002),	 723.	While	Eric	 L.	 Saak	 is	 referring	 to	 specific	 historical	 developments	 in	 eleventh	 to	 early	sixteenth-century	Christianity,	whereby	to	be	‘religious’	expanded	from	its	limited	application	to	monks,	his	characterization	of	religionization	is	applicable	here	as	well.	58	See,	e.g.,	Shenhav	(2007),	11;	Velikonja	(2003);	and	Juergensmeyer	(2004),	226.	Mark	Juergensmeyer	also	used	this	term	‘religionize’	throughout	his	various	publications,	however	this	was	the	only	publication	I	found	that	directly	offered	a	definition.	Others	vaguely	refer	to	placing	social	and	political	situations	into	religious	terms	or	sentiments.	
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reaction	 to	 the	scientification	of	 religion	specifically	and	of	 reductionism	generally,	while	reflecting	 the	 assumptions	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity.	 Thus,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 this	 sort	 of	conversation	is	unfolding	between	mutual	exclusivity,	scientification,	and	religionization.		
2.4 Inclusivity	Thus	far,	we	have	seen	that	the	differentiation	of	religion	and	science	via	mutual	exclusivity	set	 the	 stage	 for	 likening	 and	 eventually	 reducing	 the	 two.	 Contrast	 set	 the	 stage	 for	comparison	and	new	relational	constructs	emerged.	Meanwhile,	there	was	a	lot	of	discontent	about	how	the	religion-science	relationship	developed.	Specifically,	there	was	concern	about	the	disenchantment	that	scientification	gave	rise	to	in	framing	religion	as	merely	real	and	thus	of	little	significance,	while	the	dogmatism	of	religionized	science	left	science	no	better	than	the	religion	it	attempted	to	overcome.	Many	felt	that	both	religion	and	science	had	failed	in	these	ways,	which	was	largely	attributed	to	notions	of	mutual	exclusivity	and	the	identity	construct.	 Thus,	 the	 problem	 was	 approached	 through	 the	 argument	 that	 religion	 and	science	 are	 ‘not	mutually	 exclusive.’	 This	 is	what	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 ‘inclusivity	 construct,’	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Six.	 Inclusivity	 is	 constructed	 in	 relative	 perspective	 to	 these	 other	constructs,	 as	 the	 exclusion	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity	 and	 reductionism	 as	 well	 (since	reductionism	 is	 a	 product	 of	mutual	 exclusivity).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 inclusivity	 construct,	‘religion’	 is	 relationally	 defined	 as	 ‘not	 excluding	 science’	 and	 ‘science’	 as	 ‘not	 excluding	religion.’	I	sometimes	refer	to	this	as	‘inclusive	religion’	and	‘inclusive	science,’	respectively.			 To	demonstrate	the	development	of	the	inclusivity	construct,	I	discuss	the	‘religions	of	science’	that	developed	in	force	from	around	the	1860s	to	the	1940s.	These	religions	of	science	were	 framed	as	part	of	a	 ‘reformation,’	specifically	a	reformation	of	scientificated	religion,	 religionized	 science,	 and	 religion-science	 exclusivity.	 I	 refer	 to	 a	 ‘reformation’	because	those	who	sought	to	 form	these	religions	of	science	were	doing	so	 in	reaction	to	previous	formulations	and	specifically	targeted	reductionist	accounts	and	mutual	exclusivity	in	their	quest	to	construct	an	alternative	religion-science	relational	construct.	The	inclusivity	construct	 thus	 shows	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 ‘conversation’	 between	relational	constructs,	as	the	discourse	evolved	relative	to	these	pre-existing	constructs.		
																																																						the	 social	 sciences’	 colonization	of	 political	 deliberation	 in	 favor	 of	 technocratic	 calculation.	 See	Habermas	(1970),	62–80.	
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from	 an	 inclusive	 perspective,	 these	 signifiers	 of	 science	 were	 not	 thought	 to	 exclude	signifiers	 of	 religion	 and	 the	 scientificity	 of	 religion	 ensued.	 Furthermore,	 points	 of	difference	that	were	maintained	were	treated	as	non-oppositional,	such	as	materialism	and	spirituality,	constructed	as	complementary.			 As	 such,	 the	 pre-existing	 relational	 constructs	 set	 the	 terms	 of	 Buddhism-science	engagement	 in	many	ways.	To	make	 science-like	was	based	on	notions	of	 science	 as	per	mutual	exclusivity,	including	its	signifiers.	To	make	unlike	religion	was	also	based	in	notions	of	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 thus	 constructing	 Buddhism	 in	 contrast	 to	 religion	 specifically	conceptualized	as	excluding	science.	Furthermore,	this	often	involved	a	direct	engagement	with	the	parameters	of	the	term	‘religion’	such	that	its	contrast	with	religion	was	not	thought	to	negate	religion,	but	rather	to	redefine	its	boundaries	in	an	inclusive	way.	At	the	same	time,	likening	the	religion	of	Buddhism	and	science	was	also	done	from	an	inclusive	perspective,	such	that	the	scientific	character	of	Buddhism	was	not	thought	to	exclude	or	negate	religious	considerations	nor	religious	significance.	On	the	contrary,	science	is	thought	to	enhance	the	religion,	 making	 the	 likening	 specifically	 non-reductive,	 resulting	 in	 the	 scientificity	 of	religion.	
	








the	 immaterial	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 reality.	 Though	 not	 all	 agreed,	 the	 standard	interpretation	of	quantum	physics	suggests	that	the	observer	plays	a	part.	The	observer,	for	many,	means	 consciousness,	 giving	 subjectivity	 a	 role	 in	 objective	 reality.	 This,	 too,	was	likened	 to	 religious	perspectives	 since,	 as	we	 saw,	 religion	had	already	been	 signified	by	subjectivity,	 the	 mind,	 and	 immaterialism	 as	 per	 mutual	 exclusivity.	 With	 physicalism,	materialism,	and	localization	abandoned	at	the	quantum	level,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	naturalism	came	under	fire	as	well.	Many	began	to	construct	quantum	physics	in	terms	of	supernaturalism,	while	maintaining	a	space	for	naturalism	at	the	same	time.			 Now	 that	 signifiers	of	 religion	and	science	had	become	part	of	one	another,	many	began	 to	 interpret	 quantum	 physics	 as	 holding	 a	 non-reductive	 similarity	 to	 religion,	 a	source	 for	 science	 and	 transcendent	 inspiration,	 a	 religiosity	 of	 science.	 New	 signifiers	emerged	 to	 express	 this	 non-reductive	 similarity	 between	 religion	 and	 science,	 namely	‘mysticism.’	In	fact,	the	religiosity	of	science	in	the	context	of	quantum	physics	has	even	been	labeled	 ‘quantum	 mysticism.’	 ‘Mysticism’	 was	 constructed	 as	 a	 commonality	 across	 all	religions,	leaving	problematic	signifiers	aside.	As	such,	many	came	to	see	quantum	physics,	with	its	similarity	to	mysticism,	as	the	realm	of	which	religion	and	science	could	be	likened	in	a	genuine	way,	that	did	not	sacrifice	the	religion	or	the	science	and	that	did	not	favor	one	over	the	other.		
3 The	Structure	of	Discursive	Change	&	the	Relational	Model		In	 summary,	 religion	 and	 science	 came	 to	 be	 contrasted	 to	 one	 another	 to	 carve	 out	independent	conceptual	space	for	each	term.	As	the	main	source	for	identification	was	this	contrast,	the	two	came	to	be	thought	of	as	mutually	exclusive	opposites.	In	some	ways,	this	process	 gave	 science	 the	 upper	 hand	 in	 knowledge	 acquisition	 and	 eventually	 science	became	 the	 dominant	 episteme.	 Scientific	 frameworks	 of	 meaning	 expanded	 and	 even	religion	became	an	object	of	scientific	investigation.	However,	because	the	two	were	thought	of	as	opposites,	making	religion	science-like	in	its	construction	as	a	scientific	object	meant	it	could	not	be	religion-like,	resulting	in	the	reduction	of	religion	to	science.	In	response	to	this	epistemological	hegemony,	science	was	 increasingly	criticized	as	being	religion-like	 in	 its	
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dogmatism,	among	other	critiques.	Similar	to	what	occurred	with	religion	in	the	context	of	science,	since	religion	and	science	were	thought	to	be	mutually	exclusive	opposites,	thinking	of	 science	 as	 religion-like	meant	 it	 could	 not	 be	 science-like	 and	 science	was	 reduced	 to	religion.	Many	came	to	be	disenchanted	with	scientificated	religion	and	religionized	science.	Both	religion	and	science	were	thought	to	have	failed	society	and	the	source	of	that	failure	was	 often	 said	 to	 be	misconception.	 That	misconception	was	 identified	 as	 the	 notion	 of	mutual	 exclusivity,	 with	 reductionism	 (the	 identity	 construct)	 as	 its	 handmaiden.	 A	‘reformation’	came	about	during	which	the	religion-science	relationship	was	conceptualized	anew.	‘Real’	religion	and	science	were	not	oppositional,	advocates	argued,	nor	could	one	be	reduced	to	the	other.	Once	it	was	thought	that	religion	and	science	were	not	oppositional,	making	 religion	science-like	and	science	 religion-like	no	 longer	 ran	 the	 risk	of	 reduction.	Similarity	could	be	interpreted	instead	as	religion	non-reductively	representing	a	science-like	quality	and	science	representing	religion	in	the	same	way.			 Throughout	this	evolution	of	 the	religion-science	relation,	we	see	a	structure	 from	point	A	to	point	B.	Mutual	exclusivity	was	a	product	of	the	non-differentiation	of	the	medieval	worldview;	reductionist	identity	a	product	of	mutual	exclusivity;	inclusivity	an	alternative	to	mutual	 exclusivity;	 and	 representation	 as	 product	 of	 inclusivity	 and	 an	 alternative	 to	reductionism.	Though	this	is	a	simplification,	we	can	see	how	each	pre-established	relational	construct	 structured	 the	 discursive	 change	 to	 the	 following	 relational	 construct.	Furthermore,	 the	 relational	 constructs	 provided	 the	 signifiers	 of	 which	 also	 structured	changing	meanings—religion	as	‘natural’	to	make	it	a	scientific	object	or	to	have	scientific	character;	 science	 as	 ‘supernatural’	 to	make	 it	 reducibly	 religious	 or	 to	 have	 a	 religious	character,	 for	 instance.	 Thus,	 how	 to	 make	 religion	 and	 science	 alike	 in	 a	 new	 way	 is	dependent	 on	 how	 they	 were	 previously	 understood	 relative	 to	 one	 another.	What	 this	demonstrates	 is	 that	 the	 signifiers	and	 their	 relational	 content,	 like	 the	 supernaturalism-naturalism	dichotomy,	born	from	mutual	exclusivity,	become	the	conceptual	structure	for	articulating	new	meanings.	Which	signifiers	differentiate	the	two	are	used	to	compare	them.	So,	to	make	‘science-like’	or	 ‘religion-like’	 is	a	purely	relational	activity,	dependent	on	the	relational	construct	setting	the	terms	for	engagement.		On	 several	 levels,	 the	 relational	 constructs	 unfolded	 in	 a	 dialogic	 manner,	conceptually	 developed	 relative	 to	 one	 another.	 Foucault’s	 genealogical	 methodology	
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religion.”69	 As	 an	 alternative,	 the	 model	 I	 am	 proposing	 here	 engages	 with	 the	 act	 of	conceiving	as	such.	I	am	not	arguing	that	the	religion-science	relationship	can	be	reduced	to	certain	types;	I	am	suggesting	the	processes	by	which	we	come	to	typologize.	It	is	a	meta-model	about	how	we	construct	our	models,	putting	various	typologies	and	theses	in	relative	perspective.	 A	 relational	 analysis	 can	 demonstrate	 the	 conceptual	 development	 of	 such	theses,	 including	relationalism	itself	as	a	product	of	the	relationalization	of	relational	and	non-relational	models,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	concluding	chapter.	It	can	show	the	procedural	how	of	discursive	change;	it	can	show	how	words	mean.			 		




example,	 but	 rather	 simply	 provides	 ‘a	 group	 of	 controlled	 decisions’	 that	 takes	 the	limitlessness	of	data,	definition,	and	discourse	as	a	theoretical	jumping-off	point.		One	might	still	be	tempted	to	point	to	signifiers	as	mechanisms	of	discursive	change.	The	signifiers	employed	in	the	relational	processes	of	likening/differentiating	are	products	of	the	relational	constructs;	and	the	constructs,	in	turn,	structure	how	relational	processes	are	interpreted,	setting	the	terms	of	engagement	and	resulting	in	new	constructs	and	new	signifiers.	While	signifiers	are	 important	for	tracking	the	changes	in	the	terms,	 it	 is	really	relational	 constructs	 that	 set	 the	 parameters	 for	meaning	making.	 For	 example,	 to	make	science-like	 will	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 reduction	 to	 science	 if	 one	 understands	 science	 to	exclude	 religion;	 whereas	 to	 make	 science-like	 will	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 non-reductive	similarity	between	religion	and	science	if	one	understands	religion	and	science	in	terms	of	inclusivity.	 Thus,	 relational	 constructs	 structure	 not	 only	 the	 way	 in	 which	 particular	signifiers	will	result	in	discursive	change,	but	also	structure	the	evolution	of	terms	in	a	way	that	is	outside	the	reach	of	those	signifiers,	or,	put	differently,	in	a	way	beyond	the	traditional	definitional	 approach.	 Saying	 science	 is	 about	 the	 natural	 and	 religion	 the	 supernatural	means	nothing	for	the	relationship	without	assumptions	about	whether	those	signifiers	are	oppositional	or	complementary.	The	signifiers	alone	cannot	lead	to	any	conclusion	about	the	religion-science	relationship.	Our	presumptions	about	the	relational	content	of	the	concepts	do	that.		 This	 and	 the	 observation	 that	 relational	 constructs	 are	 themselves	 relationally	constructed	 strongly	 supports	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 relations	 are	 primary	 and	 relata	 are	derivative.	 Put	 simply,	 this	 means	 the	 traditional	 definitional	 approach	 is	 analytically	backward.	Definitions	or	 signifiers	mean	nothing	without	 relational	 content.	As	 stated	 in	Chapter	One,	 the	 typical	approach	 to	an	analysis	of	 the	religion-science	relationship	 is	 to	define	‘religion’	and	define	‘science’	and,	based	on	these	definitions,	conclude	a	relationship	between	the	two.	In	this	approach,	the	relationship	is	set	in	the	premise	of	the	definition,	as	the	definition	will	demarcate	the	two	relative	to	one	another	so	that	they	can	then	be	related.	Put	differently,	the	act	of	demarcation	is	to	establish	a	relationship	that	is	then	used	to	argue	for	that	relationship.	Instead,	what	we	should	be	asking	is	how	this	relational	demarcation	constructs	the	meaning	of	‘religion’	and	‘science.’	And	this	is	what	a	relationality	analysis	can	show.	
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	 Relationality	analysis	directly	engages	with	the	problem	of	definition	(on	which,	see	Chapter	One).	The	issue	of	definition	is	central	to	the	progress	of	any	field	of	study,	including	religious	studies.	The	 first	step	 in	resolving	 this	 issue	 is	 to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	definitional	development.	Definitions	are	often	treated	as	if	they	must	be	universally	applied,	at	least	within	the	confines	of	a	given	study’s	data.	Yet,	to	oppose	a	multiplicity	of	definitions	is	to	oppose	the	overall	data.	This	means	that	any	given	definition	will	most	certainly	not	be	acceptable	to	everyone.	But,	why	should	we	suppose	that	this	is	the	purpose	of	definition?72			 If	 it	 is	 granted	 that	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 are	 fluid	 concepts,	 the	 traditional	definitional	approach	loses	appeal.	How	can	we	derive	any	meaning	from	dynamic	concepts	in	an	analytically	valuable	way?	We	need	to	shift	our	attention	away	from	generic	definitions	to	 the	 way	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 are	 organized,	 discussed,	 and	 otherwise	 discursively	materialized.73	 Analyzing	 limitless	 meaning	 seems	 an	 impossible	 task.	 And	 while	 it	 is	impossible	 to	 enumerate	 meanings,	 to	 determine	 meaning	 structures	 is	 within	 grasp.	Relationality	analysis	shows	that	the	problem	of	definition	can	be	resolved	by	abandoning	this	preoccupation	with	the	problem	of	variety	to	a	solution	from	variety—that	is,	allowing	the	evolution	and	fluidity	of	terms	to	dictate	how	we	treat	definition.	A	 focus	 on	 relations	 is	 already	 a	 huge	 step	 away	 from	 rigid	 analytical	 categories.	Treating	relations	as	primary	in	the	constitution	of	concepts	means	‘being’	is	understood	as	‘becoming,’	as	in	the	Heideggerian	view.	This	is	because	things	are	relational	“in	the	sense	of	first	being	internally	(constitutively)	related	to	prior	actual	entities,	then	externally	related	to	(constitutive	of)	subsequent	actual	entities	[…],”	as	claimed	in	process	philosophy.74	As	such,	 “it	 is	process,	 rather	 than	substance,	 that	should	be	 taken	as	 the	most	 fundamental	metaphysical	 constituent	 of	 the	world.”75	 Relations	 are	 not	 static	 because	 being	 is	 “pure	activity.”76	To	put	it	 in	simple	but	seemingly	paradoxical	 language,	to	be	an	individual,	an	object	must	be	in	a	relationship.77	From	a	relational	perspective	we	cannot	speak	of	an	object	
																																																						72	 For	 some	 history	 of	 definitional	 theory	 and	 philosophical	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 definition,	 see	Penner	&	Yonan	(1972),	114–117.	73	I.e.,	as	von	Stuckrad	suggested	for	the	study	of	religion	in	various	publications.	See	von	Stuckrad	(2003);	von	Stuckrad	(2010);	and	von	Stuckrad	(2013a).	74	Griffin	(2001),	6.	75	Irvine	(2015).	See	also	Griffin	(2001),	1,	5–7,	and	117–120;	and	the	seminal	work	Whitehead	(1929).	76	Zaidi	(1973),	414.	77	On	individuation,	including	various	perspectives,	see	Lowe	(2009).	My	characterization	is	in	contrast—but	not	unprecedented—to	the	classical	theory	of	individuation,	including	the	claim	that	individuation	hinges	on	
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in-itself,	but	we	can	speak	of	the	appearing-of-an-object,	the	individual	appearing	from	the	processes	of	relationalization.	If	we	can	determine	the	actions	or	processes	of	relationalization,	we	need	not	know	what	words,	definitions,	and	meanings	are	applied	to	the	terms,	as	everything	we	need	to	know	 will	 be	 present	 in	 the	 relation	 itself.	 For	 example,	 if	 religion	 and	 science	 are	constructed	as	mutually	exclusive,	then	whatever	science	is	said	to	be,	we	know	a	priori	the	definition	of	religion	will	be	its	opposite.	If	science	is	said	to	be	about	fact,	then	religion	is	about	belief	or	whatever	is	constructed	as	the	opposite	of	fact.	Science	is	truth;	religion	is	superstition,	 falsity,	 pseudoscience,	 for	 example.	 The	 relational	 structure	 of	 negative	correlation	 tells	 us	 that	 ‘religion’	 is	 relationally	 bifurcated	 against	 ‘science.’	 Knowing	 the	applicable	relation,	all	relata	(or	definitions)	are,	in	theory,	knowable.	This	is	“not	because	the	 relational	 framework	 includes	 the	 particulars	 of	 ordinary	 conception,	 but	 because	 it	includes	 every	 ‘intentional’	 act	 (‘directed	 towards’	 such	particulars)—and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	physical	world	besides.”78	What	this	means	for	the	end	game	here	is	that	if	we	can	determine	the	relational	structure	between	two	concepts,	we	can	also	see	how	the	concepts	become	‘directed	 towards’	 certain	 definitions	 and	 include	 every	 possibility	without	 enumerating	them.	In	this	way,	we	can	account	for	the	fluidity	of	concepts	while	retaining	stable	structures	for	analysis,	namely	relational	constructs.	Focusing	on	how	relational	constructs	make	terms	‘act’	in	certain	ways	speaks	volumes	more	about	what	a	term	means	than	any	definition	can	do.		 			 	





1 Science	as	‘Not	Religion’		Theologian	and	philosopher	William	George	Ward	made	the	above	comments	in	1867	in	an	environment	 in	 which	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘science’	 was	 rather	 ambiguous,	 specifically	regarding	its	demarcation	from	religious	considerations.	The	idea	that	‘science’	excluded	the	theological	 was	 not	 at	 all	 obvious	 and	 indeed	 its	 usage	 often	 did	 involve	 discursive	connections	to	theology,	metaphysics,	and	religion.	Thus,	such	remarks	mark	a	transition	in	the	use	of	the	term	to	refer	to	increasingly	narrow	subject	matter.	Trimming	down	the	usage	of	‘science’	meant,	in	part,	excluding	discourses	of	‘religion.’	Relationally	defining	science	in	contrast	to	religion	enabled	not	only	further	specification	of	the	term,	but	also	broadened	it	by	giving	it	independent	conceptual	space	and	a	realm	of	inquiry	and	authority	of	its	own	that	had	been	previously	co-occupied	by	many	overlapping	concepts.2			 As	 stated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 my	 approach	 is	 to	 examine	 how	 ‘religion’	 and	‘science’	have	been	conceptualized	relative	to	one	another.	How	have	the	discourses	of	the	term	 ‘religion’	 been	 constructed	 relative	 to	 the	 term	 ‘science’?3	 In	 this	 first	 case	 study	chapter,	I	examine	the	beginnings	of	religion-science	mutual	conceptualization.	This	close	discursive	connection	between	the	formulation	of	the	term	‘science’	and	the	construction	of	the	term	‘religion’	is	due	to	the	Medieval	unified	view	of	knowledge,	in	which	there	was	no	
																																																						1	Quoted	in	Simpson	(2016f).	Emphasis	added.	2	 Science	 has	 been	 relationally	 defined	 in	 contrast	 to	mechanics,	 philosophy,	 and	 the	 classics	 as	well.	 The	relation	between	science,	the	classics,	philosophy,	and	religion	are	discussed	extensively	in	Gay	(1966–1969).	On	the	differentiation	between	science	and	mechanics,	see	Gieryn	(1983).	Despite	the	important	roles	these	have	played	in	conceptualizing	‘science,’	boundary	work	between	these	concepts	and	science	do	not	appear	in	nearly	so	many	realms	of	society	as	does	the	contrast	with	religion	nor	does	it	feature	as	centrally	today	as	it	has	in	the	past.	3	According	to	Cunningham	&	Williams	(1993),	420	n.34,	there	has	been	no	critical	analysis	of	the	changing	meanings	of	‘science.’	To	my	knowledge,	this	is	still	true	today.	On	the	etymology	and	semantics	of	‘science,’	see	Ross	(1962);	Williams	(1976),	232–235;	and	Harris	(2005).	
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the	dichotomy.	For	example,	Olav	Hammer	and	James	R.	Lewis	stated,	“the	most	common	way	to	make	science	function	as	a	legitimating	warrant	[of	religion]	is	to	reinterpret	science”	and	“Using	science	as	a	warrant	 for	religion,	 then,	only	works	when	science	 is	subsumed	under	a	 religious	strategy.	Only	a	 sacralised	science	can	confirm	a	scientific	 religion.”5	 In	Hammer	and	Lewis’	view,	if	science	is	part	of	religion,	it	is	religious	science,	not	science	as	science.	Put	differently,	 if	 it	 is	religious	it	 is	necessarily	not	scientific.	Thus,	 it	 invokes	the	relational	 construct	 of	 religion-science	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 while	 framing	 alternative	formulations	as	 invalid.	 I	will	 show	 that	 this	 is	not	 a	 given—despite	how	obvious	 such	a	demarcation	may	seem	to	our	present	eyes.	Rather	 the	notion	of	 science	as	 ‘not	 religion’	developed	through	a	long	historical	process	of	conceptualizing	science	in	direct	contrast	to	religion—bringing	 us	 to	 the	 point	 today	 that	 the	 invocation	 of	 the	 mutual	 exclusivity	construct	is	oftentimes	not	even	recognized	or	easily	recognizable.	In	terms	of	Foucauldian	discourse	theory,	it	is	tacit	knowledge.		 It	would	be	invidious	to	pick	just	one	out,	as	I	could	refer	to	virtually	any	scholar	to	make	 this	point	 of	 the	ongoing	 influence	of	 the	mutual	 exclusivity	 construct	 in	 academic	analyses.	And	yet	 that	 is	 exactly	 the	point—mutual	 exclusivity	has	become	 convention—even	appearing	painfully	obvious	to	state	that	science	is	‘not	religion.’	But,	as	noted,	this	was	not	obvious	for	those	such	as	Ward	and	many	others	of	his	time	to	the	point	that	religion-science	demarcation	had	 to	be	discussed	 in	order	to	clearly	articulate	the	meaning	of	 the	concepts	in	question.	And	even	though	specialists	are	quite	aware	of	this	point,	what	they	fail	to	recognize	is	that	the	development	of	the	term	‘science’	was	strongly	structured	by	this	mutual	conceptualization	with	religion.	Because	of	this	lacuna,	the	dichotomous	use	of	the	terms	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 has	 not	 been	 seriously	 problematized—or	 at	 least	 not	problematized	enough.			 For	 example,	 common	 definitions	 of	 religion	 as	 ‘regarding	 the	 supernatural’	 and	science	as	‘natural	investigation’	are	widely	used	in	contexts	far	beyond	the	religion-science	situation,	which	in	fact	were	a	direct	result	of	relationalizing	religion	and	science.	Thus,	this	
																																																						5	Hammer	&	Lewis	(2010),	6	and	8.	See	also	Hammer	(2001),	203	and	passim	for	a	discussion	of	the	notion	that	science	and	spirituality	are	oftentimes	viewed	as	 two	sides	of	 the	same	coin,	demonstrating	he	certainly	 is	aware	of	the	relevant	contingencies.	Nonetheless,	his	presumptions	about	religion-science	distinction	structure	his	conclusions.	
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relational	construct	continues	 to	perpetuate	conflictual	notions	by	 the	very	definitions	of	religion	and	science	in	our	present	day	and	age,	definitions	that	are	invoked	with	a	total	lack	of	 awareness	 that	 common	 understandings	 of	 these	 terms	 were	 actually	 due	 to	 mutual	conceptualization	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 in	 direct	 contrast.	 While	 these	 definitions	 and	conflictual	relationships	are	regularly	contested,	by	offering	counterexamples	for	instance,	this	 does	 not	 get	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 issue,	 because	 the	 source	 of	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 the	definitions,	but	rather	the	relationalization	of	the	terms	that	resulted	in	these	definitions.	This	observation	has	not	been	made	 transparent	 in	 the	 relevant	 literature,	otherwise	we	would	not	be	preoccupied	with	offering	counterexamples	 to	conflict	and	simply	conclude	that	religion	and	science	are	dichotomous	because	the	terms	have	been	historically	defined	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	them	oppositional.		 With	a	better	understanding	of	the	conceptual	origins	of	religion-science	conflict,	we	can	begin	to	tackle	related	social	issues	at	a	more	fundamental	level	of	meaning	making	since	it	is	the	history	of	our	definitions	that	brought	us	to	this	point	to	begin	with.	The	origins	of	the	warfare	thesis—and	the	closely	related	‘conflict	thesis’	(on	which,	see	Chapter	One)—have	already	been	explored	in	the	relevant	literature	time	and	time	again.	Though	it	is	widely	recognized	 that	 there	 is	 not	 as	 much	 of	 a	 historical	 basis	 for	 conflict	 as	 was	 originally	suggested	 by	 early	 commentators	 on	 the	 relations	 of	 religion	 and	 science,	 this	 does	 not	resolve	the	issue	of	mutual	exclusivity.	Mutual	exclusivity	is	no	myth,	but	rather	has	a	strong	history	and	an	ongoing	one	at	that.	The	warfare	and	conflict	theses	(of	which,	for	simplicity’s	sake,	 I	will	refer	to	collectively	as	the	 ‘conflict	 thesis’	 from	here	on	out,	since	the	two	are	historically	and	conceptually	related)	and	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct	are	very	different.	This	chapter	will	examine	a	lot	of	historical	data	that	could	be	read	as	supporting	the	conflict	thesis,	with	 its	 focus	on	notions	of	 the	religion-science	dichotomy.	Yet,	my	point	 is	not	 to	show	 this	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 explaining	 or	 supporting	 the	 conflict	 thesis,	 but	 rather	 to	exemplify	the	processes	of	relational	conceptualization—specifically	how	‘science’	has	been	relationally	constructed	as	mutually	exclusive	with	‘religion.’	The	key	difference	here	is	that	whereas	 the	 conflict	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 historically	 religion	 and	 science	 conflict,	 the	relational	thesis	is	that	the	term	‘science’	itself	emerged	as	an	independent	idea	in	the	act	of	contrasting	it	to	‘religion,’	which	later	resulted	in	conceptual	opposition.	In	fact,	the	conflict	thesis	was	itself	a	product	(though	also	a	producer)	of	the	relational	construction	of	religion-
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The	central	aim	of	natural	philosophy	was	to	investigate	the	natural	world	as	God’s	creation,	an	 embodiment	 of	 God’s	 power	 and	 purposes.	 As	 the	 natural	 world	 was	 open	 to	investigation,	 it	provided	a	means	to	examine,	understand,	and	praise	God.9	In	the	Middle	Ages,	science	was	not	an	autonomous	field,	but	rather	referred	to	a	specialized	branch	of	knowledge	 that	 today	 is	 divided	 into	many	 different	 fields,	 including	 logic,	mathematics,	rhetoric,	grammar,	astronomy,	music,	and	theology,	the	latter	of	which	was	even	referred	to	as	 the	 ‘queen	 of	 the	 sciences.’10	 The	 idea	 of	 ‘theology,’	 in	 turn	was	 closely	 connected	 to	‘religion,’	 increasingly	 used	 from	 the	 twelfth	 century	 on	 to	 refer	 the	 academic	 or	philosophical	study	of	‘religion,’	which	already	at	this	time	was	often	understood	as	a	‘system	of	beliefs.’11	Thus,	there	was	no	clear	conceptual	difference	between	the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘science’	as	we	understand	these	words	today.		 This	characterization	of	the	Medieval	worldview	is,	of	course,	an	oversimplification	of	a	more	complex	historical	situation.	There	is	not	sufficient	space	or	need	to	go	into	the	details	here.	The	important	point	for	our	purposes	is	to	make	it	clear	that	there	was	a	high	degree	of	conceptual	entanglement	and	thus	in	order	to	clearly	differentiate	the	concepts	‘religion’	and	‘science’	the	construction	of	contrast	was	needed.			
3 Scientific	Knowledge	as	‘Not	Religious	Knowledge’		The	 first	 known	use	 of	 this	Middle	 English	 term	 ‘science’	was	 in	 the	 fourteenth	 century.	‘Science’	was	first	used	as	a	synonym	for	‘knowledge,’	and	quickly	gained	the	connotation	of	accurate	 and	 systematized	 knowledge.12	 Gradually,	 the	 phrase	 ‘scientific	 knowledge’	emerged	 to	 express	 the	 distinction	 between	 knowledge	 generally	 construed	 in	 natural	
																																																						
not	natural	philosophy	[…]	For	what	this	assertion	means	is	that	(modern)	science	in	their	period	went	under	the	 title	of	 ‘philosophy’	or	 ‘natural	philosophy,’	which	 I	 trust	 is	 self-evidently	 absurd	as	 a	historical	 claim.”	Emphasis	original.	There	is	also	ongoing	contestation	about	whether	natural	philosophy	belongs	to	the	history	of	science,	as	will	be	discussed,	and	the	arguments	presented	are	contingent	on	what	relation	between	religion	and	science	was	considered	to	be	present	in	natural	philosophy.	However,	natural	philosophy	was	not	religion,	nor	science,	nor	religion	and	science—it	was	natural	philosophy.	9	Cunningham	&	Williams	(1993),	421;	and	Barbour	(1997),	5.	10	Cunningham	(1991),	387;	and	Cunningham	(2000a),	260.	11	Simpson	(2016l);	and	Simpson	(2016e).	12	Ross	(1962),	66.	
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nineteenth-century	academics.25	This	was	not	an	idle	choice—‘religion’	acted	as	an	effective	foil	to	demarcate	the	new	concept	of	 ‘scientific	knowledge’	giving	it	conceptual	space	and	shape.	Put	differently,	 ‘scientific	knowledge’	gained	identity	by	framing	it	as	 ‘not	religious	knowledge.’		




Benjamin	Farrington	(1891–1974)	and	G.	E.	R.	Lloyd	to	name	only	a	couple	from	the	vast	number	of	individuals	who	contributed	to	this	historical	story.	In	these	accounts	“a	single	semantic	 contrast	 is	 being	 taken	 as	 definitional	 and	 everything	 else	 is	 ignored.	 Burnet,	Farrington	and	Lloyd	elect	to	see	science	as	opposed	primarily	to	religion.”28	In	other	words,	the	historical	emergence	of	science	is	marked	by	the	exclusion	of	religion.		 The	historical	beginnings	of	science	have	also	often	been	placed	in	medieval	natural	philosophy.	William	Whewell	(1794–1866)	suggested	that	the	end	of	natural	philosophy	was	the	beginning	of	science	in	his	seminal	work	History	of	the	Inductive	Science	from	the	Earliest	
to	the	Present	Time	(1837).	Similarly,	historian	H.	Floris	Cohen	argued,	“the	emancipation	of	science	from	an	overarching	entity	called	‘natural	philosophy’	is	one	defining	characteristic	of	the	Scientific	Revolution.”29	Placing	natural	philosophy	as	the	historical	source	of	science	has	 been	 done	 in	 two	 ways	 relative	 to	 religion:	 (1)	 science	 is	 historically	 located	 in	 its	separation	 from	 natural	 philosophy/religion;	 or	 (2)	 natural	 philosophy/science	 is	historically	 located	 in	 its	separation	 from	religion.	Despite	 the	contradiction	 in	 these	 two	approaches,	both	frame	religion	and	science	in	conceptual	opposition,	making	the	historical	emergence	of	science	contingent	on	the	exclusion	of	religion.	And	no	matter	which	 is	 the	‘true’	history,	the	facts	and	the	fictions	have	both	contributed	to	how	the	concepts	in	question	are	understood	today.		
4.1 Science	as	‘Not	Natural	Philosophy/Religion’	The	distinction	between	science	and	natural	philosophy,	“the	single	greatest	difference,”	has	been	described	 in	 terms	of	 its	 relation	 to	religious	considerations,	discursively	related	 to	‘God’:		 Natural	Philosophy	was	an	enterprise	which	was	about	God;	Science	by	contrast	is	an	enterprise	which	(virtually	by	definition)	is	not	about	God.	[…]	it	was	only	when	men	stopped	looking	for	God	in	Nature	
																																																						28	Harris	(2005),	29–32.	On	the	anachronistic	application	of	 ‘science’	and	 ‘scientist’	 to	antique	thinkers,	see	ibid.,	5–24.	On	the	problematic	application	of	‘science’	and	‘scientist’	to	later	thinkers,	see	ibid.,	25–46.	See	also	Dear	(2001a).	29	Cohen	(1994),	167.	See	also	Schaffer	(1986),	408:	“After	1800,	the	organization	of	training	and	research	and	the	structure	of	natural	philosophy	were	transformed,	and	histories	of	the	sciences	changed	too.	Historians	now	transferred	the	wonder	of	nature	and	of	nature’s	divine	author	to	natural	science	and	its	heroic	authors.”	
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that	they	stopped	doing	Natural	Philosophy.	The	God-less	activity	they	started	to	do	was	Science.30		What	scholars	fail	to	recognize	here,	however,	is	that	this	‘virtual	definition’	of	science	was	actually	a	product	of	this	exact	type	of	analysis—i.e.,	‘science’	was	constructed	by	excluding	religion.	According	to	this	perspective,	when	religious	considerations	were	no	longer	playing	a	role	“they	necessarily	stopped	doing	natural	philosophy”	and	this	is	then	understood	as	the	historical	emergence	of	science.	Andrew	Cunningham	argued	that	understanding	science	as	not	about	God	“is	one	of	the	most	basic	things	that	the	members	of	 the	modern	scientific	community	 hold	 in	 common.”	 Religious	 consideration,	 “more	 than	 anything	 else,	distinguishes	it	[natural	philosophy]	from	our	modern	science.”31		 Here,	we	see	that	the	history	of	science	was	constructed	as	ultimately	the	freedom	from	and/or	the	end	of	natural	philosophy,	taking	the	best	parts	of	natural	philosophy	along	with	it	and	specifically	abandoning	the	religious	aspects.	The	effect	of	differentiating	science	and	natural	philosophy	based	on	religious	considerations	is	to	construct	religion	and	science	as	mutually	 exclusive.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 simple.	 Prior	 to	 this	 everything	 that	 science	meant	was	subsumed	in	natural	philosophy.	Once	that	is	taken	away,	with	the	single	dividing	line	being	religion,	then	the	only	thing	that	makes	science	what	it	is	is	what	it	is	not	and	that	thing	is	religion.	In	addition	to	Cunningham’s	argument,	we	can	see	the	influence	of	this	type	of	 thinking	 in	 those	 such	 as	 Cohen	 and	 John	 A.	 Schuster,	 as	 well.32	 There	 are	 certainly	




4.2 Science/Natural	Philosophy	as	‘Not	Religion’	While	 some	 differentiated	 science	 from	 natural	 philosophy/religion	 to	 establish	 the	historical	emergence	of	the	field,	as	discussed	above,	others	differentiated	science/natural	philosophy	from	religion	for	the	same	purposes.	In	the	historical	study	of	science,	natural	philosophy	has	often	been	divorced	from	religion	to	justify	its	inclusion	in	the	(pre-)history	of	science.	For	example,	Edward	Grant’s	method	of	analyzing	‘science’	in	natural	philosophy	was	specifically	accomplished	by	noting	the	lack	of	religious	considerations	within	natural	philosophy.35	Moreover,	 Grant	 claimed	 that	when	 religious	 considerations	 are	 taken	 into	
																																																						discuss	how	historians	have	characteristically	treated	modern	science	in	specific	contrast	to	natural	philosophy	and	 the	 signifier	of	 religion	does	appear.	There	are	also	 contrasts	between	natural	philosophy	and	 science	based	on	signifiers	that	are	frequently	discursively	entangled	with	religion,	such	as	 ‘magic,’	 ‘mysticism,’	and	‘superstition.’	See	also	Schuster	(1990).	33	This	view	that	natural	philosophy	is	necessarily	religious	is	challenged	by	some,	e.g.,	Grant	(2007),	xi	and	250–251.	See	also	Grant	(1999);	and	Dear	(2001a).	Grant	(2007),	251,	suggested	that	there	is	one	point	that	negates	Cunningham’s	view:	 “Those	who	believe	 that	natural	philosophy	 is	always	about	God	would	surely	interpret	natural	philosophy	and	its	impact	quite	differently	than	those	who	failed	to	recognize	that	profound	truth	 […]”	and	yet,	he	argued,	 “not	a	single	 important	consequence	 […]	 flows	 from	these	radically	different	approaches.”	However,	there	is	a	significant	consequence	that	Grant	is	overlooking—those	who	resisted	the	association	between	natural	philosophy	and	religion	used	this	as	a	means	for	justification	for	including	it	in	the	history	of	 science.	Whether	or	not	natural	philosophy	 counts	 as	 science	hinges	on	 these	 radically	different	views,	 which	 manifested	 first	 in	 Whig	 history,	 representing	 one	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 and	 later	 in	historiography,	on	the	other	end,	which	recognized	the	need	for	contextual	analysis	of	natural	philosophy	on	its	 own	 terms	 rather	 than	 on	 preconceived	 notions	 of	 what	 ‘science’	 is.	 Nonetheless,	 whether	 we	 can	convincingly	 think	of	natural	philosophy	as	religious	or	not	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	differentiation	between	natural	philosophy	and	religion,	on	the	one	hand,	and	science,	on	the	other,	has	contributed	to	the	discourse	 constructing	 science	 as	 ‘not	 religion.’	 For	 the	 exchange	 between	 Cunningham	 and	 Grant,	 see	Cunningham	(2000a);	Grant	(2000);	and	Cunningham	(2000b).	34	 Dear	 (2001a),	 381.	 See	 also	 the	 exchange	 between	 Cunning	 and	Dear	 in	 Cunningham	 (2001);	 and	Dear	(2001b).	35	Grant	(1996);	Grant	(1999);	Grant	(2000);	and	Grant	(2007).	The	editors	of	an	open	forum	between	Grant	and	Cunningham	take	some	middle	ground	between	the	two,	suggesting	natural	philosophy	is	a	“discipline	that	is	 obviously	 co-extensive	 with	 neither	 ‘science’	 nor	 ‘philosophy.’”	 See	 Thijssen	 &	 Lüthy	 (2000).	 David	 C.	Lindberg	could	be	cited	as	another	example	that	regards	natural	philosophy	as	part	of	science,	although	he	ignores	the	role	of	religion	altogether	in	his	definition	of	this	enterprise,	rather	than	use	the	natural	philosophy-religion	distinction	as	a	means	of	 justification	 to	 include	 it	 in	 the	history	of	science,	as	Grant	does.	 ‘Natural	philosophy’	is	described	as	the	“investigations	of	the	natural	world	that	concentrated	on	questions	of	material	causation	[…].”	Though	he	does	not	cite	religion	in	his	definition	of	natural	philosophy,	he	does	discuss	it	in	other	regards.	See	Lindberg	(2007),	3.	
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account,	 it	 is	no	 longer	natural	philosophy:	 “Theology	and	 faith	 could	not	 enter	 it	 in	 any	significant	manner	because	to	do	so	would	transform	natural	philosophy	into	supernatural	philosophy,	 natural	 theology,	 or	 theology.”36	 However,	 this	 is	 to	 invoke	 a	 natural-supernatural	dichotomy	that	had	not	yet	been	established	in	this	context,	which,	in	fact,	was	constructed	via	the	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	construct,	as	will	be	discussed.	Grant	made	it	quite	clear	that	the	exclusion	of	religion	from	natural	philosophy	is	the	grounds	for	including	 it	 as	 science:	 “[F]rom	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 onward,	 natural	 philosophy	 remained	relatively	free	of	theological	encroachments.	And	it	also	makes	it	quite	plausible	to	believe	that	natural	philosophy	is	the	real	precursor	of	modern	science.”37		
	 As	Cunningham	aptly	noted,	Grant	“maintains	the	science/religion	apposition	as	his	analytical	tool,	and	since	he	treats	natural	philosophy	as	simply	an	early	version	of	(modern)	science,	whenever	he	speaks	of	a	‘natural	philosophy/religion’	(or	theology)	apposition	this	means	just	the	same	thing.”38	In	other	words,	such	a	thesis	puts	religion	and	science	in	an	oppositional	construct	by	suggesting	that	science	is	historically	rooted	in	natural	philosophy	specifically	because	 it	 is	not	religious,	making	the	dividing	 line	between	science	and	non-science	that	of	religion.	This	is	another	example	of	the	discursive	circle	that	starts	with	the	tacit	 knowledge	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity	 and	 constructs	 the	 historical	 evidence	 to	 meet	presumptions.	As	Thomas	F.	Gieryn	analyzed	it,	“scientists	sought	to	keep	selected	elements	of	religion	out	of	natural	philosophy;	here,	the	rhetorical	goal	is	to	keep	elements	of	science	out	of	religion.”39		The	 two	 forms	 of	 this	 history	 of	 science	 as	 ‘not	 religion’	 result	 in	 two	 very	 different	
																																																						36	Grant	(2000),	290.	A	similar	statement	occurs	in	ibid.,	288:	“Whenever	a	theological	explanation	is	given	in	natural	philosophy,	it	converts	what	should	have	been	a	natural	explanation	to	a	supernatural	explanation	and,	consequently,	defeats	the	very	purpose	of	a	treatise	on	natural	philosophy,	which	is	to	explain	phenomena	by	natural	causes.	If	this	were	done	to	any	considerable	extent,	the	treatise	in	question	would	no	longer	be	a	work	in	 natural	 philosophy,	 but	would	 have	 been	 converted	 to	 one	 on	 supernatural	 philosophy,	 or	 theology,	 or	perhaps	a	treatise	on	natural	theology.”	37	Grant	(2000),	290.	Grant	(2007),	303–316,	traced	the	separation	of	‘science’	and	‘natural	philosophy’	back	to	the	 thirteenth	 century.	 However,	 science	was	 still	 considered	 to	 be	within	 the	 ranks	 and	 order	 of	 natural	philosophy	and	what	is	pertinent	is	the	separation	of	natural	philosophy	and	science	as	constituting	their	own	super-categories.	38	Cunnigham	(2000a),	267–268	and	267–268	n.11.	Though,	as	we	have	seen,	Cunningham	is	guilty	of	a	similar	thing.	39	Gieryn	(1988),	591.	See	also	ibid.	for	a	discussion	of	further	examples	of	the	science/religion	divide	in	relation	to	natural	philosophy	in	early	accounts.	
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arguments:	one,	the	freedom	from	natural	philosophy	was	the	cause	for	the	emergence	of	science;	 and,	 two,	 natural	 philosophy	 was	 the	 precursor	 of	 science.	 Yet	 whatever	 the	historical	reality,	both	accounts	construct	religion	and	science	as	mutually	exclusive.	In	fact,	both	might	have	been	true	in	regard	to	the	variety	of	the	historical	actors’	own	views	and	in	regard	to	the	specific	time	period.	There	was	a	brief	time	when	‘philosophy’	and	‘science’	were	used	synonymously	(mainly	ca.	1800–1850),	though	the	separation	of	these	terms	was	also	increasing	during	this	period,	with	the	assignment	of	‘philosophy’	to	the	theological	and	metaphysical	and	‘science’	to	the	experimental	and	physical	branches	of	knowledge.40	Either	way,	mutual	 exclusivity	 ensued	 and	 this	 is	 demonstrated	 above	 by	 the	 observation	 that	‘natural	philosophy’	is	only	considered	part	of	the	history	of	‘science’	insofar	as	‘religion’	is	
specifically	 excluded.41	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 the	presence	of	 religious	 thinking	has	 even	been	suggested	to	preclude	the	emergence	of	science	in	some	societies.	For	example,	historian	of	science	Seyyed	Hossein	Nasr	argued,	“the	main	reason	why	modern	science	never	arose	in	China	or	Islam	is	precisely	because	of	the	presence	of	metaphysical	doctrine	and	a	traditional	religious	structure	which	refused	to	make	a	profane	thing	of	nature.”	From	this	perspective,	science	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 “the	 substance	 and	 stuff	 of	 nature	 so	 depleted	 of	 a	sacramental	and	spiritual	character”	or	“purely	secular.”42		 In	this	way,	we	can	think	of	the	writing	of	history	as	a	historical	product	where	battles	
																																																						40	 Ross	 (1962),	 69.	 See	 also	 Grant	 (2007),	 316–319.	 There	 were	 some	 exceptions	 to	 this	 time	 period	 of	synonymy.		41	 Some	 readers	might	be	wondering	at	 this	point,	 so	what	 is	 the	historical	 reality?	Was	 the	 freedom	 from	natural	philosophy	the	cause	for	the	emergence	of	science	or	did	natural	philosophy	make	science	possible?	All	I	can	conclude	must	be	based	on	my	analysis	here,	from	a	discursive	and	relational	perspective—my	concern	is	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 concepts	 and	 I	 care	 little	 about	 historical	 realities	 that	 did	 not	significantly	impact	the	formation	of	the	concepts	in	question.	Thus,	from	this	perspective,	I	would	argue	that	they	are	both	partially	correct,	but	incomplete.	The	boundary	work	between	natural	philosophy	and	science	helped	create	conceptual	space	for	science	as	a	distinct	discipline—in	this	way	the	formation	of	science	was	contingent	on	both	the	contiguity	with	and	separation	from	natural	philosophy.	As	is	the	case	with	any	contrast	case,	both	absence	and	presence	play	equally	important	roles.	(Though	this	paints	a	general	picture,	reality	is	never	so	black	and	white.	There	were	individuals	who	argued	for	the	abandonment	of	natural	philosophy	in	favor	of	science,	as	well	as	 individuals	who	argued	for	the	integration	of	natural	philosophy	and	science,	as	science	began	to	take	on	its	own	flavor.)	There	is	another	important	aspect	to	consider	regarding	the	historical	reality—the	relation	between	religion	and	science.	In	their	own	ways,	both	of	these	forms	of	history	‘ignore’	the	role	of	religion	to	paint	a	picture	of	science.	However,	as	this	chapter	suggests,	religion	was	the	primary	contrast	case	that	constructed	‘science.’	These	historians	fail	to	see	that	by	disregarding	the	role	of	religion,	they	are	actually	contributing	to	the	discourse	at	hand	and	constructing	‘science’	via	this	exclusion.	It	also	seems	prudent	to	give	a	reminder	here	that	I	am	not	suggesting	the	mutual	exclusivity	reading	is	somehow	‘wrong’—but	nor	is	it	‘right’—it	is	simply	constructed.	42	Nasr	(1968a),	97–98.	See	also	Nasr	(1968b),	which	contains	a	similar	formulation.	
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5 The	History	of	Science	as	‘Not	Religion’		While	the	‘beginnings’	of	science	were	shifting	among	time	periods,	the	heyday	of	science	was	first	positioned	in	the	Scientific	Revolution	and	the	Enlightenment	in	early	histories.46	Cunningham	and	Perry	Williams	identified	three	main	ways	that	science	was	characterized	in	 early	 historical	 accounts.	 The	 first	 was	 defining	 science	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 its	methodology,	as	regards	naturalism	in	terms	of	causal	laws,	explanation,	and	prediction.	The	second	method	for	characterizing	science	was	to	formulate	the	enterprise	in	moral	terms	of	freedom,	 rationality,	 truth,	 and	 progress.	 The	 third	way	 of	 characterizing	 science	was	 to	frame	it	as	a	universal	human	enterprise,	the	expression	of	the	fundamental	human	desire	for	 knowledge	 and	 understanding.47	 While	 these	 characterizations	 certainly	 have	 their	distinguishing	features,	they	all	share	in	common	that	they	were	explained	and	understood	in	specific	contrast	to	religion.	To	this	day,	the	Scientific	Revolution	and	the	Enlightenment	“act	as	motifs	for	describing	historical	religion–science	conflict.”48		 While	many	of	the	above-mentioned	themes	feature	throughout	this	work	in	various	contexts,	here	I	will	offer	a	brief	explanation	of	how	these	three	historical	characterizations	of	 science	were	constructed	 in	contrast	 to	 religion.	 In	 the	 first	 characterization,	 scientific	methodology	 is	 contrasted	with	 religious	 revelation,	 by	 the	 early	modern	 differentiation	between	the	Book	of	Nature	and	the	Book	of	God,	and	by	the	distinction	between	reason	and	faith	 and	objective	 and	 subjective	 inquiry,	 for	 instance.49	 Science	was	 identified	with	 the	growth	of	a	kind	of	knowledge	that	was	‘independent’	of	humankind,	to	emphasize	that	it	is	not	people	who	make	these	ideas,	as	religion	was	criticized	of	doing,	but	rather	was	dictated	by	nature.	This	independence	always	came	along	with	emphasis	on	freedom	from	hegemony	of	thought	that	was	largely	identified	with	religion	and	thus	directly	relates	to	the	second	characterization.		
																																																						46	Periodizations	for	these	movements	vary	widely.	Those	events	and	historical	persons	of	interest	mentioned	in	connection	with	these	movements	generally	fall	between	1500	and	1800.	47	Cunningham	&	Williams	(1993),	411–412.	48	Aechtner	(2015),	212.			49	van	Berkel	&	Vanderjagt	(2006).	The	metaphor	of	the	‘Book	of	Nature’	was	instrumental	in	gaining	social	legitimacy	for	new	approaches	to	investigating	nature.	Though	the	metaphor	dates	back	to	antiquity,	it	only	became	popular	in	early	modern	history.	On	the	earlier	use	of	this	trope,	see	van	Berkel	&	Vanderjagt	(2005).	See	 Williams	 (1976),	 233–234	 on	 the	 etymological	 differentiation	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 based	 on	 a	subjective/objective	demarcation.	
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primarily	 shaped	 and	 imparted	 to	 us	 by	 the	 philosophes.”55	Though	much	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	histories	were	constructed,	religion	does	indeed	seem	to	have	been	the	point	of	reference	and	the	explicit	and	primary	target	of	many	of	the	Enlightenment	philosophers.56	Religion	was	also	the	implicit	context	of	which	Enlightenment	thinking	was	reacting	to,	both	in	its	historical	and	discursive	contexts.	Religion	dominated	life	and	thus	formed	the	broad	social	context	of	the	emergence	of	scientific	knowledge.	In	the	historical	primary	materials	and	in	past	and	contemporary	histories	reflecting	on	the	Enlightenment,	religion	is	set	as	the	contextual	backdrop,	a	background	that	draws	the	foreground	of	science	in	relief,	even	when	religion	 does	 not	 feature	 as	 an	 explicit	 object	 of	 inquiry.57	 The	 conceptual	 opposition	constructed	between	religion	and	science	is	ubiquitous.	This	time	period	has	been	described	as	 “the	 model”	 of	 scientific	 rationalism	 against	 religious	 superstition	 and	 the	 theocracy	preceding	 it	 as	 ‘antiscience.’58	 As	 such,	 there	 was	 certainly	 a	 lot	 of	 material	 for	 later	historians	to	exemplify	this	perspective.			 Reflecting	 religion-science	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 the	 ‘Enlightenment’	 has	 also	 been	defined	by	scholars	as	a	movement	“grounding	knowledge	on	the	exercise	of	critical	reason,	
as	opposed	to	tradition,	established	religion,	or	conventional	political	and	social	thinking.”59	In	 fact,	 the	 presumptions	 about	 the	 relation	 between	 divine	 and	 human	 reason	 set	 the	parameters	for	how	notions	of	scientific	reason	would	evolve.	In	the	seventeenth	century,	it	was	assumed	that	human	reason	was	a	means	of	understanding	the	mind	of	God,	indeed	that	made	us	like	God.	Constructing	the	relation	between	human	and	divine	reason	in	this	way	“can	call	into	question	the	need	for	divine	reason	at	all,	as	once	assured	of	our	own	powers	of	reason	we	may	decide	not	to	look	for	any	further	grounding.”	And	such	a	shift	is	exactly	what	happened	in	the	eighteenth	century.	“Reason	came	to	be	seen	not	so	much	as	a	way	of	penetrating	to	the	eternal	truths	of	the	divine	mind,	but	rather	as	a	way	of	investigating	the	
																																																						55	Aechtner	(2015),	212.	56	Hammer	(2001),	3;	and	Byrne	(1996),	25.	57	 E.g.,	 Hampson	 (1968);	 and	 Cohen	 (1994).	 From	 my	 understanding,	 Cohen’s	 work	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	comprehensive	works	on	the	historiography	of	the	Scientific	Revolution,	and,	as	such,	it	is	a	very	good	resource	for	making	this	point.	Time	and	again	the	histories	of	the	Scientific	Revolution	bring	religion	into	play,	even	though	this	is	not	explicitly	identified	as	a	central	theme	of	the	work.	The	classics	were	also	a	common	foil	for	Enlightenment	thinking,	which	nonetheless	also	brought	in	theological	considerations,	which	have	historically	been	discursively	related	to	religion.	58	Zafirovski	(2011),	123	and	125.	59	Byrne	(1996),	1.	Emphasis	added.	
Mutual	Exclusivity	
	 77	
here	and	now	of	the	empirical	world.”60	By	explaining	nature,	this	left	open	the	possibility	that	knowledge	needed	no	recourse	to	divine	activity.			 Whether	 the	 heyday	 of	 science	 was	 placed	 in	 the	 Scientific	 Revolution	 or	 the	Enlightenment,	 it	 is	 regularly	 identified	 by	 the	 specific	 exclusion	 of	 religion.	 Across	 the	board,	‘science’	was	conceptualized,	articulated,	and	explained	by	its	contrast	with	‘religion.’	This	may	seem	 like	an	obvious	approach.	However,	when	we	 take	 into	consideration	 the	meaning	 of	 ‘science’	 prior	 to	 this,	 under	 the	 Medieval	 unified	 view	 of	 knowledge,	 this	relational	construct	is	by	no	means	a	given.	It	was	not	obvious	or	even	established	prior	to	these	discursive	developments	that	‘science’	meant	‘not	religion.’	Rather,	mutual	exclusivity	was	constructing	the	historical	evolution	of	the	term	‘science’	in	novel	ways.		








intellectual	 works	 of	 this	 time	 period	 have	 been	 collectively	 characterized	 as	 stringent	attacks	on	religion,	also	associated	with	the	work	of	the	leading	figure	of	the	Enlightenment,	Voltaire	(François	Marie	Arouet;	1694–1778).	For	an	increasing	amount	of	Enlightenment	thinkers,	 each	 scientific	 advance	 was	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 negation	 of	 particular	religious	 beliefs,	 and	 though	 there	 were	 important	 exceptions,	 histories	 of	 the	Enlightenment	reflected	 this	narrative.69	And	we	see	 that	 this	was	 the	case	 for	more	and	more	 of	 those	 coming	 from	 a	 religious	 perspective	 as	 well—science	 was	 thought	 to	 be	counter	 to	 religion.	 For	 example,	 in	 1858,	 one	 religious	 newspaper	 publication	 based	 in	Ireland	stated:	[W]e	have	no	hesitation	in	maintaining	that	if	in	the	judgment	of	the	Church	the	promulgation	of	any	scientific	truth	was	more	likely	to	hinder	man’s	salvation	than	to	promote	it,	she	would	not	only	be	justified	in	her	efforts	to	suppress	it,	but	it	would	be	her	bounden	duty	to	do	her	utmost	to	suppress	it.70		 Similar	 to	 Denis	 Diderot	 (1713–1784),	 Adam	 Smith	 (1723–1790),	 in	 Wealth	 of	
Nations	 (1776),	 argued:	 “Science	 is	 the	 great	 antidote	 to	 the	 poison	 of	 enthusiasm	 and	superstition.”71	Thomas	Paine	(1737–1809)	in	his	Age	of	Reason	(1794–1807)	pointed	to	the	abuse	of	science	in	the	form	of	superstition,	juxtaposing	it	with	religious	authority:		There	is	scarcely	any	part	of	science,	or	anything	in	nature,	which	those	impostors	and	blasphemers	of	science,	 called	 priests	 […]	 have	 not,	 at	 some	 time	 or	 other,	 perverted,	 or	 sought	 to	 pervert	 to	 the	purpose	of	superstition	and	falsehood.72			 Kant	 distinguished	 between	 the	 realm	 of	 religion	 and	 that	 of	 scientific	 inquiry,	arguing	 the	 two	 constitute	 distinct	 methods,	 systems,	 and	 ways	 of	 thinking.	 Knowledge	about	 the	 world	 has	 to	 do	 with	 objective	 certainty;	 religion	 is	 about	 faith	 or	 subjective	certainty.73	 Science	 describes	 the	 natural	 world,	 while	 religion	 belongs	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	
																																																						69	Byrne	(1996),	1	and	11.	70	 Quoted	 in	 Ellegård	 (1958),	 98–99,	 from	 the	Dublin	 Review.	 See	 also	 ibid.,	 104,	 quoted	 from	 the	British	
Quarterly	Review	(1869):	“[T]he	age	yearns	for	religious	faith,	and	is	disquieted	only	because	it	religious	faith	is	disturbed	by	the	readjustments	which	the	advance	of	science	necessitates.”	71	Smith	(1995	[1776]),	82;	and	Griswold	(1998),	11,	where	this	is	also	quoted	and	discussed.	72	Paine	(1954),	128.	73	Kant	(1998).	This	characterization	simplifies	a	more	complex	view	on	the	limits	of	reason	and	the	futility	in	the	application	of	reason	beyond	the	phenomenal	world.	As	the	inner	reality	of	things	as	they	truly	are—the	noumenal	world—includes	the	realm	of	religious	belief	and	is	not	accessible	to	rational	thinking,	religion	is	necessarily	 a	 separate	 sphere,	 according	 to	Kant.	 See	 also	Byrne	 (1996),	 203–228.	 Faith	 produces	 another	common	 dichotomy	 positioned	 relative	 to	 fact	 that	 is	 in	 play	 in	 religion-science	mutual	 exclusivity.	 Smith	(2003a),	9,	noted	that	religion	and	science	are	historically	represented	as	factions	in	“an	enduring	‘warfare’	of	fact	against	faith.”	
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morality	and	ethics.	While	the	major	point	of	difference	between	religion	and	science	has	often	 been	 identified	 as	 regards	 truth	 claims,	 differentiation	 was	 also	 often	 based	 on	understanding	 religion	 as	 concerning	 social	 values,	meaning,	 and	 other	 such	 concerns.74	Kant’s	 idea	 of	 separate	 spheres	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 continued	 in	 the	 later	 thought	 of	existentialists	(Søren	Kierkegaard	[1813–1855]	and	his	successors)	and	continues	to	echo	through	the	years	in	the	common	sentiment	that	science	is	about	facts	(or	‘how’	questions)	and	 religion	 is	 about	 values	 (or	 ‘why’	 questions).	 This	 places	 the	 scientific	 enterprise	 as	solely	occupying	the	quest	for	truth	in	direct	contrast	to	religion.		
7 The	Scientific	Profession	as	‘Not	Religious’		Due	 to	historiographical	 considerations,	 as	well	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 contextualism	 in	 academia	generally,	 it	 is	now	well	established	 that	our	concept	of	 the	Scientific	Revolution	and	 the	Enlightenment	 need	 to	 be	 problematized	 accordingly.75	 New	 histories	 have	 complicated	these	 characterizations	 of	 science	 by	 focusing	 on	 specific	 contexts	 that	 reveal	 not	 only	 a	spectrum	of	views,	but	also	that	religion	may	have	even	helped	facilitate	the	development	of	science	in	terms	of	the	rational	and	empirical	investigation	of	the	natural	world.76	The	results	of	 such	 developments	 were	 that	 the	 invention	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science,	 the	 discursive	formulation	of	the	term	‘science,’	and	the	invention	of	science	itself	came	to	be	positioned	in	the	time	of	the	professionalization	of	science	in	the	nineteenth	century.			 Professionals	worked	to	build	the	scientific	community	via	devising	codes	of	ethics,	consolidating	professional	organizations,	instituting	professional	schools,	and	disseminating	information	 to	 the	general	public.77	At	 this	 time,	 the	 sciences	began	 to	 feature	 in	 a	more	
																																																						74	Evans	&	Evans	(2008),	100.	Further	references	available	in	ibid.	See	also	Evans	(2011);	Evans	(2013);	and	Geertz	(1973),	87–125.	This	is	just	a	small	sample,	as	the	literature	framing	religion	in	this	way	is	ubiquitous.	75	See,	e.g.,	Lindberg	&	Westman	(1990).	Also	relevant	to	the	problematization	of	a	unified	notion	of	‘science’	as	well	as	 its	history	are	developments	 in	the	philosophy	of	science.	See	Feyerabend	(1975)	on	the	various	methods	 of	 producing	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	 Kuhn	 (1970	 [1962])	 on	 the	 contextualized,	 paradigmatic	nature	 of	 scientific	 methodology.	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 various	 intellectual	 movements	 toward	problematizing	the	notion	of	unified	science,	see	Cunningham	&	Williams	(1993),	esp.	413–417.	76	Merton	(1970	[1938]);	Hooykaas	(2000	[1972]);	and	Jaki	(1974).	77	Turner	(1978),	359.	See	also,	ibid.,	362–363.	
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central	place	 in	educational	 institutions’	curriculum.78	 It	was	also	during	this	 time	period	that	 a	 research	 site	 specifically	 dedicated	 to	 the	 production	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 of	nature—the	laboratory—first	became	common,	which	was	polemically	separated	from	the	long-established	laboratories	dedicated	to	alchemy	and	were	instead	labeled	according	to	particular	disciplines,	like	physics	and	physiology.79	In	short,	with	the	professionalization	of	science,	we	see	a	real	social	structure	in	place	that	could	warrant	the	historical	placement	of	the	emergence	of	science	at	this	time.	And,	pertinent	to	our	discussion	here,	along	with	the	professionalization	 of	 science,	 we	 see	 religion-science	 mutual	 exclusivity	 materialize	 in	much	firmer	ways	than	it	ever	had	before.		
7.1 Scientific	Fields	of	Study	as	‘Not	Religious’		Concrete	examples	include	the	formation	of	specialized	scientific	fields	of	study,	specifically	accomplished	by	the	exclusion	of	the	religious	aspects	of	the	pre-existing	fields	of	study	in	natural	 philosophy.	 Georges	 Cuvier	 (1769–1832),	 Charles	 Lyell	 (1797–1875),	 and	 others	formed	the	field	of	geology	as	a	secular	history	in	which	religious	questions	about	God	and	purpose	were	framed	as	inappropriate.	This	was	a	replacement	of	‘sacred	history’	that	was	an	 attempt	 in	 the	 factual	 establishment	 of	 the	 Biblical	 account	 of	 creation.80	 Conversely,	geological	 questions	 were	 framed	 as	 inappropriate	 for	 religion.	 For	 instance,	 Anglican	minister	 Henry	 Cole	 (1792–1858),	 in	 his	 work	 Popular	 Geology	 Subversive	 of	 Divine	
Revelation!	(1834),	asked	“What	was	God	doing	before	the	first	of	the	six	days	of	creation?,”	answering	“He	was	decreeing	from	everlasting	a	hell	for	all	infidel	inquirers.”81	At	the	same	time,	 many	 thought	 “Geology	 disproved	 Genesis,”	 concluding	 science	 and	 religion	 had	“opposed	conclusions”	and	challenges	to	the	Bible	across	the	board	were	labeled	‘science.’82	As	 such,	 this	 line	 between	 religious	 and	 scientific	 fields	 of	 study	 also	 contributed	 to	 the	demarcation	between	religious	belief	and	scientific	fact—an	obvious	persistent	theme	in	the	
																																																						78	Harrison	 (2003),	 781.	 There	 are	many	 sources	 that	 established	 the	 professionalization	 of	 science	 in	 the	nineteenth	century.	E.g.,	for	Britain,	see	Hall	(1984);	on	France,	see	Fox	(1984);	and	for	Germany,	see	Turner	(1971).	79	Cunningham	&	Williams	(1993),	423;	Landbrecht	&	Straub	(2016),	33	and	35;	and	Simpson	(2016d).	80	Cunningham	&	Williams	(1993),	422;	Klaver	 (1997),	1;	and	Brooke	&	Cantor	 (1998),	58.	See	also	Klaver	(1997),	in	entirety;	Brooke	&	Cantor	(1998),	57–62;	Rudwick	(1990),	xvi–xviii;	and	Kolbl-Ebert	(2009).	81	Quoted	in	Moore	(1988),	438.	82	Chadwick	(1972),	3.	
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7.2 Scientist	as	‘Not	a	Person	of	Religion’		It	was	also	 in	the	nineteenth	century	that	the	professional	category	of	 ‘scientist’	emerged	(the	 coinage	 attributed	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 Whewell	 in	 1834),	 specifically	 excluding	clergy,	who	had	hitherto	played	a	central	role	in	the	study	of	natural	philosophy.88	Samuel	Taylor	Coleridge	(1772–1834)	provides	another	example	of	early	use	of	the	term,	which	he	used	to	refer	to	the	new	group	of	researchers	who	were	leaving	aside	the	profound	questions	of	natural	philosophers	for	more	practical	applications,	like	the	development	of	technology.	For	 Coleridge,	 being	 a	 romantic,	 the	 label	 ‘scientist’	 was	 somewhat	 derogatory,	 with	 its	abandonment	of	cosmological,	moral,	religious,	and	philosophical	questions.89	Whether	with	positive	 or	 negative	 connotation,	 ‘scientist’	was	 conceptualized	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 in	contrast	to	those	concerned	with	religious	considerations.			 Many	members	 of	 this	 new	 group,	 identifying	 themselves	 as	 ‘scientists,’	 ridiculed	clerical	 practitioners	 of	 science	 and	 framed	 the	 clergy	 as	 incapable	 of	 being	 genuine	scientists,	sometimes	even	 framing	the	clergy	as	a	whole	as	 the	enemies	of	science.90	For	example,	this	featured	as	a	theme	in	English	Men	of	Science:	Their	Nature	and	Nurture	(1874),	in	which	Francis	Galton	(1822–1911)	stated,	“The	pursuit	of	science	is	uncongenial	to	the	priestly	 character.”91	 Galton	 argued	 for	 his	 position	 based	 on	 his	 observation	 that	 few	scientists	came	from	clerical	backgrounds	and	on	his	own	experiences	of	the	ineptitude	of	clergy	for	valuable	scientific	work.	Though	clearly	this	is	not	an	accurate	assessment,	as	prior	to	and	during	this	time	period	clericals	in	science	were	commonplace,	and	much	scientific	work	even	took	place	within	churches,	it	nonetheless	demonstrates	that	the	construction	of	‘scientist’	was	done	 in	 specific	 contrast	 to	 religion.92	Galton’s	assessment	and	 tactic	were	typical	for	the	emerging	professional	group.	It	was	a	means	to	“persuade”	the	public:		
																																																						88	Turner	(1978),	360,	364	and	passim;	Harrison	(2003),	781;	Ross	(1962),	71;	and	Simpson	(2016j).	89	McMahan	(2008),	86.	David	McMahan	credited	Coleridge	with	coining	the	term	in	1833.	It	was	actually	due	to	a	conversation	with	Coleridge	that	led	Whewell	to	discuss	the	term	in	his	account	of	their	meeting	at	the	British	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Science	in	1833,	in	a	publication	in	1834	often	cited	as	the	first	use	of	the	term.	This	suggests	that	 indeed	the	word	had	already	been	introduced	at	 least	by	1833,	though	from	Whewell’s	 comments	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 who	 actually	 coined	 the	 term.	 Still,	 he	 does	 refer	 to	 some	 “ingenious	gentleman,”	which	Ross	(1962),	72	claimed	was	Whewell	himself.	See	also	[Whewell]	Anon.	(1834),	59;	and	Schaffer	(1986),	409–410.	On	the	point	that	this	anonymous	work	was	written	by	Whewell,	see	Ross	(1962),	71.	90	Turner	(1978),	365;	and	Chadwick	(1972),	27.	91	Quoted	in	Turner	(1978),	365.	92	Hampson	(1968),	24;	Grant	(1996),	84–85	and	174–176;	Cunningham	(2000a),	275–276;	Heilbron	(1989);	and	Kozhamthadam	(2002),	5–9.	
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few.107			 John	 Tyndall	 (1820–1893)	 contributed	 many	 influential	 public	 addresses	 and	popular	writings	that	are	an	excellent	source	on	how	the	scientific	institution	was	specifically	demarcated	from	religion.	Tyndall	often	used	religion	as	a	‘contrast	case’	when	engaging	in	this	boundary	work	of	science	to	present	the	new	profession	to	the	public.	Thomas	F.	Gieryn,	like	myself,	specifically	described	this	contrasting	behavior	as	 formulating	 ‘science	as	not	religion.’108	Tyndall	invoked	many	dichotomies	to	establish	the	mutual	exclusivity	of	religion	and	science.	He	associated	science	with	technology,	material	progress,	and	practicality,	while	religion	was	deemed	for	emotional	uses,	if	useful	at	all.	Tyndall	argued,	“that	the	knowledge	brought	to	us	by	those	prophets,	priests	and	kings	of	science	is	what	the	world	calls	‘useful	knowledge,’	the	triumphant	application	of	their	discoveries	prove.”	In	contrast,	religion	was	seen	as	“capable	of	adding,	in	the	region	of	poetry	and	emotion,	 inward	completeness	and	dignity	 to	 man.”	 In	 another	 example,	 science	 was	 associated	 with	 empiricism,	experimentation,	and	truth	of	the	natural	world,	while	religion	was	assigned	to	the	realm	of	metaphysics,	spirituality,	and	a	truth	that	cannot	be	verified.	Tyndall	stated,	“while	science	cheerfully	submits	to	this	ordeal	[of	fact-checking	via	observation],	it	seems	impossible	to	devise	a	mode	of	verification	of	their	theories	which	does	not	rouse	resentment	in	theological	minds.”109	Science	was	also	associated	with	skepticism	and	framed	as	subservient	only	to	fact,	while	religion	was	connected	to	dogmatic	authority.	Science	was	seen	as	objective	and	free	of	biases,	while	religion	was	regarded	as	subjective	and	emotional.110			 And	in	his	famous	Belfast	Address	in	1874,	Tyndall	threw	down	the	gauntlet:		[G]rotesque	in	relation	to	scientific	culture	as	many	of	the	religions	of	the	world	have	been	and	are—dangerous,	nay,	destructive,	to	the	dearest	privileges	of	freemen	[…]	We	[representing	science]	claim,	and	we	shall	wrest,	from	theology	the	entire	domain	of	cosmological	theory.	All	schemes	and	systems,	which	thus	infringe	upon	the	domain	of	science,	must,	in	so	far	as	they	do	this,	submit	to	its	control,	and	relinquish	all	thought	of	controlling	it.111		
																																																						107	Turner	(1978),	357	and	357	n.8	for	several	relevant	references;	and	Gieryn	(1999),	44.	108	Gieryn	(1983);	and	Gieryn	(1999),	43.	See	also	Gieryn	(1995),	393–443,	on	the	boundary	work	of	science.	109	Quoted	in	Gieryn	(1983),	785.	110	Gieryn	(1983),	785–786.	See	also	 ibid.;	and	Gieryn	(1999),	37–64,	 for	 further	quotes	and	explanation	of	Tyndall’s	views.	On	the	demarcation	of	religion	and	science	via	empiricism,	skepticism,	and	practical	utility	in	the	boundary	work	of	Tyndall,	see	ibid.,	46–51.	111	Tyndall	(1874),	61.	Emphasis	original.	This	was	widely	interpreted	as	addressed	to	all	religious	institutions,	though	Tyndall	 later	specified	that	he	was	referring	to	Roman	Catholicism	in	particular.	See	Turner	(1978),	373–374.	
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As	Gieryn	noted,	Tyndall’s	decision	to	formulate	science	as	‘not	religion’	was	not	an	arbitrary	choice,	but	served	a	particular	and	pressing	purpose—to	garner	support	for	science	during	a	time	in	which	religion	was	an	impediment	(both	apparent	and	real	in	various	ways)	to	the	growth	 of	 science.	 And	 this	 strategy	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 a	 success—following	 Tyndall’s	death,	 science	 became	 an	 established	 part	 of	 the	 educational	 system	 that	 enjoyed	unprecedented	freedom	from	clerical	interference	and	public	funding	for	scientific	research	greatly	increased.	The	scientific	profession	constructed	in	contrast	to	religion	contributed	to	the	 legitimization	 of	 the	 scientific	 institution,	 as	 well	 as	 public	 support	 for	 science,	 and	provided	a	“rationale	for	the	superiority	of	scientists.”112		 	This	was	not	a	simple	clash	of	worldviews	based	on	pre-established	meanings	of	the	concepts,	 but	 a	 systematic,	 structured,	 and	 often	 deliberately	 constructed	 separation	 of	religion	 and	 science	 on	 the	 part	 of	 scientists	 in	 the	 quest	 of	 professionalization.	 This	 is	exemplified	 in	 the	 case	 of	 St.	 George	 Jackson	Mivart	 (1827–1900).	Mivart	was	 a	 Roman	Catholic	 biologist	 and	 a	 student	 of	 Huxley,	 a	 supporter	 of	 naturalism,	 and	 a	 secondary	member	of	the	Darwin	circle.	However,	Mivart	also	held	the	conviction	that	evolution	was	perfectly	 compatible	with	Christianity.	 It	was	Mivart’s	 hope	 to	 reconcile	 Catholicism	 and	science	in	this	environment	of	increasing	antagonism	as	has	been	discussed	thus	far.113	And	Mivart	 was	 not	 alone;	 many	 leaders	 in	 science	 and	 theology	 regarded	 evolution	 as	compatible	with	religious	beliefs	or	even	saw	religion	and	science	as	mutually	reinforcing.114	Biologist	Henry	Drummond	(1851–1897)	even	went	so	far	as	to	argue	that	it	was	incorrect	to	discuss	a	reconciliation	between	Christianity	and	evolution	since	they	were	one	and	the	same.115	If	religion	and	science	were	only	clashing	based	on	worldviews	and	doctrines,	this	would	seem	a	natural	direction	for	the	discourse	to	take,	finding	a	means	to	accommodate	them	both.	And	yet,	Mivart’s	own	teacher,	Huxley,	viciously	attacked	his	work.	As	religion-science	antagonism	was	thought	to	be	centrally	instrumental	to	the	progression	of	science,	scientists	 largely	 saw	 this	 clash	 as	within	 the	 interests	 of	 their	 community.	According	 to	
																																																						112	Gieryn	(1983),	784	and	787.	113	Turner	(1978),	369–371.	See	also	Pleins	(2013),	84–88.	On	the	life	of	Mivart,	see	Gruber	(1980).	114	 Cantor	 (2005),	 2;	 Ellegård	 (1958),	 99,	 102–103,	 and	 108–110;	 Livingstone	 (1987);	 and	 Numbers	 &	Stenhouse	(1999),	the	last	source	of	which	discussed	evolution,	religion,	and	science	in	several	different	areas	of	the	world,	as	well	as	in	several	social	contexts.	115	Brooke	(1991),	16.	
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8 Conflict	as	the	Materialization	of	Mutual	Exclusivity		Because	science	was	already	conceived	of	as	‘not	religion,’	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	when	the	term	‘conflict’	came	to	refer	to	a	clash	between	views,	discursively	linking	the	term	to	conceptual	opposition,	it	was	readily	applied	to	the	religion-science	relationship.	Prior	to	the	late	the	nineteenth	century,	use	of	the	word	‘conflict’	was	restricted	to	references	of	battles	or	 collisions.	 It	was	 not	 until	 Draper’s	work	History	 of	 the	 Conflict	 Between	 Religion	 and	
Science	was	published	in	1875	that	 ‘conflict’	came	to	refer	to	religious,	philosophical,	and	political	opposition.	Draper	was	likely	responsible	for	adding	this	new	connotation	to	the	term.119		 Conflict	went	through	fifty	printings	by	the	early	1930s	and	was	translated	into	ten	languages.120	 It	was	 likely	 due	 to	 the	 success	 of	 this	 publication	 that	 the	 religion-science	dichotomy	became	common	knowledge	and	that	this	conceptual	dichotomy	was	redefined	as	a	hard	fact,	i.e.,	conflict.121	Draper	“created	a	myth	of	the	reifications	Science	and	Religion	wrestling	 together	 for	 dominance.”122	 One	 example	 that	 Draper	 utilized	 to	 demonstrate	religion-science	conflict	was	the	juxtaposition	of	the	Christian	flat-Earth	cosmology	and	that	of	sphericity	upheld	in	the	scientific	community.	Prior	to	1870,	history	texts	seldom	referred	to	 the	 flat-Earth	 cosmology.	 Yet,	 following	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 warfare	 thesis	 and	 the	popularization	 of	 such	 views,	 this	 Christian	 myth	 appeared	 in	 nearly	 all	 history	 texts	following	 1880.	 Although	we	 cannot	 be	 certain	 about	 the	 causal	 link,	 the	 coincidence	 is	striking,	suggesting,	at	the	very	least,	cultural	currency	of	the	religion-science	conflict.123	In	fact,	some	have	linked	this	directly	to	Draper	and	his	fellow	warfare	theoretician	White	since	they	 exaggerated	 the	 degree	 of	 reception	 of	 flat-earth	 cosmology.124	 Draper’s	 work	 was	
																																																						119	Cantor	&	Kenny	(2001),	766–767.	E.g.,	over	the	following	decade,	other	authors	followed	suit,	using	‘conflict’	as	a	means	to	express	intellectual	opposition,	including	The	Conflict	of	Christianity	with	Heathenism	(1879)	and	
The	Conflict	Between	Literature	and	Science	(1881).	See,	 respectively,	Ropes,	Smyth,	&	Uhlhom	(1879);	and	Tilden	(1881).		120	Fleming	(1972),	134.	121	Russell	(1997),	38.	See	also	Fleming	(1972),	126–129.	122	Fleming	(1972),	128.	123	Russell	(1997),	x,	43,	and	90–91	n.84.	On	the	flat	earth	myth,	see	also	Cormack	(2009);	and	Garwood	(2007).	124	Principe	(2015),	48;	and	Garwood	(2007),	10–13	and	23.	There	were	many	other	falsehoods	and	half-truths	about	 the	history	of	 religion	and	science	perpetuated	by	Draper	and	White.	See	Numbers	 (2009),	1–3;	and	Principe	(2009),	100.	Besides	the	cases	of	Draper	and	White,	in	general,	the	history	of	religion	and	science	has	
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to	 problems	 which	 science	 could	 not	 solve	 at	 the	 time,”	 making	 the	 advancement	 of	knowledge	inevitably	appear	as	religion-science	conflict.137	While	the	God	of	the	gaps	role	in	religion-science	conflict	is	not	the	only	contributing	factor,	it	does	demonstrate,	in	relational	terms,	that	the	enterprise	of	 ‘religion’	was	also	being	defined	in	terms	of	its	contrast	with	science.	Advocates	on	both	sides	of	the	debate	were	framing	scientific	facts	in	terms	of	the	mutual	implication	of	religion	and	science.			 By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	 framing	science	as	 ‘not	religion’	had	evolved	beyond	a	simple	conceptual	boundary	 line	and	become	a	means	of	 interpreting	empirical	facts,	as	well	as	a	means	for	materializing	opposition.	Put	differently,	the	very	act	of	religion-science	dichotomization	in	analyzing	facts,	like	in	the	instance	of	the	polyp,	does	not	reveal	conflict;	 it	 creates	 it.	 Though	 this	 is	 a	 construct,	 the	 conflict	 becomes	 concretized	 in	 the	success	of	scientific	theories	that	hinged	on	their	challenges	to	religion,	as	seen	here,	but	also	in	 legal	 proceedings	 and	 judgments	 and	 even	 in	 empirical	 studies	 of	 the	 religion-science	relationship.138			 As	recent	as	2015	it	was	found	that:		[C]ontemporary	postsecondary	textbooks	and	reference	materials	of	various	disciplines	[“around	the	world”]	 still	 present	 the	 conflict	model’s	narrative	 as	 the	historical	 account	of	 religion	and	 science	interactions.	 Hence,	 the	 conflict	 model	 persists	 not	 merely	 as	 a	 popular	 artifact,	 but	 also	 as	 a	conspicuous	historical	narrative	in	modern	university-level	pedagogical	and	reference	materials.139		Notions	of	a	religion-science	conflict	have	led	many	to	conclude	that	“the	advancement	of	science	is	served	by	an	attack	on	its	antitype	...	religion.”140	Conflict	perpetuates	conflict,	all	the	while	with	 little	 to	no	 awareness	 that	 the	notion	of	 conflict	 is	 based	on	a	 contingent	historical	formulation	of	science	as	‘not	religion.’		The	 main	 reason	 there	 is	 conflict	 is	
																																																						137	Holton	(1973),	449.	138	On	legal	matters,	see,	e.g.,	the	varying	descriptions	of	‘science’	at	the	Scopes	Monkey	Trial	and	the	McLean	Creation-Science	 Trial	 (McLean	 v.	 Arkansas	 Board	 of	 Education,	 1981–1982)—regarding	 the	 role	 of	evolution/creationism	in	education—which	demonstrate	that	ultimately,	the	final	judgment	of	the	cases	rested	on	 the	 demarcation	 of	 religion	 and	 science.	 See	 Gieryn,	 Bevins,	 &	 Zehr	 (1985);	 Prelli	 (1989),	 219–236;	Holtzman	&	Klasfeld	(1983);	and	Larson	(1997).	While	this	does	not	come	as	a	surprise,	what	should	be	taken	away	 from	 this	point	 is	 that,	 again,	 science	 is	 conceptualized	 in	 this	particular	mode	of	 religious	exclusion,	which	 is	 by	no	means	 a	 standard	 related	 to	 some	 idealized	vision	of	 science	 as	 outside	of	 social	 influence.	Regarding	the	 latter	point,	early	empirical	studies	on	the	religion-science	relationship	put	disproportionate	emphasis	on	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity,	framing	the	study	in	terms	of	an	inverse	ratio	between	being	religious	and	being	scientific.	See	Evans	&	Evans	(2008),	93;	and	Stark	&	Finke	(2000),	73.	139	Aechtner	(2015),	210	and	220.	140	Harrison	(2011).	
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because	religion	and	science	were	defined	as	conflictual,	a	definition,	we	have	seen,	that	was	due	 to	 the	 historical	 conceptualization	 of	 religion-science	 mutual	 exclusivity.	 This	etymological	evolution	was	a	novelty,	not	a	necessity.			 Though	 it	 is	 increasingly	 recognized	 that	 religion-science	 conflict	 is	 contingent,	nonetheless	discussions	about	the	religion-science	relationship—from	the	academic	to	the	popular—are	largely	preoccupied	with	conflict,	appearing	as	a	major	theme	even	in	those	works	 that	 suggest	 alternative	 perspectives.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	awareness	of	 the	 root	of	 the	problem,	which	 is	misidentified	as	 the	 thesis	 itself.	As	 such,	challenges	to	the	thesis	are	via	differing	theses	or	counterexamples,	all	the	while	drawing	upon	common	understandings	of	religion	and	science	to	make	these	points.	For	example,	some	counter	conflict	by	arguing	that	naturalism	and	supernaturalism	are	not	necessarily	opposed	 (as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Six	 and	 Chapter	 Eight).	 And	 yet,	 these	 common	definitions—like	 religion	 as	 regarding	 the	 supernatural	 and	 science	 in	 reference	 to	 the	natural—are	also	results	of	mutual	exclusivity.	The	conflict	thesis	resides	primarily	in	the	realm	of	historical	ideas	of	religion-science	relationalization	and	thus	this	is	what	needs	to	be	 addressed	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 underlying	 issues.	Working	 from	definitions	 to	counter	said	thesis	remains	problematic	because	the	signifiers	present	in	these	definitions	are	also	the	product	of	relationalization.			 I	will	now	turn	to	some	of	the	main	signifiers	of	religion	and	science	born	from	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct	that	are	still	operative	today	in	the	conceptualization	of	these	terms,	as	well	as	operative	 in	 the	re-constellation	of	 these	concepts	 in	 the	articulation	of	alternative	 perspectives.	 In	 order	 to	 seriously	 challenge	 theses	 of	 the	 religion-science	relationship,	we	need	to	understand	how	the	terms	and	definitions	used	in	these	theses	are	constructed	and	constructing	the	religion-science	relation.		
9 Exclusive	Science:	Signifiers	of	Science	as	‘Not	Religion’		Scientific	 knowledge,	 the	 history	 of	 scientific,	 the	 scientific	 enterprise,	 the	 profession	 of	science,	and	‘fact’-based	conflict	have	all	been	conceptualized	by	relationalizing	religion	and	science	in	a	dichotomous	fashion.	The	result	has	been	that	the	actual	terms	themselves	came	
Mutual	Exclusivity	
	 95	




intellectuals	voiced	their	opinions	that	the	word	should	exclude	morals,	theology,	and	other	terms	related	to	religious	considerations.	Though	this	was	done	in	part	by	those	who	thought	these	 considerations	 were	 ‘higher’	 than	 science,	 it	 was	 also	 promoted	 on	 the	 part	 of	advocates	 of	 the	 professionalization	 of	 science	 who	 deemed	 their	 own	 views	 more	prestigious.143	The	public	debate	between	Huxley	and	Bishop	Samuel	Wilberforce	(1805–1873)	at	a	British	Association	meeting	in	1860	made	the	conceptualization	of	‘science’	as	‘not	religion’	quite	 famous.	The	discussion	was	 in	 regard	 to	Darwin’s	On	 the	Origin	of	 Species	(1859),	which	had	a	significant	influence	on	how	the	general	public	understood	the	meaning	of	the	word	‘science.’	As	Roy	Harris	succinctly	put	it:		If	Darwin	was	a	typical	scientist,	and	The	Origin	of	Species	a	typical	work	of	science,	and	if	the	problem	was	that	accepting	Darwinian	biology	meant	rejecting	the	account	of	creation	given	in	the	Bible,	then	what	science	‘stood	for’	assumed	a	quite	specific	public	profile	that	it	had	not	had	previously.	Science	came	to	be	seen	as	alternative	to	Christianity,	which	in	turn	was	seen	as	a	long-standing	obstacle	to	scientific	progress.144		In	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 Christians	 contributed	 to	 the	 dichotomy	 as	 well,	 with	 many	labeling	any	challenge	to	the	Bible	as	‘science.’	Whether	it	emerged	from	the	historical	study	of	the	Bible	or	not,	the	public	failed	to	make	such	a	distinction.145		 Outside	of	the	religion-science	context,	‘science’	continues	to	be	defined	in	ways	that	can	be	specifically	traced	to	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity.	‘Science’	as	dealing	with	the	natural,	material,	and	physical	among	other	signifiers,	were	all	assigned	to	science	due	to	the	dichotomization	of	religion	and	science,	while	‘religion,’	in	the	spirit	of	negative	correlation,	was	likened	to	supernaturalism,	dualism,	and	the	subjective	or	spiritual.		




engaged	 in	 “an	 immense	bargaining	process	with	 secular	 thought,”	whereby	 religion	and	theology	 took	 place	 with	 “constant	 regard”	 for	 the	 secular	 intellectuals	 and	 what	 they	deemed	 to	 be	 acceptable	 knowledge.	 “It	 is	 with	 them	 that	 the	 necessary	 intellectual	compromises	are	 ‘negotiated,’”	suggesting	a	push	and	pull	between	religious	and	rational	thought.148	Though	‘rationalism’	seems	to	be	the	most	recurrent	theme,	this	is	consistently	tied	 to	 empirical	 standards	 of	 evidence,	 scientific	 knowledge,	 and	 technological	advancement—in	other	words,	it	forms	a	discursive	knot	with	the	same	strands	commonly	tied	to	science.			 Moreover,	objective	methodical	observation	has	etymologically	been	generalized	as	both	science	and	rationality	and	this	was	in	specific	contrast	to	religion.	That	this	was	done	in	 contrast	 to	 religion	 is	 quite	 evident	when	we	 consider	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 term	 ‘reason’	emerged	 in	 theological	 contexts,	 thus	 to	 extrapolate	 rationality	 to	 other	 contexts	 would	require	 such	 differentiation.149	 The	 changes	 in	 what	 constituted	 ‘reason’	 from	 being	regarded	as	derived	deductively	a	priori	to	the	emphasis	on	inductive	empiricism	was	the	result	of	redefining	scientific	knowledge	as	distinct	from	natural	philosophy	and	religious	considerations.150	 The	 term	 ‘rationalization,’	 etymologically	 linked	 to	 ‘rationality,’	 even	gained	 the	meaning	 of	 “explaining	 away	 the	 divine	 or	 the	 wonderful”	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century.151	For	example,	William	Edward	Hartpole	Lecky	(1838–1903),	 in	A	History	of	the	




social	 meaning	 of	 denominational	 identities,	 and	 undermining	 active	 engagement	 in	 faith-based	organizations	and	support	for	religious	parties	in	civic	society.153		We	see	this	dichotomy	reinforced	on	the	side	of	religion	as	well.	For	example,	some	have	suggested	 that	 the	 rise	of	 fideism	was	a	 twentieth-century	 reinterpretation	of	 religion	 in	reaction	 to	 the	 mechanistic	 and	 materialistic	 outlook	 of	 the	 scientific	 worldview.	 This	religious	movement	is	identified	on	the	primary	basis	of	its	emphasis	on	faith	over	reason	as	the	mode	for	procuring	truth.154	Sociological	theory	emphasizing	the	rise	of	secularism	and	rationality	was	sometimes	treated	with	disdain,	exemplified	in	the	reaction	of	late	twentieth-century	 Catholic	 officials	who	 argued	 for	 a	 distinction	 of	 ‘facts’	 and	 ‘truth’	 to	 emphasize	religious	over	scientific	knowledge.155		 The	 idea	 that	 a	 rational	 worldview,	 embodied	 by	 science,	 would	 undermine	 the	foundations	of	religion	and	all	 things	supernatural	or	magical	was	strongly	 influenced	by	Max	Weber’s	 (1864–1920)	 The	 Protestant	 Ethic	 and	 the	 Spirit	 of	 Capitalism	 (1904)	 and	
Economics	and	Society	(1933).	Many	leading	sociologists,	such	as	Peter	Berger,	David	Martin,	and	Brian	Wilson,	also	argued	for	such	a	perspective,	which	gained	popularity	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.156	And	 even	dating	back	 to	 the	Enlightenment	 era,	many	philosophers,	 social	scientists,	 and	natural	 scientists	 suggested	 religious	 superstitions	would	be	outgrown	by	reason	in	the	imminent	future.	At	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	sociologist	Enrico	Ferri	(1856–1929)	 made	 the	 continually	 common	 argument,	 “[…]	 science	 and	 religion	 are	 in	inverse	ratio	one	to	the	other;	the	one	diminishes	and	becomes	feeble	in	the	same	measure	as	the	other	increases	and	is	strengthened	in	its	struggle	with	the	unknown.”157	 		








was	not	of	the	material	world	was	excluded	from	science	and	knowledge.163	As	Charles	Alan	Taylor	noted,	the	familiar	features	of	science,	like	empiricism,	objectivism,	etc.,	are	presumed	associations	and	“The	epistemic	base	of	power	for	such	presumptions	is	that	they	are	taken	as	 ‘natural’	 reflections	 of	 science	 and	 scientific	 practice.”	 There	 is	 no	 natural	 association	between	science	and	these	familiar	features,	but	rather	“they	are	variably	deployed	in	order	to	fulfill	particular	rhetorical	ends,	that	is,	to	serve	particular	goals	in	particular	rhetorical	situations.”164			 The	association	of	science	with	a	naturalistic	approach,	as	well	as	with	the	empirical	method,	was	 intimately	related	 to	 the	professionalization	of	 science.	That	 the	association	between	science	and	naturalism	was	born	out	of	the	negative	correlation	with	religion	and	supernaturalism	is	evidenced	by	naturalist	attacks	on	the	authority	of	religion	 in	 the	 late	nineteenth	century.165	This	“constituted	both	a	cause	and	a	weapon”	against	religious	dogma,	natural	 theology,	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 religious	 authorities.	 By	 laying	 claim	 to	 their	 own	epistemology	and	methodology	as	 the	exclusive	domain	of	 science,	as	well	as	 the	correct	model	of	knowledge	generally,	 science	was	positioned	as	an	 independent	profession	 that	both	 differentiated	 it	 and	 legitimized	 it	 in	 the	 face	 of	 alternative	 knowledge	 systems,	specifically	religion.	The	adoption	of	naturalism	and	empiricism	“provided	an	 intellectual	solvent	to	cleanse	contemporary	science	of	metaphysical	and	theological	survivals.”166	In	the	late	 nineteenth	 century,	 those	 who	 spoke	 of	 the	 miraculous	 and	 the	 supernatural	 were	increasingly	framed	as	anti-scientific.167	In	The	Twilight	of	Christianity	(1929),	Harry	Elmer	Barnes	(1889–1968)	made	that	claim	that	science	is	naturalism	and	anti-supernaturalism	and,	in	a	word,	anti-religion.168		 Of	course,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	naturalism	is	contrasted	to	supernaturalism,	however	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	naturalism	 is	 (largely)	 specifically	 regarded	 as	negating	supernaturalism,	 in	 terms	 of	 explanatory	 accounts.	 This	 is	 no	 minor	 distinction.	 Many	
																																																						163	 Quote	 in	 Ross	 (1962),	 70.	 See	 also	 ibid.,	 75.	 Regarding	 ‘nescience,’	 this	 is	 a	 particularly	 apt	 usage	 of	terminology,	 in	 that	 ‘nescience,’	 from	the	Latin	nescientia,	means	 lack	of	knowledge.	Note,	 the	Latin	root	of	‘science’	is	scientia.	Thus,	we	might	interpret	the	use	of	‘nescience’	to	mean	the	lack	of	knowledge	is	equated	to	the	lack	of	scientific	understanding,	further	reinforcing	this	relational	construction.	164	Taylor	(1996),	90.	165	Asprem	(2010),	636.	See	also	Huxley	et	al.	(1889).	166	Turner	(1978),	364.	167	Chadwick	(1972),	32.	168	Ransom	(1931	[1930]),	8.	
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believe	that	divine	action,	for	example,	occurs	through	natural	means,	thus	naturalism	and	supernaturalism	 are	 not	 necessarily	 mutually	 exclusive.	 However,	 in	 this	 discourse	 on	naturalism,	supernaturalism	was	and	is	not	only	a	target	for	criticism,	but	moreover	a	central	point	of	repudiation	as	a	source	of	explanation.	 In	 fact,	supernaturalism	is	defined	in	this	discourse	in	the	specific	sense	of	problematically	accounting	for	natural	occurrences,	which	ought	 to	 be	 done	 via	 naturalism.169	 Furthermore,	 naturalism	 is	 specifically	 positioned	 as	science	negating	religion,	with	the	appeal	to	naturalism	and	reason	described	as	‘counter-rhetoric’	to	religion	and	scientific	accounts	of	the	‘supernormal’	as	replacing	the	category	of	the	 ‘supernatural.’170	 Natural	 explanation	 is	 often	 thought	 to	 eliminate	 possibilities	 for	supernatural	sources	of	causality.171			 Alvin	 Plantinga	 has	 argued	 that	 one	 source	 of	 the	 naturalistic	 worldview	 is	 the	rejection	of	theism.	Naturalism	was	part	of	a	process	to	remove	ourselves—the	subjective	factor—from	the	world	being	studied,	to	‘objectify	inquiry,’	as	humans	tend	to	personify	the	world	 and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 theism,	 see	 creation,	 governance,	 and	 purpose	 as	 sources	 of	explanation.	For	scientific	purposes,	there	is	a	rejection	of	this	tendency,	paving	the	way	for	natural	 accounts.	 Objectifying	 inquiry	 also	 involved	 rejecting	 teleology,	 as	 teleology	positions	humanity	as	a	culmination	of	purpose	or	design	and	thus	needs	to	be	removed	to	also	remove	ourselves	from	‘the	picture.’	This	Plantinga	traced	back	to	Francis	Bacon	(1561–1626),	 who	 regarded	 the	 tendency	 toward	 teleological	 explanations	 as	 having	 “relation	clearly	 to	 the	 nature	 of	man	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 universe.”172	 Supernatural	explanation	was	seen	as	inhibiting	the	advancement	of	science,	of	natural	accounts,	and	as	‘defiling	philosophy,’	to	paraphrase	Bacon.	Plantinga	stated,	“The	claim	is	that	science	[…]	has	no	need	for	the	supernatural	or	spiritual	for	its	proper	prosecution,	and	indeed	it	is	best	done	by	deleting	any	such	references.”	Naturalism,	Plantinga	argued,	can	be	summed	up	as	“secularism	with	respect	to	science”	or,	in	relational	terminology,	science	as	‘not	religion.’173		 Another	way	naturalism	was	defined	in	contrast	to	religion	was	through	the	rejection	
																																																						169	Asprem	(2010),	637.	170	Dyrendal	(2010),	897–898;	and	Asprem	(2010),	639.	171	Turner	(1974),	31;	and	Dyrendal	(2010),	887–888.	172	Quoted	in	Plantinga	(2010),	304.	See	also	ibid.,	303.	173	 Plantinga	 (2010),	 304–305.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 naturalism	 does	 not	 necessarily	 preclude	supernaturalism	in	other	areas	of	life,	though	there	are	these	more	extreme	claims	as	well	suggesting	that	the	supernatural	should	be	eliminated	from	all	considerations.	
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combination	 of	 ancient	 materialist	 philosophies,	 anti-religious	 polemics,	 and	 scientific	rhetoric,	often	utilizing	less	than	rigorous	scientific	hypothesis	and	conjecture.	Materialism	became	the	credo	of	scientific	philosophy,	as	Tyndall	claimed,	“the	physical	philosopher,	as	such,	must	be	a	pure	materialist.”177	It	was	developed	not	via	scientific	accuracy,	but	as	a	way	to	formulate	a	new	philosophy	of	life	that	left	behind	religious	considerations,	by	for	instance	recasting	the	human	being	not	as	a	creature	of	God	with	an	immortal	soul,	but	as	a	creature	of	nature,	demarcated	from	the	rest	of	the	animals	by	the	faculty	of	reason.	Materialists—in	France	in	particular—even	framed	themselves	as	the	initiators	of	religion’s	demise,	framing	the	battle	as	one	in	which	scientific	progress	was	pitted	against	religion.	Materialism	was	formulated	as	an	alternative	to	a	religious	worldview	and	it	continues	to	fulfill	that	role	to	the	present	day.178		 Scientific	rationality	coupled	with	naturalism,	materialism,	and	physicalism	led	to	an	understanding	of	scientific	explanation	as	the	only	means	of	interpreting	the	world,	since	all	else	was	 constructed	 in	 terms	of	 religion	 and	 superstition.	This	 is	 part	 of	 the	 reason	 the	scientific	worldview	 is	 typically	 reductionist.	 Though	 there	 is	more	 to	 it,	 of	which	 I	will	discuss	extensively	 in	 the	next	chapter,	reductionism	was	also	a	product	of	 the	relational	etymology	of	the	term	‘science’	contrasted	with	‘religion.’	The	etymology	of	the	word	science	is	derived	from	the	Latin	scire,	to	know,	which	has	been	linked	to	the	Latin	scindere	‘to	split’	and	 the	 Sanskrit	 chyati,	 ‘to	 cut	 off.’	 Though	 there	 is	 disagreement	 among	 scholars,	 the	etymology	of	the	word	‘religion’	is	often	traced	to	the	Latin	verb	religare,	‘to	bind	together.’	So,	in	the	etymology	of	these	two	words,	religion	and	science,	we	have	some	indication	of	conflict	but	also	 a	 necessary	 relationship.	 Science	 is	 to	 split	 apart;	 religion	 is	 to	 bind	 the	 parts	 together.	 The	concepts	of	reductionism	and	holism	are	embedded	in	the	very	etymology	of	the	two	words.179		Even	regarding	the	narrative	on	the	etymology	of	the	individual	terms,	we	again	see	religion-science	 mutual	 exclusivity.	 Others	 have	 suggested	 that	 ‘religion’	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 Latin	
relegere,	 meaning	 “painstaking	 observance	 of	 rites.”180	 If	 that	 is	 correct,	 then	 the	 other	
																																																						177	Quoted	in	Ellegård	(1958),	111.	178	 Byrne	 (1996),	 171.	My	 remarks	 here	 paint	 somewhat	 of	 a	 generalized	 picture.	Not	 all	materialists	 saw	conflict	with	religion.	 In	this	chapter,	 though,	I	am	only	concerned	with	a	particular	relational	construct.	As	stated	 previously,	 all	 the	 histories	 of	 the	 various	 constructs	 should	 be	 read	 in	 light	 of	 one	 another,	which	demonstrates	contending	visions	of	religion-science	relations.	179	Grassie	(2010),	166.	Emphasis	original.	On	the	Latin	roots	of	the	term	‘religion,’	see	also	Smith	(1978),	19–23;	and	Simpson	(2016e).	180	Simpson	(2016e).	
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etymology	may	simply	have	been	a	product	of	the	tacit	knowledge	on	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	that	does	not	correspond	with	the	linguistic	history.	Whichever	is	correct,	this	former	narrative	on	 the	 etymology	 is	 still	 a	discursive	materialization	of	 religion-science	relationalization.	And	in	this	discourse,	science	becomes	associated	with	reduction,	which	leads	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 it	 constitutes	 a	 complete	 explanation,	 something	 that	 strongly	structures	the	future	evolution	of	the	terms	in	question	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.		
9.3 Other	Signifiers	of	Science	as	‘Not	Religion’		The	 many	 signifiers	 discussed	 that	 play	 a	 role	 in	 constructing	 religion	 and	 science	 as	mutually	exclusive	are	only	the	tip	of	the	iceberg.	Countless	other	examples	could	be	drawn	upon,	of	which	there	is	not	sufficient	space	to	explore	here	including	ethical,	normative	vs.	empirical,	 descriptive;	 ideological,	 dogmatic,	 indoctrinating	 vs.	 free-thinking,	 humility;	conversion,	faith	and	belief-based	vs.	investigative	and	fact-based;	regarding	ultimate	nature	and	 limitlessness	 (e.g.,	 omnipotence,	 omniscience,	 omnibenevolence,	 omnipresence)	 vs.	uncertainty,	 limited	 nature,	 skepticism;	 salvific	 role	 vs.	 practical,	 technological	 role;	 and	worship,	idolization	vs.	critical	thinking.	In	the	course	of	this	chapter,	many	of	these	signifiers	have	already	been	discussed	in	passing.	All	of	these	are	also	discussed	in	some	regard	in	the	following	 chapters.	 While	 this	 list	 is	 meant	 to	 be	 comprehensive,	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 it	 is	exhaustive.		
10 Reflections	on	Mutual	Exclusivity		Upon	presentation	of	my	research	on	the	formulation	of	science	as	‘not	religion’	to	a	group	of	colleagues,	one	immediate	response	was	“Isn’t	this	obvious?”	That	this	question	is	even	asked	confirms	my	point	that	the	mutual	exclusivity	of	religion	and	science	has	developed	into	 tacit	 knowledge.	 The	 reason	 it	 seems	 obvious	 is	 because	 mutual	 exclusivity	 is	 the	dominant	relational	construct,	influencing	alternative	ways	the	religion-science	relation	has	been	 conceptualized,	 which	 is	 also	 why	 I	 have	 chosen	 this	 as	 my	 first	 case	 study.	 This	additionally	serves	as	a	launching	point	for	my	investigation	of	relational	constructs	because,	
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being	tacit	knowledge,	it	 is	not	fully	understood	or	even	easily	identifiable	in	many	cases.	And	seeing	the	contingencies	of	this	relational	construct	can	help	us	understand	that	there	are	other	ways	 religion	and	 science	have	been	 constructed	 that	 are	 equally	 relevant	 and	operative.	Of	 course,	 it	 comes	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 religion	 and	 science	 have	 a	 history	 of	conceptual	distinction	nor	is	it	groundbreaking	to	note	that	religion	and	science	have	been	formulated	as	dichotomies,	but	that	is	not	the	‘big	picture’	of	this	chapter.	The	main	question	has	not	been	whether	the	religion-science	dichotomy	has	been	constructed.	The	point	here,	and	 for	my	 research	 project	 in	 general,	 is	 about	 the	processes	 and	 structures	of	 how	we	construct	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science.’	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 show	 that	 these	 processes	 and	structures	are	relational	in	nature	and,	more	specific	to	this	chapter,	constructed	by	putting	religion	and	science	in	contrast	that	led	to	their	conceptualization	as	opposites	and	led	to	the	formation	of	specific	signifiers	and	definitions	for	religion	and	science,	which	are	also	both	products	 and	 producers	 of	 this	 opposition.	What	 these	 terms	mean	 today	 is	 a	 product	 of	
relating	 them	 to	 one	another.	Why	 is	 ‘science’	 opposed	 to	 ‘religion’?	Because	 the	 concept	evolved	 (historically	 and	 discursively)	 in	 contrast	 to	 religion.	What	 are	 the	 etymological	roots	of	‘science’	as	regarding	the	natural?	Contrast	with	religion.	What	are	the	etymological	roots	of	‘religion’	as	regarding	the	supernatural?	Contrast	with	science.	How	have	discourses	of	the	term	‘religion’	evolved	relative	to	discourses	of	the	term	‘science’?	In	this	case	study,	via	 contrast	 and	 mutual	 exclusion.	 It	 is	 the	 relational	 construct	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 a	qualifying	 aspect,	 that	 gave	 expression	 to	 these	 concepts	 by	 putting	 the	 two	 in	 relative	
perspective.	 This	 is	 what	 it	means	 to	 be	 a	 relational	 construct,	 to	 gain,	 lose,	 and	 change	meanings	 in	 the	 act	 of	 comparison	 and	 contrast.	 Though	 it	 is	 ‘obvious’	 that	 religion	 and	science	 are	 oftentimes	 regarded	 as	 opposites,	 the	 contribution	 here	 is	 how	 this	 became	obvious.	This	became	obvious	because	 in	the	development	of	 the	term	‘science,’	 the	most	dominant	ideas	of	 ‘science’	rest	on	its	negation	of	 ‘religion.’	And	it	 is	this	 latter	point	that	makes	up	the	central	argument	of	this	chapter.	When	I	say	that	religion	and	science	are	mutually	exclusive,	this	can	be	taken	in	two	senses—in	terms	of	the	conflict	thesis	and	of	that	of	the	relational	thesis.	The	conflict	thesis	suggests	 that	 religion	 and	 science	 conflict	 in	 particular	 historical	 circumstances,	 over	particular	 conceptual	 issues,	 that	 the	 two	make	 opposing,	 irreconcilable	 claims,	 etc.	 The	
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conflict	thesis	has	been	discussed	extensively	in	the	literature.	I	am	not	oblivious	to	this	and	I	am	not	trying	to	lay	claim	to	already	established	views.	In	my	view,	this	work	still	misses	the	 central	 point,	 which	 is	 the	 relational	 sense	 of	 saying	 that	 religion	 and	 science	 are	mutually	 exclusive.	 The	 conflict	 thesis	 takes	 presumed	 understandings	 of	 religion	 and	science	to	be	the	departure	point	for	identifying	conflict.	The	relational	view	suggests	that	by	the	very	process	of	the	conceptualization	of	religion	and	science	they	are	constructed	as	dichotomous.	 Put	 differently,	 the	 objects	 of	 study	 are	 shaped	by	 the	 relational	 processes	employed	in	defining	and	analyzing	them.	In	the	conflict	thesis,	concepts	give	rise	to	a	certain	relationship.	 In	 the	 relational	 thesis,	 relationalization	 gives	 rise	 to	 certain	conceptualizations,	 so	 the	 causal	 direction	 of	 the	 argument	 is	 reversed.	 The	 individual	definitions	 on	 their	 own	 are	 not	 determinative	 of	 the	 relationship,	 but	 rather	 it	 is	 the	
relational	definition	or	construct	 that	determines	 the	 individual	definitions.	Relations	are	primary	and	relata	are	derivative.	The	idea	that	religion	and	science	are	dichotomous	in	the	conflict	thesis	is	redundant,	from	a	relational	view,	because	dichotomy	was	historically	built	into	the	concepts	themselves.	The	conflict	thesis	is	a	circular	argument,	since	the	conclusion	necessarily	follows	from	the	original	relational	content	of	the	definitions	and	assumptions.			 Historians	and	other	academics	in	the	field	of	religion	and	science	have	gone	through	great	pains	to	contextualize	the	conflict	thesis,	offer	counterexamples,	and	tackle	with	the	notion	 on	 various	 planes	 of	 philosophical,	 theological,	 and	 psychological	 grounds	 (many	examples	will	be	provided	in	the	following	chapters).	When	scholars	take	note	of	the	conflict	myth,	the	point	 is	that	others	have	read	into	the	past	more	conflict	than	was	present	and	thereby	construct	it,	thus	reflecting	some	observations	here	as	well.	This	is	important,	but	not	central	to	my	argument	here.	When	I	state	that	religion	and	science	are	constructed	as	mutually	exclusive,	I	do	not	mean	this	in	the	banal,	inane	sense	that	the	two	concepts	are	simply	 oppositional,	 rather	 I	 am	 suggesting	 something	 subtler—that	 the	 definition,	demarcation,	 and	 conceptualization	 of	 science	 has	 been	 accomplished	 in	 a	 process	 of	opposing	it	to	religion	and	vice	versa.	This	is	not	the	conflict	thesis	because	what	I	have	done	is	examine	 the	historical	and	structural	processes	 that	made	 the	 idea	of	conflict	between	religion	and	science	even	possible.	As	such,	the	data	on	religion-science	conflict	is	symbolic	in	 that	 it	 represents	changes	 in	 the	 ideas	or	concepts	of	people.	My	contribution	 is	much	
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more	etymological	in	a	sense,	since	I	am	suggesting	that	the	term	‘science’	actually	evolved	via	its	contrast	with	‘religion.’		 Furthermore,	when	scholars	speak	of	the	religion-science	dichotomy,	they	are	saying	that	 the	 dichotomy	 was	 constructed	 in	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 religion	 and	 science.	 But	science	understood	in	this	fashion	is	not	all	restricted.	I	am	making	the	claim	that	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	has	been	one	of	the	primary	sources	for	how	the	individual	terms	are	understood	outside	of	the	religion-science	context	and	in	most	contexts.	This	is	what	it	means	to	be	the	product	of	a	relational	construct—a	concept	is	born	in	a	specifically	relative	constellation	of	meaning,	such	that	it	endures	beyond	the	specific	context.	Science	as	natural,	empirical,	rational,	objective,	and	in	terms	of	many	other	common	definitions	can	be	traced	to	 its	contrast	with	religion.	Moreover,	 science	 is	 implicitly	 treated	as	relating	 to	religion	even	 when	 there	 is	 no	 explicit	 connection.	 Today,	 religion	 remains	 one	 of	 the	 main	contrasting	categories	in	the	conceptualization	of	science.181	It	is	difficult	to	pick	up	a	book	in	popular	science,	history	of	science,	or	a	media	article	on	science	and	not	find	mention	of	religion—the	 exception	 being	 some	 natural	 science	 journals	 and	 books.	 The	 scientific	worldview	 and	 the	 religious	worldview	 continue	 to	mutually	 define	 each	 other	 in	 court	cases,	education,	and	academic	fields	of	study,	such	as	bioethics	and	cognitive	science.182	So	much	 of	 how	 we	 understand	 science	 and	 how	 we	 understand	 religion	 continue	 to	 be	interrelated.		 I	would	 like	to	provide	a	word	of	caution	before	concluding	this	chapter:	we	must	remember	 that	mutual	 exclusivity	was	not	 the	only	 relational	 construct	 in	 the	discourse.	However,	the	religion-science	dichotomy	has	been	one	of,	if	not	the	most,	influential	ways	of	relationalizing	these	concepts	and	of	constructing	the	definitions	of	these	terms	outside	of	the	 religion-science	 context.	 It	 is	 the	 dominant	 relational	mode	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 the	construction	 of	 discourses	 of	 ‘religion’	 relative	 to	 those	 of	 ‘science’	 that	 has	 limited	 our	perception	of	alternatives,	even	on	the	side	of	historians.	And	yet,	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	is	just	one	thread	of	a	much	greater	conceptual	tapestry.	There	were	many	other	important	movements	that	happen	contemporaneously	to	the	development	of	the	mutual	
																																																						181	Harris	(2005),	x.	182	 Regarding	 bioethics,	 see	 Evans	 (2002),	 esp.	 72–98.	On	 the	 development	 of	 cognitive	 science	 relative	 to	religion,	see	the	following	chapter.	
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exclusivity	construct	that	contributed	to	construction	of	various	relations.	Mutual	exclusivity	is	a	rather	limited	view	of	both	history	and	the	use	of	analytical	concepts,	which	has	led	to	the	 exclusion	 of	 much	 of	 the	 data	 on	 the	 religion-science	 relation	 and	 an	 impoverished	perspective.	 This	 relational	 construct	 cannot	 account	 for	 when	 ‘religion’	 is	 identified	 as	‘rational’	 and	 ‘God’	 is	 placed	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 ‘nature’;	 when	 ‘science’	 is	 associated	 with	‘metaphysical,’	 even	 ‘supernatural’	 claims,	 and	 ‘empiricism’	 is	 problematized	 by	‘subjectivity.’	What	happens	when	what	we	know	as	‘science’	and	what	we	know	as	‘religion’	cannot	 coherently	 be	 described	 in	mutually	 exclusive	 terms?	 Though	mutual	 exclusivity	cannot	 endure	 under	 such	 circumstances,	 it	 continues	 to	 structure	 the	 evolution	 of	discourses	of	religion	and	science.	This,	 in	turn,	 is	 indicative	of	the	relational	structure	of	discursive	change,	which	will	become	increasingly	apparent	when	we	see	in	the	following	chapters	how	mutual	exclusivity	has	guided	the	subsequent	development	of	 the	concepts	‘religion’	and	‘science.’	
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Chapter	4:	The	Scientification	of	Religion	&	the	Case	of	the	Science	of	Religion		 [O]ur	perception	of	the	world,	the	way	we	move,	interact,	speak,	and	feel	might	all	just	be	a	giant,	incredibly	complex	science	experiment	inside	our	heads.	—Deven	Dayal1		
1 Religion	as	a	‘Scientific	Object’		The	above	quote	was	the	response	of	one	test	subject	of	the	‘Koren	Helmet,’	more	popularly	known	 as	 the	 ‘God	Helmet.’2	 The	 head	 researcher,	 neuroscientist	Michael	 Persinger,	 has	claimed	 that	 ‘genuine	 religious	 experiences’	 can	 be	 artificially	 induced	with	 the	 device.3	Persinger’s	 God	Helmet—the	 earliest	model	 looking	 something	 like	 a	motorcycle	 helmet	with	wires	on	 the	outside	and	electrodes	within—is	 said	 to	 induce	a	 ‘visitor	experience,’	variously	interpreted	as	closeness	with	God	or	in	the	presence	of	angels,	saints,	ancestors,	aliens,	 ghosts,	 and	 other	 paranormal	 agents.	 (One	 subject	 claimed	 the	 testing	 chamber	should	be	exorcised	because	the	Devil	was	in	there,	while	others	have	claimed	the	presence	of	 demons.)4	The	God	Helmet	 stimulates	 the	brain	 via	 transcranial	magnetic	 stimulation,	creating	an	environment	in	which	the	left	hemisphere	interprets	the	right	hemisphere	as	a	separate	entity.5	Interpretations	vary	widely,	but	the	research	is	most	commonly	understood	as	of	“colossal	 importance”	 in	establishing	a	 ‘clear	 link’	between	religious	experience	and	precise	brain	activity.6	This	link	is	often	interpreted	as	wholly	accounting	for	religion	within	
																																																						1	Dayal	(2013).		2	Other	descriptions	of	use	of	the	God	Helmet	and	related	technologies	can	be	found	at	St.	Pierre	&	Persinger	(2006),	1095;	and	Murphy	(n.d.).	3	See,	e.g.,	Persinger	et	al	(2010).	See	also	Murphy	(2012);	and	Murphy	(n.d.).	4	Cotton	(1995);	and	Ratcliffe	(2006),	82–83,	the	latter	of	which	offers	six	different	ways	of	describing	the	‘God	experience.’	For	other	common	themes	in	subject	reports,	see	Murphy	(2012);	St.	Pierre	&	Persinger	(2006);	Granqvist	 (2006),	 134;	 Schojoedt	 (2009),	 321;	Khamsi	 (2004);	 Begley	 (2010);	Hitt	 (1999);	 and	Blackmore	(1991).	See	also	Web	of	Stories	(n.d.)	for	Blackmore’s	reaction	to	the	God	Helmet.	For	similar	research,	see	also,	Ramachandran	&	Blakeslee	(1998).	5	Alston	(2007),	3;	and	Schojoedt	(2009),	321.	Transcranial	magnetic	stimulation	has	also	been	used	to	elicit	experiences	 of	 unity,	 compared	 to	 those	 feelings	 achieved	 in	 meditation.	 See	 Yaden	 et	 al	 (forthcoming),	discussed	in	Yaden	(2014).	6	Foster	(2010),	56;	The	Science	Channel	[Discovery]	(2010);	and	BBC	(2003a).	While	Persinger’s	theoretical	assumptions	 have	 been	 questioned	 and	 his	 results	 have	 been	 unable	 to	 be	 wholly	 replicated,	 his	 work	 is	
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scientific	frameworks	of	meaning.	The	God	Helmet	research	has	been	described	as	“a	perfect	science	versus	religion	story;	it	was	thought	to	deeply	challenge	religious	people	[…].”7		 This	 is	 because	 when	 religion	 is	 constructed	 as	 a	 scientific	 object,	 the	 questions	consistently	arise	of	whether	religious	belief	is	incorrect	and	whether	religious	experience	is	‘real.’	The	scientific	discovery	of	the	neural	correlates	of	religious	experience	lead	many	to	conclude	 religion	 is	 false,	 merely	 a	 “hallucination,”	 or	 that	 religious	 experience	 is	 a	‘misactivation’	or	‘malfunction’	of	cognitive	systems.8	What	curious	conception	of	‘religion’	allowed	for	it	to	be	reified	as	a	scientific	object	while	at	the	same	time	negating	its	reality	and	veridicality?	In	this	chapter,	I	will	examine	how	religion	has	been	constructed	as	a	scientific	object	in	a	reductive	way,	a	relational	construct	I	refer	to	as	the	‘scientification	of	religion.’	The	scientification	of	religion	is	a	subcategory	of	the	identity	construct.	Whereas	the	identity	construct	suggests	reduction	generally,	religion	reduced	to	science	and	science	reduced	to	religion	result	in	very	different	perspectives.	The	former	I	will	address	here,	with	the	latter	constituting	the	following	chapter.		 With	 the	 concepts	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 clearly	 differentiated	 following	 the	development	 of	 the	 mutual	 exclusivity	 construct,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	comparison	became	possible—comparison	requires	two	distinct	things	to	be	compared	after	all.	If	my	hypothesis	that	relational	constructs	structure	discursive	change	is	correct,	then	we	would	expect	that	in	the	process	of	constructing	religion	as	science,	to	make	‘science-like’	will	reflect	what	‘science’	means	in	the	context	of	mutual	exclusivity.	And	that	is	exactly	what	we	see.	Religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	and	the	likening	of	religion	and	science	employ	the	exact	same	signifiers	in	their	dichotomous	formation,	which	I	will	further	explore	here.	These	 signifiers	 of	 religion	 as	 per	 mutual	 exclusivity	 are	 often	 the	 supernatural,	transcendent,	 immaterial,	 etc.,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 natural,	 localizable,	 and	 material,	 for	
																																																						historically	significant	in	that	he	represents	wider	intellectual	trends	in	the	construction	of	religion	as	science.	See	Aaen-Stockdale	(2012).	For	a	detailed	and	multifaceted	examination	of	Persinger’s	research,	including	but	not	limited	to	the	God	Helmet,	see	Runehov	(2007),	67–136.	See	Granqvist	et	al	(2005),	1–6,	which	found	that	subjects	had	high	scores	on	a	suggestibility	scale,	indicating	that	mystical	experience	may	have	been	a	product	of	suggestion.	However,	Persinger	has	responded,	saying	“They	didn’t	replicate	it,	not	even	close.”	Quoted	in	Khamsi	 (2004).	 See	 also	 Persinger	 &	 Koren	 (2005);	 and	 Larsson	 et	 al	 (2005).	 In	 response	 to	 the	 role	 of	suggestibility,	see	St.	Pierre	&	Persinger	(2006);	and	Murphy	&	Persinger	(2011).	A	more	recent	independent	replication	of	the	study	suggests	the	effects	are	perhaps	not	due	to	suggestibility.	See	Tinoco	&	Ortiz	(2014).	7	Beauregard	&	O’Leary	(2007),	86.	8	BBC	(2003a);	Paloutzian,	Swenson,	&	McNamara	(2006),	162;	Pigliucci	(2002);	and	Cheyne	(2001).	
Scientification	
	 111	
example	(depending	on	context)	that	are	regarded	as	signifiers	of	science.	How	to	make	the	two	alike	is	based	on	how	they	have	been	differentiated	in	relative	perspective.			 Furthermore,	 if	 my	 hypothesis	 is	 correct,	 not	 only	 will	 the	 signifiers	 of	 mutual	exclusivity	 set	 the	 terms	 of	 engagement	 for	 religion-science	 likening,	 but	 also	 this	 pre-existing	relational	construct	will	structure	how	these	 likenings	will	be	 interpreted,	giving	rise	 to	 a	 new	 relational	 construct.	 Departing	 from	 the	 notion	 that	 science	 has	 been	historically	conceptualized	as	 ‘not	religion,’	 then	to	conceptualize	religion	as	science	 is	 to	deconstruct	previous	notions	of	what	is	meant	by	‘religion’	and	reconstruct	it	into	notions	of	what	‘science’	is.	This	means	that	constructing	religion	as	science	via	likening	to	naturalism,	for	instance,	is	thought	to	preclude	supernaturalism,	as	the	signifier	‘naturalism’	is	applied	as	per	the	dichotomous	demands	of	mutual	exclusivity.	At	a	more	general	level,	constructing	religion	as	science	is	thought	to	exclude	religion	in	terms	of	its	pre-existing	signifiers,	since	science	is	already	understood	to	be	the	very	antonym	of	religion.	With	this	exclusion,	science	is	left	as	the	sole	framework	of	meaning	and	the	reductionism	of	identity	ensues.9			 Demonstrating	 that	mutual	 exclusivity	 set	 the	 terms	 for	 engagement	 in	 the	 above	ways	illustrates	how	relational	constructs	structure	discursive	change,	which	is	the	central	claim	 of	 this	 overall	 work.	 My	 hypothesis	 here	 and	 now	 is	 that	 the	 mutual	 exclusivity	construct	structured	the	likening	of	religion	to	signifiers	of	science	to	produce	the	identity	construct.	For	my	case	study,	 I	 examine	 the	history	of	 religion	constructed	as	a	 scientific	object	of	inquiry.10	This	chapter	examines	the	progression	of	the	scientific	study	of	religion	across	 many	 fields	 converging	 in	 contemporary	 cognitive	 science	 of	 religion.11	 The	
																																																						9	While	I	typically	use	‘reductionism’	to	refer	to	the	replacement	of	the	concept	of	‘religion’	by	a	sole	framework	of	meaning	subsumed	under	science,	I	also	use	‘reductionism’	in	terms	of	scientific	reductionism,	which	can	refer	 to	 at	 least	 two	different	positions.	One	 is	methodological	 reductionism,	which	 is	 to	 examine	 complex	processes	in	terms	of	its	parts.	The	second	position	is	causal	or	explanatory	reductionism,	which	is	the	position	that	the	mind,	behavior,	and	experiences	are	caused	by	the	most	fundamental	building	blocks	of	physics	and	chemistry,	which	constitutes	a	complete	explanation.	Both	positions	are	evident	in	the	scientification	of	religion	and	in	science	more	generally—although	recently	causal	reductionism	has	been	more	rigorously	challenged,	particularly	by	relatively	new	discoveries	such	as	neuroplasticity	and	the	role	of	agency	in	its	effectiveness.	Brown	(2003),	616.	My	use	of	‘reductionism’	should	be	clear	in	the	context.	10	Though	the	focus	is	quite	different,	see	also	Harrison	(1990)	for	a	history	of	the	science	of	religion	as	pertains	to	the	conceptual	development	of	the	term	‘religion.’	11	 The	 cognitive	 sciences	 are	 usually	 said	 to	 include	 neuroscience,	 psychology,	 and	 philosophy	 of	 mind—sometimes	 artificial	 intelligence	 and	 linguistics	 are	 included	 as	well.	 Here	 I	 am	primarily	 interested	 in	 the	cognitive	science	of	religion,	but	as	this	is	historically	connected	to	the	other	fields	mentioned	above,	I	will	also	refer	 to	 various	 pertinent	 developments	 in	 broader	 field	 of	 the	 natural	 science	 of	 religion.	 On	 an	 insider’s	
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understandings	 of	 ‘religion’	 as	 per	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 with	 the	 end	 result	 of	 reduction.	(Though	I	have	divided	up	this	chapter	according	to	these	above-mentioned	elements,	they	are	 all	 intimately	 interconnected.)	 In	 demonstrating	 the	 connection	 between	 mutual	exclusivity	and	the	identity	construct,	each	section	on	‘religion	as	“natural”’	can	be	read	in	terms	of	 three	 sub	points:	 (1)	 religion	as	natural	makes	 it	 science-like;	 (2)	 the	natural	 is	thought	to	exclude	the	supernatural/religion;	(3)	signifying	the	natural	to	the	exclusion	of	supernatural/religion	leads	to	the	reduction	of	religion	to	science.	These	points	collectively	show	that	the	discursive	change	to	the	identity	construct	is	structured	by	mutual	exclusivity.	I	 will	 then	 turn	 to	 how	 this	 negation	 of	 pre-existing	 notions	 of	 religion	 resulted	 in	 new	signifiers	for	the	new	concept	of	‘religion’	as	a	‘scientific	object.’	I	will	also	discuss	how	this	led	to	the	signifier	of	‘reduction’	for	‘science.’		
2 Knowledge	of	Religion	as	‘Natural’		In	this	section	I	will	show	that	likening	knowledge	of	religion	to	the	natural,	conflated	with	the	material,	led	to	the	scientification	of	religion.	One	consideration	in	this	complex	task	is	how	the	natural	science	of	religion	is	discursively	related	to	the	academic	study	of	religion.	Part	of	the	reason	for	this	 link	is	that	the	historical,	cultural,	and	social	scientific	study	of	religion	 has	 been	 and	 is	 frequently	 incorporated	 into	 the	 natural	 science	 of	 religion.	Moreover,	both	the	academic	study	of	religion	and	the	natural	science	of	religion	came	to	treat	religion	in	terms	of	natural	knowledge.	Indeed,	the	discursive	constructions	of	‘religion’	under	these	two	domains	are	historically	entangled.		 While	 religious	experience	and	God	are	 today	generally	understood	 to	occupy	 the	domain	of	the	supernatural	(if	only	conceptually),	religion	has	been	‘brought	down	to	earth’	since	 antiquity,	 positioning	 it	 in	 a	 natural	 setting.	 One	 way	 this	 has	 been	 commonly	accomplished	is	 through	the	philosophy	of	materialism.13	Via	materialism,	the	 immaterial	
																																																						13	Physicalism	and	materialism	are	sometimes	used	interchangeably	and	I	refer	to	both	here	since	they	are	not	only	conceptually	very	similar,	but	closely	entangled	in	the	discourse	as	well.	However,	physicalism	holds	that	ultimately	everything	is	composed	of	the	fundamental	entities	of	physics,	which	includes	things	like	fields,	for	example,	while	materialism	is	a	narrower	view	that	everything	is	made	of	matter	and	that	reality	is	sufficiently	explained	by	the	nature	of	matter.	As	a	doctrine	of	the	cognitive	sciences,	 it	 is	 the	position	that	the	mind	is	
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aspects	of	humanity—like	the	soul,	emotions,	and	religious	experiences—are	placed	in	the	realm	of	the	brain	and	the	psyche.	Forms	of	materialism	have	been	around	at	least	since	the	emergence	of	Greek	philosophy	in	the	sixth	century	BCE.	From	this	time	on	through	history	to	the	present	day,	materialism	has	been	thought	of	 in	terms	of	 its	challenges	to	religion,	resulting	 both	 in	 its	 reinterpretation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 categorical	 rejection	 of	 religion,	particularly	following	the	development	of	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity.14			 Despite	materialism’s	early	developments,	it	was	not	until	the	seventeenth	century	that	 this	 ancient	 thought	 saw	 a	 revival	 largely	 attributed	 to	 the	 empiricist	 and	 Roman	Catholic	priest	Pierre	Gassendi	(1592–1655),	who	extended	materialism	across	(what	would	today	be	thought	of	as	the	fields	of)	physics	and	psychology,	while	others	sought	to	apply	it	to	 the	 moral	 and	 philosophical	 realms,	 creating	 the	 foundation	 for	 many	 European	materialists	of	the	eighteenth	century.15	The	reach	of	materialism	continued	to	spread.	With	the	publication	of	David	Hume’s	(1711–1776)	Natural	History	of	Religion	(1757),	we	see	the	beginnings	of	a	“paradigm-shift	from	a	religious	to	a	naturalistic	framework	for	the	study	of	religion”	that	fired	up	in	the	nineteenth	century	to	the	specific	exclusion	of	supernatural	or	transcendent	causes	or	origins	of	religion.16	This	work	was,	in	many	ways,	“the	foundation	of	 the	modern	scientific	study	of	 religion.”	Not	only	did	 this	book	position	 the	origin	and	growth	 of	 religion	 in	 natural	 phenomena,	 it	 was	 also	 interpreted	 from	 the	 outset	 as	 in	opposition	to	“the	interests	of	the	popular	religion”	and	as	“establishing	Atheism,”	despite	Hume’s	protests	against	such	views.	In	the	introduction	to	Hume’s	work,	John	M.	Robertson	(1856–1933)	described	the	thrust	of	the	book	to	be	centered	around	the	observations:		
																																																						reducible	to	a	fixed	brain,	that	mental	processes	are	nothing	more	than	neural	processes,	and,	more	generally,	that	 all	 of	 what	 constitutes	 the	 human—including	 personality,	 behavior,	 attitudes,	 and	 emotions—can	 be	explained	by	neural	 happenings.	 In	 some	discussions	 in	 philosophy	of	mind,	 this	 position	 is	 referred	 to	 as	identity	theory,	suggesting	mental	states	and	properties	are	neurological	states	and	properties.	The	notion	that	mental	 processes	 can	 be	 explained	 away	 by	 biological	 processes	 is	 sometimes	 further	 specified	 as	‘physiological	materialism.’	 This	 is	 how	 the	 term	will	 be	 used	 in	 this	 study.	While	 there	 are	 forms	 of	non-reductive	physicalism,	when	 the	 term	 ‘physicalism’	 is	used	 in	 the	discourse,	 this	 strong	 form	of	ontological	physicalism	as	I	have	defined	it	is	usually	assumed.	See	also	Bielfeldt	(2003a);	Jammer	(2003),	538;	and	Stoljar	(2015).	Physicalism	can	also	refer	to	several	other	positions—see	Bielfeldt	(2003a)—as	can	materialism—see	Jammer	(2003).		14	Gregory	(2000),	177.	For	an	early	history	of	notions	of	the	soul	in	the	body,	see	Zimmer	(2004),	9–23.	15	Jammer	(2003);	and	Ben-David	(1971),	182.	16	Preus	(1987),	xv,	84–103,	and	207.	See	also	Segal	(1994).	
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That	deities	are	the	mere	personifications	of	unknown	causes;	[…]	that	religious	history	is	a	process	of	flux	and	reflux	between	the	refined	and	the	crude	conceptions,	ignorance	now	degrading	a	doctrine,	and	reason	again	revolting	from	the	follies	of	ignorance	and	seeking	to	purify	its	ideas.17		Robertson	characterized	the	publication	in	terms	of	the	progress	of	naturalism	equated	to	religious	 decline,	 as	 well	 as	 naturalistic	 explanation	 negating	 religious	 meaning.	 For	Robertson	 and	many	others,	 as	 knowledge	of	 religion	was	naturalized,	 it	was	 thought	 to	exclude	all	other	ways	of	knowing.		 While	the	academic	study	of	religion	predates	the	nineteenth	century,	it	was	not	until	this	time	period	that	the	natural	study	of	religion	began	to	be	treated	as	a	coherent	field	of	research.18	 In	 the	 mid-1800s,	 the	 academic	 study	 of	 religion	 had	 unprecedented	developments.19	 Religion	 at	 large	 came	 to	 be	 objectified	 and	 externalized—placed	 in	 the	realm	of	society	and	culture,	which	was	regularly	paired	with	the	reduction	of	religion	to	natural	accounts.	Ludwig	Feuerbach	(1804–1872)	positioned	religion	 in	 the	material	and	social	 realm	 in	 his	 work	 Essence	 of	 Christianity	 (1841),	 arguing	 that	 God	 is	 a	 human	projection	 of	 wishful	 thinking.	 Karl	 Marx	 (1818–1883),	 departing	 from	 Feuerbach’s	observations,	 claimed	 religion	 needed	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 purely	 social	 and	 political.	 The	publication	of	Charles	Darwin’s	(1809–1882)	On	the	Origin	of	Species	(1859)	reinforced	the	philosophical	 notion	 of	 a	 material	 world	 and	 its	 mechanical	 processes—as	 well	 as	 a	naturalistic	 account—as	 paramount	 and	 the	 philosophy	 of	 materialism	 became	 deeply	entrenched	in	the	scientific	worldview.	Although	many	did	not	agree	with	materialism,	of	course,	it	was	from	this	pivotal	point	that	the	discourse	of	materialism	could	not	be	ignored	in	discussions	about	the	nature	of	reality	and	of	scientific	knowledge.	Scientific	knowledge	and	explanation	should	be	confined,	it	was	argued,	to	the	material	world,	the	world	of	the	senses—and	 this	 confinement	 should	 apply	 to	 explanations	 for	 religion	 according	 to	 an	increasing	number	of	academics.	However,	since	scientific	knowledge	was	also	constructed	
																																																						17	Hume	(1889),	v,	vii,	and	xxii–xiii.	18	Wheeler-Barclay	(2010),	1–2.	In	this	sense,	the	history	of	the	science	of	religion	has	been	treated	already	in	many	publications.	See,	e.g.,	Sharpe	(1997).	For	an	overview	of	the	cognitive	approaches	to	religion,	see	Geertz	(2004),	 355–363.	However,	 examining	 the	 history	 of	 the	 science	 of	 religion	 in	 terms	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	contexts	is	more	limited.	For	this	approach,	see	Krech	(2000),	e.g.,	which	contains	a	few	other	references	to	similar	approaches.	For	an	extensive	overview	of	 the	history	of	 the	study	of	religion,	see	Stausberg	(2007);	Stausberg	(2008);	and	Stausberg	(2009).	To	clarify,	the	‘academic	study	of	religion’	does	not	mean	the	academic	field	of	religious	studies,	but	rather	refers	to	a	more	generalized	practice	of	reflecting	on	religion	in	scholarship.	19	When	this	field	actually	emerged	is	widely	debated,	spanning	just	about	every	major	era	of	human	history.	See	Stausberg	(2007),	298.	
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correlated	 the	 advance	 of	 materialism	 with	 the	 decline	 of	 religion,	 that	 “to	 promote	materialism”	was	“at	the	expense	of	traditional,	spiritually	oriented	ideas	of	human	nature.”	“Objectivity	 came	 to	mean,	 among	other	 things,	 hostility	 to	 a	nonmaterialist	 approach	 to	RSMEs	[religious,	spiritual	and/or	mystical	experiences].”27	We	can	see	notions	of	mutual	exclusivity	in	play	here	as	science	was	thought	to	negate	religion,	even	when	accounting	for	it.	Put	differently,	if	religion	is	a	scientific	object	it	cannot	be	religious	and	all	that	is	left	is	a	scientific	framework	of	meaning.	This	mutually	exclusive	content	of	naturalism	vs.	religion	left	science	as	the	sole	interpretive	framework	and	reduction	ensued.			 	




	 Naturalizing	 the	 history	 of	 religion	 was	 framed	 as	 the	 exclusion	 of	 supernatural	origins,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 any	 inherent	 value	 to	 religious	 feelings.	 From	 an	 evolutionary	perspective,	 religion	 is	 functionally	 related	 to	 the	 fitness	 of	 individuals	 and	 communities	along	similar	lines	of	explanatory	frameworks	for	other	social	institutions.	Edward	Burnett	Tylor	(1832–1917)	was	among	the	first	to	apply	the	biological	evolutionary	concept	to	the	history	of	 religions	 in	1871.	 In	The	Principles	 of	 Sociology	 (1874–1896),	Herbert	 Spencer	(1820–1903)	expanded	on	evolutionary	theory	in	the	social	sphere,	including	religion,	and	argued	that	“civilized	men	have	no	innate	tendency	to	form	religious	ideas”	and	that	religions	“have	a	natural	origin”	for	which	there	were	“abundant	proofs.”	Gods	were	said	to	originate	in	 apotheosis,	which	 in	 turn	was	 said	 to	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 priestly	 function,	 along	with	 its	governing	role,	and	thus	the	formation	of	ecclesiastical	institutions	as	well.32			 Several	other	influential	authors	applied	evolutionary	theory	to	the	development	of	religion	as	well,	a	tradition	that	continues	to	this	day.33	For	example,	in	the	cognitive	science	of	 religion,	 we	 see	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 brain’s	 capacity	 to	 experience	 a	 ‘felt	 presence,’	 as	induced	by	 the	God	Helmet	 for	 instance,	 is	 the	prototype	 for	 the	God	experience	and	 the	source	 of	 belief	 about	 supernatural	 beings,	 which	 can	 explain	 the	 evolutionary	 origins	religion.34	Religion	is	thought	to	serve	specific	evolutionary	functions,	as	when	Persinger,	for	example,	 suggested	 that	 the	 God	 concept	 serves	 to	 temper	 existential	 anxiety.	 Persinger	described	 this	as,	 “A	biological	capacity	 […]	critical	 for	 the	survival	of	 the	species.”35	And	backing	up	the	claim	that	religion	manages	disposition,	Jeffrey	Kluger	found	that	religious	belief	 releases	 the	 same	 chemicals	 in	 the	 brain	 as	 Prozac	 and	 other	 anti-depressants.36	‘Natural’	accounts	of	these	‘supernatural’	experiences	are	typically	argued	to	‘explain	away’	religion,	according	to	advocates.37		 That	 religion	 is	 a	 product	 of	 evolution	 is	 regularly	 linked	 to	 arguments	 against	veridicality.	Several	respondents	to	Persinger’s	work	concluded	we	simply	are	“programmed	
																																																						32	Above	quoted	in	Krech	(2000),	249.	For	preceding	comments,	see	ibid.,	246–247.	33	 See,	 e.g.,	Atran	 (2002);	Boyer	 (2001);	Wilson	 (2002);	 and	Linden	 (2007).	 For	 an	overview	of	 the	 role	of	evolutionary	theories	in	the	cognitive	science	of	religion,	see	Geertz	(2004),	355–363.	34	The	Science	Channel	[Discovery]	(2010);	and	Schojoedt	(2009),	320.	35	Persinger	(2002b),	274.	See	also	Persinger	(1985);	and	Persinger	(2002a),	290.	36	Thornton	(2011),	154.	37	BBC	(2003a).	
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However,	now	with	morality	and	ethics	separated	out	as	independent	from	specific	religious	 traditions,	 there	 was	 an	 increased	 distinction	 between	 ‘objective	 religion’	 and	‘subjective	religiosity’	to	mark	this	difference	between	varying	institutionalized	dogmas	and	an	 inner	 essence.	 For	 example,	 Feuerbach	 equated	 theology	 to	 psychology,	 as	 did	 Søren	Kierkegaard	(1813–1855).51	In	the	case	of	Kierkegaard,	“The	whole	significance	is	displaced	from	the	objective	(dogmatic)	pole	to	the	subjective	(psychological)	pole.”52	In	academia	and	various	 social	 movements—including	 agnostic	 humanitarianism	 and	 behaviorist	 social	engineering—‘objective	religions’	in	terms	of	social	institutions	were	no	longer	regarded	as	a	suitable	basis	for	social	unity	and	religion	increasingly	gained	significance	at	the	level	of	the	subjective	individual.			 During	these	developments,	largely	in	the	nineteenth	century:		Contents	and	institutions	of	traditional	religion	became	more	and	more	obsolete.	At	the	same	time	the	




pole	of	religion	was	already	showing	tendencies	toward	being	objectified	in	the	natural	study	of	religion.	For	example,	Feuerbach	reduced	the	divine	to	human	aspirations,	aspirations	of	which	were	reified	and	naturalized	to	the	specific	exclusion	of	religious	understandings.	He	argued	that	the	entities	posed	by	religions	are	“nothing	but	the	subject’s	own	nature	taken	objectively.”56	And	this	emphasis	on	conceiving	religion	in	terms	of	the	subjective	resulted	in	 placing	 religion	primarily	 in	 the	 realm	of	 the	 psyche,	 corresponding	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 the	psychology	of	religion—though	not	yet	as	a	specialized	field.	As	such,	subjective	religion	also	came	to	be	thought	of	in	terms	of	natural	knowledge.		 The	psychology	of	religion	began	to	take	shape	as	an	empirical	science	around	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	alongside	the	development	of	psychology	at	large.	During	the	mid-twentieth	 century,	 the	 focus	 of	 psychology	 shifted	 to	 experiments	 and	 theories	regarding	 human	 behavior,	 though	 there	 had	 already	 been	 tendencies	 to	 understand	 all	human	behavior	 scientifically	 since	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 Gradually,	psychology	came	to	be	combined	with	more	rigorous	empirical	methods	in	the	mid-	to	late	twentieth	 century,	 including	 a	 neuroscientific	 bent,	 leading	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 cognitive	psychology.57	While	psychology	was	becoming	more	‘scientific,’	religion	was	too,	since	it	was	thoroughly	situated	in	the	psyche	at	this	point.	Ironically,	though	subjective	religion	emerged	in	 part	 as	 a	 means	 to	 reconcile	 the	 idea	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 social	 unifier	 and	 the	 obvious	conflicting	claims	of	various	dogmas,	with	this	psychologization	of	religion,	religion	lost	its	privileged	status.	One	of	the	consequences	of	dividing	religion	into	inner	and	outer	parts	was	that	 the	 external	 world	 came	 to	 represent	 the	 ‘real	 world,’	 while	 the	 inner	 portion	 lost	significance.	Though	thought	to	have	some	degree	of	‘reality,’	it	certainly	was	regarded	as	less	than	the	outer	world.58			 Moreover,	 psychology	 came	 to	 be	 a	 “campaign	 against	 mysticism	 of	 every	 kind.”	‘Mysticism’	 is	 historically	 discursively	 entangled	with	 ‘religion,’	 and	 has	 been	 frequently	used	to	refer	to	the	subjective	side	of	religion,	uniting	all	religion	under	its	auspices.	In	1920,	Knight	Dunlap	 (1875–1949)	 claimed,	 “No	one	 can	 accept	 the	 fundamental	 hypotheses	 of	
																																																						56	Quoted	in	Gaukroger	(2016),	340.	See	also	ibid.,	309.	57	Krech	 (2000),	255–259.	 See	also	 Jeeves	&	Brown	 (2009),	7	 and	13;	Carlson	 (2009),	157;	 and	Ben-David	(1971),	127–128.	58	Jevons	(1923),	4–5.	
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and	material	phenomena.	By	time	the	specialized	field	of	the	psychology	of	religion	emerged	around	the	1980s,	religion	had	already	been	reduced	to	purely	psychological	aspects	in	this	context.68			 In	short,	what	we	see	here	is	that	as	psychology	came	to	develop	along	the	lines	of	natural	 science,	 psychological	 explanations	 of	 religion	 increasingly	 became	 objectified,	naturalized,	and	reductive.	The	result	was	that	the	purpose	and	significance	of	religion—the	religious	 enterprise—whether	 it	 be	 objective	 or	 subjective	 was	 reduced	 to	 natural	explanations.	The	naturalistic	explanation,	in	many	cases,	was	thought	to	specifically	exclude	the	 understanding	 of	 religion	 in	 any	 other	 manner,	 particularly	 concerning	 a	 positive,	spiritual,	moral,	and/or	ethical	role.	Furthermore,	for	many,	the	role	of	religion	had	become	negative,	 representing	 false	 beliefs,	 delusion,	 or	 social	woes.	When	we	 keep	 in	mind	 the	contingency	of	the	mutual	exclusivity	of	religion	and	science,	as	well	as	of	naturalism	and	supernaturalism,	these	developments	can	be	read	in	a	new	light,	as	a	product	of	relational	conceptualization.	The	natural	only	negates	religion	and	reduces	religion	to	science	insofar	as	one	already	understands	these	concepts	in	a	particular	relational	network	of	meaning.	
	




clear	link	between	the	mind	and	body	was	thought	to	be	widely	established.	By	bridging	the	divide	 between	 the	 study	 of	 the	 brain	 and	 specific	 behaviors,	 phrenology	 constitutes	 a	historical	 link	 between	 early	 psychology—primarily	 a	 branch	 of	 philosophy	 and	epistemology—and	later	empirical	psychology.70	This	bridge	allowed	psychologists	to	relate	their	findings	to	those	of	neuroscience	and	related	fields	of	natural	science.71	As	such,	the	widespread	 interest	 in	 phrenology	 helped	 feed	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 related	 disciplines	 of	human	 psychology,	 anthropology,	 and	 sociology,	 dealing	with	 similar	 issues	 of	 localizing	mental	functions	during	various	stages	of	the	fields’	development.72			 While	localizationism	has	a	long	history,	the	first	extensive	theory	mapping	cortical	gyri	to	cognitive	functions	was	in	the	field	of	phrenology,	now	considered	a	pseudoscience.73	Phrenology,	developed	by	the	German	physicians	Franz	Joseph	Gall	(1758–1828)	and	Joseph	Casper	Spurzheim	(1776–1832)	in	the	late	eighteenth	century,	is	the	practice	of	identifying	personality,	intelligence,	and	character	traits	and	aptitudes	by	examining	the	varying	shapes	and	unevenness	on	the	surface	of	the	skull.	For	example,	a	pronounced	forehead	suggests	a	well-developed	 benevolence	 ‘organ,’	 localizing	 a	 benevolent	 disposition.	 Some	 other	relevant	 traits	 categorized	 according	 to	 the	 phrenological	 brain	 sections	 are	 religious	sentiment	and	devotion.74	The	goal	of	such	a	materialist	philosophy,	or	at	least	the	narrative	of	the	goal,	was	specifically	to	establish	the	non-existence	of	the	immaterial,	including	the	soul,	and	to	delegitimize	natural	philosophy	and	theology.75			 Just	as	with	other	studies	of	religion	at	the	time,	phrenology	drew	from	theories	of	social	 evolution	 that	 looked	 for	 objective	 knowledge	 of	 divinity,	 design,	 and	 purpose.76	
																																																						70	Jeeves	&	Brown	(2009),	31.	On	the	importance	of	phrenology	in	the	development	of	psychology,	see	Young	(1990).	71	Carlson	(2009),	157.		72	 Jeeves	 &	 Brown	 (2009),	 31;	 and	 Uttal	 (2009),	 103.	 Phrenology	was	 so	widely	 popular	 and	 socially	 and	scientifically	accepted	that	 it	was	ranked	at	 the	 level	of	Darwin’s	 theories	and	an	anthropometric	character	reading	could	even	be	used	as	a	reference	when	applying	for	employment.	This	new	‘science	of	mind,’	as	it	was	labeled,	 became	 popular	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 in	 Europe,	 North	 America,	 and	Australia—found	 in	 the	highest	elite	circles.	See	van	Wyhe	(2000);	and	Anon.	(1879).	73	On	the	language	of	‘mapping’	as	specific	to	localization	discourse,	see	Thornton	(2011),	37–45.	74	Brown	(2003),	611–612;	and	Jeeves	&	Brown	(2009),	31.	75	Shapin	(1979),	142,	144,	167,	and	169.	Steven	Shapin	claimed	that	this	was	the	case	for	Gall.	However,	Gall	has	also	been	 said	 to	have	been	attempting	 to	prove	 the	existence	of	God.	 See	 Jeeves	&	Brown	 (2009),	33.	Whichever	 is	 the	 case,	we	 can	 see	 how	 this	 former	narrative	 conforms	 to	 the	 relational	 content	 of	mutual	exclusivity.	76	Dalton	(2000),	513–514;	and	Brown	(2003).	
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these	 phrenological	 ideas	 have	 “a	 wide,	 if	 cryptic	 and	 implicit,	 acceptance	 in	 modern	cognitive	 neuroscience.”83	 “Cognitive	 neuroscience	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	 precept	 that	 a	discoverable	correspondence	exists	between	mental	states	and	brain	states,”	exemplified	by	the	fact	that	photos	of	imaging	and	fMRI	data	identifying	the	location	of	mental	processes	dominate	world-leading	 scientific	 journals,	 like	Science.84	 Because,	 from	 this	 perspective,	structure-function	 is	 ‘hardwired’	 and	 biologically	 determined,	 once	 the	 location	 is	determined,	any	experience	can	be	controlled	and	recreated	in	the	lab,	including	religious	experience,	which	in	turn	is	thought	to	confirm	its	natural	nature.85		 Psychologist	William	R.	Uttal,	among	others,	has	argued	that	localization	is	simply	the	‘new	phrenology,’	as	cognitive	processes	are	examined	through	locating	them	via	imaging	technology,	 while	 within	 the	 same	 studies	 observations	 of	 behavior	 are	 almost	 totally	absent.86	With	 this	 absence	of	 behavioral	 observations	 is	 the	 implicit	 construction	of	 the	mental	states	as	nothing	more	than	neural	processes.	Despite	the	disconnect	between	the	images	and	observing	behavior	and	despite	the	simplified	scheme	of	this	mapping	method,	these	imaging	techniques	have	been	described	as	having	“revolutionized	the	brain	sciences”	with	the	potential	to	“revolutionize	the	scientific	study	of	religion.”87	Such	approaches	are	regarded	as	the	very	“basis”	for	this	line	of	research,	demonstrating	the	central	role	of	these	images,	the	central	role	of	localization,	in	the	research	under	consideration	here.88			 Like	materialism,	localizationism	has	oftentimes	been	framed	as	specifically	negating	religious	worldviews,	and	thus	constructing	religion	as	reductively	scientific	 in	nature.	 In	
Histoire	Naturelle	 de	 l’Ame	 (Natural	History	of	 the	Soul),	 Julien	Offray	de	 la	Mettrie	 (also	
																																																						we	look	at	sensory	inputs	and	motor	outputs.	See	Uttal	(2009),	13–14.	Uttal	claimed,	“although	the	brain	is	certainly	differentiated,	most	high-level	cognitive	functions	cannot	be	justifiably	associated	with	localized	brain	regions.”	Ibid.,	25.	For	critiques	of	localizationism,	see	ibid.;	and	Farah	(1994).	83	Uttal	(2009),	103.	84	Schall	(2003),	23;	and	Uttal	(2009),	xiii.	85	However,	 in	recent	decades,	the	complexity	and	wide	distribution	of	functions	throughout	the	brain	have	been	increasingly	recognized.	See,	e.g.,	Uttal	(2009).	Others,	such	as	Andrew	Newberg,	have	found	that	during	spiritual	experiences,	some	areas	of	the	brain	are	‘turned	on’	and	some	‘off,’	making	him	conclude	a	network	of	structures	are	involved.	BBC	(2003a).	See	also	d’Aquili	&	Newberg	(1999),	esp.	47–76.	86	 Uttal	 (2009),	 passim.	 Satel	 &	 Lilienfeld	 (2013),	 3,	 also	 discussed	 the	 notion	 of	 brain	 imaging	 as	‘neophrenology.’	Though	the	authors	claimed	the	characterization	is	unfair,	they	offered	further	critical	work	on	the	oversimplification	of	imaging	techniques.	See	Satel	&	Lilienfeld	(2013),	1–24.	Journalist	Jeffrey	Goldberg	similarly	questioned	imaging	of	brain	states,	stating,	“I	wondered	to	what	degree	this	was	truly	scientific	and	to	what	degree	it	was	21st-century	phrenology.”	Goldberg	(2008).	See	also	Jeeves	&	Brown	(2009),	37.	87	Carlson	(2009),	159.	88	Newberg	(2003),	310.	
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surgery,	Penfield	was	able	to	gain	subjective	reports	while	stimulating	various	regions	of	the	brain,	finding	that	prodding	the	temporal	lobes	caused	some	patients	to	report	out-of-body	experiences,	 auditory	 hallucinations	 (e.g.,	 hearing	 voices),	 and	 visual	 hallucinations	 (e.g.,	seeing	apparitions).95			 For	 some,	 Penfield’s	 work,	 or	 sometimes	 the	 work	 in	 the	 1950s	 to	 the	 1970s	 of	scholars	 such	 as	 Herbert	 Simon	 (1916–2001),	 George	Miller	 (1920–2012),	 Allen	 Newell	(1927–1992),	and	Noam	Chomsky,	marked	the	beginning	of	the	cognitive	science	of	religion.	Such	 research	was	 also	 conducted	 by	 British	 psychiatrists	 Eliot	 Slater	 (1904–1983)	 and	Alfred	W.	Beard	(1920–1985)	in	the	1960s.96	Either	way,	historicizing	the	field	as	such	firmly	situates	 localizationism	as	 the	 theoretical	 foundation	of	 the	 field.97	 Similar	 localizationist	work	 today	has	 led	Persinger	 to	claim	 that	he	has	mapped	specific	 types	of	mystical	and	religious	experiences	to	precise	patterns	of	magnetic	pulses	and	stimulation,	leading	many	to	 conclude	 “God	 resides	 in	 our	brains.”98	And	neuroscientist	 Francis	 Crick	 (1916–2004)	took	a	thoroughly	reductive	stance	when	he	concluded,	“you—your	joys	and	your	sorrows,	your	memories	and	your	ambitions,	your	sense	of	personal	identity	and	free	will—are	in	fact	no	more	than	the	behavior	of	a	vast	assembly	of	nerve	cells	and	their	associated	molecules.”99	Thus,	while	phrenology	was	left	behind	in	the	refuse	heap	of	science,	it	endured	in	theoretical	postulations	 of	 localizationism	 and	 reductionism	 “that	 dominate	 neuroscience	 even	today.”100			 It	might	be	said	that	“the	history	of	brain	science	can	be	told	as	a	history	of	localization	theories	and	methods.”101	Localization,	after	all,	has	been	one	of	the	few	major	perspectives	that	have	persisted	throughout	the	history	of	the	brain	sciences.	As	we	have	seen,	one	of	the	
																																																						notion	of	the	‘God	Gene.’	Dean	Hamer,	who	hypothesized	about	the	connection	between	religion	and	particular	genetic	makeup,	was	given	the	cover	story	on	Time	(Europe)	magazine,	showing	the	discursive	impact	is	large.	See	Paloutzian,	 Swenson,	&	McNamara	 (2006),	 162–164;	Kluger	 (2004);	 and	Time	 (2004).	 See	 also	Hamer	(2004);	Eaves	(2004);	and	Koenig	et	al	(2005).	95	Penfield	&	Rasmussen	(1950),	esp.	164–177;	Penfield	(1955),	454–461;	and	Penfield	&	Perot	(1963).	96	Slater	&	Beard	(1963).	97	E.g.,	Guthrie	(1980);	and	Sperber	(1975).	Barrett	(2013)	marked	the	1970s	as	containing	the	roots	of	the	field.	See	also	Slone	(2007).	98	The	Science	Channel	[Discovery]	(2010);	and	Persinger	(2001).	99	Crick	(1994),	3.	100	Carlson	(2009),	156;	and	Bielfeldt	(2003b),	716.	101	Thornton	(2011),	36.	For	a	history	of	neuroscience,	see	also,	McHenry	(1969);	Clarke	&	Jacyna	(1987);	Star	(1989);	Finger	(1994);	and	Zimmer	(2004).	
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Just	as	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct	gave	rise	to	specific	signifiers	for	religion	and	science,	the	 scientification	 of	 religion	 led	 to	 a	 new	network	 of	meaning	 surrounding	 the	 concept	‘religion.’	Because	‘religion’	here	is	a	scientific	object,	this	network	of	meaning	included	new	signifiers	 for	 ‘science’	as	well.	Obviously	 likening	religion	to	science	via	naturalism	led	to	naturalism	signifying	religion,	but	the	identity	construct	also	gave	rise	to	its	own	signifiers	as	well.	
	




thinkers	 such	 as	 Rudolf	 Otto	 (1869–1937),	 Gerardus	 van	 der	 Leeuw	 (1890–1950),	 and	Mircea	Eliade	(1907–1986).108	This	approach	of	identifying	the	essence	of	religion	typically	rested	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 unique	 form	 of	 experience,	 which	 made	 up	 this	essentialized	 core.	 In	 the	 past,	 philosophers	 of	 religion,	 theologians,	 historians,	anthropologists,	 and	 academics	 of	 religion	 from	 many	 other	 backgrounds	 have	 treated	religion	 as	 a	 special	 category,	 one	 that	 included	 special	 experiences,	 commitments,	 and	mental	happenings	not	conducive	to	‘regular’	forms	of	inquiry.	This	was	increasingly	called	into	 question	 as	 it	 suggested	 religious	 experience	 is	 sui	 generis,	 it	 isolated	 the	 study	 of	religion	from	other	disciplines,	allowed	for	the	presence	of	theological	agendas,	and	because	it	reflected	Western	presuppositions	about	religion.109		 However,	 the	 psychology	 of	 religion	 early	 on	 through	 today	 has	 focused	 on	discovering	the	‘essence	of	religion’	identified	with	the	experience	of	‘subjective	religion.’110	And	this	has	 influenced	 its	sister	discourse	on	the	cognitive	science	of	religion	as	well,	 in	which	many	treat	religion	as	if	there	is	some	common	core,	though	‘religious	experience’	has	come	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 plethora	 of	 phenomena	 in	 the	 field.111	 While	 religion	 and	 religious	experience	 often	 continued	 to	 hold	 a	 special	 status	 as	 something	 unique	 in	 the	 natural	sciences,	 questions	 about	 their	 degree	 of	 uniqueness	 and	 the	 possibility	 for	 ‘normal’	scientific	 inquiry	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 scientification	 of	
																																																						108	See	Otto	(1923);	van	der	Leeuw	(1938);	and	Eliade	(1987	[1957]).	109	For	a	critique	of	the	sui	generis	argumentation,	see,	e.g.,	Smith	(1990),	36–53;	and	McCutcheon	(1997).	110	Krech	(2000),	261	and	265.		111	 E.g.,	 psychologist	 David	 Wulff	 stated	 that	 spiritual	 experiences	 being	 common	 across	 time	 and	 space	“suggest[s]	a	common	core	that	is	likely	a	reflection	of	structures	and	processes	in	the	human	brain.”	Quoted	in	Begley	(2010).	See	also,	Andersen	et	al	(2014),	218,	where	the	authors	identified	essentialist	views	as	one	of	the	major	theoretical	positions	in	the	natural	science	of	religion.	Ann	Taves,	a	leading	specialist	in	the	field,	has	attempted	to	tackle	the	issue	in	Taves	(2009).	Taves	situated	herself	in	the	scholarly	context	outlined	above	by	critiquing	sui	generis	accounts	and	by	showing	how	her	approach	to	the	study	of	religious	experience	avoids	the	 pitfalls	 that	 earlier	 approaches	 fell	 victim	 to.	 Her	 aim	 was	 to	 develop	 a	 naturalistic	 understanding	 of	religious	experience	as	well	as	to	identify	a	methodology	that	will	bring	together	religious	studies,	the	social-psychological	study	of	the	mind,	and	the	neuroscientific	study	of	the	brain,	thus	incorporating	the	humanities	and	sciences	where	past	scholarship	has	failed.	Essentialism	is	questioned	in	the	field	of	neuroscience	as	well,	although	by	a	seeming	minority.	See,	e.g.,	Slone	(2007)	who	looks	at	recurring	historical,	social,	and	cultural	features	 to	 identify	 religion	 in	 a	 broader	way.	 See	 also	Granqvist	 (2006),	 134;	 and	Ratcliffe	 (2006),	 95.	As	regards	the	role	of	religious	experience	in	the	cognitive	sciences,	as	Justin	Barrett	noted,	‘religion’	is	not	even	typically	 defined	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 cognitive	 science	 of	 religion,	 rather	 ‘religion’	 is	 treated	 in	 a	 ‘piecemeal	fashion’	by	identifying	what	is	‘generally	considered	religious.’	See	Barrett	(2011),	231.	Today,	there	is	no	clear	consensus	in	the	cognitive	sciences	as	to	what	constitutes	‘religion.’	See	also	Zinnbauer	&	Pargament	(2005).	
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religion.112	Natural	scientists	increasingly	argued	that	ordinary	explanations	were	sufficient	for	the	analysis	of	religion.	Philosopher,	psychologist,	and	physician	William	James	(1842–1910),	for	example,	argued	that	religious	experiences	do	not	occur	through	a	distinct	faculty,	but	rather	through	the	ordinary	senses,	accompanied	by	the	perception	of	the	divine.113			 And	with	the	development	of	localizationism,	bridging	the	gap	between	the	brain	and	specific	 behaviors	 and	 between	 psychology	 and	 ‘hard’	 neuroscience,	 all	 experience	 was	increasingly	 understood	 as	 accessible,	measurable,	 and	 thus	 to	 some	 degree	 ‘normal.’	 E.	Thomas	 Lawson	 and	 Robert	 McCauley,	 in	 Rethinking	 Religion:	 Connecting	 Cognition	 and	
Culture	(1990),	argued	that	religious	 ideas,	experiences,	and	actions	could	be	understood	through	 regular	 approaches	 to	 cognition.114	 Some	 scholars	 suggest	 that	 this	 publication	marked	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 cognitive	 science	 of	 religion,	 as	 this	 theoretical	 basis	 has	continued	 to	 shape	 the	 development	 of	 the	 field.115	 And	 with	 normalization,	 scientific	frameworks	 of	 meaning	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 for	 explanation.	Reductionism	became	one	of	the	identity	markers	of	the	method	and	theory	of	the	science	of	religion.	For	instance,	in	cognitive	science,	reductionism	has	largely	become	a	“principle”	of	the	discipline;	neuroscientific	theory	and	research	is	said	to	specifically	exclude	the	concept	of	 immaterialism;	and,	as	we	have	seen,	psychology	developed	in	 its	separation	from	and	reduction	of	religious	worldviews.116		 While	 centuries	ago,	 it	was	 thought	 that	 there	might	be	a	 specialized	organ	 in	 the	brain	that	is	responsible	for	religious	experience,	like	the	pineal	gland	for	example,	which	then	contributed	to	religious	experience’s	unique	status,	today	the	communis	opinio	is	that	there	is	no	separate	‘religion	organ’	to	speak	of.117	Religious	experiences	engage	the	same	organs	as	any	other	experiences	and	there	is	“no	universal	pattern	among	brain	states	that	one	might	term	religious.”118	This	suggests	that	the	correlate	mental/brain	states	of	religious	
																																																						112	Even	though	the	investigation	of	the	unique	aspects	of	human	religiosity	has	been	a	key	theme	in	the	field,	this	uniqueness	 is	questioned	and	debated	 in	 the	 field	as	well.	Paloutzian	 (2013),	1904	and	1909.	See	also	Baumeister	(2002).	113	Hay	(1994);	and	Gendlin	(1962).	114	For	further	examples,	see	also	Lawson	(2000),	344–345;	Persinger	(1984a);	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997),	499;	and	Ratcliffe	(2006),	84.	115	Slone	(2007),	593.	See	also	Barrett	(2013);	and	Newberg	(2003),	passim.	116	Brown	(2003),	616.	See	also	Bennett	&	Hacker	(2003),	355–377.	117	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997),	499.	118	Carlson	(2009),	164	and	168.	See	also	Depraz,	Varela,	&	Vermersch	(2003).	
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experiences	 are	 likely	 not	 unique	 to	 those	 experiences	 and	 also	 may	 occur	 in	 other	situations.119	Yet,	the	notion	that	religion	can	be	essentialized	as	experience	remained	and	as	such	the	idea	of	‘locating’	religion	in	the	brain	was	further	strengthened	since	experiences	had	become	identified	with	brain	states.		Such	 notions	 were	 central	 to	 the	 ‘Cognitive	 Revolution’	 of	 the	 late	 twentieth	century.120	It	was	during	this	time	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	that	cognitive	science	and	neuroscience	 joined,	 forming	the	field	of	cognitive	neuroscience—“one	of	 the	most	significant	scientific	trends”	of	this	time	period.121	This	union	is	symbolic	of	the	identity	between	cognition	and	brain	states.	The	rise	of	the	psychology	of	religion	and	the	cognitive	science	of	religion	in	the	late	twentieth	to	early	twenty-first	centuries	were	part	of	this	wider	intellectual	 trend	 as	 well.122	 In	 this	 era,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Neurocentric	 Age,	 an	increasing	number	of	people	began	to	think	that	“the	brain	is	central	not	only	to	the	body	but	to	 our	 conception	 of	 ourselves.”	 And	 this	 has	 also	 created	 a	 “new	way	 of	 conceiving	 the	soul.”123	 This	 conception	 is	 illustrated	 by	 psychologist	 and	 neuroscientist	 Joshua	Greene,	who,	when	performing	 fMRI	 scans	 on	 subjects	 thinking	over	moral	 dilemmas,	 remarked,	“Some	people	in	these	experiments	think	we’re	putting	their	soul	under	[a]	microscope	and	in	 a	 sense,	 that’s	what	we’re	doing.	This	 is	what	 your	 soul	 is,	 if	 anything	 is.”124	The	new	conception	of	the	‘soul’	and	of	‘religion’	had	become	firmly	situated	in	the	framework	of	the	natural	scientific	study	of	religion	and	this	was	specifically	reductive.	In	this	Brain	Age	(or	‘neuromania’	as	some	have	come	to	call	it),	mind	and	soul,	free	will,	and	religious	experience	
																																																						119	Brown	(2003),	615–616.	Ramachadran,	e.g.,	claimed	that	religious	experience	constitutes	a	unique	class	and	thus	regardless	of	a	person’s	background,	if	the	brain	conditions	are	right,	then	that	person	will	have	a	religious	experience.	In	contrast,	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997),	499,	claimed	that	religious	experiences	are	those	identified	as	religious	 and	 can	 include	 feelings	 of	 deep	 significance,	 harmony,	 joy,	 etc.,	 that	 another	 subject	 would	 not	describe	in	religious	terminology.		120	Miller	(2003);	Jeeves	&	Brown	(2009),	5–6;	Geertz	(2004),	349;	Brown	(2003),	614;	Newberg	(2003),	310;	and	Carlson	(2009),	158–159.	121	Brown	(2003),	614.	The	distinguishing	factor	seems	to	be	that	while	neuroscience	focuses	on	the	nervous	system,	 cognitive	 science	 focuses	 on	 cognition,	 and	 cognitive	 neuroscience	 has	 its	 core	 in	 the	 relationship	between	the	nervous	system	and	cognition.	122	Lawson	(2000).	See	also,	Zimmer	(2004);	Barrett	 (2000);	Barrett	 (2011),	230;	Barrett	 (2013),	409;	and	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997),	508.	Important	contributions	include	Lawson	&	McCauley	(1990);	Guthrie	(1993);	Boyer	(1994);	and	Whitehouse	(1995).	123	Zimmer	(2004),	7.		124	Quoted	in	Zimmer	(2004),	264.	See	also	Trimble	(2007),	on	situating	‘the	soul	in	the	brain’	(the	title	of	the	work).	
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all	came	to	be	reduced	to	their	material	aspects	in	the	natural	sciences.125		Though	reductive	materialism	had	been	around	for	a	significant	period	of	time,	it	was	during	 this	 age	 of	 ‘brain	 culture,’	 in	 which	 the	 individual	 came	 to	 be	 framed	 as	 a	‘neurochemical	self.’126	The	human	being	came	to	be	expressed	in	a	formulaic	and	wholly	reductive	way:	“[H]uman	=	self-conscious	mind	=	brain.”127	This	is	because:		Naturalists	often	assume	that	the	modes	of	explanation	adopted	in	the	physical	sciences,	with	their	requirement	that	explanations	be	given	solely	in	terms	of	natural	causes,	are	paradigmatic	of	what	it	is	to	explain	or	even	to	understand	a	phenomenon.128		One	of	the	founders	of	the	field,	Justin	Barrett,	agreed:	“Cognitive	scientists	of	religion	adopt	a	 methodological	 naturalism	 perspective,	 seeking	 strictly	 natural	 mechanisms	 for	 the	phenomena	under	consideration	[…].”129	To	be	a	cognitive	scientist	of	religion	is	to	be	strictly	a	naturalist,	creating	a	reductive	framework.	To	have	true	knowledge	of	human	experiences	and	 subjective	 reality	 is	 to	 speak	 in	 the	 language	 of	 physicalism,	 from	 this	 perspective.	Persinger	argued,	“in	the	history	of	science,	those	phenomena	which	were	considered	to	be	nonphysical,	ultimately	we	did	find	a	physical	basis	and	when	we	found	the	physical	basis	
then	we	understood	it.”130	According	to	Persinger,	the	basis	of	cognitive	science	is	to	“try	to	understand	 the	brain	basis	 to	all	 experiences.	The	assumption	 is	 that	 all	 experiences	are	
generated	by	brain	activity.”131	 In	other	words,	 there	 is	not	an	experience	 ‘out	 there’	 that	then	produces	brain	 activity,	 nor	 is	 there	 a	one-to-one	 correlate	of	 experience	 and	brain	activity,	but	rather	brain	activity	determines	experience.	Other	academics	look	at	this	work	and	 conclude	 the	 same:	 the	 correlation	 between	 certain	 brain	 activity	 and	 religious	experience	 suggests	 these	 experiences	 have	 a	 “physiological	 basis	 linked	 to	 brain	mechanisms.”132	Religion	does	not	simply	have	a	physical	component;	 it	 is	 fundamentally	
																																																						125	Oomen	(2003),	617;	and	Satel	&	Lilienfeld	 (2013),	xiv	and	xix.	On	 free	will	and	agency,	 see	also	Satel	&	Lilienfeld	(2013),	125–147.	126	Thornton	(2011),	7	and	115–116;	and	Rose	(2007),	187–223.	See	also	Satel	&	Lilienfeld	(2013).	127	Gay	(2009a),	23.	128	Davis	&	Collins	(2000),	204.	129	Barrett	(2013),	409.	130	Skeptiko	(2014).	Emphasis	added.	131	 Skeptiko	 (2014).	 Emphasis	 added.	 See	 also	 in	 ibid.:	 “[O]ur	 research	 starts	 on	 the	 basic	 premise	 that	 all	experience	is	generated	by	brain	activity”;	“all	experience…must	be	associated	to	brain	activity.”	See	also	St.-Pierre	&	Persinger	(2006),	e.g.,	in	addition	to	Persinger’s	other	publications,	in	which	he	reiterates	time	and	again	that	the	brain	‘generates’	experiences.	131	Martin	(n.d.).	132	McClenon	(2006),	144.	Emphasis	added.	
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physical,	from	this	perspective,	with	reductionism	as	the	underlying	basis	of	the	scientific	outlook.	 In	 another	 example,	 physicist	 Lawrence	 Krauss	 suggested	 that,	 “once	 we	understand	the	physiological	basis	of	consciousness	the	theological	realm	of	 the	soul	will	retreat,	 to	 avoid	 conflict	 with	 experiment.”133	 This	 formulation	 is	 one	 of	 the	 foremost	arguments	put	forth	in	the	literature	on	the	science	of	religion	as	well	as	naturalism	more	broadly—time	 and	 time	 again	physical	 science	has	 been	 able	 to	 explain	what	were	 once	thought	mysterious	or	supernatural	in	terms	of	well-supported	naturalistic	processes	and	this	amounts	to	total	understanding.134	The	result	was	that	via	the	scientification	of	religion,	‘science’	 came	 to	 be	 signified	 by	 ‘reductionism,’	 for	 many.	 And	 this	 signifier	 plays	 an	important	role	in	further	discursive	developments	of	the	term,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.		




in	which	science	is	making	a	case	for	the	nonexistence	of	the	thing	they	are	investigating.	In	differentiating	 the	 scientific	 object	 of	 religion	 from	 religion	 conceived	 in	 any	 other	 way	results	in	new	signifiers	for	the	term	that	reflect	this	odd	situation.	In	this	discourse,	we	see	religion	framed	as	a	pathological	mistake,	as	illusion	or	delusion,	and	as	insignificant,	all	of	which	 take	 on	 this	 structure	 of	 the	 scientific	 object	 of	 religion	 negating	 religion	conventionally	understood	(which	is	exclusive	religion).	This	relational	equation	develops	in	the	discourse.		 	For	 instance,	 the	question	consistently	arises	about	whether	 the	science	 indicates	religion	is	not	religious.	Even	when	this	question	is	answered	in	the	negative,	that	it	could	be	asked	at	all	 is	demonstrative	 that	an	 interplay	between	 likening	religion	and	science	and	mutual	exclusivity	has	occurred,	as	 it	 is	only	 in	this	context	that	constructing	 ‘religion’	as	‘science’	 can	 result	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 religion	 as	 potentially	 ‘not	 religion.’	 This	 is	 a	reflection	of	the	structure	of	changing	meanings	of	the	term	‘religion’	and	‘science’	via	the	interplay	between	various	relational	constructs	and	processes.	In	the	following	subsections,	I	 will	 examine	 how	 religion	 has	 come	 to	 be	 signified	 in	 ways	 that	 challenge	 its	 own	veridicality	as	an	expression	of	how	religion	constructed	as	science	is	structured	by	mutual	exclusivity.	Thus	far,	we	have	seen	mutual	exclusivity	in	play	by	determining	what	signifiers	would	constitute	making	religion	science-like	and	by	determining	that	those	signifiers	would	be	treated	in	a	dichotomous	formation	to	the	exclusion	of	religion,	resulting	in	the	reduction	to	 science.	 In	doing	so,	 signifiers	of	 religion	are	negated,	but	 religion	 in	a	very	particular	sense	 remains.	 Here,	 in	 contrast,	 we	 see	 mutual	 exclusivity	 in	 play	 in	 that	 to	 construct	religion	as	science	is	to	construct	religion	as	‘not	religion’	and	negate	the	very	veridicality	of	religion.	Though	we	have	already	seen	such	thoughts	recur	in	the	above	accounts,	it	is	worth	emphasizing	 here	 that	 the	 scientification	 of	 religion	 is	 not	 just	 about	 reduction	 but	 a	relational	 construct	 that	 structures	 meaning	 making	 and	 discursive	 change	 in	 what	 the	concept	‘religion’	entails.			
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6.2.1 Religion	as	Pathology	In	the	cognitive	science	of	religion,	religious	experiences	are	often	localized	in	the	temporal	lobes.135	 Such	 localization	 has	 a	 long	 tradition,	 in	 studies	 of	 patients	with	 temporal	 lobe	epilepsy	for	example,	who	have	been	found	to	be	‘hyper-religious.’136	It	has	been	found	that	those	with	heightened	activity	of	these	specific	neurocircuits	are	more	conducive	to	religious	belief.	Some	scientists	now	think	that	what	occurs	in	temporal	lobe	epileptics	might	just	be	an	exceptional	heightening	of	what	occurs	in	us	all,	to	varying	degrees,	resulting	in	religious	experiences	and	beliefs.137			 The	localization	of	religion	in	the	temporal	lobes	and	the	connection	with	epilepsy	is	one	way	in	which	religion	is	characterized	as	not	veridical,	more	specifically	as	inauthentic	and	 pathological.	 Epileptic	 seizures	 have	 been	 simultaneously	 associated	 with	 religious	experience	and	brain	malfunction	since	antiquity,	thus	establishing	a	link	between	religion	and	pathology.	There	is	evidence	of	prehistoric	accounts	of	epilepsy	involving	both	physical	and	spiritual	elements,	among	many	ancient	cultures.138	Epileptics	are	suggested	to	be	linked	to	the	divine,	demonic,	and	supernatural	across	many	societies	and	these	religious	aspects	in	turn	are	associated	with	disease	early	on	in	history,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	Hippocratic	work	and	the	first	monograph	on	the	condition	On	the	Sacred	Disease	(ca.	400	BCE),	as	well	as	in	Plato’s	 (ca.	 428–347	 BCE)	 Timaeus	 (ca.	 360	 BCE).139	 The	 same	 associations	 can	 be	 found	centuries	later,	in	Caelius	Aurelianus’	(fl.	fifth	century)	description	in	early	medieval	medical	glosses,	in	the	thought	of	St.	Hildegard	of	Bingen	(1098–1179),	and	in	the	poetry	of	Dante	
																																																						135	See,	e.g.,	Persinger	(1983);	Persinger	(1987);	Cook	&	Persinger	(1997);	Persinger	(1984b);	and	Schojoedt	(2009),	321.	In	this	field	of	study,	sometimes	other	locations	are	emphasized	instead.	See	Newberg	(2003),	308.	Another	study	has	found	that	firing	magnetic	pulses	into	the	inferior	parietal	lobe	decreases	spirituality.	See	Crescentini	et	al	(2015).	136	Dewhurst	&	Beard	(1970);	Ramachandran	&	Blakeslee	(1998);	Ogata	&	Miyakawa	(1998);	Slater	&	Beard	(1963),	143–150;	Devinsky	&	Lai	 (2008);	Bear	&	Fedio	 (1977);	d’Aquili	&	Newberg	 (1993);	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997);	and	Schachter	(2006).	Later	studies	challenged	this	view.	Neuropsychiatrist	Peter	Fenwick	concluded:	“It	is	likely	that	the	earlier	accounts	of	temporal	lobe	epilepsy	and	temporal	lobe	pathology	and	the	relationship	to	 mystic	 and	 religious	 states	 owe	 more	 to	 the	 enthusiasm	 of	 their	 authors	 than	 to	 the	 true	 scientific	understanding	of	the	nature	of	temporal	 lobe	functioning.”	Quoted	in	Hughes	(2005),	135.	See	also	Saver	&	Rabin,	(1997),	499–504.	Many	scholars	of	religion,	particularly	those	within	neuroscience,	do	not	endorse	this	view	of	religious	experience.	See,	e.g.,	Austin	(1998);	Glassman	(2002);	Hood	et	al	(1996);	McNamara	(2002);	Peterson	(2001);	Peterson	(2002);	and	Teske	(2001).	137	BBC	(2003a).	138	See,	e.g.,	Margetts	(1967);	and	Brown	(2003),	615.	139	Temkin	(1971),	3–6	and	155.	See	also,	Trimble	(2007),	133–152.	
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suggesting	the	possibility	of	being	seizure	induced.	Similarly,	the	Abrahamic	prophet	Moses	saw	a	burning	bush.161	Other	 religious	 figures	 that	have	been	suggested	 to	have	epilepsy	include	Jesus	(ca.	4	BCE–30	CE),	Muhammad	(ca.	570–632),	Joan	of	Arc	(ca.	1412–1431),	St.	Teresa	 of	 Avila	 (1515–1582),	 Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 (1688–1772),	 Joseph	 Smith	 (1805–1844),	and	Ann	Lee	(1736–1784),	among	others.162	Some	have	argued	that	many	religious	visionaries	do	not	have	associated	mental	impairments	that	often	accompany	temporal	lobe	epilepsy	and	instead	have	many	notable	accomplishments,	the	implication	being	that,	again,	epilepsy	has	to	be	discounted	if	we	are	to	value	the	experiences	and	contributions	of	these	individuals—a	 forced	 choice	 between	 the	 option	 of	 religion	 as	 reductively	 scientific	 and	pathological	and	thus	as	not	religious,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	option	of	genuineness,	on	the	other.163		 Pathologizing	religion	is	perceived	as	negating	religion.	Matthew	Ratcliffe	observed:	The	 tension	 between	 a	 malfunction	 explanation	 and	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 resultant	 experiences	 are	veridical	becomes	unavoidable	if	one	accepts	a	noncontingent	connection	between	function	and	well-formed	belief.	Certain	theists	and	atheists	alike	have	argued	that	well-formed	beliefs	just	are	those	that	are	 generated	 by	 properly	 functioning	 cognitive	 apparatus	 operating	 in	 normal	 environmental	conditions.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	any	belief	arising	as	a	result	of	malfunction	is,	by	implication,	not	to	be	trusted.164	Similarly,	James	noted	that	the	reduction	of	religion	to	science	and	the	association	between	pathology	 and	 religious	 experience	 is	 a	 reading	 that	 implicitly	 affirms	 the	 materialist	worldview	by	specifically	challenging	the	legitimacy	of	religious	experience.	He	pointed	out:		Medical	materialism	finishes	up	Saint	Paul	by	calling	his	vision	on	the	road	to	Damascus	a	discharging	lesion	of	the	occipital	cortex,	he	being	an	epileptic.	It	snuffs	out	Saint	Teresa	as	an	[sic]	hysteric,	Saint	Francis	of	Assisi	as	an	[sic]	hereditary	degenerate.	George	Fox’s	discontent	with	the	shams	of	his	age,	and	his	pining	 for	 spiritual	veracity,	 it	 treats	as	a	 symptom	of	a	disordered	colon	 […]	And	medical	materialism	 then	 thinks	 that	 the	 spiritual	 authority	 of	 all	 such	 personages	 is	 successfully	undermined.165	
																																																						161	BBC	(2003a).	162	Begley	(2010);	Biello	(2007);	Bradley	Hagerty	(2009),	144;	Ingram	(2003);	Hughes	(2005);	Trimble	(2007),	142–144,	Table	7.1;	and	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997),	501–502,	Table	1,	both	tables	of	which	provides	an	outline	of	various	religious-historical	 figures	suggested	 to	have	epilepsy	within	 the	medical	 literature,	descriptions	of	their	symptoms,	the	likelihood	of	a	diagnoses	of	epilepsy,	and	other	possible	diagnoses.	163	 Paloutzian,	 Swenson,	 &	 McNamara	 (2006),	 156.	 Here	 can	 also	 be	 found	 several	 other	 critiques	 to	 the	hypothesis	associating	temporal	lobe	epilepsy	and	religiosity.	164	Ratcliffe	(2006),	97–98.	165	James	(1917),	13.	
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	 In	conclusion,	the	localization	of	religious	experience	in	the	temporal	lobes	results	in	a	specific	characterization	of	 those	experiences—as	a	pathology,	a	misfiring,	a	mistake.	 It	challenges	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 religion,	 the	 validity	 of	 religion	 beyond	 the	 scientific	 object	religion,	creating	a	situation	of	which	the	science	is	thought	to	account	for	religion	while	at	the	 same	 time	 dismiss	 it.	 As	 the	 above	 comments	 show,	 pathology	 is	 often	 taken	 as	 a	demotion	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 genuine	 experience.	 As	 such,	 the	 scientification	 of	 religious	experience	is	not	simply	a	scientific	discovery;	it	is	a	discursive	birth.	Scientification	is	not	simply	to	construct	a	scientific	object,	but	to	attribute	character;	it	is	not	only	a	thing,	but	also	a	perception.			




ourselves.”170	Of	course,	they	are	only	irrelevant	if	‘religion’	is	constructed	in	certain	ways,	that	 is	 as	mutually	 exclusive	with	 science,	 leaving	 nothing	 but	 a	 scientific	 framework	 of	understanding.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 if	 religious	 experience	 is	 a	 scientifically	 induced	experience,	 it	 must	 be	 only	 a	 scientific	 phenomenon	 and	 as	 a	 scientific	 phenomenon	 it	negates	religion.			 One	 test	 subject	 of	 the	God	Helmet,	 J.	 Hitt,	 lamented,	 “Do	 I	 really	want	God	 to	 be	rendered	as	explicable	and	predictable	as	an	endorphin	rush	after	a	3-mile	run?”	Hitt	found	himself	‘disappointed’	and	“letdown,”	seemingly	due	to	the	scientific	interpretive	framework	that	he	regarded	in	zero-sum	terms	of	engagement	with	religion.	For	example,	he	presented	the	research	as	‘killing	off	God’	by	‘explaining	away	mystical	experience’	as	“nothing	more	than	a	bit	of	squelchy	feedback	in	the	temporal	lobes,”	as	“merely	a	side	effect.”	Although	this	subject	 himself	 did	 not	 seem	 totally	 convinced	 of	 this	 characterization	 of	 religion,	 he	certainly	characterized	Persinger’s	work	as	such,	as	do	other	test	subjects.	Scientification	to	him	seems	inevitably	to	give	rise	to	a	negation	of	religion,	suggesting	mutual	exclusivity	is	the	underlying	presumption.	The	subject	concluded:		‘Seeing	God’	is	really	just	a	soothing	euphemism	for	the	fleeting	awareness	of	ourselves	alone	in	the	universe:	a	look	in	that	existential	mirror.	The	‘sensed	presence’—now	easily	generated	by	a	machine	pumping	our	brains	with	electromagnetic	spirituality—is	nothing	but	our	exquisite	and	singular	self,	at	one	with	the	true	solitude	of	our	condition,	deeply	anxious.	We’re	itching	to	get	out	of	here,	to	escape	this	tired	old	environment	with	its	frayed	carpets,	blasted	furniture,	and	shabby	old	God.171		




radio	 broadcaster	 Don	 Hill	 found	 himself	 under	 the	 ownership	 of	 a	 ‘haunted’	 house.	Investigating	 his	 experiences,	 he	 ended	 up	 in	 Persinger’s	 lab,	 in	 which	 he	 sensed	 the	presence	of	the	same	ghost	he	had	encountered	at	his	previous	home,	leading	Hill	to	conclude	that	the	ghost	was	nothing	other	than	a	creation	of	his	brain,	that	his	ghost	was	‘literally	in	his	head.’174			 As	another	neurologist	conclusively	put	it,	“instead	of	God	creating	our	brains,	our	brains	created	God.”175	Others	in	the	field	have	looked	at	work	on	the	cognitive	science	of	religion	and	concluded	the	same.	As	cognitive	neuroscientist	Irving	Biederman	put	it,	such	work	 confirms	 what	 the	 “vast	 majority”	 of	 neuroscientists	 already	 believe—that	 these	religious	experiences	“reside	in	the	activity	of	the	brain,	rather	than	the	external	world.”176	Similarly,	Ron	Barrier,	a	spokesman	for	American	Atheists	based	in	Cranford,	New	Jersey,	stated,	 “The	 real	 common	denominator	here	 is	 brain	 activity,	 not	 anything	 else.	 There	 is	nothing	to	indicate	that	this	is	externally	imposed	or	that	you	are	somehow	tapping	into	a	divine	entity.”177	Physicist	Taner	Edis	concluded,	in	the	relational	language	we	might	expect,	that	such	work	‘demystifies	mysticism’	since	it	shows	religious	experience	is	produced	by	the	brain.178			 As	one	author	succinctly	put	it:	If	 a	 comprehensive	 functional	 account	made	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 causal	 role	 of	 the	 supernatural	 in	producing	the	experience,	this	would	imply	that	the	supernatural	had	no	role	to	play	in	the	genesis	of	the	experience.	Otherwise	the	account	would	be	incomplete.		From	this	perspective,	it	is	possible	that	there	is	no	intrinsic	religious	experience	whatsoever	since	emotionally	charged	situations	that	are	interpreted	as	religious	could	account	for	the	phenomenon.179	Reacting	to	such	accounts,	many	concluded	that,	“Neuroscience	will	soon	relegate	‘God’	to	the	ash	heap	of	history.”	‘God’	as	“an	absolute	that	exists	independent	of	the	human	brain”	is	an	“illusion.”180		
																																																						174	Despite	Hill’s	conclusion,	it	is	worth	mentioning,	that	his	wife	and	friends	had	similar	experiences	of	ghostly	apparitions,	 feelings	of	dread,	witnessing	objects	moving,	 cold	 spots,	 and	knocking	 and	other	noises	 in	 the	home.	This	was	explained	to	Hill	as	a	product	of	geophysical	conditions	there	that	give	rise	to	a	‘haunting.’	See	Hill	(1998).	See	also	Hill	(1997a);	Hill	(1997b);	Hill	(1997c);	and	Hercz	(2002).	175	Quoted	in	Hercz	(2002).	176	Shermer	(1999).	Emphasis	added.	177	Quoted	in	Holmes	(2001).	178	Edis	(2006),	118–119.	179	Above	quote	in	Ratcliffe	(2006),	98.	Emphasis	original.	See	also	ibid.,	84.		180	Quoting	Persinger	in	Bradley	Hagerty	(2009),	141.	
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	 If	 religion	 is	 “an	 unavoidable	 by-product	 or	 side-effect	 of	 some	 other	 functional	cognitive	process”	 then	 “this	would	 seriously	 threaten	 the	 case	 for	 veridicality,”	Ratcliffe	noted.	“If	the	historical	emergence	of	something	can	be	fully	accounted	for	in	terms	of	some	other	wholly	non-mysterious	phenomenon,	then	there	is	no	need	to	resort	to	an	additional	supernatural	element	to	explain	its	presence.”181	For	example,	science	writer	Michael	White	stated,	 “science	 became	 so	 overwhelmingly	 successful	 that,	 to	 many,	 the	 supernatural	became	almost	superfluous.”182	When	religious	experiences	are	constructed	as	reducible	to	scientific	understandings,	the	idea	that	religious	experiences	are	not	‘real’	(or	merely	real,	epiphenomena)	often	accompanies	it.183	For	example,	Crick	claimed,	“You	are	nothing	but	a	pack	of	neurons.”184			 The	implications	of	scientification	for	the	veridicality	of	religion	is	a	prominent	topic	throughout	history,	some	philosophers	consistently	emphasizing	that	materialism	implies	atheism,	 like	 philosopher	 Paul	 Henri	 Thiry	 d’Holbach	 (1729–1789).	 Many	 have	characterized	 Persinger’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 research	 atheistically	 as	 well.185	 As	physiologist	Pierre-Jean-Georges	Cabanis	 (1757–1808),	 a	 friend	of	d’Holbach,	proclaimed	“The	nerves—that’s	all	there	is	to	man!”186	Implicit	in	such	claims	is	that	mental	products	are	devoid	of	true	reality,	as	Feuerbach	declared,	including	religion,	which	is	identified	as	
																																																						181	Ratcliffe	(2006),	98.	182	Quoted	in	Mellor	(2003),	528.	183	Some	would	distinguish	between	these	two	positions:	i.e.,	on	the	one	hand,	that	religious	experience	has	no	reality	 is	 called	 ‘elminativist,’	 while,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 position	 that	 religion	 is	merely	 real	 is	 labeled	reductionist.	See,	e.g.,	Bielfeldt	(2003b),	715.	While	the	conceptual	differentiation	is	evident,	the	differentiation	in	the	discourse	is	not	so	opaque.	These	two	possible	conceptual	positions	are	often	confused	by	the	individual	putting	 them	 forth	 or	 conflated	 by	 those	 responding	 to	 them.	 Suggesting	 that	 reducing	 religion	 to	 natural	phenomena,	for	example—rather	than	simply	saying	religious	experience	does	not	exist—still	to	no	lesser	a	degree	leads	to	the	question	of	whether	religious	experience	should	be	taken	seriously.	Moreover,	some	seek	to	 circumvent	 the	 issue	 by	 adopting	 religious	 naturalistic	 positions,	 suggesting,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	supernatural	acts	through	natural	means.	This	then	leads	to	the	question	of	whether	this	is	still	naturalism	and	if	 so	whether	 it	 is	 still	 religious.	No	matter	what	 semantics	 are	 employed—reductionism,	 eliminativism,	or	religious	naturalism—the	question	 remains:	 is	 religious	experience	 real?	 See	also	Barrett	 (2011),	233;	 and	Barrett	(2013),	410.	184	Crick	(1994),	3.	Clearly,	in	light	of	the	discursive	history	at	hand,	his	‘astonishing	hypothesis,’	as	he	called	it,	is	 not	 so	 astonishing,	 but	 rather	 one	 that	 has	 a	 long	 and	 strong	 past.	 Similarly	 claiming	 originality,	neuroscientist	 and	 critic	 of	 religion	 Sam	 Harris,	 along	 with	 his	 co-authors,	 argued	 they	 were	 the	 first	 to	characterize	 belief	 at	 the	 level	 of	 brain	 activity,	 independent	 of	 propositional	 content.	 See	Harris,	 Sheth,	&	Cohen	 (2008),	 141.	 It	 is	 unclear	 whether	 these	 claims	 are	 due	 to	 historical	 ignorance	 or	 to	 the	 need	 for	sensationalism—but	what	is	clear	is	that	these	thoughts	are	a	product	of	the	time.	185	E.g.,	Oomen	(2003),	617;	Bulkeley	(2007);	and	Hercz	(2002).		186	Quoted	in	translation	in	Jammer	(2003),	540.		
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scientific	knowledge.	It	shows,	that	for	many,	the	questions	raised	by	the	natural	science	of	religion	are	not	 simply	 about	 the	hard	data,	 but	 about	 truth,	 the	nature	of	 the	mind	and	consciousness,	 the	nature	of	 religious	and	other	experiences,	 and	 the	 limits	and	scope	of	science.	Questions	about	the	reality	and	significance	of	religion	are	a	primary	topic	in	the	discourse,	even	in	the	neuroscientific	literature.194			 That	religion	in	the	framework	of	science	leads	to	the	question	about	the	veridicality	of	religion	and	religious	experiences	in	a	significant	number	of	instances	is	testament	to	the	fact	 that	a	scientification	of	 religion	 is	often	a	matter	of	 framing	religion	as	 ‘not	religion,’	which	 reflects	 the	 interplay	between	 the	 relational	 constructs	and	processes.	 Indeed,	 the	development	of	the	science	of	religion	was	more	often	than	not	a	question	of	what	people	believed	 and	 whether	 it	 was	 true,	 with	 an	 underlying	 assumption	 that	 “Naturalistic	explanations	 are,	 of	 course,	 incompatible	with	 religious	 belief.”195	 The	 veridicality	 of	 the	belief	was	already	built	into	the	premise—the	underlying	naturalistic	worldview	as	per	its	exclusion	 of	 the	 supernatural	 and	 religious.	 Since	 science	 is	 ‘not	 religion’	 as	 per	mutual	exclusivity,	 to	make	 religion	 science-like	 is	 to	make	 it	 unlike	 religion	 and	 confusion	 and	ambiguity	ensue,	as	well	as	the	findings	of	‘disproof’	and	‘disbelief’	of	religion.	The	questions	of	the	veridicality	of	religion	are	products	of	the	assumptions	of	mutual	exclusivity.			 As	mentioned	in	Chapter	One,	if	religion	were	framed	as	like	mysticism,	this	will	not	raise	the	question	of	if	 it	can	still	be	considered	religion—because	religion	and	mysticism	are	not	thought	of	as	oppositional.	So,	why	is	it	that	religion	as	a	scientific	object	raises	the	matter	of	truth	and	falsity?	It	is	because	the	two	domains	are	already	taken	to	be	mutually	exclusive	in	some	way,	suggesting	the	central	role	of	relational	construction	in	the	evolution	of	the	term	‘religion’	here.	Because	religion	and	science	are	taken	to	be	mutually	exclusive,	when	 religion	 is	 constructed	 as	 science-like,	 religion	 is	 reduced	 to	 science	 and	 any	 non-scientific	object	called	‘religion’	is	negated.		
																																																						194	E.g.,	one	neuroscientific	publication	on	the	neural	correlates	of	religious	experiences	mentioned	in	the	very	first	 paragraph,	 “Religious	 experience	 is	 brain-based	 […]	 Determining	 the	 neural	 substrates	 […]	 does	 not	automatically	lessen	or	demean	their	spiritual	significance.”	It	is	obvious	from	the	location	of	these	remarks	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	article	that	this	issue	is	something	that	needs	to	be	addressed	before	further	remarks	can	be	made.	Saver	&	Rabin	(1997),	498.	195	Harrison	(1990),	2;	and	Nielsen	(2010),	525.	See	also	Smith	(1978),	40.	
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all	intellectual	thought.6		 Yet,	at	 the	same	time,	 the	hegemony	of	 the	scientific	worldview	came	to	be	severely	 criticized.	 The	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 saw	 an	 unprecedented	disenchantment	 with	 science,	 an	 extraordinary	 rejection	 of	 naturalism	 and	positivism,	and	an	exceptional	opposition	against	the	scientific	movement.7	From	this	time	on	through	today:	[T]he	intrusion	of	science	into	the	territories	of	the	humanities	has	been	deeply	resented.	Just	as	reviled	is	the	application	of	scientific	reasoning	to	religion;	many	writers	without	a	trace	of	a	belief	in	God	maintain	that	there	is	something	unseemly	about	scientists	weighing	in	on	the	biggest	questions.8		The	expansion	of	science	had	reached	a	point	so	that	many	felt	it	had	overstepped	its	bounds,	in	framing	all	of	knowledge	under	its	reductive	framework	of	naturalism	as	a	complete	explanation.9	The	term	‘scientism’	emerged	in	reaction	to	this	context	and	was	 largely	 used	 as	 a	 criticism	of	 the	 reductive	 application	 of	 the	methods	 of	 the	natural	 sciences	 to	 social	 phenomena	 (i.e.,	 scientification).10	 The	 objective	 of	scientism	has	been	suggested	to	be	“The	translation	of	nonscientific	discourse	into	scientific	 discourse,”	 which	 “is	 also	 the	 source	 of	 its	 intellectual	 perfunctoriness.”	Leon	Wieseltier,	for	instance,	characterized	the	scientistic	mindset	as	an	“attempt	to	reduce	human	experience	and	human	feeling	[…]	to	materialistic	scientific	factors.”11	In	 another	 example,	 Joseph	 Ben-David	 pointed	 to	 the	 ‘carelessness’	 and	‘superficiality’	 of	 scientistics’	 over-application	 of	 scientific	models	 to	 the	 study	 of	society.12	Scientism	is	seen	as	an	attempt	to	“colonize”	beyond	its	territory,	a	position	
																																																						5	Burnham	(1987),	168.	6	Lightman	(2012),	451.	7	MacLeod	(1982),	2–3.	8	Pinker	(2013).	9	See,	e.g.,	Smith	(2003),	233–234.		10	Ziemann	et	al	(2012),	2;	Hayek	(1979	[1952]);	Olson	(1982);	Olson	(1990);	and	Hakfoort	(1995),	376.	 See	 also	 Stenmark	 (2001),	 1–17,	 for	 an	 in-depth	 discussion	 on	 different	 formulations	 of	‘scientism,’	how	they	relate	to	one	another,	and	how	they	relate	to	religion.	11	Wieseltier	(2013a).	12	Ben-David	(1971),	90.	
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for	a	renewed	religion	and	some	took	this	 to	 the	extreme	claim	that	science	could	replace	religion	in	total.22	This	led	to	the	establishment	of	some	of	the	first	religions	of	science,	the	very	advocates	 of	 which	 were	 intimately	 involved	 in	 scientific	 expansionism	 in	 the	establishment	of	sociology—which,	as	we	saw,	contributed	to	scientification	and	the	identity	of	 reductionism	as	a	 signifier	of	 science.	Auguste	Comte	 (1798–1857),	 for	instance,	fathered	sociology,	one	of	the	accursed	sciences	in	the	realm	of	religion	and	society,	and	he	also	developed	a	religion	based	on	science	that	was	thought	to	usurp	‘traditional’	 religion,	 as	 did	 his	 predecessor	 Henri	 Saint-Simon	 (1760–1825).	 The	context	of	such	views	included	momentous	changes	in	economic,	social,	political,	and	cultural	 life,	 such	 as	 the	 French	 Revolution	 (1789–1799),	 the	 Napoleonic	 Empire	(1804–1814),	and	the	Restoration	in	the	1820s	and	1830s.	This	created	a	situation	in	which	people	strove	for	order	and	stability,	something	science	promised	to	provide.	Already	among	many	thinkers,	science	was	thought	to	hold	the	future	of	humankind	in	 its	 hands,	 accelerating	 and	directing	 the	progress	 of	 the	human	 race,	 as	 can	be	found	in	Marquis	de	Condorcet’s	(1743–1794)	Sketch	for	a	Historical	Picture	of	the	




Though	 the	 term	 ‘scientism’	 did	 not	 emerge	 until	 later	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century,	it	was	this	context	that	gave	rise	to	the	neologism.26	By	1870	(less	than	two	decades	 after	 Comte’s	 death),	 the	 term	 ‘scientism’	 was	 introduced	 to	 the	 English	language	 to	 describe	 the	 scientific	 worldview	 in	 general,	 but	 also	 to	 express	ideological	tyranny	of	human	thought	specifically,	with	Saint-Simon	and	Comte	used	as	primary	examples.27	By	the	1880s,	there	was	a	strong	movement	of	criticism	and	pessimism	toward	“scientific	arrogance,”	identified	with	“scientism,”	the	new	“creed”	of	science,	and	attributed	to	a	“Radical	party.”28	While	there	were	many	advocates	for	a	science-based	religion,	others	adamantly	argued,	“Scientific	methods	[…]	could	not	replace	religion;	scientific	reasoning	could	not	provide	a	morality.”29		We	see	the	term	constructed	similarly	on	into	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	centuries.	 This	 notion	 of	 scientism	 as	 religion	 was	 increasingly	 widespread	throughout	Europe	and	North	America	following	World	War	I	(1914–1918).	With	the	economic	 and	 political	 situation,	 some	 circles	 put	 much	 faith	 in	 technological	advances,	in	the	ability	of	science	to	increase	productive	efficiency,	and	the	possibility	of	socialism	to	replace	failing	liberal	free-market	societies.30	Max	Weber	(1864–1920)	also	famously	described	the	modern	world	as	one	of	‘disenchantment,’	a	situation	in	
																																																						26	Though	its	use	was	not	particularly	popular	until	the	twentieth	century.	Turner	(1974),	11.	Some	have	 suggested	 that	 ‘scientism,’	 in	 its	 various	manifestations	 can	be	dated	back	 to	 antiquity,	while	others	place	its	origins	in	the	Scientific	Revolution	or	the	Enlightenment.	See	Olson	(1982),	62;	Feser	(2011/12);	Feyerabend	(2011),	16–26	and	69–81;	Stenmark	(2003);	Ben-David	(1971),	78–85	and	89–90;	Sorell	(1991),	34–35;	Hutchinson	(2011),	7;	and	Hakfoort	(1995),	383–390.	However,	here	I	focus	on	the	timeline	as	per	the	emergence	of	the	discourse.	Brooke	&	Cantor	(1998),	46.	Literature	on	the	general	history	of	scientism	is	rather	scarce.	For	the	period	from	antiquity	to	the	early	nineteenth	century	(though	not	a	systematic	treatment	of	‘scientism’),	see	Olson	(1982);	and	Olson	(1990);	and	for	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 see	 Hayek	 (1979	 [1952]).	 See	 Sorell	 (1991),	 on	 the	 seventeenth	 and	twentieth	 centuries,	 but	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 scientism	 within	 philosophy;	 and	 Stenmark	 (2001),	 for	contemporary	 scientism	 (though	 primarily	 from	 a	 theoretical	 standpoint,	 examining	 different	conceptualizations	of	‘scientism,’	as	well	as	containing	a	critical	analysis	of	scientistic	claims).	See	also	Cameron	&	Edge	(1979),	on	the	social	aspects	of	scientism,	with	references	to	many	primary	sources.	27	See	Simpson	(2016i),	with	references	to	early	uses	of	the	term.	See	also	Unus	de	multis	(1877),	for	an	example	of	the	early,	pejorative	use	of	the	term	‘scientism.’	For	a	broad	exploration	of	various	uses	of	the	term,	see	Peels	(n.d.).	28	MacLeod	(1982),	4–5.	See	also	Levine	(1990),	231–232.	29	MacLeod	(1982),	8.	30	Caldwell	(2010),	24–29;	and	Sorell	(1991),	13–15.	This	can	be	contrasted	with	my	comments	on	perceptions	 of	 science	 following	 the	 war	 in	 the	 following	 chapter.	 Of	 course,	 different	 circles	emphasized	 different	 views	 and	 all	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 historically	 representative.	 There	 is	 no	 need	 to	assume	a	uniformity	of	opinion	here.	
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which	science,	rationality,	and	other	‘secular’	realms	were	valued	over	religion.31	It	has	 also	been	argued	 that	 scientism,	 as	well	 as	 science	more	generally,	 fulfills	 the	psychological	functions	of	religion.32	At	the	same	time,	many	saw	the	faith	in	socialism	and	science	as	misguided	and	the	notion	that	science	would	lead	to	the	rationalization	of	 society	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 hubris	 of	 science	 and	 reason,	 characterized	 as	scientism.33	The	rise	of	 socialism	and	scientism	were	even	regarded	as	having	 the	same	 intellectual	 origins	 in	 Saint-Simon	 and	 Comte,	 put	 forth	 by	 Émile	Durkheim	(1858–1917),	as	well	as	by	Hayek.34		In	developing	the	notion	of	‘scientism,’	Hayek	was	also	specifically	reacting	to	Saint-Simonism,	 Comtian	 thought,	 and	 similar	 reductionist	 attitudes	 toward	subsuming	all	knowledge	under	science.	He	not	only	utilized	religious	analogies	and	signifiers	 to	explicate	 scientism	(e.g.,	 ‘pilgrimage,’	 ‘temple,’	 and	 ‘omniscience’),	but	also	discussed	Saint-Simon’s	and	Comte’s	roles	in	creating	religions	from	science	as	evidence	of	scientific	hubris.	In	his	analysis	of	Saint-Simon,	Comte,	and	followers,	he	pointed	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 creating	 a	 utopian	world	 via	 science	 and	 technology.35	 He	referred	to	this	as	the	“engineering	point	of	view”	of	society,	which	he	identified	as	one	of	the	central	features	of	scientism—the	expansion	of	science	into	the	study	of	
																																																						31	Carroll	(2011),	120.	32	Hakfoort	(1995),	388;	Farias	et	al	(2013);	Haught	(2005);	Sorell	(1991);	Preston	(2012);	and	Sagan	(2006).	 Though	 more	 nuanced	 and	 with	 a	 bit	 different	 focus,	 but	 nonetheless	 relevant	 to	 this	observation,	see	also	Midgley	(1992),	esp.	51–61;	and	Plantinga	(2015).	33	Caldwell	(2010),	29.	34	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	185–211;	Caldwell	(2010),	14,	24–25,	and	29;	Ben-David	(1971),	78–83;	and	Durkheim	(1958),	104–105.	Durkheim	referred	to	‘positivism,’	rather	than	‘scientism.’	The	discursive	connection	 between	 these	 terms	 will	 be	 discussed	 at	 a	 later	 point.	 On	 the	 connection	 between	socialism	 and	 scientism	 see,	 e.g.,	 Ferri	 (1906),	 which	 also	 brought	 in	 the	 motif	 of	 Darwinism	(specifically	as	the	scientific	foundation	of	socialism),	discussed	in	connection	with	scientism	at	a	later	point	 in	 this	 chapter.	 It	 is	 additionally	 notable	 here	 that	 socialism	 has	 also	 been	 interpreted	 as	 a	religion,	and	thus	forms	a	discursive	knot	with	the	religionization	of	science	and	scientism	as	well	that	has	its	historical	roots	in	this	movement.	On	socialism	as	a	religion,	see,	e.g.,	Yeo	(1977);	and	Burleigh	(2000).	 The	 term	 ‘socialism,’	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 political	 movement,	 was	 first	 used	 in	 the	 Saint-Simonian	newspaper	Le	Globe	(1824–1832).	See	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	282,	and,	regarding	socialism,	scientism,	and	Saint-Simonism,	see	ibid.,	passim.	Twentieth-century	scientistics	are	also	connected	to	socialism	and	positivism	in	Sorell	(1991),	14–15.	35	 The	 utopian	 vision	 of	 scientistics	 vary	 significantly,	 further	 indicating	 the	 social,	 rather	 than	scientific	or	fact-based,	nature	of	scientism.	Cf.,	e.g.,	Mesthene	(1947);	and	Rapoport	(1957).	
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society.36	This	engineering	of	society	is	nowhere	more	apparent	than	in	the	founding	of	the	Saint-Simonian	and	Comtian	religions.		Though,	for	Hayek,	the	connection	between	religion	and	scientism	is	indirect	and	does	not	constitute	his	main	critique	of	scientism,	he	did	regularly	draw	upon	the	connection	between	the	two.	For	example,	Hayek	suggested	Saint-Simon	saw	himself	as	the	Prophet	of	the	Lord,	whose	instruction	was	revealed	directly	to	him.	Hayek	saw	a	transition	in	Saint-Simonism	from	science	to	religion,	equating	the	rise	of	the	latter	with	the	fall	of	the	former	and	thus	following	the	structure	of	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct.	Further	 to	 this	point	of	nescience,	Hayek	went	 into	minute	detail	 about	Saint-Simon’s	life	to	demonstrate	his	“very	superficial	and	ill-digested	knowledge	of	the	 scientific	 literature.”37	 He	 similarly	 emphasized	 Comte’s	 “cerebral	 hygiene”—purposefully	refraining	from	obtaining	new	information—as	evidence	to	the	fact	that	he	could	hardly	be	considered	the	‘master	of	the	world	and	all	the	sciences’	that	he	claimed	to	be.38	In	this	way,	‘scientism’	was	not	only	evident	in	the	religious	aspects,	but	 also	marked	 off	 as	 ‘not	 science,’	 as	 would	 be	 expected	 in	 likening	 science	 to	religion	when	departing	from	notions	of	mutual	exclusivity.	It	was	also	around	the	time	following	that	of	Saint-Simon	and	Comte,	from	the	mid-nineteenth	to	the	early	twentieth	centuries,	that	evolutionary	ethics	and	other	forms	of	Social	Darwinism	were	on	the	rise,	which	were	thought	to	act	as	substitute	religions	 as	 well,	 which	 will	 be	 explored	 further.	 So,	 while	 religion	 was	 being	explained	 away	 by	 science	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 science	was	 also	positioned	in	terms	of	replacing	its	social	and	moral	functions,	of	replacing	a	religion	that	was	increasingly	regarded	as	insignificant	and	false	as	per	scientification.		
																																																						36	 Hakfoort	 (1995),	 382;	 and	 Hayek	 (1979	 [1952])	 25,	 166,	 202–203,	 and	 passim.	 The	conceptualization	of	scientism	as	the	application	of	quantitative	science	to	social	planning	has	been	one	 of	 the	main	 associations	with	 scientism	 at	 least	 until	 the	 late	 1970s	 (and	 perhaps	 later).	 See	Cameron	 &	 Edge	 (1979),	 5,	 for	 relevant	 literature.	 As	 this	 is	 only	 indirectly	 related	 to	 the	religionization	of	science,	I	will	not	go	into	these	historical	developments	further,	but	note	it	here	as	one	perspective	on	the	role	of	a	religion	of	science	in	terms	of	specific	social	development	centered	on	scientific	ideals.	37	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	223	and	passim	throughout	213–234.	See	also	ibid.,	283.	38	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	325.	Hayek	claimed	Comte	refused	to	read	any	new	publications,	however	according	to	Pickering	(1993),	230,	Comte’s	“cerebral	hygiene”	was	to	limit	himself	to	poetry	readings.	
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attempt	“to	put	science	in	religion’s	place	not	only	as	an	account	of	the	natural	world,	but	as	a	cultural	authority,	a	source	of	values	intellectual,	moral	and	spiritual.	That	is,	in	 replacing	 religion	 with	 science	 they	 were	 turning	 science	 into	 a	 religion.”46	Naturalism	was	constructed	as	a	complete	worldview	that	 “separates	Nature	 from	God,	 subordinates	 Spirit	 to	 Matter,	 and	 sets	 up	 unchangeable	 law	 as	 supreme,”	according	to	James	Ward	(1843–1925).47	This	exhibits	all	three	relational	constructs	discussed	 thus	 far—mutual	 exclusivity,	 scientification,	 and	 religionization	 (or,	regarding	the	latter,	simply	the	relational	process	of	making	religion-like,	depending	on	 one’s	 perspective),	 bringing	 the	 three	 together	 in	 defining,	 expanding,	 and	conquering	knowledge	for	science	relative	to	religion.	As	scientification	is	linked	to	scientism	qua	religion,	we	see	those	committed	to	the	scientification	of	religion	framed	as	religious.	For	instance,	Daniel	Dennett,	due	to	his	use	of	science	to	‘explain	away’	religion,	does	not	only	appear	in	the	discourse	on	scientification,	he	is	also	suggested	to	have	an	“arguably	religious	commitment”	to	scientism.48	Furthermore,	the	likening	of	science	to	religion	was	purposefully	done	in	order	to	expand	science.	Thomas	Huxley	(1825–1895),	 John	Tyndall	 (1820–1893),	and	Herbert	 Spencer	 (1820–1903)	 all	 thought	 of	 science	 as	 religion-like	 in	 that	 it	could	explain	and	replace	the	functions	of	religion.	These	men	positioned	naturalism	in	multiple	ways	relative	to	religion	and	science	to	serve	these	goals:	as	that	which	distinguishes	religion	and	science,	as	that	which	can	explain	away	religion,	and	as	that	which	 can	 replace	 religion.	 As	 naturalistic	 explanation	 was	 a	 major	 source	 of	scientification,	this	constitutes	another	example	of	the	construction	of	scientification	as	religious.		 In	fact,	since	the	term	‘scientific	naturalism’	was	introduced	by	Huxley	in	1892,	he	 and	 his	 fellows	 of	 the	 influential	 X-Club	 agreed	 that	 naturalism	 should	 be	presented	 as	 a	 system	 similar	 to	 religion,	 that	 could	 “still	 spiritual	 cravings,”	 but	founded	upon	science,	 installing	the	“God	of	Science.”49	 Indeed,	 it	has	been	argued	
																																																						46	Dewitt	(2013),	33.	47	Quoted	in	Turner	(1974),	15.	48	Hutchinson	(2011),	191.	See	also	ibid.,	192–196.	49	Quote	by	Huxley	in	Lightman	(2012),	454;	and	Lightman	(1987),	160.	See	also	ibid.,	152–160;	Levine	(1990),	 236;	 and	 Turner	 (1974),	 8–37.	 Huxley	 and	 Tyndall	 were	 preoccupied	 with	 finding	 an	
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that	 naturalism	 can	 fulfill	 the	 cognitive	 functions	 of	 religion.50	 From	 Huxley’s	perspective,	science	was	understood	as	a	competing	mode	of	faith	with	religion,	not	as	a	way	of	having	no	faith.51	Huxley’s	views	have	been	characterized	as	scientistic	and	as	“constructing	a	naturalistic	‘theodicy,’”	with	its	power	to	explain	and	change	the	world.	 “The	 true	 God	 is	 nature,	 the	 true	worship,	 science.”52	 Tyndall,	 another	member	 of	 the	 club	 and	 a	 leader	 in	 the	 movement	 toward	 naturalism,	 has	 been	characterized	 as	 engaging	 in	 a	 “sage-like	 secularization	 of	 experience	 […]	 another	form	 of	 mystification.”53	 Indeed,	 Tyndall	 argued	 that	 as	 with	 religion,	 “The	 same	impulse,	 inherited	 and	 intensified,	 is	 the	 spur	 of	 scientific	 action	 today.”54	 Such	positions	were	used	to	argue	for	the	replacement	of	religion	with	science.	Spencer	and	his	group	went	even	further	in	drawing	parallels	between	religion	and	scientific	naturalism.55	 And	 Spencer’s	 work	 has	 been	 said	 to	 be	 “as	 much	 religious	 as	scientific.”56	Ward	also	thought	of	naturalism	as	an	alternative	religion,	while	Wood	described	 the	 science-theology	 of	 the	 science-theologian	 as	 “naturalism.”57	 Many	other	eminent	scientists	of	this	time	period	also	framed	naturalism,	in	various	ways,	as	 the	 new	 “creed”	 or	 the	 “religion	 of	 science.”58	 “The	 basis	 of	 the	 naturalists’	arguments	[…]	was	faith,”	a	cluster	of	philosophical	assumptions	that	was	perhaps	a	“form	of	spiritual	pride.”59	Discussions	on	what	label	should	be	affixed	upon	this	line	of	 thinking	 included	arguments	 for	 the	 terms	 ‘Naturalist,’	 ‘Comtist,’	and	 ‘Positivist’	(the	 latter	 also	 referring	 to	 Comtian	 thought),	 thus	 further	 intertwining	 these	discursive	strands,	along	with	‘scientism.’60		 Scientification	and	religionization	have	often	been	treated	as	closely	related	
																																																						alternative	 to	 Christianity.	 Lightman	 (1987),	 96–99.	 For	 further	 information	 on	 the	 X-Club,	 see	MacLeod	(2000),	305–322.		50	Plantinga	(2015).	Plantinga	characterized	naturalism	as	a	‘quasi-religion.’	51	Midgley	(1992),	52.	52	Levine	(1990),	225.	On	Huxley’s	thought	as	scientistic,	see	Zeigler	&	Howell	(1964).	53	Levine	(1990),	233;	and	MacLeod	(2000),	x.	54	Quoted	in	Turner	(1974),	33.	55	Lightman	(2012),	451–455.	See	also	Lightman	(1987),	81–90.	56	Lightman	(1987),	90.	57	Turner	(1974),	17;	and	Wood	(1922),	6.	58	MacLeod	(1982),	3–4;	and	Turner	(1974),	12.	59	Levine	(1990),	249.	60	Turner	(1974),	10–11.	
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knowledge.	He	coordinated	 this	 “from	the	point	of	view	of	physicism,”	as	did	Otto	Neurath	(1882–1945)	and	other	positivist	philosophers	 in	the	Vienna	Circle.65	In	a	thoroughly	 reductionist	 move,	 Neurath	 claimed,	 “A	 new	 generation	 educated	according	to	unified	science	will	not	understand	the	difference	between	the	‘mental’	and	 the	 ‘physical’	 sciences,	 or	 between	 ‘philosophy	 of	 nature’	 and	 ‘culture,’”	 a	statement	that	turned	out	to	be	rather	true	as	we	saw	in	the	case	of	scientification.66	The	Vienna	Circle	had	the	explicit	aim	to	explain	away	religious	claims,	metaphysics,	and	theology.67	Indeed,	this	unified	whole	was	regularly	reductionist—in	outlook,	but	also	in	its	reductive	identification	with	religion	on	the	part	of	later	thinkers.			 Saint-Simon	 regarded	physicism	as	not	only	 the	new	scientific	method,	but	also	as	a	“new	religion,”	a	“scientific	creed”	that	would	structure	all	of	life	and	be	the	basis	for	morality.68	And	this	physicalism	has	been	used	as	a	synonym	of	“reductionist	scientism.”69	Following	in	Saint-Simon’s	footsteps,	one	early	publication	aimed	at	a	popular	audience	regarding	anchoring	religion	in	science,	the	Vestiges	of	the	Natural	




assume	 and	 vitalize	 one	 more	 expressive	 of	 its	 essence”	 in	 its	 “uncompromising	pursuit	of	truth.”71	The	new	form	was	oftentimes	that	of	science.	Further	to	the	point	that	scientification	and	religionization	are	closely	related,	there	 are	 some	 significant	 historical	 connections	 that	 could	 be	 considered.	 For	example,	Ludwig	Feuerbach	(1804–1872)	influenced	Karl	Marx	(1818–1883),	as	well	as	Friedrich	Engels	(1820–1895),	and	directly	through	his	own	work	and	indirectly	through	 these	 thinkers,	 contributed	 to	 the	 conception	 of	 religion	 in	 a	 scientific	framework	 as	 something	 wholly	 social,	 external,	 and	 objective.	 He	 was	 a	 major	contributor	 of	 the	 scientification	 of	 religion.	 While	 lacking	 direct	 evidence,	 there	seems	to	be	a	great	deal	of	circumstantial	support	for	the	influence	of	Saint-Simonism	in	his	thinking	as	well,	such	as	the	fact	that	in	the	formative	period	of	his	thought	in	the	 early	 1830s,	 Saint-Simonism	 was	 ubiquitous	 in	 intellectual	 discussion	 and	Feuerbach	spent	some	time	in	Paris	as	well,	where	the	religion	of	Saint-Simon	enjoyed	its	 greatest	 success.	 It	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 he	would	 not	 have	 encountered	 Saint-Simonism.	Moreover,	there	are	obvious	resemblances	between	his	and	Comte’s	work,	so	much	so	that	it	seems	improbable	it	was	coincidental.72	Furthermore,	he	did	a	great	deal	 of	 work	 on	 positivism,	 which	 was	 a	 Comtian	 system	 of	 thought	 that	 was	originally	formulated	as	religious.		Comte	 coined	 the	 term	 ‘positivism’—which	 came	 to	be	nearly	 synonymous	with	‘scientism’—to	express	the	position	that	empirical	knowledge	is	the	best	form	of	knowledge	and	the	only	kind	that	breeds	justified	belief.	Though	commonly	known	as	exclusively	philosophical	or	even	scientific,	positivism	was	first	characterized	as	a	religious	 system	 of	 thought.73	 Comte	 claimed	 that	 he	 “dared	 to	 join	 …	 the	 name	[religion]	to	the	thing	[positivism],	in	order	to	institute	directly	an	open	competition	
																																																						71	Moore	(1988),	424–425	and	434.	See	also	ibid.,	426–432.	72	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	304–305,	speculated	on	the	connections	between	Feuerbach	and	Saint-Simon	and	Comte.	73	On	the	synonymous	use	of	positivism	and	scientism,	see,	e.g.,	Pickering	(1993–2009),	vol.	1,	3;	and	Scharff	(1995),	47.	Other	material	in	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	281–282;	Bryson	(1936);	Kremer-Marietti	(2005);	and	Fumerton	(1999).	The	term	‘positivism’	first	appeared	in	print	in	the	Doctrine	de	Saint-
Simon,	 Exposition	 (1830).	 Before	 Exposition	 was	 published,	 however,	 Comte	 was	 already	 giving	lectures	on	his	positivist	philosophy	beginning	 in	1826	and	while	he	did	not	author	Exposition,	his	thought	certainly	had	a	degree	of	impact	on	the	Saint-Simonians	who	did	author	this	work.	See	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	272.	
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with	 all	 the	 other	 systems.”74	 Followers	 of	 the	 Positivist	 Faith	 also	 described	 the	religion	as	a	 “scientific	 reality,”	 the	creed	of	which	“could	never	be	doubtful,	 for	 it	rests	 on	 accepted	 science.”	 Early	 advocates	 also	 described	positivism	 as	 religious,	oftentimes	employing	the	term	as	an	alternative	to	Comtian	religion,	calling	it	“a	form	of	worship,”	 “a	mode	 of	 religion,”	 and	 “duty	 as	 revealed	 by	 science.”75	 In	 another	example,	Huxley	described	Comte’s	 vision	as	 “Catholicism	minus	Christianity”	 and	described	 the	 system	 of	 thought	 as	 more	 of	 a	 religion	 than	 a	 scientific	 body	 of	knowledge.76	Positivism	included	both	social	and	political	aspects	in	which	science	would	 displace	 religion,	 as	 well	 as	 philosophy,	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 ideology.77	 Today,	positivism—also	called	‘positive	philosophy’	and	‘logical	positivism’—is	understood	as	a	philosophical	system	based	on	empiricism	and	verificationism,	that	is	‘positive	facts’	derived	from	the	scientific	method,	which	are	thought	to	constitute	a	complete	explanation	 or	 at	 least	 justified	 belief.78	 This	 again	 demonstrates	 a	 connection	between	the	reductionism	of	scientification	and	the	likening	of	science	to	religion.		 Another	 remarkable	 historical	 connection	 between	 the	 scientification	 of	religion	 and	 the	 religionization	 of	 science	 is	 related	 to	 Marx,	 who	 contributed	 to	scientification	 as	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 Augustin	 Thierry	 (1795–1856)	profoundly	influenced	Marx.	Thierry	was	a	pupil	of	Saint-Simon	and	coauthored	with	him	 De	 la	 réorganisation	 de	 la	 société	 européenne	 (1814).	 Moreover,	 one	 of	 the	strongest	 influences	 on	 Marx’s	 early	 development	 was	 Lorenz	 von	 Stein	 (1815–1890),	who	greatly	contributed	to	the	spread	of	Saint-Simonism	in	Germany.	Marx	
																																																						74	Quoted	in	Pickering	(1993),	233.	See	also	Pickering	(1993–2009),	vol.	1,	688–690.	75	Bryson	(1936),	350	and	357.	Emphasis	added.	See	also	Brooke	&	Cantor	(1998),	passim	in	47–57.	76	 Hayek	 (1979	 [1952]),	 355;	 Lightman	 (2012),	 449;	 and	 Brooke	 &	 Cantor	 (1998),	 55.	 By	way	 of	comparison,	it	is	relevant	to	note	here	that	Saint-Simon	labeled	his	religion	the	‘new	Christianity’	in	his	Nouveau	Christianisme.	See	Saint-Simon	(1825).	77	Hughes	 (2012);	Kremer-Marietti	 (2005);	 and	Fumerton	 (1999).	 See	also	 Jacob	 (1998),	248–249.	Comte’s	Religion	of	Humanity	and	the	doctrine	of	positivism	was	the	source	of	inspiration	for	many	humanists	 as	 well,	 which	 is	 also	 considered	 a	 religion	 by	 some.	 Davies	 (2008),	 28–31;	 American	Humanist	Association	(2002);	and	Winston	(2015).	Humanism	is	also	taken	to	be	a	defining	feature	of	scientism.	 See	 Peters	 (2005),	 8185;	 and	 Pinker	 (2013).	 Humanism	 is	 additionally	 linked	 to	evolutionary	ethics,	which	has	also	been	framed	as	scientism	and	has	been	religionized.	Wilson	(2004),	206–207;	Little	Hersh	(2010),	541–542	and	544;	Houts	(2007a);	Morris	(2001);	Smith	(2003),	247;	Elwell	(2010),	40;	and	Dunphy	(1983),	26.	Though	Wilson	does	not	utilize	the	term	‘scientism,’	he	is	often	 associated	 with	 this	 discourse	 and	 commonly	 characterized	 as	 being	 scientistic.	 See,	 e.g.,	Stenmark	(2013),	2104.	78	Kremer-Marietti	(2005).	
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also	criticized	Comte	for	utilizing	scientific	arguments	to	undermine	religion	and	he	was	 denounced	 for	 “atheism,”	 “materialism,”	 “irreligion	 and	 pride.”95	 Thus	 while	reducing	 Comtian	 thought	 to	 religion,	 it	 was	 also	 positioned	 as	 negating	 religion.	While	this	may	seem	contradictory,	 it	 is	exemplary	of	 the	relationalization	 in	play.	Science	as	a	 religion	 is	a	 challenge	 to	 religion	exactly	because	science	 is	primarily	understood	 in	 opposition	 to	 religion,	 allowing	 for	 such	 seeming	 inconsistencies.	Comte	is	framed	as	irreligious	and	religious,	scientific	and	nonscientific,	reflecting	an	underlying	 presumption	 of	 religion-science	 mutual	 exclusivity	 while	 also	transgressing	these	supposed	boundaries	between	knowledge	systems.			 Similar	critiques	continued	outside	of	the	circle.	One	early	editorial	from	1877	referred	to	‘scientism’	as	belief	and	criticized	the	Comtian	view	of	humankind	as	the	“New	Supreme	Being,”	 creating	an	overt	 religious	 tone.	William	Allingham	(1824–1889),	under	the	pseudonym	Unus	de	multis,	saw	the	scientists’	effort	to	explain	the	evolution	of	the	universe	as	“a	new	effort	to	build	the	Tower	of	Babel	up	to	the	skies,”	and	quoting	a	“Dr.	Bridges”	stated	“The	scaffolding	is	no	longer	of	the	old-fashioned	sort,	firmly	planted	on	the	earth’s	surface;	planks	and	beams	are	suspended	in	the	sky	by	the	largest	balloons	that	hypothesis	can	inflate.”96	The	concerns	expressed	by	this	author	seem	to	have	reflected	a	wider	opinion,	as	writers	in	popular	magazines	of	the	1870s	 were	 increasingly	 expressing	 alarm	 at	 the	 perceived	 over	 enthusiasm	 for	science.97		 Reacting	to	the	religionization	of	Comtian	thought,	Comte,	in	turn,	was	one	of	the	first	to	reduce	Saint-Simonism	to	religion,	accusing	the	followers	of	a	deficiency	in	intellectual	vigor	through	their	“general	speculations”	and	“sentimentalism”	and	saw	in	their	religion	“a	sort	of	incarnation	of	the	divinity	in	Saint-Simon.”98	In	Cours	




Saint-Simonians	[…]	as	a	sounding	board	to	show	off	the	distinguishing	features	of	his	own	[Comte’s]	scientific	system.”99	With	Comte’s	emphasis	on	education,	intellectual	rigor,	 logic,	 and	 discipline,	 he	 is	 in	 effect	 accusing	 the	 Saint-Simonian	 religion	 of	lacking	in	these	aspects.	In	Comte’s	view,	Saint-Simonism	was	an	inauthentic	science	that	had	become	nothing	more	than	a	religion.	Similar	to	the	above	Saint-Simonians’	analysis	of	Comtian	thought,	Comte	was	also	implicitly	applying	mutual	exclusivity	to	interpret	 science	 likened	 to	 religion,	 as	 unrepresentative	 of	 ‘real’	 science,	 leaving	religion	as	the	sole	framework	of	meaning.			 While	 Comte	 saw	 the	 religious	 aspects	 of	 Saint-Simonism	 as	 something	 to	criticize,	the	Saint-Simonians	more	or	less	embraced	these	ideas	and	also	emphasized	sympathy	 over	 reason	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 social	 progress.	 Though	 the	 Saint-Simonians	 did	 stress	 the	 religious	 nature	 of	 their	 work,	 they	 also	 regarded	 this	religion	as	scientific	or,	more	to	the	point,	as	a	substitute	or	reformational	religion.	Eventually	 Comte	 followed	 suit,	 though	 he	 rejected	 the	 role	 of	 religion	 in	 social	progress	at	different	points	 in	his	career.	Comte	began	 to	emphasize	 the	Christian	concept	 of	 love	 as	 the	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 social	 reality	 and	 expressed	admiration	 for	Catholic	 conservative	 thinkers,	 including	 Joseph	de	Maistre	 (1753–1821),	who	criticized	the	weight	given	to	reason	during	the	Enlightenment.100	While	Comte	 once	 claimed	 that	 he	 would	 “never”	 be	 party	 to	 “the	 fabrication	 of	 a	 new	religion,”	 he	 followed	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Saint-Simonians	 and	 did	 exactly	 that,	according	to	his	own	description,	in	1849.	Comte’s	new	religion,	a	‘positivist	religion’	or	a	“religion	of	science”	(in	his	words),	was	called	the	‘Religion	of	Humanity,’	in	which	humanity—the	 “Great	 Being”—replaced	 God.101	 The	 religion	 was	 replete	 with	 a	system	of	morality,	worship	and	other	religious	rituals,	icons,	a	delineation	of	“saints,”	and	 positivist	 doctrine.102	 Like	 Saint-Simonism,	 the	 Religion	 of	 Humanity	 enjoyed	
																																																						99	Pickering	(1993),	221	and	228.	100	Pickering	(1993),	216	and	229–231.	101	Livingstone	(2013);	 Jacob	(1998),	248;	and	Pickering	(1993),	232–234.	On	Comte’s	religion,	see	also	Comte	(1973);	Wright	(1986);	and	Wernick	(2001).	102	Wernick	 (2005),	132;	Blackburn	 (2008);	Pickering	 (1993),	233;	Hutchinson	 (2011),	80;	Bryson	(1936),	357–358;	and	Brooke	&	Cantor	(1998),	50–55.	
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some	 success	 across	 Europe.103	 Comte	 is	 perhaps	 most	 commonly	 identified	 as	representing	 “a	 ‘glacial’	 scientism,”	and	he	 seems	 to	be	 the	 figure	most	 commonly	associated	with	scientism	qua	religion	as	well.104		 Saint-Simonism	 and	 Comtian	 thought	 have	 involved	 likening	 religion	 and	science	 since	 their	 induction,	 in	 various	 ways.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	 that	 other	thinkers	 would	 apply	 a	 similar	 model	 in	 interpreting	 these	 thinkers	 in	 terms	 of	scientism	qua	religion.	Both	 these	men	and	 their	 followers	also	contributed	 to	 the	idea	that	science	could	be	expanded	to	order	all	of	society,	reducing	all	knowledge	under	 its	 framework	 of	meaning,	 a	 reductionism	 that	 was	 later	 criticized.	 In	 this	expanse,	even	religion	comes	under	the	capabilities	of	the	scientific	enterprise	and	this	 ‘dogmatic	hegemony’	became	one	of	 the	major	sources	 for	 likening	science	 to	religion	 in	 a	 reductive	 way.	 Put	 differently,	 those	 who	 scientificated	 society	constructed	science	as	 religion-like	and	 their	 thought	was	constructed	 in	 terms	of	religionization.	Both	Saint-Simon	and	Comte	also	applied	the	presumptions	of	mutual	exclusivity	 in	 interpreting	one	another’s	philosophies,	each	criticizing	 the	other	as	unscientific	and	narrowly	religious.	This	also	set	the	stage	for	the	analysis	of	religions	of	science	in	a	zero-sum	fashion,	leaving	only	religion	as	the	interpretive	framework	of	meaning.		
																																																						103	Hutchinson	(2011),	80;	de	Botton	(2012),	300–301;	Wright	(1986);	and	Brooke	&	Cantor	(1998),	55–57.	As	a	relevant	side	note,	Alain	de	Botton	argued	that	Comte’s	greatest	conceptual	mistake	was	to	 refer	 to	 this	worldview	 as	 ‘religion.’	 Thus,	we	 see	 that	 there	 is	 a	 continued	 attempt	 to	 exclude	religion	 form	 what	 is	 “relevant	 and	 rational,”	 perpetuating	 the	 signifiers	 involved	 in	 the	 mutual	exclusivity	construct.	See	ibid.,	307.		104	 Pickering	 (1993),	 220;	 and	 Stenmark	 (2013),	 2104.	However,	 Comte	 strongly	 disassociated	 his	earlier	and	later	works.	He	first	had	stressed	industry	and	science	and	later	religion.	Comte	eventually	came	 to	 regret	 his	 aforementioned	 publication	 of	 Cours	 de	 philosophie	 positive	 and	 recanted	 his	assertion	that	science	alone	was	able	to	reconstruct	society.	He	came	to	be	relieved	that	religion	had	“freed”	him	from	anxieties	about	“scientific	prestige”	and	claimed	in	the	last	part	of	his	life	that	“science	…	is	as	preliminary	as	theology	and	metaphysics	and	must	be	finally	…	eliminated	by	the	universal	religion.”	 Quoted	 in	 Pickering	 (1993),	 235.	 Ellipses	 original.	 Comte	 also	 changed	 his	 view	 of	 the	scientist	in	the	priestly	role	as	well	that	he	later	said	could	be	fulfilled	either	by	a	philosopher	or	poet.	Comte	had	changed	his	perspective	on	the	foundation	of	his	religion	in	scientific	thought	and	even	from	the	outset	of	his	religion,	Comte	already	tended	toward	aesthetics.	Ironically,	however,	as	Comte	lost	interest	in	science,	the	scientific	aspects	of	his	work	were	becoming	increasingly	popular	as	his	famous	disciple	 Emile	 Littré	 (1801–1881)	 was	 making	 positivism	 one	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 scientific	manifestos	in	history,	which	has	also	been	further	likened	to	religion.	Ibid.,	234–236.	
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3 History	of	Science	as	the	Social	Evolution	of	Religion		Not	only	did	Saint-Simon	and	Comte	make	religions	out	of	science,	they	also	framed	the	history	and	future	of	science	in	terms	of	the	social	development	of	religion,	which	gave	further	 impetus	to	those	who	would	reduce	their	science	to	religion.	And	the	history	of	science	as	the	peak	of	the	social	evolution	of	religion	occurred	in	a	much	larger	 context	 than	 Saint-Simonism	 and	 Comtian	 thought.	 This	 was	 an	 important	source	of	likening	science	to	religion	that	led	many	to	a	reductive	analysis	of	scientism	qua	religion.		Saint-Simon	 saw	 the	 reductionism	 of	 all	 knowledge	 under	 the	 scientific	worldview	as	the	culmination	of	religious	evolution	from	polytheism,	to	deism,	and	finally	 culminating	 in	 his	 own	 vision.105	 Comte,	 similar	 to	 Saint-Simon,	 argued	 for	developmental	stages	of	human	thought	from	theology,	to	metaphysics,	and	finalizing	with	science—specifically	“the	queen	of	the	sciences,”	sociology.106	Comte’s	account	of	the	full	expanse	of	human	history	could	essentially	be	identified	as	a	history	of	the	growth	of	the	natural	sciences,	beginning	with	the	‘fiction’	of	theology	to	the	mature	positivism	 of	 science.107	 Reverend	 Frederic	William	 Farrar	 (1831–1903)	 similarly	claimed:		




shown	 themselves	 quite	 as	 well	 acquainted	 with	 anything	 which	 can	 be	 called	theology	[…].”109		 As	explained	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	history	of	religion	was	increasingly	conceptualized	in	terms	of	natural	history,	and	society	was	understood	in	terms	of	evolutionary	processes	as	part	of	the	scientification	of	religion.	The	history	of	science,	too,	 became	 a	 part	 of	 this	 story.	 Science	 was	 understood	 as	 the	 peak	 of	 social	evolutionary	progress	and	the	culmination	of	religious	worldviews,	which	had	also	been	construed	at	 this	 time	in	terms	of	morality	and	ethics	(see	Chapter	Four).	As	such,	science	came	to	be	thought	of	as	the	realization	of	a	superior	morality	and	the	cultivation	of	science-based	ethics	became	the	future	goal	for	the	social	evolution	of	religion.	Such	approaches	were	part	of	the	wider	trend	to	understand	all	of	human	behavior	 scientifically	 as	 we	 saw	 occur	 in	 the	 case	 of	 scientification—which	 was	opposed	 to	 conceptualizations	 in	 the	humanities,	 for	 example.110	 For	 instance,	 the	development	of	experimental	psychology,	which	was	part	of	this	trend,	was	also	part	of	 a	 larger	 attempt	 to	 develop	 a	 science-based	moral	 philosophy.111	 Though	 there	were	critics	of	this	undertaking	by	psychology	professionals,	among	others,	the	moral	commentary	found	in	the	field	seems	to	have	contributed	to	its	success.112	And	even	today	some	have	argued	that	cognitive	science	will	eventually	explain	the	mind	and	human	nature	in	entirety	and	thus	it	will	and	should	determine	human	values,	similar	to	Michael	Gazzaniga’s	proposal	of	a	“brain-based	philosophy	of	life.”113	
																																																						109	Quoted	in	Moore	(1988),	443.	See	also	ibid.,	425,	438,	and	440–444.	110	This	in	part	led	to	the	twentieth-century	gap	between	science	and	the	humanities,	as	identified	in	C.	P.	Snow’s	lectures	on	the	‘two	cultures.’	Snow	more	specifically	referred	to	the	scientific	versus	the	literary	cultures,	the	latter	a	narrower	conception	of	the	arts,	which	did	not	include	philosophy	and	some	 types	 of	 social	 history.	 Though	 at	 times	 this	 gap	 was	 more	 apparent	 than	 real,	 Snow’s	observations	are	important	nonetheless	as	they	paint	a	picture	of	the	intellectual	current	of	the	time—one	 in	 which	 the	 scientific	 worldview	 was	 demarcated	 and	 uplifted	 relative	 to	 all	 other	 ways	 of	thinking.	Snow’s	work	gives	the	sense	that	being	part	of	the	scientific	community	has	moral	value	and	implies	 that	scientific	culture	 is	morally	superior	 to	 the	 literary	culture.	See	Snow	(1964).	See	also	Sorell	 (1991),	98–99	and	106.	The	conflict	between	scientism	and	 the	humanities,	as	well	as	other	forms	of	knowledge,	 is	a	major	theme	in	the	 literature.	See	also	Kitcher	(2012);	Olson	(1982),	1–3;	Reedy	(1983);	Rosenberg	(2011),	275–315;	and	Sorell	(1991),	12–18,	and	98–126.	111	Ben-David	(1971),	127–128.	See	also,	Rieff	(1961).	112	Rieff	(1961),	2.	113	Satel	&	Lilienfeld	(2013),	xviii.	
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	 Something	 similar	 occurred	 in	 the	 then	 new	 science	 of	 anthropology.	Following	 the	 developments	 in	 the	 field,	 American	 scientist	 Lester	 Ward	 (1841–1913)	suggested	the	evolution	of	religion	could	be	traced	from	primitive	superstition	to	magic,	 polytheism,	monotheism,	 and	 finally	 culminating	 in	 science.114	 And	 in	 a	similar	vein,	Richard	von	Mises	(1883–1953),	a	member	of	the	Vienna	Circle,	drew	a	parallel	between	metaphysics	and	religion,	arguing	both	are	“primitive”	approaches	to	 issues	 not	 yet	 addressed	 by	 science.115	 He	 framed	 science	 not	 only	 as	 the	culmination	of,	but	also	as	in	competition	with,	alternative	domains	of	inquiry.116			 The	past	overt	religious	formulations	found	in	Saint-Simonism	and	Comtian	thought	were	overshadowed	by	the	rise	of	Darwinian	evolution,	which	became	the	central	 interpretive	 framework	for	 the	history	of	science	as	 the	social	evolution	of	religion.	 Following	 the	 emergence	 of	 Darwinian	 thought,	 these	 religious	 themes	persisted,	but	under	the	guise	of	evolutionary	symbolism.117	Extensive	discussions	of	scientism	as	religion	are	somewhat	lacking,	however	part	of	the	reason	for	this	is	that	the	 literature	 on	 scientism,	 even	 in	 its	 broadest	 construction,	 is	 rather	 scarce.	However,	 taking	Darwinism	qua	religion,	and	evolution	more	generally,	as	a	 focus,	the	 literature—which	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 scientism—suddenly	appears	a	whole	lot	richer.	With	the	scientification	of	society	on	the	rise,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	ever	since	the	publication	of	Charles	Darwin’s	(1809–1882)	




	 Spencer	argued	that	ethics	arose	as	an	adaptive	trait	in	the	evolution	of	human	societies,	as	did	Darwin.	Spencer,	as	well	as	Huxley,	further	suggested	that	specific	moral	 values	 could	 be	 derived	 from	 evolutionary	 studies,	 also	 known	 as	 ‘Social	Darwinism.’119	Such	moves	led	many	to	the	conclusion	that	Darwinism	“symbolized	scientific	 naturalism,	 and	 the	 hubris	 of	 the	 ‘priesthood.’”120	 Spencer	 has	 been	described	 as	 the	 “apostle	 of	 Social	 Darwinism,”	 who	 preached	 of	 the	 progress	 of	humankind	toward	a	utopian	future,	which	has	been	likened	to	a	religious	position.121	Huxley	 deliberately	 sought	 to	 develop	 a	 substitute	 religion	 from	 Darwinism,	specifically	 in	 order	 to	 fulfill	 the	 psychological	 function	 of	 religion,	 providing	existential	meaning	and	a	system	of	morality.	Huxley	even	gave	“lay	sermons,”	as	he	referred	to	them,	and	missionized	about	his	worldview.	Understood	as	an	institution	of	 science	 today,	Huxley	 and	his	 colleagues	 built	 substitute	 churches	 according	 to	their	vision,	which	they	called	‘museums	of	natural	history’:	[P]laces	where,	instead	of	going	to	a	Christian	cathedral	on	a	Sunday	morning,	a	family	could	go	 on	 a	 Sunday	 afternoon	 and	 seen	 [sic]	 magnificent	 panoramas	 of	 past	 life	 […]	 On	 the	principle	that	imitation	is	the	sincerest	form	of	flattery,	natural	history	museum	after	museum	was	built	in	the	style	of	a	gothic	cathedral	or	earlier.122			 Darwin	 and	 Spencer	were	 both	 utilized	 by	 later	 advocates	 in	 developing	 a	complete	 system	of	 evolutionary	ethics,	 including	by	Leslie	 Stephen	 (1832–1904),	Benjamin	 Kidd	 (1858–1916),	 John	 Fiske	 (1842–1901),	 Samuel	 Alexander	 (1859–1938),	Woods	Hutchinson	(1862–1930),	Julian	Huxley	(1887–1975)—grandson	of	T.	Huxley—,	 and	 C.	 H.	 Waddington	 (1905–1975),	 who	 are	 all	 associated	 with	scientism.123	 Stephen	 regarded	 evolutionary	 theory	 as	 having	 a	 genuine	 religious	nature	and	hoped	that	it	would	provide	the	basis	for	a	new	religion,	as	did	Francis	Galton	 (1822–1911)	 and	William	 Kingdon	 Clifford	 (1845–1879).124	 J.	 Huxley	 and	Waddington	argued	that	humanity	could	direct	evolution	to	the	purpose	of	greater	
																																																						119	Hughes	(2012).	See	also	Spencer	(1973);	and	Huxley	(1973),	209–215.	120	MacLeod	(1982),	7.	Emphasis	original.	121	Phillips	(2012).	This	article	provides	a	 lot	of	examples	of	religionizing	different	aspects	 that	are	related	to	science,	however	since	the	attack	of	this	 ‘new	intolerance’	 is	aimed	at	such	a	generalized	group	or,	when	specified,	to	disparate	groups,	it	is	very	difficult	to	grasp	who	or	what	exactly	is	being	criticized.		122	Ruse	(2011).	See	also	Ruse	(2003).	123	Hughes	(2012).	See	also	Cameron	&	Edge	(1979),	28–33.	124	Lightman	(1987),	159–160.	
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human	fulfillment	and	the	achievement	of	higher	values.	J.	Huxley	even	authored	a	book	 entitled	 Religion	 Without	 Revelation	 (1927),	 in	 which	 he	 discussed	 the	normative	 directives	 of	 nature	 to	 preserve	 and	 aid	 humankind.	 More	 explicitly	formulating	the	science	as	a	religion,	J.	Huxley	stated,	“[…]	the	passion	for	getting	at	the	truth	that	characterizes	some	great	minds,	including	the	highest	type	of	scientific	mind	[…]	is	indeed	a	religion	of	truth.”125	He	argued	we	must	change	“our	pattern	of	religious	 thought”	 from	 a	 “god-centered	 to	 an	 evolution-centered	 pattern.”126	 J.	Huxley	depicted	science	as	a	religion	and	suggested	that	religion	should	depart	from	the	knowledge	gained	in	science	to	formulate	its	‘theology.’			 In	a	similar	example	of	evolution	qua	religion,	Enrico	Ferri	(1856–1929)	saw	positive	science	generally	and	evolution	specifically	as	the	scientific	basis	of	socialism	and	this	line	of	thinking	as	the	culmination	of	religious	thought,	the	last	phase	of	the	“evolution	of	religious	beliefs”	being	“the	realisation	of	happiness	[…]	in	the	continued	evolution	 of	 the	whole	 of	 humanity.”	 He	 goes	 on,	 “socialism	 is	 joined	 to	 religious	evolution	and	tends	to	substitute	itself	for	religion.”	Socialism	“can	perfectly	replace	the	 faith	 in	 the	 ‘something	beyond’	of	 the	old	religions.”127	 “[P]ositive	science”	has	“substituted	 the	 conception	 of	 natural	 causality	 for	 the	 conception	 of	miracle	 and	divinity,”	 “replacing	 the	notion	of	 imago	dei	with	 the	 evolutionary	doctrine	 imago	




Darwinists	are	the	modern	equivalent	of	 the	Gnostics,	 the	priestly	millenarian	caste	whose	higher	knowledge	of	perfect	truths	puts	them	on	to	a	superior	plane	from	the	rest	of	humanity	[…]	 that	 all	 must	 comply	 with	 […]	 on	 pain	 of	 being	 excommunicated	 from	 the	 realm	 of	rationality.	 […]	 the	 religion	 […]	 has	 led	 atheist	 scientists	 to	 morph	 from	 science	 into	scientism.130	 			Science	as	religion-like	becomes	scientism,	not	science,	as	per	mutual	exclusivity,	and	scientism	is	reduced	to	religion.	When	scientism	has	been	associated	with	a	specific	ethical	system	it	has	usually	been	that	of	evolutionary	ethics,	which	stemmed	from	this	 construction	 of	 the	 history	 of	 science	 as	 the	 culmination	 of	 religious	development.131	In	turn,	the	religions	of	science	and	evolutionary	ethics	have	been	associated	with	scientism	and	collectively	characterized	as	reducibly	a	 “religion	of	evolution.”132	For	instance,	some	claim	that	“evolution	is	religion—not	science,”	thus	invoking	 the	 zero-sum	 terms	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity.133	 One	 author	 argued,	“evolutionist	interpretation	[…]	end[s]	with	a	statement	of	faith.”	This	is	understood	as	without	 a	 “scientific	 basis—they	 are	 beliefs	 based	 on	 one’s	worldview”	 and	 on	“faith	in	the	theory	of	evolution.”134	Similarly,	another	individual	claimed,	“The	fact	is	that	evolutionists	believe	in	evolution	because	they	want	to.”	Regarded	as	a	form	of	scientism,	this	belief	“makes	it	a	religion.”135	This	assessment	comports	with	Thomas	M.	Lessl’s	finding	that	“scientism	has	grown	into	a	mythico-religious	interpretation	of	evolutionary	facts.”136		
4 The	Scientistic	Enterprise	as	‘Religious’		
																																																						130	Phillips	(2012).	Phillips’	work	is	not	academic	and	is	rather	unclear	about	who	her	attacks	are	aimed	at,	creating	a	generalized	picture	of	‘evil’	all	about.	I	include	it	here	not	as	an	academic	argument,	but	as	an	example	of	how	 the	discourse	manifests	 from	academia	 to	popular	culture,	 in	 science	and	 in	religious	communities.	Regarding	the	characterization	of	atheistic	science	as	scientistic,	see,	e.g.,	Feser	(2011/12).	131	See,	e.g.,	Cameron	&	Edge	(1979),	28–33;	Farber	(1998),	174;	and	Stenmark	(2001),	67–77	and	137–138.	The	literature	on	(including	critiques	of)	evolutionary	ethics	is	extensive	and	cannot	be	fully	explored	here.	For	an	introduction	and	references	to	relevant	literature,	see	Quinton	(1965);	Nitecki	&	Nitecki	(1993);	and	James	(2011).	132	Wood	(1922),	101.	On	the	religion	of	evolution,	see	also	Midgley	(1986);	and	Barlow	(1994),	221–249.	On	the	connection	to	scientism,	see	ibid.,	194,	248,	and	268;	and	Midgley	(1986),	31.	133	E.g.,	Houts	(2007a);	and	Houts	(2007b).	Cf.	Ruse	(2000);	and	Ruse	(2011).	134	Houts	(2007a).	Similar	comments	on	“faith”	can	be	found	in	Houts	(2007b).	135	Morris	(2001).	Emphasis	original.	136	Lessl	(1996),	392.	
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Drawing	 on	 such	 connections	 between	 scientism,	 the	 religions	 of	 science,	 and	evolutionary	 ethics,	 science	 came	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 particular	 systematic	purposeful	activity—the	scientific	or,	more	pointedly,	the	scientistic	enterprise	with	the	goal	being	nothing	short	of	a	complete	system	of	morality,	 including	salvation,	with	evolution	as	its	teleology.	These	associations	have	been	a	major	source	for	the	religionization	of	science.		 The	 idea	 of	 scientism	 as	 salvific	 is	 connected	 to	 notions	 of	 science	 as	 the	champion	 of	 free	 thinking.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Three,	 science	 as	 an	 agent	 of	liberation	 was	 a	 common	 motif	 during	 the	 Enlightenment.	 By	 the	 middle	 of	 the	seventeenth	 century,	 science	had	already	become	an	 important	 and	possibly	 even	central	symbol	of	an	open	and	advanced	society,	the	ideal	of	many	powerful	social	groups,	quickly	spreading	throughout	Europe.137	Education	in	science	was	associated	with	 virtue	 and	 as	 a	 “source	 of	 moral	 improvement.”	 In	 the	 eighteenth-century	




wider	vision	of	 truth,”	 then	science	would	be	able	 to	 “infuse	 fresh	 life	 into	 the	old	religious	doctrines.”142			 Though	 science	 as	 liberator	 was	 discussed	 previously	 in	 terms	 of	 framing	religion	and	science	as	mutually	exclusive	opposites,	with	science	 illuminating	 the	ignorance	and	tyranny	of	religion,	the	salvific	role	of	science	is	often	thought	to	be	in	direct	competition	with	religion,	as	an	alternative	type	of	faith.	Discussing	the	salvific	role	of	science,	Mary	Midgley	stated,	“The	project	[…]	must	be	able	to	promise	glory	and	immortality	reminiscent	of	the	strongest	offers	available	from	religion,	but	more	seductive	still	because	they	offer	complete	supremacy.”143	The	mutual	exclusivity	of	religion	and	science	both	distinguishes	the	two	and	puts	them	in	competition	with	one	 another.	All	 dichotomies	 create	 a	 forced	 choice.	But	 being	 alternatives	 to	 one	another	also	obscures	their	distinction,	as	now	they	share	something	in	common—a	larger	conceptual	framework	in	which	the	alternatives	are	understood	as	such,	in	this	relational	manner	of	connection.			 In	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 idea	 that	 science	 was	 crucial	 to	 the	betterment	of	society,	a	more	virtuous	society,	was	on	the	rise.	Ben-David	argued	that	this	 is	 one	marker	of	 scientism,	 a	 ‘belief	 in	 science’	 as	 the	 “effective	mastery	over	nature	as	well	as	to	the	solution	of	the	problems	of	the	individual	and	his	society.”144	Those	 who	 advocated	 such	 views	 concluded	 that	 it	 was	 thus	 humankind’s	 moral	obligation	 to	 cultivate	 scientific	 growth,	 such	 as	 geneticist	 J.	 B.	 S.	Haldane	 (1892–1964).145	Carl	Wilhelm	Wolfgang	Ostwald	 (1883–1943),	a	 contemporary	of	Hayek,	was	 also	 inspired	 by	 Comte	 and	 similarly	 formulated	 a	 “substitute	 religion”	(Ersatzreligion)	based	on	science,	which	has	been	labeled	‘scientism.’146	He	claimed	that	 science	 is,	 or	 at	 the	 least	 soon	 will	 be,	 omnipresent,	 omnipotent,	 and	omnibenevolent.	 Notably,	 Ostwald	 even	 spoke	 positively	 of	 the	 ‘intellectual	




The	False	Messiah	(1927)—a	“testimony	of	 the	sciences”—rejected	 the	notion	 that	science	can	be	society’s	savior	and	argued	that	“by	trying	to	make	our	beliefs	scientific	we	have	succeeded	only	in	making	them	absurd,”	reflecting	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity.	Ayres	characterized	his	work	as	“heresy,”	implying	the	cultural	climate	he	found	himself	in	was	one	in	which	science	is	understood	as	“the	inviolable	faith	of	our	new	dispensation.”151	The	popularity	of	science-based	morality/evolutionary	ethics	declined	for	a	time.	However,	the	discussion	on	scientism	and	evolutionary	ethics	qua	religion	also	picked	up	again	from	around	the	1970s	on.152		Michael	 Shermer	 saw	 the	 resurgence	 beginning	 with	 mathematician	 Jacob	Bronowski’s	 (1908–1974)	 popular	 book	 and	 television	 series,	 both	 entitled	 The	








people	live.”161	“[S]cience	is	able	to	offer	us	salvation,	to	fulfill	the	role	of	religion	in	our	lives.”	Because	of	this,	there	is	an	existential	need	of	science	and	as	such	“We	can	and	 must	 put	 our	 faith	 in	 science.”162	 Characterizing	 scientistics	 outlook	 on	 life,	Wieseltier	stated,	“They	need	to	be	saved;	they	need	to	be	saved	by	something	other	than	themselves;	they	need	to	be	saved	by	science.”	Wieseltier	regarded	scientism	as	‘superstitious,’	in	the	“business	of	emancipation.”163	As	such,	it	is	regarded	as	more	representative	of	religion	than	science.		 One	of	the	commonly	identified	defining	features	of	scientism	is	that	“fact	and	value	 are	 systematically	 confused”	 and	 indeed	 many	 of	 those	 identified	 with	scientism	 argue	 for	 this	 position	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly,	 including	 Michael	 Ruse,	Wilson,	 Anatol	 Rapoport,	 Ostwald,	 and	 Adam	 Smith	 (1723–1790).164	 Scientism,	Stenmark	noted	as	one	manifestation,	positions	scientific	 theory	as	able	 to	“justify	ethical	norms	and	beliefs	and	provide	us	with	a	new,	scientific	ethic.”	This	includes	the	argument	that	“Ethics	can	be	reduced	to	or	translated	into	science.”165	Ben-David	also	pointed	to	the	‘confusion’	of	fact	and	value	in	scientistic	thought,	separating	it	from	 scientific	 thought,	 as	 we	 would	 expect	 in	 the	 relational	 construct	 of	religionization.166	As	one	scientist	pointed	out,	 “Perhaps	no	area	of	philosophy	has	seen	a	greater	effort	 at	 appropriation	by	advocates	of	 scientism	 than	ethics,”	 thus	bringing	 to	 light	 the	 transgressive	 act	 of	 appropriation,	 from	 this	 perspective.167	Similarly,	Stenmark	analyzed	this	scientism	as	‘beyond	science’:		Another	way	of	expanding	the	boundaries	of	science	is	to	maintain	that	not	only	can	science	fully	 explain	 morality,	 but	 it	 can	 also	 replace	 traditional	 ethics	 and	 tell	 people	 how	 they	
																																																						161	Midgley	(1992),	37	and	57.	162	Stenmark	(2001),	14.	163	Wieseltier	(2013a);	and	Wieseltier	(2006).	164	Gray	 (2012).	Hakfoort	 (1995)	 offered	 several	 examples,	with	 references,	 of	 is/ought	 confusion,	which	he	characterized	as	one	of	the	main	tenets	of	scientism.	Though	not	about	scientism	particularly,	but	rather	about	the	is/ought	conflation	in	evolutionary	ethics,	see	also	Flew	(1967),	31–51.	See	also	Ruse	&	Wilson	(1986),	174;	Wilson	(1998);	Rapoport	(1957),	798;	Sorell	(1991),	161;	Hakfoort	(1992),	534–537;	 and	 Olson	 (1990),	 222–226.	 Notably,	 the	 is/ought	 distinction	 has	 not	 been	 uniformly	accepted	among	philosophers.	Marxists	and	Existentialists	have	regarded	the	distinction	as	invalid.	165	Stenmark	(2001),	viii	and	12.	See	also,	ibid.,	67–77.	166	Ben-David	(1971),	90.	167	Hughes	(2012).	
Religionization	
	 185	
morally	ought	 to	behave	 […]	 science	 is	 the	 sole,	 or	 at	 least	 the	most	 important,	 source	 for	developing	a	moral	theory	and	explaining	moral	behavior.168		Stenmark	argued	that	with	the	tradition	providing	values	and	an	ethical	code	it	could	be	 considered	 a	 religion,	 but	 that	 would	 include	 extra-scientific	 claims.169	 Put	differently,	 to	be	 religion-like	 is	 to	be	 ‘extra-scientific,’	 to	be	outside	of	 science.	 In	being	‘beyond	science,’	it	becomes	scientism,	not	science,	from	this	perspective.	This	reflects	 an	underlying	 structure	of	mutual	 exclusivity	 in	 the	discursive	 changes	 to	religionization	occurring	here.		
5 Scientistic	Knowledge	as	‘Religious’		William	James	(1842–1910),	 in	an	anonymous	letter	to	the	editor	of	The	Nation	 in	1874,	critiqued	the	science	of	the	time	as	reflecting	“the	mood	of	Faith,	not	Science,”	a	 tendency	 toward	 the	 commitment	 to	 “vast	 theories	 […]	 unverified.”170	 James’	concern	regarding	unwarranted	belief	 reflected	a	wider	unease	 toward	 the	notion	that	scientific	knowledge	represented	all	of	truth,	characterized	by	omniscience,	one	of	the	major	features	identified	with	scientism	from	the	first	usages	of	the	term	to	the	present	day.			 According	to	Diderot’s	definition,	‘knowledge’	is	akin	to	‘science,’	specifically	“clear	and	certain	knowledge.”171	Diderot’s	view	was	not	yet	the	norm,	but	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	Three,	 it	would	become	so	shortly	after	his	 time.172	During	 this	period,	there	was	a	change	occurring	from	the	largely	eighteenth-century	idea	that	scientific	study	allowed	for	the	object	of	study	to	dictate	the	methodology	to	the	nineteenth-century	notion	that	scientific	knowledge	was	associated	with	a	precise	methodology	and	the	exactitude	of	the	results.	At	the	time	of	Diderot,	the	majority	was	still	ruled	by	 more	 ‘traditional’	 religious	 and	 political	 groups,	 which	 were	 viewed	 by	 the	
																																																						168	Stenmark	(2003),	784.	169	Stenmark	(2001),	129	and	131.		170	 Quoted	 in	 Woelfel	 (2013),	 177.	 Though	 to	 my	 knowledge	 James	 does	 not	 employ	 the	 term	‘scientism,’	his	concerns	regarding	the	overreaching	of	science	are	often	characterized	as	commentary	on	scientism.	For	another	example,	see	Putnam	(1997),	326	and	passim.	171	Quoted	in	Hutchinson	(2011),	6.	172	Hutchinson	(2011),	8.		
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emerging	professional	group	of	scientists	as	suppressing	freedom	of	thought.	Thus,	science	became	not	simply	‘clear	and	certain	knowledge’	of	the	natural	world,	but	also	represented	a	new	social	order.173	With	this	came	changes	in	the	approach	to	study	society,	in	which	imitating	the	scientific	method	became	dominant	and	all	knowledge	became	scientific	knowledge.174			 By	this	time	science	had	already	had	a	significant	and	often	positively	received	impact	 on	 religious,	 political,	 and	 economic	 life	 over	 the	 previous	 two	 centuries.	Because	 scientific	 knowledge	 was	 increasingly	 presumed	 to	 be	 true	 and	 certain,	extending	 science	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 religious	 and	 social	 topics	 was	 all	 the	 more	appealing.175	 Many	 felt	 that	 science	 needed	 to	 be	 socially,	 technologically,	 and	politically	 relevant,	 which	 in	 turn	 further	 fed	 its	 popularization,	 admiration,	 and	expansive	 applicability.	 The	 increasing	 success	 of	 the	 natural	 sciences	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century	 created	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 the	 intellectual	 and	 social	implications	 of	 science	 became	 exceedingly	 attractive,	 forming	what	 is	 commonly	referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘scientific	 worldview.’	 In	 the	 process	 of	 scientific	institutionalization,	 a	 social	 value	was	placed	on	 science	 in	 terms	of	 technological	development	 and	 social	 progress	 and	 change.176	 “Scientific	 progress,”	W.	 J.	McGee	wrote	in	1898,	“is	so	closely	interwoven	with	industrial	and	social	progress	that	the	advance	of	one	cannot	be	traced	without	constant	reference	to	the	other.”177	Natural	knowledge	was	thought	to	have	a	“progressive,	ultimately	benevolent	character.”178		 At	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 were	 concerned	 with	 the	 ultimacy	 assigned	 to	scientific	knowledge.	For	example,	philosopher	Paul	Feyerabend	(1924–1994),	in	his	
The	 Tyranny	 of	 Science	 (posthumously	 published	 in	 2011),	 traced	 the	 growing	concern	of	science’s	‘Reign	of	Terror’—its	‘tyrannical’	and	‘dogmatic’	rule—and	of	its	proper	 role	 in	 society,	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 nineteenth	 century.179	 Allingham,	 for	
																																																						173	Ben-David	(1971),	78–85;	and	Hakfoort	(1995),	383.	174	Caldwell	(2010),	9;	and	Burnham	(1987),	27–29.	175	Olson	(1990),	9–12	and	93.	176	Ben-David	(1971),	78–85,	89–90,	and	93;	Hakfoort	(1995),	383;	and	Sorell	(1991),	34–35.	177	Quoted	in	Burnham	(1987),	168.	178	MacLeod	(1982),	3.	179	 Feyerabend	 (2011);	 and	 Lightman	 (2012),	 460.	 For	 a	 discussion	 of	 Feyerabend	 as	 related	 to	scientism,	see,	e.g.,	Feser	(2011/12).	
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instance,	noted,	“Science	has	of	 late	unquestionably	shown	a	tendency	to	overbear	and	tyrannize	in	the	domain	of	Human	Thought.”180	We	can	also	see	such	concerns	in	the	thought	of	de	Maistre,	who	believed	the	view	of	science	as	social	salvation	was	a	danger	to	society	and	strongly	criticized	the	notion	that	science	was	the	only	means	to	knowledge.	He	saw	an	ongoing	trend	in	converting	science	into	a	comprehensive	“ideology	 of	 scientific	 rationalism,”	 beginning	with	Diderot	 and	 his	 colleagues.	 He	referred	 to	 this	 tendency	 as	 ‘scientific	 dogmatism,’	 the	 theories	 of	 which	 “have	become	a	kind	of	religion”	that	is	“suited	only	to	retard	science.”181	Thus	we	see	that	scientific	knowledge	as	religious	is	set	in	opposition	to	the	growth	of	science,	or,	in	other	words,	that	this	science	is	not	scientific.	Put	differently,	science	constructed	as	religion	is	nothing	more	than	religion,	reduced	to	religion.	Moreover,	 later	authors	regarded	 de	 Maistre’s	 opposition	 to	 scientific	 ideology	 as	 one	 against	 scientism	specifically	and	criticized	similar	thinkers	as	‘believers	in	science,’	for	whom	science	was	a	religion.182		 A	common	argument	against	the	expansionism	of	scientific	knowledge	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	was	that	“there	was	little	that	was	scientific	about	the	creed	of	 scientific	naturalism.”	Being	unscientific,	 it	was	based	on	 faith	 just	as	any	other	religion.183	Scientific	naturalism	has	regularly	been	criticized	as	based	on	belief	and	resemblances	 to	 the	dogmatism	of	 religion	have	been	 repeatedly	 emphasized.	 For	example,	Lewis	Wright	 (1838–1905),	 in	1888,	 referred	 to	materialism	as	 the	 ‘new	dogma,’	which	he	equated	to	a	‘creed.’184	Scientific	materialism	is	frequently	regarded	as	a	dogma,	in	that	it	is	a	universally	applied	worldview	constituted	by	a	set	of	beliefs	
																																																						180	Quoted	in	MacLeod	(2000),	xi.	181	Lebrun	(1969),	220	and	228.	182	 At	 times,	 de	Maistre’s	 criticism	 of	 science	was	 all	 encompassing,	 but	 it	was	 not	 his	 position	 to	abandon	science	altogether	and	he	focused	his	attacks	specifically	on	the	themes	discussed	here.	See,	e.g.,	Lebrun	(1969),	227–229.	Seeing	as	how	de	Maistre	criticized	this	religion	of	science,	but	ultimately	argued	 for	an	affinity	between	science	and	 religion,	 specifically	Christianity,	 then	not	only	was	 the	religion	of	science	viewed	as	not	really	science,	but	the	religion	was	not	quite	right	either.	Whether	he	argued	that	within	the	religion	of	science	the	science	was	not	proper	science	or	the	religion	was	not	proper	religion,	we	see	the	relational	construct	in	play	that	‘science	as	religion’	is	rooted	in	the	mutual	exclusivity	 construct	 of	 ‘science	 as	 not	 religion,’	 leading	 to	 reduction	 and	 again	 allowing	 for	 such	inconsistent	views	on	the	religion-science	relation	as	we	saw	with	some	of	the	other	thinkers	above.	183	Lightman	(2012),	461	and	463	.	184	Lightman	(2012),	449.	
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and	 attitudes	 requiring	 intellectual	 and	 emotional	 allegiance.185	 Dave	 Pruett	suggested	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 universe	 is	 only	material	 is	what	makes	 scientism	 a	“statement	of	faith.”186	And	indeed	the	claim	has	appeared	that	because	“science	can	explain	religion	as	a	whole	material	phenomenon”	“suggests	that	scientific	naturalism	or	 materialism	 should	 replace	 religion”—a	 clear	 discursive	 connection	 between	scientification	and	its	reductionism,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	construction	of	science	as	 religion-like,	 on	 the	 other.187	 Stenmark	 even	 used	 ‘scientific	 naturalism’	 as	 a	synonym	for	the	position	of	scientism	as	a	religion.188		 The	 reductive	 stance	 of	 naturalism	 was	 traced	 to	 positivism	 by	 Austin	 L.	Hughes,	who	observed	that	“The	positivist	tradition	in	philosophy	gave	scientism	a	strong	 impetus	 by	 denying	 validity	 to	 any	 area	 of	 human	 knowledge	 outside	 of	natural	 science.”	Many	 scientists	 and	other	 intellectuals	 have	 also	 expressed	 their	dismay	at	the	increasingly	ubiquitous	nature	of	“the	arrogance	of	the	philosophers	of	the	 positivist	 tradition,”	 and	 of	 scientism	 generally,	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 science	constitutes	 “the	 entire	 domain	 of	 truth.”189	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 ‘positivism’	 and	‘scientism’	 were	 and	 are	 often	 conflated	 in	 the	 relevant	 discourse.	 As	 mentioned	previously,	the	terms	have	often	been	used	as	synonyms	or	at	least	closely	related,	
																																																						185	Sheldrake	(2012),	6–12	provided	a	similar	definition	and	also	categorized	this	belief	as	a	‘creed.’	See	also	Lightman	(2012).	186	Pruett	(2013a).	187	Stenmark	(2003),	784.	See	also	Voelker	(2011).	188	Stenmark	(2001),	124.	189	Hughes	(2012).	Reductionism	in	the	realm	of	the	social	sciences	and	humanities	was	not	the	only	concern,	but	 also	 the	expansion	of	 science	 in	philosophy,	which	 is	 closely	 connected	 to	positivism.	These	 different	 areas	 were	 related	 as	 well	 since	 reductionism	 was	 often	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	philosophical	presuppositions	 that	not	only	dictated	philosophy	but	also	 the	philosophy	of	how	all	knowledge	systems	should	be	treated.	Though	positivism	gave	science	the	philosophical	grounding	for	advancing	scientism,	“advocates	of	scientism	have	taken	the	ironic	but	logical	next	step	of	denying	any	useful	 role	 for	philosophy	whatsoever.”	Hughes	 (2012).	 See	also	Lessl	 (1996).	This	 replacement	of	philosophy	with	science	was	regarded	as	the	very	definition	of	‘scientism’	in	some	cases.	See	Simpson	(2016i);	 Mish	 (2004);	 Berdyaev	 (1938),	 12;	 and	 Quine	 (1969),	 126.	 Furthermore,	 philosophy	 in	general	 and	 metaphysics	 specifically	 were	 typically	 thought	 to	 signify	 religion,	 as	 per	 mutual	exclusivity.	Thus,	framing	scientism	in	terms	of	philosophy	was	one	way	in	which	science	was	likened	to	religion.	For	critiques	of	scientism	as	regards	 its	 intellectual	colonization	of	philosophy,	see	also	Friedland	(2012);	and	Sorell	 (1991).	Ostwald,	e.g.,	believed	the	system	of	 the	sciences	accorded	no	separate	space	for	philosophy,	but	rather	subsumed	different	branches	of	it	within	different	sciences—epistemology	within	psychology	and	ethics	in	cultural	science,	for	instance.	See	Hakfoort	(1992),	533–534.	
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sometimes	with	positivism	suggested	to	be	the	forerunner	to	scientism.190	Hayek,	for	example,	referred	to	scientism	as	a	“species	of	modern	positivism.”191		 Similar	to	the	presumptive	philosophy	associated	with	positivism,	some	have	argued	that	science	can	work	as	an	ideology.192	Pruett	stated,	“scientism	is	to	science	what	fundamentalism	is	to	religion:	cocksure	and	inflexible.”193	As	Pascal-Emmanuel	Gobry	explained	it,	science	“has	an	ideology	that	must	be	obeyed.”194	As	early	as	1872,	scientific	ideology	was	likened	to	orthodoxy,	bigotry,	and	blind	faith	“as	dogmatically	as	the	most	ultra	and	fanatical	religionists.”195	The	last	two	decades	of	the	nineteenth	century	 saw	 a	 revolt	 against	 the	 dogma	 of	 positivism,	 in	 addition	 to	 scientific	naturalism	and	the	 ‘bigotry	of	science’	was	 likened	to	the	 ‘bigotry	of	the	religious,’	often	in	a	reductive	manner.196			 On	 a	 related	 note,	 dogmatism	 has	 not	 only	 been	 associated	with	 scientific	ideology	and	positivism,	but	also	with	scientism	from	among	the	earliest	uses	of	the	term,	which	in	turn	has	been	associated	with	religion.197	Just	as	all	the	great	religions	were	 labeled	 as	 ‘isms,’	 such	 as	 Hinduism,	 Buddhism,	 and	 Confucianism,	 so	 too	‘science’	 came	 to	be	 framed	as	an	 ism—‘scientism,’	 specifically	connoting	 ideology	and	dogma,	which	from	around	the	Enlightenment	on	through	the	present	day	have	been	 regular	 signifiers	 of	 religious	 institutions	 (on	which,	 see	 Chapter	 Three	 and	Chapter	Four).198	Dave	Pollard	also	drew	a	parallel	between	scientistic	dogma	and	religion	 when	 he	 compared	 scientism	 to	 the	 Inquisition	 and	 claimed	 “the	consequence	of	the	new	scientism	dogma	[…]	becomes	a	force	for	tyranny.”199	Curtis	White	argued	that	scientism	is	science	combined	with	an	“ideology	of	certainty”	that	
																																																						190	 Laudan	 (2003),	 670;	 and	 MacLeod	 (1982),	 5.	 It	 is	 not	 uncommon	 in	 the	 literature	 to	 see	formulations	such	as	“scientism	or	positivism,”	such	that	they	are	formulated	as	synonyms.	See,	e.g.,	Woelfel	(2013),	175;	and	Burnham	(1987),	127.	191	Hayek	(1979	[1952]),	185–186.	192	Reedy	(1983),	591.	193	Pruett	(2013a).	194	Gobry	(2014).		195	Anon.	(1872b).	Similar	argument	in	James	(1948),	97.	196	Lightman	(2012).	197	Simpson	(2016i);	and	Seiss	(1913	[1865]),	vol.	2,	439.	See	also	Lightman	(2012),	449.	198	Ferrao	(2002),	227	n.2.	199	Pollard	(2013).	
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Rudolf	 Carnap	 (1891–1970)	 similarly	 claimed,	 “When	 we	 say	 that	 scientific	knowledge	 is	unlimited,	we	mean:	there	 is	no	question	whose	answer	 is	 in	principle	
unattainable	by	science.”207	This	again	goes	back	to	T.	Huxley,	who	claimed	“there	is	








suggests	 that	 scientists	 are	 qualified	 to	 answer	 theological	 questions,	which	 some	have	analyzed	as	a	manifestation	of	scientism	in	culture.223			 Those	 who	 adhere	 to	 the	 omniscience	 of	 science	 have	 been	 described	 as	“science	 believers”	 akin	 to	 the	 religious	 faithful,	 as	 “a	 science	 believer	 thinks	 that	science	can	be	one’s	religion	in	the	functional	sense,”	leading	some	to	conclude	that	“science	 can	 constitute	 a	 religion.”224	 And	 this	 religion	 of	 science,	 this	 “scientistic	faith,”	as	Stenmark	described	 it,	 is	not	 science,	 from	 this	perspective.	Thus,	as	per	mutual	exclusivity,	science	is	negated	and	then	reduced	to	religion.	And,	again,	it	is	specifically	 the	 reductionism	 of	 science	 that	 is	 framed	 as	 religion-like	 in	 many	contexts.	For	example,	Wieseltier	argued,	“The	scientizers	do	not	respect	the	borders	between	 the	 realms	 [of	 knowledge/academic	 disciplines];	 they	 transgress	 the	borders	so	as	to	absorb	all	the	realms	into	a	single	realm,	into	their	realm.”	And,	as	Wieseltier	noted,	within	this	idea	of	explanation	the	notion	of	‘intelligibility’	“is	a	very	particular	 one”—scientific	 intelligibility,	 which	 is	 disguised	 “as	 the	 whole	 of	intelligibility	itself.”225	He	elsewhere	argued,	“the	belief	that	science	is	supreme	in	all	the	contexts,	or	that	it	has	the	last	word	on	all	the	contexts,	or	that	all	the	contexts	await	 the	 attentions	 of	 science	 to	 be	 properly	 understood—that	 is	 an	 idolatry	 of	science,	or	scientism.”226	And,	as	such,	“scientism	is	not	science.	Scientism	is	the	belief	that	science	has	the	answers	to	all	questions,	including	non-scientific	questions.	It	is	not	a	belief	in	the	propositions	of	science,	but	a	belief,	a	certain	belief	in	the	place	of	science	in	life.”227		 Atkins	 described	 “the	 limitless	 power	 of	 science”	 as	 “omnicompetence.”228	With	science	in	such	a	framework	as	the	only	source	of	the	truth	and	of	the	whole	truth,	 a	 sort	 of	 omnipotence	 comes	 to	 be	 assigned	 to	 science.	 Such	 views	 are	frequently	 closely	 associated	 with	 the	 signifier	 supernaturalism.	 For	 example,	 in	1956,	E.	H.	Hutten	said,	“This	belief	in	the	omnipotence	of	[…]	scientism	represents	
																																																						223	Smith	(2003),	238–239.	See	also	Dyson	(1998).	224	 Stenmark	 (2001),	 viii	 and	 126.	 See	 also	 ibid.,	 124;	 and	 Stenmark	 (2003),	 784;	 and	Hutchinson	(2011),	183–185.	225	Wieseltier	(2013a).	226	Pinker	&	Wieseltier	(2013).	227	Wieseltier	(2013a).	228	Atkins	(1995b),	132.	
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science	 lost’—the	 title	 of	 his	 work,	 expressing	 a	 zero-sum	 relational	 construct	 as	instrumental	in	the	religionization	of	science.233			




scientists	within	educational	and	governmental	 institutions	would	eventually	“give	rise	to	the	establishment	of	a	sort	of	scientific	priesthood	throughout	the	kingdom.”241	Positivist	A.	W.	Benn	(1843–1915)	noted,	“a	great	part	of	the	reverence	once	given	to	priests	 and	 to	 their	 stories	 of	 an	 unseen	 universe	 has	 been	 transferred	 to	 the	astronomer,	 the	 geologist,	 the	 physician,	 and	 the	 engineer.”242	 The	 scientific	institution,	 “in	 a	missionary	metaphor	 of	 its	 own	 choosing”	 referred	 to	 a	 “church	militant”	of	 scientists.243	As	MacLeod	put	 it,	 in	a	discussion	of	 the	 late	nineteenth-century	 “creed	 of	 science,”	 “Nature’s	 God	was	 the	 supreme	 legislator,	 the	man	 of	science	his	civil	judge,	and	the	laboratory	his	consistory	court.”244		 This	has	been	regularly	addressed	in	the	relevant	literature	as	indicative	of	the	reductionism	of	science,	as	well	as	of	the	religions	of	scientism	and	of	scientification.	Regarding	the	latter,	some	have	argued	that	there	is	a	close	relation	between	science	in	 a	 competitive	 relationship	with	 other	 knowledge	 systems,	 such	 as	 religion	 and	philosophy,	 and	 the	 ability	 of	 scientism	 to	 “transform	 the	 scientific	 culture	 into	 a	secular	priesthood.”245	While	those	such	as	Galton	were	arguing	for	such	a	role	for	scientists,	 many	 intellectuals	 and	 scientists	 of	 the	 1880s	 criticized	 this	 new	“priesthood”	for	its	failure	as	science.246	Unus	de	multis,	though	careful	to	point	out	that	he	was	not	 against	 science	 in	 general,	 as	well	 as	not	 an	advocate	of	 religious	thought,	was	very	concerned	with	the	intellectual	trend	he	saw	among	the	populace	toward	 scientific	 dogmatism	 and	 doctrine	 and	 satirically	 referred	 to	 various	scientists	and	 intellectuals	as	 “modern	prophets”	and	“High	Priests.”247	Gobry,	 too,	criticized	scientific	ideology	in	the	form	of	scientists	as	“high	priests.”248	Wertheim	observed	an	overconfidence	of	scientists	in	that	“they	see	themselves	as	some	sort	of	
																																																						241	Quoted	in	Turner	(1978),	367.	242	Quoted	in	Turner	(1978),	359.	The	charismatic	view	of	science	is	explored	in	some	scholarly	works.	E.g.,	Ben-David	(1991);	and	Merton	(1970	[1938]).	243	MacLeod	(2000),	x.	244	MacLeod	(1982),	4.	245	Lessl	(1996),	380	and	382.	See	also	Lessl	(1989).	246	 See	MacLeod	 (1982),	 passim	 for	 several	 examples	 of	 advocates	 and	 critics	 of	 the	 scientific	 and	scientistic	priesthood	during	this	time	period.	247	Unus	de	multis	(1877),	273–292.	248	Gobry	(2014).		
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priesthood	 in	 their	own	right.”249	Others	have	spoken	of	 this	 “new	 ‘priesthood’”	as	well	and	have	argued	that	many	accept	scientism	or	the	ideology	of	science	“not	as	simply	ordinary	science	but	as	something	that	replaces	religion.”250	Frank	J.	Tipler,	Casper	Hakfoort,	and	Midgley	agreed	that	in	such	formulations	“Man	the	Scientist	is	becoming	the	Supreme	Being,”	which	in	turn	is	described	as	“certainly	metaphysical	[…]	and	not	scientific,”	reflecting	mutual	exclusivity	in	the	reduction	of	scientism	to	signifiers	of	religion.251		 Another	way	this	discourse	on	the	religious	profession	of	science	manifests	is	via	the	idolization	of	scientists	and	the	blind	appeal	to	their	authority.	As	Wesley	Jay	Smith	put	it,	“The	scientism	faithful	presume	that	all	of	us	non	scientists	[sic]	should	bow	down	before	 the	 scientific	 consensus.”252	Similarly,	others	attribute	 scientism	with	“uncritical	adherence.”253	Susan	Haack	referred	to	scientism	as	“an	exaggerated	kind	of	deference	towards	science,	an	excessive	readiness	to	accept	as	authoritative	any	claim	made	by	 the	sciences.”254	Scientism	 is	often	defined	by	an	expression	of	excessive	 faith	 or	 exaggerated	 trust	 in	 science.255	 In	 a	 discussion	 about	 the	misconceptions	of	‘science,’	Gobry	stated,	“when	people	say	‘science,’	what	they	really	mean	 is	magic	or	 truth.”	 Gobry	 argued	most	 people	would	 understand	 science	 as	“something	 that	 cannot	 possibly	 be	 understood	 by	 mere	 mortals.	 It	 delivers	wonders.”	And,	reflecting	the	assumptions	of	mutual	exclusivity,	this	‘science’	is	said	to	be	“the	exact	opposite	of	what	modern	science	actually	is.”	Gobry	also	described	a	tendency	to	endow	scientists	with	“magical	powers,”	a	theme	that	has	been	picked	up	by	 sociologists	 as	well	 in	 reference	 to	 technology.256	Robert	Montenegro	 similarly	complained	that	scientists	are	treated	as	“wizards,”	while	the	ability	of	scientists	to	advance	 society	has	 been	described	 elsewhere	 as	 the	 “sprinkling	 of	magic	 dust	 of	
																																																						249	Wertheim	(1995),	249–250	and	passim.	Emphasis	original.	250	Chittick	(2007),	30;	and	Wertheim	(1995),	249–250	and	passim.	Lapp	(1965)	also	spoke	of	science	as	 the	 ‘new	 priesthood,’	 the	 title	 of	 his	 work,	 however	 the	 focus	 is	 more	 on	 science’s	 political	relationship	to	society	and	not	the	construction	of	science	as	a	religion	per	se.	251	Hakfoort	(1995),	389.	See	also	Midgley	(1992),	199;	and	Tipler	(1994).	252	Smith	(2012).	253	Hughes	(2012).	254	Haack	(2003),	17–18.	255	Simpson	(2016i);	and	Mish	(2004).	256	Gobry	(2014).	Emphasis	original.	See	also	Stahl	et	al	(2002),	117–132.	
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the	believers	in	witchcraft	and	all	this	‘supernatural,’	are	now	turning	to	be	caught	in	the	toils	of	scientific	charlantry	[sic].		A	 century	 later,	 the	 same	 worries	 are	 echoed	 as	 educators	 called	 for	 a	 critical	approach	 to	 scientific	 understanding,	 without	 which	 “we	 are	 facing	 a	 new	 age	 of	superstition	and	a	new	priesthood	in	which	science	is	taking	the	place	of	the	older	dogmas.”262		 In	fact,	scientists	and	popularizers	at	one	time	spoke	openly	of	“converting”	people,	particularly	since	the	rise	of	Darwinism.263	With	this	proselytizing	activity,	science	is	often	thought	to	be	negated	and	only	religion	remains	as	the	framework	of	interpretation.	For	example,	Stenmark	argued	scientistics	are	facing	a	dilemma:		
[E]ither	 scientific	 naturalists	 [equated	with	 religion]	maintain	 that	what	 they	 are	 doing	 is	science	but	then	have	to	give	up	their	missionary	activities	or	their	naturalism	and	become	merely	scientists,	or	scientific	naturalists	keep	their	naturalism	but	then	have	to	admit	that	they	are	not	doing	science	anymore.264		In	other	words,	 the	choice	 is	 the	classical	choice	of	mutual	exclusivity—either	 it	 is	religion	or	it	is	science,	since	science	is	understood	as	‘not	religion’	after	all.	The	result	is	that	religion-like	science	is	constructed	as	just	religion.			












‘religion’	is	still	‘religious.’	Those	who	religionize	science	point	to	this	reductionism	and	other	philosophical	assumptions	as	evidence	that	science	is	reducibly	religious	and	question	whether	this	‘science’	is	still	‘scientific.’	The	major	difference	between	scientification	 and	 religionization	 is	 where	 the	 ‘work’	 is	 being	 done—on	 what	constitutes	‘religion’	or	on	what	constitutes	‘science.’			 Despite	the	significance	of	this	difference,	the	linkage	between	these	relational	constructs	 is	 also	 important.	 If	 there	 did	 not	 exist	 the	 attempt	 to	 scientificate	 all	worldviews,	 including	 religion,	 then	 there	 likely	 would	 be	 little	 to	 no	 impetus	 to	religionize	science,	since	the	religionization	of	science	was	largely	a	critique	of	the	expansionism	 and	 reductionism	 of	 science	 involved	 in	 scientification.	 (Though	certainly	religion-science	likening	would	still	occur.)	It	is	this	particular	worldview	that	makes	science	‘guilty’	of	being	reducibly	religious.	Indeed,	the	scientification	of	religion	 primes	 religion	 for	 replacement	 by	 scientific	 religious	 philosophies	 of	materialism,	 naturalism,	 humanism,	 and/or	 scientism.	 This	 makes	 sense	 since	religion	as	natural,	physical,	explicable,	etc.	allows	science	to	replace	it	as	part	of	its	conceptual	domain.	Put	differently,	 religion	and	science	must	have	some	points	of	commonality	to	be	in	competition.	Furthermore,	as	the	significance	of	religion	was	stripped	away	by	scientification	(see	Chapter	Four),	the	remaining	meaning	was	left	in	the	domain	of	science,	creating	a	new	conceptual	space	for	science	as	an	ultimate	framework.		 From	a	relational	perspective,	this	is	what	is	to	be	expected.	Ever	since	religion	and	science	were	defined	relative	to	one	another,	it	created	a	situation	in	which	any	redefinitions	 or	 reevaluations	 of	 the	 terms	 circle	 back	 around.	 Since	 religion	 and	science	 are	 conceptualized	 in	 relative	 perspective,	 changes	 to	 one	 term	 result	 in	changes	to	the	other,	which	then	changes	the	original	term	in	question.	Not	only	do	we	 see	 the	 relational	 structure	 in	 this	 reciprocity,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 these	redefinitions	ultimately	reinforce	the	mutual	exclusivity	they	sought	to	violate.	This	is	because	problematizing	 the	 religion-science	dichotomy	 through	notions	 like	 the	scientification	 of	 religion	 and	 the	 religionization	 of	 science	 still	 cling	 to	 that	dichotomy	 in	 their	 reductive	 explanations	 that	 only	 allow	 for	 one	 or	 the	 other	mutually	 exclusive	 frameworks	 of	 meaning.	 Using	 the	 signifiers	 of	 ‘religion’	 and	
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science	 was	 immediately	 followed	 by	 criticisms	 of	 this	 failed	 religion,	 along	with	accusations	of	scientific	impiety,	leading	to	unprecedented	critiques	of	the	scientific	worldview	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	By	the	1860s,	a	religion	of	science	 reformation	 of	 sorts	 was	 already	 developing,	 attempting	 to	 address	 the	problems	that	had	been	raised	against	thinkers	like	Henri	Saint-Simon	(1760–1825)	and	Auguste	Comte	(1798–1857).	This	reformation	constitutes	the	case	study	of	this	chapter,	with	a	focus	on	how	the	religion-science	relation	in	this	context	developed	in	relative	perspective	to	the	other	relational	constructs	discussed.	The	 religion	 of	 science	 reformation	 was	 largely	 a	 disenchantment	 with	religionized	 science	 and	 its	 failure	 to	 uphold	 ‘true’	 science	 (see	 Chapter	 Five).	However,	 this	 movement	 also	 targeted	 the	 scientification	 of	 religion,	 with	 its	delegitimization	of	religion	(see	Chapter	Four).	As	religion	was	explained	away	with	a	naturalist	account,	scientificated	religion	was	not	thought	to	be	genuine	religion.	With	science	constructed	as	religion	and	religion	constructed	as	science,	there	was	an	intellectual	 void	 and	 spiritual	 vacuum	 that	 were	 increasingly	 understood	 as	intimately	 related.	 That	 relation	 was	 religion-science	 opposition.	 The	 problems	associated	with	the	first	wave	of	religions	of	science	were	typically	thought	to	have	originated	with	this	‘misconception’	of	the	religion-science	relationship.	The	problem	of	 reduction	was	 traced	 to	 presumptions	 of	mutual	 exclusion	 and	many	 began	 to	address	 the	 issues	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity	 directly,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 rethink	 the	conceptualization	of	the	religion-science	relation.	In	response,	there	was	a	call	for	a	reformation,	resulting	in	the	development	of	various	religious	sciences	and	scientific	religions	 that	 were	 framed	 as	 alternatives	 to	 the	 reductively	 constructed	relationships	of	the	past.	Scientification	and	religionization	were	used	as	foils	in	the	demarcation	 of	 a	 new	 ‘religion	 of	 science.’	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 case	studies,	this	once	again	demonstrates	a	relational	‘conversation’	that	structures	the	discursive	 changes	 of	 religion	 and	 science.	 The	 religions	 of	 science	 were	conceptualized	and	articulated	in	contrast	to	reductive	and	exclusive	understandings	of	religion	and	science,	with	the	goal	to	embody	the	virtues	without	the	vices,	and,	above	all,	to	be	‘true’	to	both	religion	and	science.		
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According	to	the	findings	of	Chapter	Three,	the	nineteenth	century	was	also	a	key	time	for	crystallization	of	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct.	Alongside	the	growing	perception	of	antagonism	between	religion	and	science	was	a	budding	articulation	of	alternatives.	In	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	what	form	those	alternatives	would	take	was	still	unclear,	though	there	were	clearly	optimistic	expectations.	“Hope	reclines	on	her	 anchor	wistfully	 looking	 forward	 to	 the	period	when	Religion	and	Science	shall	make	all	men	brothers,”	as	one	mid-nineteenth	century	author	put	it.6	By	 1940,	 the	 common	 sentiment	 had	 appeared	 that	 religion	 and	 science	 are	 “not	mutually	 exclusive	but	mutually	 complementary,”	 as	American	 theologian	Edgar	 J.	Goodspeed	(1871–1962)	declared.7	It	was	this	relational	construction	of	religion	and	science—as	 ‘not	 mutually	 exclusive’—that	 became	 the	 central	 point	 for	 the	articulation	of	the	new	religions	of	science.		Religion	 and	 science	 as	 ‘not	 mutually	 exclusive’	 is	 what	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 the	‘inclusivity	construct.’	Constructed	in	specific	contrast	to	the	dichotomous	construct	of	mutual	exclusivity,	this	is	a	non-oppositional	relation.	In	the	previous	two	chapters,	we	 saw	 that	 the	notion	of	mutual	 exclusivity	 structured	 the	discourse	even	 in	 the	cases	of	which	alternatives	to	the	religion-science	dichotomy	were	proposed.	In	this	and	the	following	two	chapters,	I	will	explore	case	studies	exemplifying	perspectives	on	the	religion-science	relation	that	do	not	‘play	by	the	rules’	of	mutual	exclusivity—or	only	do	so	in	so	far	as	is	needed	to	break	those	rules.	The	argument	that	religion	and	 science	 are	 ‘not	mutually	 exclusive’	 has	 been	 in	 circulation	 since	 the	mutual	exclusivity	construct.	Inclusivity	and	exclusivity	mutually	defined	one	another	both	conceptually	and	historically.	Ideas	of	inclusivity	range	from	harmony	to	integration	to	critical	complementarity.8	No	matter	what	relationship	is	advanced	however,	the	
																																																						6	Anon.	(1847).	7	Goodspeed	(1940),	132–133.	8	 E.g.,	 some	 frame	 ‘integration’	 and	 ‘harmony’	 as	 assimilating	 worldviews	 to	 conform	 to	religious/scientific	 dogmas,	 while	 a	 critical	 approach	 attempts	 to	 make	 careful	 and	 discerning	judgment	about	the	content.	See,	e.g.,	Küng	(2005),	41.	Some	other	examples	that	aim—with	various	degrees	of	success—for	a	critical	approach	to	complementarity	are	Wilber	(1998);	and	Jones	(2008).	
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underlying	 relational	 construct	 is	 the	 same:	 religion	 and	 science	 are	 not	 in	opposition.9			 As	the	opposite	of	mutual	exclusivity,	inclusivity	can	be	constructed	in	any	way	that	 negates	 mutual	 exclusivity.	 The	 rejection	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity	 is	 commonly	approached	in	at	least	four	different	ways	of	which	I	will	devote	separate	sections	to.	The	first	way	religion	and	science	are	constructed	as	inclusive	relative	to	one	another	is	 by	 positioning	 the	 two,	 in	 a	 very	 straightforward	 manner,	 as	 ‘not	 mutually	exclusive.’	This	exact	phrase	is	employed	in	(at	least)	hundreds	of	print	publications	and	in	over	twenty	thousand	electronic	publications,	often	used	to	argue	in	favor	of	somehow	 likening	 religion	and	 science.	Others	 refer	 to	 a	 rejection	of	 an	 either/or	relationship	between	religion	and	science,	which	boils	down	to	the	forced	choice	of	mutual	 exclusivity.	 Though	 I	 will	 discuss	 ‘exclusivity	 negated’	 separately	 in	 the	following	section,	we	will	also	see	this	argument	appear	in	the	remaining	ways	that	inclusivity	is	constructed.		 A	 second	 argument	 for	 the	 non-opposition	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 is	 by	rejecting	the	validity	of	reductionism	in	the	case	of	 likening	religion	and	science.10	This	is	effective	because	the	reductionism	of	scientification	and	religionization	rely	on	mutual	exclusivity	in	their	justification	for	subsuming	the	explanation	under	one	framework	of	meaning	to	the	exclusion	of	the	other.	If	religion	is	likened	to	science	or	science	is	likened	to	religion,	but	the	one	is	not	reduced	to	the	other,	then	the	shared	signifiers	 cannot	be	oppositional.	A	 third	way	of	negating	mutual	 exclusivity	 is	by	arguing	the	religion	and	science	(or	signifiers	of	religion	and	science)	that	oppose	one	another	are	not	‘really’	religion	and	science—they	are	not	‘true,’	‘good,’	or	‘genuine.’	A	fourth	way	of	negating	mutual	exclusivity	is	by	rejecting	the	relational	content	of	those	 signifiers	 so	 that	 the	 opposition	 of	 dichotomies	 is	 reframed	 as	 a	
																																																						9	In	it	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	inclusivity	is	not	some	sort	of	a	‘true	union,’	which	could	only	be	constructed	relative	to	some	‘false	disjunction’	anyway,	thereby	ever	failing	to	really	be	a	union	at	all.	Rather	inclusivity	continues	to	display	relational	modes	of	mutual	conceptualization.	Inclusivity	is	constructed	relative	to	mutual	exclusivity,	putting	the	two	in	mutual	opposition.	10	The	rejection	of	reductionism	alone	is	not	necessarily	an	argument	for	inclusivity,	as	one	could	reject	reductionism	on	the	grounds	of	mutual	exclusivity,	like	in	Gould’s	NOMA,	suggesting	that	reductionism	is	 not	 possible	 because	 religion	 and	 science	 do	 not	 overlap.	 However,	 it	 can	 be	 an	 argument	 for	inclusivity	when	the	rejection	of	reductionism	is	 in	the	context	of	 likening	religion	and	science.	See	Gould	(1997).	
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complementarity.	All	of	these	methods	for	constructing	inclusivity	will	be	explored	and	explained	in	much	more	detail	throughout	this	chapter.		 To	 demonstrate,	 I	 examine	 the	 case	 of	 the	 religions	 of	 science	 that	 were	articulated	 in	 specific	 contrast	 to	 notions	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity	 and	 reduction,	especially	 responding	 to	 religionized	 science.	 In	 its	 display	 of	 the	 mutual	conceptualization	 of	 these	 relational	 constructs,	 this	 case	 again	 illustrates	 how	relational	 constructs	 are	 constructed	 relative	 to	 one	 another	 and	 how	 relational	constructs	 structure	 discursive	 change.	 Publications	 on	 the	 “religion	 of	 science”	appear	regularly	from	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century	on,	with	perhaps	at	most	a	couple	 of	 dozen	 a	 decade,	 until	 around	 the	 1860s	 when	 we	 see	 hundreds	 of	publications	 emerge	 per	 decade.	 There	 was	 a	 sharp	 increase	 in	 the	 1890s,	 when	approximately	two	thousand	publications	employ	the	phrase,	representing	a	critical	point	in	which	this	trend	carried	on	until	a	decline	following	the	1940s.11	Because	of	this,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	the	religion	of	science	reformation	followed	the	formation	of	 the	religionization	construct,	 I	 focus	on	the	time	period	from	approximately	the	1860s	to	1940s.		 The	 phrase	 ‘religion	 of	 science’	 has	 been	 employed	 to	 refer	 to	 all	 sorts	 of	disparate	 traditions.12	 One	 common	 way	 it	 has	 been	 used	 is	 to	 refer	 to	 science	reduced	 to	 religion,	 as	we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	Here,	 however,	 I	 examine	when	 this	 terminology	 is	 used	 in	 an	 inclusive	way,	 setting	 the	parameters	 for	 the	analysis.	When	we	look	at	the	historical	material	from	the	advent	of	this	phrase,	it	has	been	most	commonly	used	in	the	primary	material	in	this	manner,	though	later	most	commonly	analyzed	in	the	secondary	literature	in	terms	of	reduction.	The	tendency	of	scholars	to	analyze	religions	of	science	as	reductively	religious	is	mistaken.	From	a	historiographical	 perspective,	 we	 must	 take	 seriously	 how	 the	 historical	 actors	
																																																						11	 Some	 early	 examples	 of	 the	 use	 of	 this	 phrase	 include	 H.	 [anon.]	 (1832);	 Stamm	 (1860a);	 and	Blanchard	(1860).	In	the	case	of	the	anonymous	H.’s	publication,	the	phrase	is	used	to	refer	to	how	science	can	support	religious	worldviews,	like	design.	However,	in	the	other	examples,	the	“religion	of	science”	refers	more	directly	to	science	as	religion.	The	number	of	publications	cited	was	arrived	at	from	first-hand	research,	cross-referencing	results	in	HathiTrust,	WorldCat,	and	Google.	12	 For	 a	 typology	 of	 religions	 of	 science	 in	 Victorian	 Britain,	 see	 Moore	 (1988),	 383–467.	 This	observation	was	also	based	on	first-hand	research,	in	which	I	examined	the	use	of	this	exact	phrase	in	publications	from	this	time.	
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described	 their	 own	activities	 and	 to	 “reconstruct	 that	 activity	with	 the	 extension,	boundaries,	aims,	typical	products—in	short	with	the	‘wholeness’—that	that	activity	had	for	its	practitioners,”	as	Andrew	Cunningham	pointed	out.13	Religionized	science	certainly	does	not	account	for	all	understandings	of	religions	of	science.	Those	who	have	 thought	of	 the	 ‘religion	of	 science’	as	 inclusive	are	numerous	and	significant.	Before	turning	to	this	movement,	however,	I	will	discuss	the	wider	context	of	which	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	was	being	challenged.		












educators	 in	 Washington	 DC.25	 The	 manifesto’s	 chief	 proponent	 was	 the	 leading	scientist,	Nobel	Prize	winner	 in	physics,	and	religion-science	 inclusivity	proponent	Robert	 A.	 Millikan	 (1868–1953),	 an	 exceedingly	 influential	 public	 figure.26	 In	 a	semiformal,	preliminary	statement,	Millikan	announced	the	aim	of	the	manifesto	to	be	as	 follows:	 “To	assist	 in	 correcting	 two	erroneous	 impressions	 that	 seem	 to	be	current	among	certain	groups	of	persons.	The	first	is	that	religion	to-day	stands	for	medieval	 theology;	 the	 second	 that	 science	 is	 materialistic	 and	 irreligious.”27	Conceding	materialism	meant	to	“abandon	all	further	opposition	to	religion	as	such,”	meaning	 materialism	 was	 conceived	 in	 opposition	 to	 religion,	 while	 also	 being	disassociated	with	science.	By	leaving	materialism	behind,	an	inclusive	relationship	could	be	formed.	The	clericals,	 in	turn,	agreed	to	“modernize”	their	faith	and	leave	behind	the	most	dated	aspects.28	For	Millikan:	[S]cience,	 imbued	with	 the	 spirit	 of	 service,	 which	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 religion,	 and	 religion	guided	by	the	intelligence,	the	intellectual	honesty,	and	the	objectiveness,	which	is	the	essence	of	 science,	 can	 between	 them	without	 a	 shadow	 of	 a	 doubt	 […]	 transform	 this	world	 in	 a	generation.29		Millikan	repeatedly	argued	for	a	“complete	lack	of	antagonism	between	the	fields	of	science	and	religion”	and	claimed	that	the	top	dozen	scientists	in	America	did	not	see	a	conflict	either.	Furthermore,	many	even	supported	religious	positions	and	provided	their	testimonials	to	Millikan.30	Millikan,	with	an	eye	to	the	future,	claimed	that	“the	




	 The	idea	that	religion	and	science	are	not	mutually	exclusive	was	a	cause	taken	up	by	the	religion	of	science	reformers	as	well.	In	fact,	the	foundation	of	the	entire	movement	 was	 challenging	 the	 relational	 content	 of	 the	 concepts	 ‘religion’	 and	‘science.’	And	the	success	of	the	inclusivity	construct	can	be	attributed,	to	a	significant	degree,	to	this	reformation.	Before	turning	to	the	additional	modes	of	constructing	inclusivity,	I	will	further	introduce	this	movement.		





Science	(1895),	identified	a	cultural	turn	toward	integration:	The	rising	flood	of	pamphlets	and	books	published	on	this	subject,	demonstrates	that	such	a	natural	union	of	faith	and	knowledge,	such	a	reasonable	reconciliation	of	the	feelings	and	the	reason,	are	daily	becoming	a	more	pressing	necessity	for	the	educated	classes.36	Haeckel	 and	Ostwald	 agreed	 that	monism	 could	provide	 the	needed	 link	 between	religion	 and	 science.37	 Ostwald,	 similar	 to	 Haeckel,	 saw	 in	 his	 time	 a	 distinct	movement,	though	he	differed	in	referring	to	it	as	“scientific	mysticism”	(discussed	in	regard	to	physics	in	Chapter	Eight).	Ostwald	identified	this	intellectual	trend	in	the	revival	of	 the	study	of	Paracelsus	 (1493–1541)	 in	Germany;	 the	study	of	Emanuel	Swedenborg	(1688–1772)	in	England;	in	the	French	series	Bibliothèque	des	sciences	
maudites	(1907);	the	“mystical	physic-chemist”	of	August	Strindberg	(1849–1912);	and	in	the	new	commentaries	on	and	the	new	movements	inspired	by	philosopher	Friedrich	Wilhelm	Joseph	Schelling	(1775–1854).38		 Paul	Carus	(1852–1919),	who	was	a	major	figure	and	a	prolific	writer	involved	in	this	movement,	similarly	predicted	in	1892	that	“the	Religion	of	Science	is	bound	to	be	the	religion	of	the	future.”39	However,	by	the	end	of	that	century	he	announced	the	 “Dawn	 of	 a	New	Religious	 Era”	 had	 arrived,	 one	 in	which	 science	 formed	 the	intellectual	 basis	 of	 religion.40	 English	 sociologist	 Beatrice	 Webb	 (1858–1943)	likewise	noted	that	the	“religion	of	science”	was	already	ubiquitous	and	powerful	in	late	nineteenth-century	England.41	This	is	empirically	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	late	nineteenth	century	saw	an	unprecedented	number	of	books	and	articles	emerge	with	 the	 title	The	 Religion	 of	 Science,	 ranging	 from	 the	 critical	 to	 the	 charitable.42	
																																																						35	Holton	(2005),	10.	36	Haeckel	(1895),	vii.	37	Haeckel	(1895),	vii–viii;	and	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	80.	38	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	81–82.	See	also	ibid.,	80–87.	Ostwald’s	relational	construction	of	religion	and	science	is	ambiguous,	as	it	is	unclear	if	his	intent	was	to	reductively	replace	or,	instead,	renew	religion.	In	many	cases,	both	seem	to	be	operative.	39	[Carus]	P.	C.	(1892),	606.	40	Carus	(1916).	Quoted	from	the	title,	discussed	passim.	See	also	ibid.,	v–vii.	An	older	edition	of	this	work	is	dated	at	1899,	however	it	includes	a	lot	less	essays.		41	 Webb	 (1926),	 81	 and	 87.	 Webb	 also	 claimed	 that	 many	 of	 her	 contemporaries	 had	 replaced	Christianity	with	a	“religion	of	science.”	See	Edwards	(2009),	214.	See	also	ibid.,	90	and	94.		42	See,	e.g.,	Tuttle	(1872);	Kuklos	[John	Harris]	(1878);	Brown	(1882);	[Carus]	P.	C.	(1892);	[Carus]	Editor	 (1893a);	 and	Carus	 (1896	 [1893]).	Other	works	 do	not	 employ	 this	 exact	wording,	 but	 use	
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There	was	also	a	growing	public	awareness	of	the	religions	of	science,	even	featuring	in	 an	 annual	 address	 at	 a	 statewide	 educational	 convention	 in	 Ohio	 in	 1881	 and	appearing	as	a	topic	in	university	coursework	by	at	least	the	mid-twentieth	century.43		 		 Following	 the	 1890s,	 this	 phrase	 has	 appeared	 regularly	 in	 the	 relevant	discourse	 and	 has	 become	 mainstream	 relative	 to	 its	 earlier	 level	 of	 presence,	particularly	in	the	early	vigor	and	prosperity	of	quantum	physics,	as	will	be	discussed	extensively	 in	 Chapter	 Eight.	 Though	 these	works	were	making	 it	 to	 the	 press,	 it	seems	 that	 most	 of	 the	 authors	 only	 felt	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 religion	 of	 science	 to	 be	ubiquitous	 in	society	beginning	in	the	twentieth	century.	This	 is	due	in	part	to	the	social	and	historical	situation	of	the	early	twentieth	century,	which	greatly	impacted	the	general	populace’s	perceptions	on	religion	and	science.	With	the	onset	of	World	War	 I	 (1914–1918),	 faith	 in	 science	 sharply	 waned	 in	 some	 circles	 and	 criticism	ensued	 as	 the	 destructive	 potential	 of	 science	 and	 technology	 became	 ever	more	apparent.44	With	both	religion	and	science	on	the	outs	in	various	ways	(refer	to	the	previous	 two	chapters),	 there	was	an	atmosphere	of	 “general	agreement”	 that	 the	Western	world	was	“on	the	verge	of	a	spiritual	rebirth.”	And	this	rebirth	was	one	that	would	make	room	for	both	religion	and	science.	Cary	F.	Baynes	(1883–1977)	noted	that	during	the	interwar	period	there	was	an	increasing	recognition	that	“a	religious	
																																																						similar	 ideas.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Strauss	 (1873)	described	a	 ‘new	 faith’	 grounded	 in	 science	 and	 technology;	Graham	(1881)	spoke	of	a	“creed	of	science,”	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter;	and	Oliphant	(1888)	depicted	a	“scientific	religion.”	Of	these	publications	employing	the	phrase	“religion	of	science,”	most	are	 in	English	 (although	 there	 are	many	 in	German	and	French	 as	well	 and	 there	 are	publications	employing	this	phrase	in	at	least	twenty-eight	languages).	Though	this	phrase	only	regularly	appears	in	the	late	nineteenth	century,	according	to	my	research,	the	idea	was	in	circulation	already,	as	several	publications	refer	to	a	“religion	of	science”	as	not	an	innovative	term,	but	rather	as	an	existing	idea,	and	one	of	which	we	already	saw	developing	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	thought	of	Saint-Simon	and	Comte.	43	 House	 of	 Representatives	 (1882),	 208–209.	 On	 university	 coursework,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Union	 College	(1940),	56.	44	 In	Chapter	Five,	 I	discuss	how	World	War	 I	 led	many	 to	put	more	 faith	 in	 science.	Both	of	 these	depictions	 are	 found	 in	 the	 relevant	 literature	 and	were	 instrumental	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 these	different	relations.	Historically	speaking,	both	portrayals	are	likely	correct	to	some	extent,	considering	both	 have	 support	 in	 the	 source	 material	 provided.	 However,	 the	 different	 depictions	 are	 also	discursively	interesting,	as	they	exhibit	how	history	is	constructed	to	fit	particular	understandings	of	the	religion-science	relation.	
Inclusivity	
	 216	
attitude	to	life	is	as	essential	[…]	as	a	belief	in	the	authenticity	of	science.”45	Historian	H.	V.	Routh	(1878–1951)	summed	it	up	nicely:	Having	 resigned	 his	 traditional	 religion	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 science,	 and	 then	 having	discarded	 the	materialism	of	 science	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 experience	 (especially	 inward	experience),	he	is	now	looking	for	a	new	spirituality	which	be	authorised	by	science	and	yet	contain	a	religious	value.46	This	illuminates	the	relation	between	scientification,	religionization,	and	inclusivity,	with	the	latter	emerging	in	response	to	the	failures	of	other	two.			 In	 1921,	 biologist	 Edwin	 Grant	 Conklin	 (1863–1952)	 (who	 later	 served	 as	president	of	the	AAAS)	stated	we	are	“in	the	midst	of	a	religious	revolution”	involving	“great	changes	in	the	attitude	of	the	churches	on	the	questions	of	faith	and	science.”	Conklin	 continued,	 “The	 spirit	 of	 science	 has	 entered	 into	 religion.	 This	 spirit	demands	not	uniformity	of	belief	but	uniformity	of	aim,	not	absolute	and	perfect	truth	but	best	available	 truth,	not	authority	but	evidence,	not	words	but	works.”	 In	 this	discussion,	Conklin	questioned	whether	this	“religion	of	science”—which	he	saw	as	already	realized	in	society—can	be	incorporated	into	the	organized	religions	of	the	world.	A	positive	answer	to	this	question	was	on	the	rise,	and	at	the	time	of	its	full	realization	“religion	and	science	will	be	at	one,”	Conklin	claimed.47		William	Hamilton	Wood	(b.	1874),	who	authored	a	book	under	the	very	title	
The	Religion	of	Science	(1922),	declared	 the	“concrete	 fact	 faces	us	 that	 there	 is	at	present	a	definite,	 clearly	outlined	and	 rounded-out	 religion	of	 science.”	Thus,	 the	“age	 of	 the	 religion	 of	 science”	 ensued,	 reflected	 in	 the	 continuing	 wave	 of	publications	 on	 the	 topic.48	 Astrophysicist	 Arthur	 Eddington	 (1882–1944)	 saw	related	developments.	He	claimed,	 “religion	 first	became	possible	 for	a	reasonable	
																																																						45	Baynes	(1933),	vii–viii.	See	also	Turner	(1974),	247.	46	Routh	(1937),	369.	47	Conklin	(1922	[1921]),	242–244.	48	Wood	(1922),	4,	7,	and	15.	Wood	also	referred	to	a	“Professor	Crampton”	who	was	also	suggested	to	support	a	religion	of	science.	Presumably,	he	was	referring	to	Henry	Edward	Crampton	(1875–1956),	who	 did	 show	 some	 tendencies	 toward	 a	 scientifically	 informed	 religion,	 on	which	 see	 Crampton	(1912),	306–307.	See	also	Vaughan	(1902);	Aiya	(1910);	Lee	(1912);	and	Wroughton	(1918),	the	latter	of	 which	 includes	 a	 writing	 style	 that	 in	many	ways	mimics	 sacred	 texts,	 replete	with	 revelation,	religious	icons,	tenets	of	belief	and	practice,	and	a	path	to	salvation.	See	also	Burtt	(1939),	167–196;	Unger	(1976);	Peck	(2002	[1978]),	193–197;	and	Jastrow	(1992),	103–108.	
Inclusivity	
	 217	




“unique	 religious	 value,”	 the	 religion-science	 relationship	 is	 potentially	 one	 of	constructive,	mutually	reinforcing	harmony.52		The	 problems	 science	 presented	 for	 society	 became	 even	 more	 painfully	evident	to	many	with	the	events	of	World	War	II	(1939–1945)	and	the	atom	bomb.	The	problems	of	science	were	increasingly	understood	to	involve	widespread	social	concerns.	 This	 contributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 common	 interest	 in	 the	reconciliation	of	science	and	religion	among	a	substantial	portion	of	the	intellectual	and	academic	 community,	 though	again	 there	were	deep	divisions	about	how	 this	should	be	accomplished.53	Nonetheless,	by	the	1940s,	some	saw	the	“Faith	of	Science”	to	be	one	of	the	pillars	of	democracy	and	the	“fervor	of	a	new	religion	[of	science]”	“the	world	over.”54	The	religion	of	science	had	finally	gained	a	degree	of	popularity	far	exceeding	the	reach	of	Saint-Simonism	and	Comtian	religion.	Yet,	 following	the	1940s,	discourse	on	the	“religion	of	science”	sharply	declined.	On	the	one	hand,	the	movement	was	 short	 lived.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 did	 have	 lasting	 influence	 in	 its	reformation	of	the	religion-science	relation	as	one	of	inclusivity.	The	legacy	of	these	religions	 of	 science	 lived	 on	 as	 the	 presumptions	 of	 inclusivity	 structured	 the	formation	 of	 quantum	 mysticism	 and	 scientific	 Buddhism	 that	 were	 on	 the	 rise	around	the	same	time	period,	as	discussed	in	the	following	two	chapters.		As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 religions	 of	 science	 were	 developing	 and	 becoming	popular	in	a	context	of	challenging	mutual	exclusivity,	by	framing	religion	and	science	as	non-oppositional	or	inclusive.	I	will	now	turn	to	how	advocates	of	the	religions	of	science	 understood	 their	 movement	 as	 reformational,	 constructing	 these	 new	
																																																						52	 Burtt	 (1939),	 169,	 171,	 190–191,	 and	 194.	 Burtt	 compared	 this	 religion	 of	 science	 to	 a	 kind	 of	humanism	which	also	“gives	a	distinctive	religious	value	to	scientific	knowledge	and	 love	of	 truth.”	Between	the	religion	of	science	and	humanism	at	his	 time,	Burtt	saw	“no	clear	borderline	between	[them].”	See	ibid.,	193	n.24.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	humanism	has	often	been	constructed	as	a	religion	of	science,	though	oftentimes	in	a	reductive	manner,	which	is	clearly	not	what	Burtt	had	in	mind	here.	53	Gilbert	(1997),	278.	On	the	impact	of	the	World	Wars	regarding	the	perception	of	science,	see	also	Appleyard	 (2004),	 110–137.	The	 reconciliation	of	 religion	 and	 science	was	not	 restricted	 to	North	America	and	Europe,	but	was	also	a	movement	in	Asia,	as	will	be	discussed	further	in	Chapter	Seven.	54	 Goodspeed	 (1940),	 23.	 On	 the	 influential	 movement	 to	 reconcile	 religion	 and	 science	 in	 early	twentieth-century	Britain,	see	Bowler	(2001).	
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religions	 in	 contrast	 to	 previous	 religions	 of	 science,	 via	 the	 final	 three	modes	 of	constructing	inclusivity	as	mentioned	in	the	introductory	remarks	of	this	chapter.		
4 The	Religion	of	Science	as	‘Not	Reductive’		The	framing	of	religions	of	science	as	reforms	was	a	common	theme	in	the	nineteenth	century	and	has	been	identified	as	one	of	the	major	forms	of	religions	of	science	in	Victorian	Britain,	 for	 instance.	 It	 can	be	seen	as	a	common	discussion	point	 in	 the	relevant	literature	in	an	even	wider	geographical,	as	well	as	temporal,	context.55	The	spokespeople	 for	 a	 religion	 of	 science	 understood	 their	 work	 as	 reformational,	oftentimes	 with	 the	 reformation	 relative	 to	 previous	 religions	 of	 science,	 as	mentioned.	At	the	same	time,	there	was	the	sense	of	a	broader	reformation	as	well.	In	Britain,	 for	 example,	 those	 advocating	 religions	 of	 science	 sought	 to	 place	 their	movement	in	a	historical	tradition.	They	drew	from	the	English,	Scottish,	and	Puritan	reformations,	which	provided	them	with	a	context	of	new	religious	and	intellectual	liberties.	 Thus	 a	 ‘new’	 or	 ‘second’	 reformation	 sometimes	 became	 the	 point	 of	reference	as	well,	in	the	tradition	of	religious	reformations	in	the	West.56	And,	more	generally,	throughout	the	history	of	science,	religions	have	adapted	to	the	scientific	outlook	and	argued	for	conciliation	in	various	ways,	which	have	also	been	interpreted	as	 ‘reformations.’57	 Furthermore,	 from	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 to	 the	 present	 day,	Comtian	religion	and	scientism	have	served	as	contrast	cases	for	articulating	new	and	improved	religions	of	science.	The	 religions	 of	 science	 that	 formed	 between	 the	 1860s	 and	 1940s	 were	preoccupied	with	addressing	the	failures	of	previous	religions	that	took	science	as	its	basis.	We	have	already	seen	that	part	of	the	problem	was	identified	as	religion-science	mutual	 exclusivity.	 Those	 failures	 were	 also	 associated	 with	 the	 construction	 of	religion	 as	 reducibly	 science	 and	 science	 as	 reducibly	 religion.	 In	 other	 words,	
																																																						55	Moore	(1988),	383–467.	E.g.,	Anon.	(1872a).	56	Moore	(1988),	383–467.	57	Pupin	(1927),	3–4,	31,	and	273;	Carus	 (1916),	v–vii.	Regarding	 the	Abrahamic	religions,	e.g.,	 see	Rubenstein	(2003).	
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described	 as	 completely	 lacking	 of	 religion.72	 Many	 found	 Comtian	 religion	 to	 be	unsatisfying	in	that	it	“was	not	religious	enough”;	it	“would	have	to	offer	more	than	eulogy	 of	 science”;	 while	 still	 others	 saw	 its	 failure	 in	 distorting	 the	 science	 or	becoming	too	religious,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.73		In	 another	 example,	 Carus	 also	 propagated	 his	 own	 vision	 of	 a	 “religion	 of	science.”	As	with	Renan,	he	took	the	religion-science	relationship	as	a	personal	issue	and	 worked	 to	 “construct	 a	 new	 cosmology	 which	 would	 be	 both	 scientifically	responsible	and	religiously	satisfying.”74	His	intent	was	for	the	science	to	be	science	and	 the	 religion	 to	 be	 religion,	 preserving	 the	 essential	 truth,	 as	 he	 saw	 it,	 of	 the	mythologies	of	all	the	religions.75	Religion	and	science	could	be	likened	to	one	another	without	 reducing	 one	 to	 the	 other.	 As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Renan,	 Carus’	 views	 were	differentiated	 from	Comte’s	 and	 even	 called	 “the	New	Positivism.”76	Even	Comte’s	views	have	been	analyzed	according	to	this	line	between	scientism	and	the	reformed	religions	of	 science,	with	 early	Comte	 as	 a	 scientistic	 differentiated	 from	 the	 later	Comte	as	a	promoter	of	a	religion	of	science.	The	thing	that	differentiates	scientism	and	the	religion	of	science,	 from	this	perspective,	 is	 the	 former	 is	understood	as	a	replacement	of	religion	(signifying	reductionism),	while	the	latter	is	understood	as	an	 actual	 religion,	 based	 on	 science.	 In	 this	 way,	 we	 again	 see	 how	 the	 inclusive	religion	 of	 science	 was	 constructed	 by	 contrasting	 it	 with	 the	 reductive	religionization	of	science.77	Calderwood	similarly	defended	his	views	for	inclusivity	by	arguing	against	conflation:		We	do	not	aim	at	some	agglomeration	of	materials	[…]	brought	together	with	the	design	of	constructing	a	compact	and	durable	unity.	Neither	from	the	side	of	religion,	nor	from	that	of	science,	could	such	a	proposal	find	countenance.	Each	must	work	from	its	own	basis	[…].78		This	positioned	reductive	religions	of	science	and	sciences	of	religion	as	that	which	is	being	reformed.		
																																																						72	Ransom	(1931	[1930]),	13–14.		73	Bryson	(1936),	360–361.	74	Meyer	 (1962),	597;	Lopez	 (2002),	25;	and	 Jackson	 (1968),	74	and	83.	Carus	also	 referred	 to	his	worldview	as	‘monism’	and	‘positivism.’	75	[Carus]	Anon.	(1893b),	3674.	76	Carus	(1896	[1893]),	113.	77	Kracher	(2012),	134–136.	78	Calderwood	(1881),	38–39.	
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Reductionism	was	not	only	rejected	because	the	science	had	become	reducibly	religious,	but	also	because	religion-science	identity	excluded	religious	perspectives,	as	 in	 scientification.	Walter	 Lippmann	 (1889–1974),	 in	 his	widely-read	Preface	 to	




construction	as	not	representative	of	real	science,	and	 its	negation	of	 religion	was	delegitimized	and,	as	such,	the	conflict	was	thought	to	be	resolved.81		 	Around	this	time,	many	secular	humanists	emerged,	such	as	Aldous	Huxley	(1894–1963),	George	Orwell	(1903–1950),	and	C.	P.	Snow	(1905–1980),	who	came	to	agree	with	and	express	the	same	concerns	as	their	intellectual	counterparts	of	the	nineteenth	century	discussed	above.	Though	the	call	for	a	non-reductive	combination	of	religion	and	science	had	become	prominent,	the	‘religion’	of	their	tradition	and	the	‘science’	 that	 had	 developed	 “permitted	 no	 such	 spiritual	 synthesis.”	 Notions	 of	mutual	exclusivity	and	the	fresh	failures	of	the	religions	of	science	made	it	seem	that	such	a	synthesis	was	not	only	culturally,	but	conceptually	 impossible.	 In	response,	advocates	of	the	new	spirituality	“reached	outward	to	discover	evidence	of	a	spiritual	dimension	in	nature	or	searched	inwardly	to	perceive	a	reality	qualitatively	different	from	that	described	by	science,”	or	both.82	The	intelligentsia	was	determined	to	find	a	new	approach.			 It	 was	 also	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 that	 various	 traditions	 were	established	that	engaged	with	science	to	such	a	degree	as	to	be	marked	by	their	own	epithets	differentiating	distinct	religions,	such	as	anthroposophy,	 for	example,	and	quantum	 mysticism	 (the	 latter	 of	 which	 is	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Eight).	Anthroposophy	has	been	described	as	“theosophy	remolded	to	suit	German	rather	than	Anglo-Saxon	tastes”	and	in	theosophical	belief,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Seven,	the	 inclusive	 likening	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 is	 of	 central	 importance.83	 The	philosophical	 founder	 of	 anthroposophy	 was	 Austrian	 philosopher	 and	 social	reformer	Rudolf	Steiner	(1861–1925),	who	argued	for	an	objective	spiritual	world.	
																																																						81	 Griffin	 (2001),	 22–24.	 In	 another	 example,	 present-day	 research	 psychologist	 Peter	 B.	 Todd	challenged	 materialistic	 reductionism,	 a	 challenge	 of	 which	 he	 equated	 to	 new	 possibilities	 for	‘integrating’	religion	and	science.	Todd	(2012).	Another	contemporary,	priest	and	philosopher	Victor	Ferrao,	argued	that	the	reductionism	present	in	both	science	and	religion	are	responsible	for	religion-science	conflict,	however	this	reductionism	can	also	be	differentiated	from	religion	and	science,	thus	opening	up	possibilities	for	inclusivity.	Ferrao	(2002),	220.	Similarly,	theologian	John	Haught,	who	has	made	 the	 religion-science	question	central	 in	many	publications,	 argued	 that	 science	and	 scientific	materialism	are	distinct	and	this	is	interpreted	as	evidence	that	religion	and	science	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	Michaud	(2010),	912.	See	also	ibid.,	for	references	to	Haught’s	primary	material.	For	a	rather	coherent	account	of	Haught’s	views,	see	Haught	(2004).	82	Turner	(1974),	246–247	and	252.	83	Campbell	(2007),	157.	
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Science	 of	 Religion”	 and	 the	 “Religion	 of	 Science,”	 and	 “Devoted	 to	 the	 Work	 of	Conciliating	 Religion	 with	 Science.”123	 Carus,	 and	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 magazine,	Edward	Carl	Hegeler	(1835–1910)	(who	later	became	Carus’	father-in-law),	agreed	that	 the	 aim	of	 the	magazine	was	 to	be	 a	platform	 for	 religious	 and	philosophical	reform.124			 The	Monist	(est.	1888),	now	published	by	Oxford	University	Press,	is	one	of	the	oldest	 journals	 in	 philosophy.	 It	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 professionalization	 of	 the	discipline	and	has	featured	many	prominent	scientists	from	the	US	and	Europe,	such	as	 American	 philosopher	 and	 chemist	 Charles	 S.	 Peirce	 (1839–1914)	 and	 Czech-Austrian	 physicist	 and	 philosopher	 Ernst	 Mach	 (1838–1916).125	 The	 Open	 Court	Publishing	Company	also	published	a	series	entitled	“The	Religion	of	Science	Library”	(est.	1893),	which	included	sixty-one	volumes,	by	many	distinguished	scientists	and	intellectuals	 including	Mach	 and	 German	 philologist	 Friedrich	Max	Müller	 (1823–1900),	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 comparative	 religion.126	 The	 library’s	 general	professional	aim	was	described	as	“to	propound,	develop,	and	establish	the	Religion	of	Science.”127		 Though	the	various	intellectual	movements	and	individuals	discussed	above	represent	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 interests	 and	 opinions,	 we	 see	 not	 only	 historical	connections	in	the	various	relations	between	the	groups,	but	also	a	central	conceptual	position	uniting	them—the	religion	of	science	movement	was	a	reformation	toward	inclusivity.	And	inclusivity	was	constructed	by	directly	contrasting	it	with	exclusivity	and	the	‘falsity’	of	religion-science	conflict	or	conceptual	opposition.	 ‘True’	religion	and	science	follow	truth.	
	
																																																						123	The	Open	Court	(1887),	front	matter;	and	The	Open	Court	(1889),	masthead.	124	Meyer	(1962),	598;	Anon.	(2015d);	and	Carus	(1910).	125	The	Monist	(n.d.);	and	Carus	(1891–1892),	4.	126	 Open	 Court	 Publishing	 Company	 (1908),	 179–186.	 Notably,	 not	 all	 volumes	 seem	 to	 directly	address	a	‘religion	of	science,’	but	rather	the	spirit	of	the	series	seems	to	be	a	celebration	of	science	and	philosophy,	including	standard	treatises	and	classics.	127	Carus	(1896	[1893]),	iii.	
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6 Religion-Science	Dichotomies	as	‘Complementarities’		Rejecting	 reductionism	 and	 exclusivity	 is	 a	 relatively	 ‘easy’	 conceptual	 change,	however	 there	 remains	 to	 be	 discussed	 the	 additional,	 larger	matter	 of	 the	 entire	constellation	 of	 meaning	 surrounding	 religion	 and	 science	 that	 positions	 the	signifiers	of	the	two	as	dichotomies.	This	did	not	escape	the	notice	of	these	reformers.	As	mentioned,	a	fourth	way	of	constructing	inclusivity	is	by	rejecting	the	relational	content	 of	 those	 signifiers	 so	 that	 the	 opposition	 of	 dichotomies	 is	 reframed	 as	 a	complementarity.	In	line	with	this	observation,	these	‘religions	of	science’	have	been	characterized	 as	 a	 struggle	 to	 assimilate	 religious	 aspirations	 and	 the	 scientific	worldview	in	the	face	of	seeming	incommensurability.128	In	rejecting	the	construction	of	dichotomies	as	oppositional,	 the	binaries	 that	represent	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity	 are	 negated	 and	 the	 religion-science	 relation	 can	 be	 constructed	 in	 an	alternative,	inclusive	way.			 Present-day	 philosopher	 Victor	 Ferrao	 saw	 the	 decline	 of	 dichotomous	thinking	as	indicative	of	the	breakdown	of	the	religion-science	divide.	He	stated:		Today	the	binary	opposites	such	as	body/soul,	matter/spirit,	heaven/earth,	male/female	are	under	 tremendous	 fire.	 Thus	 the	 boundaries	 between	 nature	 and	 super-nature	 are	 slowly	ebbing.	Scientists	have	begun	to	see	their	task	as	a	sacred	enterprise.129		This,	 however,	was	 already	 developing	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	centuries.	For	example,	Conklin	rejected	the	naturalism-religion	divide	as	a	means	of	negating	 mutual	 exclusivity	 between	 religion	 (or	 oftentimes	 ‘theology,’	 which	 he	closely	 identified	 with	 religion)	 and	 science.130	 He	 also	 rejected	 the	 dichotomous	formulation	of	spiritual	phenomena	and	naturalism,	as,	he	argued,	the	spiritual	has	not	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 “uncaused,	 undetermined,	 unlawful,”	 qualities	 of	 which	 he	identified	with	supernaturalism.	Though	nature	is	“stated,	fixed,	and	settled,”	“This	is	not	to	say	that	nature	is	lacking	in	many	of	the	qualities	which	time	out	of	mind	have	been	 ascribed	 to	 the	 supernatural,	 such	 as	 mystery,	 infinity,	 and	 super-human	
																																																						128	Turner	(1974),	4.	129	Ferrao	(2002),	214.	130	 See	 Conklin	 (1922	 [1921]),	 185–186	 for	 the	 identification	 between	 religion	 and	 theology	 and	between	the	religion-theology-naturalism	relationship	and	the	religion-science	relationship.	
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confess	 that	 the	 supernatural	 lies	 hidden	 in	 the	 natural	 and	 is	 destined	 to	 grow	 from	 it	according	to	the	cosmic	law	of	existence.136		Carus	found	other	means	by	which	to	position	supernaturalism	and	naturalism	in	an	inclusive	way.	He	argued	that	‘God’	can	be	understood	in	many	ways	that	reflect	an	endurance	in	reality,	from	mathematical	theorems	to	ethical	injunctions,	and	claimed	“if	the	word	supernatural	has	any	sense,	here	it	is	applicable;	for	here	[…]	it	would	remain	such	as	it	is,	even	if	nature	did	not	exist.”137		Carus	 provides	 other	 examples	 of	 the	 simultaneous	 maintenance	 of	dichotomous	pairs	as	well.	Carus	believed	it	was	necessary	to	counter	the	prevalent	notion	that	science	and	morality	conflict	specifically	due	to	the	contradiction	between	free	 will—necessary	 for	 moral	 responsibility—and	 determinism—as	 a	 guiding	principle	of	science.	For	him,	this	boiled	down	to	a	religion-science	issue.	Carus	was	convinced	 that	 science	 and	 ethics	 do	 not	 conflict	 and	 accepted	 both	 free	will	 and	determinism.	He	argued	that	a	person	could	act	freely	within	only	the	limitations	of	physical	 force	 and	 those	 of	 their	 own	 character.	 In	 the	 spirit	 of	 contradicting	oppositional	dichotomies,	Carus	stated,	 “We	deny	 that	 the	 issue	 is	determinism	or	free	will;	in	opposition	to	spiritual	and	material	dualism,	we	claim	determinism	and	free	 will.”138	 Placing	 this	 view	 in	 ‘oppositional’	 regard	 also	 demonstrates	relationalization	of	inclusivity	and	exclusivity,	defining	the	former	in	contrast	to	the	latter.	This	 is	evident	in	Carus	words,	“We	maintain	that	moral	truth	and	scientific	truth,	 that	 religion	 and	 science,	 regularity	 according	 to	 law,	 and	 free	 will	 are	 no	
irreconcilable	contradictions.	They	are	oppositions	complementary	to	and	explanatory	








science	 incommensurability	 “is	 another	 of	 those	 gratuitous	 problems	 created	 by	definition.	If	science	and	religion	are	so	defined	as	to	make	them	incommensurables,	then	for	the	problem-maker	they	will	be.”141	In	these	words,	we	can	see	the	astute	observation	of	how	the	religion-science	relationship	 is	a	matter	of	religion-science	relationality,	of	how	the	concepts	are	understood	in	terms	of	one	another.	Similarly,	Ransom	pinned	 the	 issue	 on	 the	 nose	when	 he	 stated,	 “the	 point	 lies	 in	what	 the	official	meaning	of	that	term	[‘religious’]	is	going	to	be.”	For	him,	‘religion’	in	the	sense	used	by	the	relevant	scientists	to	describe	their	own	worldviews,	“is	a	comparatively	poor	kind	of	religion—that	it	is	barely	religious	at	all,	that	it	is	as	irreligious	as	can	be.”	Then	there	is	a	‘forced	choice,’	according	to	Ransom,	“between	a	religion	which	seems	to	repudiate	science	from	the	start,	and	a	science	which	seems	never	to	rise	into	 a	 religion.”142	 However,	 when	 we	 shift	 our	 perspective	 to	 how	 religion	 and	science	are	understood	in	relative	perspective,	these	obstacles	can	be	overcome.		 The	year	of	1927	saw	the	publication	of	Michael	Pupin’s	(1858–1935)	The	New	




been	 described	 as	 a	 “new	 form	 of	 naturalism,	 one	 that	 is	 equally	 religious	 and	scientific.”144	Also	in	the	1940s,	Goodspeed	argued	that	the	“Faith	of	Science”	reveals	itself	 in	the	reason	humans	desire	to	know.	He	claimed	that	 this	desire	was	“not	a	naturalistic	 attitude,”	 since	we	do	not	 share	 this	 uniquely	human	quality	with	 the	animals.	Rather,	the	desire	to	know	and	conduct	science	is	a	“profound	underlying	conviction”	that	in	science	“lay	nothing	less	than	the	hope	of	the	world,”	“the	great	cause	 to	which	man	should	devote	himself,	 the	great	 function	 in	which	he	 is	most	nobly	occupied.”	Goodspeed	argued	that	science	is	a	“faith”	partly	because	science	has	a	“moral	basis”:	“It	not	only	seeks	truth,	but	it	works	through	truth,	and	can	work	no	other	way.”	Facts	and	 findings	are	“holy	ground”	and	“sacred.”	Though	Goodspeed	recognized	 that	 science	 was	 executed	 in	 the	material	 world,	 this	 non-naturalistic	attitude	was	the	foundation	of	the	“Faith	of	Science.”	From	the	perspective	of	science,	the	universe	exhibits	truth,	truth	is	the	highest	good,	thus	the	universe	embodies	the	good,	giving	it	“genuine	and	indubitable	spiritual	value.”	The	scientist	believes	that	the	 unknown	 is	 simply	 unfound	 knowledge	 and	 truth—this	 is	 “faith.”	 Goodspeed	continued,	“These	faiths	are	not	themselves	definitely	religious,	but	they	reach	out	toward	the	faith	of	religion,	and	find	their	synthesis	and	their	completion	there.”145	It	is	the	differences	that	form	the	basis	for	a	greater	whole,	that	is,	the	complementarity	found	in	dichotomies.		 	








scholarship	 we	 see	 this	 relational	 construct	 continue	 to	 be	 perpetuated,	 with	multitudes	of	statements	like	“religion	and	science	are	not	mutually	exclusive.”149	The	decline	 of	 the	 ‘religion	 of	 science’	 movement	 has	 been	 largely	 a	 decline	 of	 this	particular	phrase,	as	 inclusivity	endures	 to	 this	day	 in	several	other	science-based	religions	and	religion-based	sciences.	Yet,	we	can	also	see	the	decline	of	the	religion	of	science	in	its	lack	of	academic	treatment.		For	 example,	 Donald	 Harvey	 Meyer	 argued	 that	 “Carus	 the	 man	 and	 his	Religion	 of	 Science	 have	 been	 all	 but	 forgotten,	 and	 one	 is	 at	 a	 loss	 to	 name	 any	important	thinker	who	was	directly	influenced	by	his	ideas.”150	Actually,	Carus	was	influential	 (on	 which,	 see	 also	 Chapter	 Seven),	 but	 Meyer’s	 comments	 reflect	 his	legacy	in	the	sense	that	he	has	been	largely	ignored	by	scholars.	Indeed,	it	seems,	it	is	not	just	Carus’	religion	of	science,	but	rather	all	the	religions	of	science	that	have	been	forgotten.	Though	Carus	contributed	much	to	defining	this	discursive	constellation	of	inclusivity	that	is	still	applicable	today,	this	has	not	translated	to	name	recognition	in	the	 general	 public	 nor	 to	 regular	 academic	 treatment.151	 He	 has	 been	 regularly	overlooked	or	rejected,	leaving	him	unknown	to	many.152	Moreover,	I	found	very	little	current	academic	research	on	the	religions	of	science	from	the	nineteenth	century	to	the	 present	 day,	with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 fields	 of	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 and	 of	scientism,	which	are	sometimes	characterized	as	‘religions	of	science.’153	One	reason	this	lacuna	has	remained	so	long	is	undoubtedly	due	to	the	unfavorable	reception	of	such	views.154	The	various	religions	of	science	have	often	been	rejected	out	of	hand	for	failing	both	religion	and	science,	just	as	the	past	forms	were,	and	analyzed	in	terms	of	 the	 identity	 construct.	 Though	 inclusivity	 developed	 partly	 in	 contrast	 to	 this	
																																																						149	For	some	examples	from	a	wide	array	of	studies,	see	Michaud	(2010),	912;	Fletcher	(2005),	545;	Kettell	(2014),	384;	Krasnodębski	(2014),	40–41;	and	Weller	&	Yilmaz	(2012),	26.	150	 Meyer	 (1962),	 607.	 Open	 Court	 Publishing	 Company	was	 also	 severely	 criticized.	 Carus	 (1896	[1893]),	112.	151	E.g.,	Asprem	(2014)	did	not	mention	Carus,	even	though	a	lot	of	the	historical	material	in	this	work	overlaps	with	what	is	covered	here.	152	On	the	influence	of	Carus,	see	Meyer	(1962),	esp.	605–607.	153	When	religions	of	 science	are	mentioned	 in	 the	contemporary	discourse,	 it	 is	oftentimes	with	a	reference	 to	something	“newly	conceived,”	suggesting	a	perceived	 lack	of	history.	See,	e.g.,	Kracher	(2012),	131;	Peck	(2002	[1978]),	228;	Rothschild	(1989),	2;	and	Dawkins	(2003).	154	 Regarding	 the	 reception	 of	 Carus,	 see	 Corvinus	 (1894a);	 Corvinus	 (1894b);	 Corvinus	 (1895a);	Corvinus	(1895b);	Corvinus	(1895c);	and	Corvinus	(1895d).	
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equate	 religionized	 science	 and	an	 inclusive	perspective	 is	 a	mistake.	The	 specific	demarcation	 between	 these	 two	 traditions	 in	 the	 discourse	 reminds	 us	 that	 in	reducing	all	to	religion,	we	are	introducing	our	own	relational	constructs	to	the	data.	The	demarcation	of	 the	 inclusive	 religion	of	 science	 from	 religionized	 science	 is	 a	significant	identity	marker	for	advocates	and	should	be	taken	seriously.		 Though	the	conflation	and	reduction	criticisms	have	been	pretty	far	spread	in	academic	circles,	from	the	history	of	science	to	philosophy,	most	disappointing	is	that	we	 see	 this	 on	 the	 part	 of	 scholars	 of	 religion	 as	well.	 Discussions	 of	 religions	 of	science	 that	might	be	perceived	 in	any	way	as	advocating	conciliation	 (sometimes	including	historical	observations	of	religion-science	alignment)	is	taboo	and,	in	some	cases,	 “academic	suicide,”	as	one	colleague	of	mine	put	 it.	Thus,	academics	 that	do	tackle	 these	 issues	 are	 sure	 to	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 all	 the	wrongs	 done	 to	 ‘real	science’	 and	 often	 refuse	 to	 take	 these	 religions/sciences	 seriously	 on	 their	 own	terms.	This	 is	reminiscent	of	how	scholars	of	religion	used	to	treat	the	category	of	‘cults’	as	misrepresentative	of	 ‘real	religion,’	to	the	embarrassment	of	all	in	light	of	the	field	of	new	religious	movements.	The	relational	analysis	thus	far	has	hopefully	been	convincing	enough	to	show	that	what	constitutes	 ‘religion’	and	 ‘science’	 is	 in	advocates’	terms	as	much	as	our	own	and	we	cannot	be	too	quick	to	put	a	final	word	on	the	matter.		 And	what	we	have	seen	here	further	demonstrates	that	relationalization	is	key	to	changes	in	discourse,	including	in	the	analysis	of	such	academics	described	above	who	employed	 the	dictates	of	mutual	exclusivity	 to	 interpret	 inclusivity	as	merely	another	case	of	 religionized	science.	Again,	we	have	seen	 that	 the	evolution	of	 the	terms	‘religion’	and	‘science’	were	structured	by	pre-existing	constructs.	An	inclusive	relation	was	conceptualized	and	articulated	relative	 to	 the	exclusivity	and	 identity	constructs.	 Inclusivity	 was	 suggested	 to	 be	 non-oppositional	 by	 a	 rejection	 of	reduction	 that	 demands	 a	 sole	 framework	 of	 religion	 or	 science	 as	 per	 mutual	exclusivity.	 Exclusivity	 was	 further	 negated	 by	 arguing	 that	 is	 was	 a	 conceptual	mistake,	that	exclusive	religion	and	science	were	not	‘true’	religion	and	science,	and	that	 the	 relational	 content	 of	 dichotomies	was	 complementary,	 not	 conflictual.	 As	regards	the	re-constellation	of	dichotomies,	we	have	seen	that	negating	exclusivity	
Inclusivity	
	 249	
can	 also	 involve	 rejecting	 the	 signifiers	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 as	 per	 mutual	exclusivity	that	are	thought	to	be	the	source	of	that	antagonism	and	thus	are	thought	to	 be	 inauthentic.	 The	 thought	 goes	 that	 the	 problematic	 signifier	 is	 not	representative	 of	 real	 religion	 or	 science.	 We	 saw	 this	 in	 several	 examples,	particularly	 as	 regards	 ‘supernaturalism.’	 Since	 supernaturalism	 continues	 to	 be	thought	 of	 as	mutually	 exclusive	with	 science	 (in	 some	 instances),	 this	makes	 an	effective	argument	for	inclusivity,	as	if	neither	religion	or	science	is	associated	with	it,	 then	supernaturalism	can	no	 longer	hold	as	evidence	of	religion-science	mutual	exclusivity.	 In	 this	 way,	 mutual	 exclusivity	 does	 continue	 to	 structure	 discursive	change	 here.	 It	 is	 exactly	 because	 supernaturalism	 is	 a	 signifier	 of	 religion	 as	 per	mutual	exclusivity	that	the	differentiation	of	religion	and	supernaturalism	work	to	frame	religion	and	science	as	non-oppositional.	At	the	same	time,	this	also	signals	a	significant	shift	away	from	the	structure	of	mutual	exclusivity	since	breaking	up	the	association	 between	 religion	 and	 signifiers	 of	 religion	 as	 per	 mutual	 exclusivity	creates	 new	 terms	 of	 engagement.	 This	 is	 also	 a	 substantial	 departure	 from	 pre-existing	constructs	because	inclusivity,	though	using	mutual	exclusivity	as	a	sounding	board,	is	also	the	very	antithesis	of	that	construct.		At	 every	 turn,	 we	 see	 relational	 constructs	 structuring	 the	 terms	 of	engagement	 for	 novel	 religion-science	 relationalization.	 Whereas	 the	 last	 three	chapters	 have	 largely	 focused	 on	how	 the	 terms	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 changed	 in	
relative	perspective,	here	we	have	seen	that	the	relational	construct	of	inclusivity	was	
constructed	 relative	 to	 other	 constructs.	 Relationalization	 occurs	 on	 these	 various	levels—conceptualizing	 terms	 relative	 to	 one	 another,	 as	 well	 as	 conceptualizing	relations	relative	to	one	another.	With	this	chapter,	we	have	continued	to	gain	a	larger	perspective	on	relational	constructs	in	relative	perspective.		 With	those	considerations	in	mind,	I	will	extend	the	analysis	of	inclusivity	to	two	 case	 studies	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 exploring	 the	 relationalization	 of	inclusivity	 and	 likening	 religion	 to	 science	 and	 science	 to	 religion.	 In	 the	 case	 of	exclusivity,	we	saw	that	likening	led	to	the	reductive	identification	between	religion	and	 science.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 inclusivity,	 likening	 leads	 to	 a	 non-reductive	 affiliation	between	religion	and	science,	 resulting	 in	what	might	be	 called	 the	 scientificity	of	
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1 Religion	as	‘Scientific’		Henry	Alabaster,	 a	 diplomat	 and	 interpreter	 to	 the	King	 of	 Siam,	made	 the	 above	statement	 from	 the	perspective	of	 a	modern	Siamese	 (Thai)	Buddhist	 in	1871.	He	credited	the	Buddha	with	scientific	discoveries	and	characterized	him	as	exceeding	all	 his	 contemporaries	 in	 scientific	 understanding.	 He	 even	 depicted	 Buddhist	practice,	such	as	meditation,	as	science.2	Though	such	ideas	had	been	in	circulation	since	the	1820s,	it	was	only	around	the	time	of	Alabaster’s	publication	that	Buddhism	came	 to	 be	 well	 known	 in	 the	West.	 As	 scholars,	 intellectuals,	 and	 sympathizers	became	familiar	with	the	religion,	the	discourse	surrounding	Buddhism	repeatedly	stressed	 its	 supposed	 scientific	 character.	 And	 when	 Buddhists	 first	 actively	presented	Buddhism	to	Europeans	and	Americans—during	the	World’s	Parliament	of	 Religions	 in	 Chicago	 (1893)—scientific	 compatibility	 was	 emphasized,	 while	broader	 cultural	 contexts	 of	 the	 religious	 tradition	were	 deemphasized.3	 It	 is	 this	discourse	on	Buddhism	as	scientific	that	makes	up	the	case	study	of	this	chapter.	
																																																						1	Alabaster	(1871),	xxi.		2	Alabaster	(1871),	xxxiii,	5,	16,	88,	103,	137,	144,	182–183,	192–194,	202,	and	232.	3	 For	 a	 discussion,	 see	 McMahan	 (2011),	 119.	 This	 is	 a	 commonly	 cited	 date	 and	 context	 for	 the	introduction	of	Buddhism	to	America,	however	there	is	some	evidence	that	Chinese	Buddhists	may	have	come	to	North	America	as	early	as	the	fifth	century.	See	Fields	(1992),	25–30.	Furthermore,	there	is	evidence	that	Eastern	culture	has	had	significant	influence	on	Western	culture	since	antiquity.	See	Campbell	(2007),	148–152	and	passim;	and	Oldmeadow	(2004),	3–6.	In	Europe,	Buddhist	immigrants	did	not	have	a	great	impact	prior	to	the	mid-twentieth	century,	though	Buddhist	thought	had	certainly	impacted	Europeans	significantly	by	this	point,	as	will	be	discussed.	See	Baumann	(2002),	86.	From	these	 time	 periods	 through	 today,	 there	 are	many	 examples	 of	 Buddhist	 contact	with	 the	West	 in	various	 forms,	 thus	 it	 is	 best	 to	 think	 of	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 discursive	construction	of	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism,	as	a	key	moment.	That	this	is	a	significant	time	period	is	also	evidenced	by	the	fact	 that	 it	was	around	the	mid-nineteenth	century	that	the	number	of	Asian	immigrants	sharply	increased	in	America,	who	naturally	brought	their	cultural	and	religious	identities	along	 with	 them,	 and	 established	 migrant	 and	 transnational	 communities	 all	 over	 the	 world.	 See	
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	 Though	many	early	scholars	of	Buddhism	upheld	such	views—in	addition	to	the	multitudes	of	present-day	Buddhists,	Buddhist	sympathizers,	and	popularizers—today,	it	is	widely	recognized	in	the	academic	field	of	Buddhist	studies	that	‘scientific	Buddhism’	is	a	particularly	modern	and	relatively	new	manifestation	of	Buddhism.	According	to	David	L.	McMahan,	‘modern	Buddhism’	is:	An	 actual	 new	 form	 of	 Buddhism	 that	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 process	 of	 modernization,	westernization,	 reinterpretation,	 image-making,	 revitalization,	 and	 reform	 that	 has	 been	taking	place	not	only	in	the	West	but	also	in	Asian	countries	for	over	a	century.4	It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 one	 of	 the	 defining	 doctrines	 of	modern	 Buddhism	 is	 its	professed	compatibility	with	science.5	In	the	case	of	modern	Buddhism,	we	see	many	elements	of	the	Buddhist	tradition	likened	to	science,	accompanied	by	the	purge	of	mythological	 elements	 and	 ‘superstitious’	 ritual	 from	 the	 religion,	 constructing	 a	scientific	Buddhism	that	was	used	to	first	describe	the	tradition	to	the	Western	world,	as	well	as	to	reintroduce	to	and	revitalize	the	tradition	in	the	East.	Situating	Buddhism	in	 the	modern	 context	 resulted	 in	new	philosophical	 interpretations	of	 cosmology	and	 psychology,	 vast	 changes	 in	 ritual	 and	 other	 practice,	 new	 speakers	 for	 the	tradition,	 and	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 intellectual	 trends,	 social	 implications,	 and	 the	language	of	modernity.	 ‘Modern	Buddhism’	 is	not	simply	Buddhism	in	the	modern	period,	 but	 specifically	 refers	 to	 forms	of	Buddhism	 that	have	 “emerged	out	of	 an	engagement	with	the	dominant	cultural	and	intellectual	forces	of	modernity.”6	
																																																						Campbell	(2007),	70–82;	Kuhn	(2008),	3	and	passim;	and	Hsu	(2000).	Additionally,	the	same	year	as	the	World’s	Parliament	saw	the	first	Buddhist	conversion	on	American	soil.	See	Fields	(1992),	129.	A	century	 after	 the	 World’s	 Parliament,	 at	 least	 one	 million	 Americans	 identified	 themselves	 as	Buddhists.	See	Fields	(1992),	369.	4	McMahan	(2008),	5.	‘Scientific	Buddhism’	is	oftentimes	associated	with	Western	Buddhism.	However,	advocates	of	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	have	included	intellectuals,	religious	representatives,	and	enthusiasts	from	all	over	the	world,	with	a	great	deal	of	dialogue	and	other	exchange	between	them.	Moreover,	while	Buddhism	was	being	constructed	as	scientific	in	the	West,	the	compatibility	between	Buddhism	and	science	was	emphasized	in	Asia	at	the	same	time,	with	Japan	and	Ceylon	being	among	the	first.	All	of	this	makes	the	division	of	Western-Eastern	Buddhisms	particularly	problematic.	See	Lopez	(2012),	10;	and	McMahan	(2008),	6	and	63–64.	Because	of	 the	geographic	 limitations	of	 the	analytical	term	‘Western	Buddhism,’	it	has	largely	been	absorbed	into	the	study	of	modern	Buddhism.	‘Modern	Buddhism’	is	also	sometimes	used	to	refer	not	only	to	the	geographical	limitations	of	Europe	and	North	America,	 but	 also	 to	Buddhism	 in	 any	 location	 outside	 of	 its	 native	Asian	 context	 or	 to	changes	in	Buddhism	that	have	largely	developed	outside	of	the	native	context,	but	of	which	may	or	may	not	have	been	introduced	to	Asia	as	well.	Borup	(2013),	290.	See	also	Croucher	(1990);	Clasquin	(2002);	and	Usarki	(2002).	5	Lopez	(2012),	122;	and	McMahan	(2008),	67.	6	McMahan	(2008),	6	and	67.	See	also	Borup	(2013).	
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constructed	as	both	‘scientific’	and	simultaneously	‘religious,’	a	Buddhist	“scientific	religion”	that	“bridges	two	antithetical	species.”9		 Buddhism’s	introduction	to	the	West	could	not	have	been	more	timely	for	the	construction	 of	 a	 non-reductive	 scientific	 religion.	 This	 religion	 came	 to	 be	constructed	as	having	a	scientific	character	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	in	the	very	same	decades	 that	Westerners	were	 first	 learning	 of	 and	 constructing	 this	 religion,	 the	religions	 of	 science	 were	 on	 the	 rise.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	inclusivity	construct	was	firmly	formulated	during	the	time	of	the	religion	of	science	reformation	 from	 the	 1860s	 to	 the	 1940s.	 The	 1860s	was	 also	 a	 key	 time	 period	during	which	Buddhism	came	to	be	constructed	as	scientific,	largely	in	Europe	and	America.	 At	 this	 time,	 Buddhism	was	 becoming	 intellectually	 trendy	 and	 popular	interest	grew,	particularly	by	the	turn	of	the	century.10	It	became	fashionable	to	call	oneself	a	Buddhist	across	the	Western	world	and	at	every	level	of	society,	from	the	average	 Joe	 to	 the	 quality	 Joe.	 This	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 early	impressions,	 suggesting	 the	 central	 role	 of	 science	 in	 the	 rise	 of	 this	 religion’s	popularity.11	And	 the	 discourse	 on	 religions	 of	 science	 in	 terms	 of	 inclusivity	was	quick	to	incorporate	Buddhism	in	the	discussion.	The	popularization	of	Buddhism	in	the	West	also	“coincided	with	the	interest	in	science	that	emerged	from	the	post-Darwinian	need	to	ground	religious	belief	in	new	 scientific	 understanding	 of	 reality,”	 an	 active	 time	 for	 the	 growth	 of	scientification.12	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	were	 ongoing	 critiques	 of	 this	 relational	construct,	 critiques	 of	 the	 reduction	 of	 religion	 to	 science,	 that	 took	 shape	 in	 the	religionization	construct.	There	was	an	intellectual	longing	to	understand	religion	in	terms	of	science,	but	to	avoid	the	disenchantment	of	scientification	and	the	hubris	of	science	replacing	religion	in	total.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	two	chapters,	there	was	
																																																						9	Cho	(2012),276	and	282.	10	The	primary	source	material	this	periodization	is	based	on	will	be	discussed	in	passing	throughout	the	remainder	of	this	work.	Lopez	(2012),	10,	concurred	with	the	timeframe.	See	also	Numrich	(2012),	138–140.	There	were	exceptions	to	a	positive	alignment	of	Buddhism	and	science,	of	course.	One	early	work	 identified	 Buddhism	 as	 “weak	 intellectually”	 because	 of	 “their	 collision	 with	 the	 results	 of	experimental	investigation,”	citing	the	cosmic	center	of	Mount	Meru	as	an	example.	See	Neale	(1859),	446.	11	Batchelor	(2011),	256.	12	Nakasone	(2003),	76.	
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For	example,	in	such	discussions	we	will	often	see	the	following	arguments:	science	is	about	the	exterior	world,	Buddhism	the	interior;	science	is	concerned	with	matter,	Buddhism	with	mind;	science	is	quantitative,	Buddhism	is	qualitative;	science	gives	us	material	advancements,	Buddhism	gives	us	spiritual	ones.		José	Ignacio	Cabezón	explained	that	this	particular	model	negotiates	not	only	differences,	 but	 similarities	 as	well.	 Since	 differences	 are	 part	 of	 a	 greater	whole,	when	similarities	are	then	drawn	upon	from	this	broader	perspective,	“holding	firmly	to	 the	 notion	 of	 irreconcilable	 differences	 it	 refuses	 to	 allow	 either	 Buddhism	 or	science	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	 other.”21	 More	 precisely	 this	 is	 the	 rejection	 of	dichotomies	 characterized	as	 irreconcilable	differences,	 instead	 regarding	 them	as	noncontradictory	pairs,	making	reductionism	both	redundant	(the	two	are	already	identified	 in	 the	whole)	 and	 conceptually	 incoherent	 (one	 half	 of	 the	 pair	 cannot	represent	the	whole).	We	saw	this	already	in	the	construction	of	 inclusivity,	 in	the	example	of	the	relational	content	of	dichotomies	interpreted	as	complementarities.	This	 means	 that	 differentiation	 is	 upheld,	 while	 simultaneously	 maintaining	 a	similarity	 in	 the	 binaries,	 united	 under	 some	 larger	 conceptual	 schema.	 Such	 a	perspective	is	part	and	parcel	to	the	representation	construct.	
	




interpretive	space	for	the	religion.23	In	the	following	three	subsections,	I	will	discuss	the	history	of	 ‘science’	 in	Buddhism	relationally	constructed	vis-à-vis	 ‘Christianity,’	‘religion,’	and	‘science.’	Though	I	will	be	discussing	both	historical	facts,	on	the	one	hand,	and	constructs	that	are	not	so	sensitive	to	historical	realities	in	the	history	of	Buddhism	and	science,	on	the	other	hand,	which	are	which	should	be	clear	when	we	keep	in	mind	the	above	discussion	and	periodization	of	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism.		
2.1 Buddhism	as	‘Not	Christianity’		Christianity	has	been	a	“source	of	creative	tension”	for	Buddhists,	as	McMahan	put	it,	which	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 relational	 construction	of	 these	 two	 religions.	McMahan	identified	another	source	of	creative	tension	as	well,	that	of	science,	and	these	two	sources	are	intimately	related.	From	as	early	as	the	sixteenth	century,	Buddhism	was	confronted	by	Christian	missionaries	who	presented	Buddhism	as	inferior	due	to	its	lack	of	scientific	support.	Christian	missionaries	saw	science	as	a	tool,	a	“reason	for	conversion.”	 Science	was	 identified	with	European	civilization	more	generally	and	was	presented	as	a	noble	cause	for	colonization.	It	was	in	this	context	that	nineteenth-century	Buddhist	reformers—in	the	East	and	West—“often	took	Christianity	as	that	to	which	Buddhism	had	to	respond,	either	by	imitation	or	critique	or	both.”24		 Buddhists	 began	 to	 present	 their	 religion	 as	 the	 truly	 scientific	 one,	 thus	turning	 Christians’	 own	 rhetoric	 against	 them,	 adopting	 the	 discourses	 of	 the	dominant	 group.25	 In	 an	 evidently	 relational	 construction,	 the	 argument	 was	presented	as	follows:		Christianity	has	a	creator	God,	and	Buddhism	has	no	God;	Christianity	has	faith,	Buddhism	has	reason;	Christianity	has	dogma,	Buddhism	has	philosophy;	Christianity	[…]	has	public	ritual,	Buddhism	has	private	reflection;	Christianity	has	sin,	Buddhism	has	karma;	Christianity	has	prayer,	Buddhism	has	meditation;	Christ	is	divine,	the	Buddha	is	human.26		
																																																						23	McMahan	(2008),	61–69;	and	Lopez	(2008),	32–33	and	115.	See	also	Heine	&	Prebish	(2003);	and	Vollmer	&	von	Stuckrad	(2017).	24	McMahan	(2008),	10–11	and	67.	See	also	McMahan	(2011),	120–121.	The	imitation	of	Christianity	on	 the	 part	 of	 Buddhists	 has	 a	 significant	 history	 and	 would	make	 for	 an	 interesting	 and	 fruitful	relational	analysis	on	its	own,	but	here	I	will	focus	on	the	contrast,	as	this	became	the	norm	and	was	hugely	instrumental	in	aligning	Buddhism	and	science.	25	Lopez	(2012),	10–11;	Batchelor	(2011),	345;	and	McMahan	(2008),	20	and	93.	26	Lopez	(2012),	11–12.		
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Friedrich	Wilhelm	Nietzsche	 (1844–1900),	 for	 example,	 in	his	 anti-Christian	work	




doctrine	of	evolution	as	 the	only	 true	one,	with	 its	 corollary,	 the	 law	of	 cause	and	effect.”	Dharmapala	elsewhere	argued	that	Christian	missionaries	in	Asia	“are	utterly	deficient	 in	 scientific	 knowledge”;	 Buddhism,	 in	 contrast,	 “is	 free	 from	 theology,	priestcraft,	 rituals,	 ceremonies,	 dogmas,	 heavens,	 hells	 and	 other	 theological	shibboleths.”	The	Buddha	taught,	according	to	Dharmapala,	“a	scientific	religion	[…]	in	 harmony	 with	 geology,	 astronomy,	 radioactivity	 and	 reality.”	 Dharmapala	predicted	that	with	the	spread	of	science	in	Europe,	people	would	shift	away	from	the	“unscientific”	beliefs	of	Christianity,	and	Buddhism	would	then	enjoy	“a	sympathetic	reception.”37	Constructing	Buddhism	in	comparison	with	science	via	its	contrast	to	Christianity	was	a	means	by	which	“All	that	was	good	was	collected	from	every	source	and	embodied	therein	and	all	that	was	bad	was	discarded,”	as	Dharmapala	described	it.38		 The	relational	construction	of	Buddhism	 in	contrast	 to	Christianity	was	not	peripheral.	 In	 fact,	 one	 of	 the	 first	 dozen	 or	 so	 English-language	 books	 that	were	written	about	Buddhism	was	a	comparison	of	Buddhism	and	Christianity	and	many	more	were	to	follow.39	The	signifier	‘science’	has	consistently	appeared	as	a	point	of	demarcation,	whether	the	authors	favored	Buddhism	or	Christianity.40	For	example,	in	 one	 relatively	 early	work	on	 the	 topic	 from	1893,	 Y.	Mayeda	 (n.d.)	 argued	 that	Buddhism	“is,	of	course,	in	exact	accordance	with	scientific	truths,	so	it	is	far	different	from	the	doctrines	of	Christianity	which	are	always	at	variance	with	science.”	Once	acquainted	with	 the	 relevant	 doctrines,	Mayeda	 claimed,	 one	would	 “perceive	 the	superior	excellence	of	Buddhism”	to	Christianity.41	Paul	Carus	(1852–1919),	who	we	
																																																						37	Quoted	in	McMahan	(2008),	91	96,	and	111–112.	Because	of	the	strong	relational	history	between	Creationism	and	evolution,	the	role	Buddhism	has	played	as	a	‘non-theistic	religion’	in	the	conversation	with	evolution	and	religion-science	relations	would	make	for	another	relevant	relational	analysis.	38	Quoted	in	Fields	(1992),	127.	39	 See,	 e.g.,	 Armstrong	 (1870);	 Hungerford	 (1874);	 Wordsworth	 (1877);	 Mohattiwatte	 &	 De	 Silva	(1878);	Reynolds	 (1884);	 Collins	 (1885);	 Lillie	 (1887);	Monier-Williams	 (1889);	 Scott	 (1890);	 and	Lillie	(1893).	40	There	is	a	significant	body	of	literature	from	Christian	authors	who	take	issue	with	reincarnation.	This	is	relevant	to	the	topic	at	hand,	in	that	if	reincarnation	is	seen	as	unscientific,	then	those	doing	the	critiquing	are	effectively	aligning	their	own	views	with	science.	This	again	demonstrates	the	role	of	‘science’	 in	demarcating	religions	at	 this	 time	and	the	push	and	pull	between	conceptualizations	of	‘Christianity’	 and	 ‘Buddhism.’	 Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 not	 sufficient	 space	 to	 explore	 this	 strand	 of	discourse	here.	41	Mayeda	(1893),	17–18.	
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contradictory	accounts	without	any	compulsion	to	reconcile	them.	[…]	Rather,	each	narrative	is	accepted	on	its	own	terms	[…].”	Not	only	can	both	narratives	be	accepted,	but	 also	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	 “narratives	 are	 not	 engaged	 in	 a	 zero-sum	competition.”73	 If	 competing	 worldviews	 can	 be	 simultaneously	 maintained,	inclusivity	 ensues	 and	 likening	 will	 be	 taken	 as	 non-reductive.	 Appropriating	 the	‘secular’	label	as	Cho	noted	elsewhere,	and	more	specifically	the	‘scientific’	label,	with	disregard	for	its	anti-religious	meaning,	has	become	“the	very	path	back	to	religion	itself.”	 She	described	 this	 as	 a	 “heedlessness	of	 fundamental	 cultural	 dualities,”	 as	expected	in	the	inclusivity	and	representation	constructs,	which	embraces	multiple	frameworks	of	meaning	as	noncontradictory.74		 That	Buddhism	was	 constructed	 in	 contrast	 to	 ‘religion,’	while	 at	 the	 same	time	 framed	 as	 a	 scientific	 religion,	 is	 not	 necessarily	 contradictory,	 but	 rather	indicative	 of	 the	 relational	 process	 of	 construction	 going	 on	 here,	 as	 the	 concept	‘religion’	 is	exactly	what	was	being	negotiated.	As	Donald	S.	Lopez,	Jr.,	aptly	noted,	“Buddhism	has	been	embraced	 in	 the	West	 as	both	 an	 alternative	 religion	 and	an	alternative	to	religion,”	 it	 is	“the	religion	that	 is	not	a	religion.”75	This	 ‘religion-not	religion’	position	Buddhism	finds	itself	in	strongly	reflects	the	primacy	of	relations	over	relata	 in	the	process	of	meaning	making.	As	a	maverick	religion,	Buddhism	is	also	the	religion	that	is	thought	to	be	most	suitable	for	religion-science	alignment.	Put	differently,	 it	 is	 precisely	 because	 Buddhism	 is	 not	 like	 other	 religions	 that	 it	 is	thought	 to	be	 capable	of	 alignment	with	 science	and	exactly	because	Buddhism	 is	constructed	relative	to	science	in	an	inclusive	and	non-reductive	way	that	it	is	unlike	other	religions.			
2.3 Buddhism	Likened	to	‘Science’		




outside	of	the	contexts	of	the	construction	of	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	vis-à-vis	‘Christianity’	 and	 ‘religion.’	 Of	 the	 dozen	 earliest	 English-language	 books	 with	Buddhism	in	the	title	that	I	have	found,	seven	mention	some	positive	relation	with	science,	 with	 two	 of	 the	 exceptions	 engaging	with	 science	 nonetheless.76	 And	 the	exceptions	are	telling,	for	a	failure	to	align	religion	with	science	was	still	perceived	as	a	delegitimizing	 force.	So	 rather	 than	counter	my	argument,	 it	 confirms	 the	 larger	point	of	the	salience	of	the	non-reductive	likening	of	religion	and	science	at	this	time.	For	instance,	Christian	reverend	Ernest	John	Eitel	(1838–1908),	though	his	argument	was	that	Christianity	was	best	suited	for	science,	also	argued	that	the	“childish	and	absurd	notions	concerning	the	universe	and	physical	science”	found	in	Buddhism	“do	not	constitute	Buddhism.”	He	claimed	that	these	associations	are	entirely	“accidental”	and	that	a	Buddhist	may	adopt	“modern	science”	and	“yet	remain	a	Buddhist.”77	A	few	exceptions	aside,	most	of	the	early	scholarship	on	Buddhism	described	the	religion	as	one	in	which	science	was	ever-present	or	made	up	some	essentialized	core.	For	example,	one	of	the	earliest	scholars	of	Buddhism,	Thomas	W.	Rhys	Davids	(1843–1922),	constructed	Buddhism	as	“scientific,	rational,	and	reasonable”	and	as	a	“science	of	mind.”78	According	to	another	early	publication	on	Buddhism,	Buddhism	is	a	“sublime	mysticism	and	science,”	a	sentiment	repeatedly	echoed	elsewhere.79	One	of	 the	 scholars	who	 did	 so	was	 Hodgson,	 whose	 views	 became	 a	major	 basis	 for	Europeans’	construction	of	‘Buddhism.’80	In	one	of	the	most	widely	read	(and	earliest)	
																																																						76	The	first	English-language	book	to	have	Buddhism	in	the	title	only	mentioned	a	connection	between	Buddhism	and	science	based	on	some	astronomical	observations	 that	were	gathered	 in	a	Buddhist	context,	but	does	not	explicitly	emphasize	religion-science	alignment.	See	Upham	(1829),	10,	58,	80,	85,	and	91.	The	connection	between	Buddhism	and	astronomy	is	noted	in	many	other	early	works	as	well.	See,	e.g.,	Schlagintweit	(1863),	273–275.	77	Eitel	(1871),	14.	In	the	context	of	the	challenges	to	Christianity	described	above,	it	makes	sense	that	this	type	of	literature	would	emerge	at	this	time.	A	similar	approach	to	liken	Christianity	with	science	while	emphasizing	the	lack	of	science	in	the	Buddhist	context	is	taken	up	in	other	works	as	well.	See,	e.g.,	Hardy	(1874),	10,	13,	and	90.	Also	relevant	to	this	interpretation	of	Buddhism	and	science	is	Hardy	(1866).	This	Buddhism-science	conflict	 is	 turned	back	on	Christianity	 in	Carus	(1899),	263–271,	 in	which	the	author	pointed	out	how	Hardy	only	seemed	to	support	science	insofar	as	it	 is	counter	to	Buddhism,	but	rejects	science	when	counter	to	Christianity.	78	First	quote	in	Fields	(1992),	106;	second	quote	in	McMahan	(2008),	52,	both	said	in	regard	to	Rhys	Davids.	Regarding	Rhys	Davids’	influence,	see	Lopez	(2012),	94.		79	Schlagintweit	(1863),	309.	He	specifically	referred	to	Buddhist	astrology	here,	but	the	same	has	been	applied	 to	Buddhism	more	generally.	E.g.,	 see	Mills	 (1876),	37;	 and	Hodgson	 (1829),	237.	 See	also	Hodgson	(1835).	80	Batchelor	(2011),	235.	See	also	Lopez	(2004),	49–76.	
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papers	on	Buddhism	in	the	nineteenth	century,	he	depicted	certain	Buddhist	texts	as	“work	of	a	scientific	character,	capable	of	being	understood	only	by	men	of	science.”81		 There	is	a	plethora	of	examples	of	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	in	early	works.	While	many	do	not	have	an	explicit	focus	on	Buddhism-science	alignment,	but	rather	make	 these	 connections	 in	 passing,	 that	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 this	 growing	 idea	went	unnoticed.	In	1871,	Alabaster	explicitly	characterized	the	“modern	Buddhist,”	as	well	as	the	Buddha,	as	supporting	compatibility	with	science.82	And	by	the	1880s,	the	idea	of	Buddhism	as	a	scientific	religion	became	widely	known	in	influential	circles.			
2.3.2 Theosophy,	Buddhism,	&	Esoteric	Science	The	 first	 book	 to	 draw	 a	 strong	 connection	 between	 science	 and	 Buddhism	 in	general—rather	than	‘modern	Buddhism’	or	specific	branches	of	Buddhism—did	not	emerge	until	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 This	work	was	 the	 extremely	 popular	A	
Buddhist	Catechism	(1881),	by	Henry	Steel	Olcott	(1832–1907).83	Olcott	was	one	of	the	founders	of	the	Theosophical	Society	(est.	1875),	which	significantly	contributed	to	the	entanglement	of	discourses	of	religion	and	those	of	science	in	a	number	of	ways.	The	 Theosophical	 Society	 was	 founded	 in	 America	 but	 became	 an	 international	organization—with	branches	 in	Europe,	 India,	and	Australia—working	 toward	 the	integration	 of	 science,	 spirituality,	 and	 religion,	 often	 with	 Buddhism	 as	 the	representative	 tradition.84	 This	 group	 has	 greatly	 contributed	 to	 the	 general	conceptualization	 of	 Buddhism	 in	 the	Western	world	 and	 to	 revitalizations	 in	 the	East.		 Olcott	 thought	of	Buddhism	as	 “not	 a	 creed	but	 a	philosophy,”	while	 at	 the	same	 time	characterizing	 the	 tradition	as	a	 “scientific	 religion.”85	 In	his	Catechism,	Olcott	drew	broad	connections	between	Buddhism	and	science	and	argued	for	 the	scientificity	of	Buddhism.	He	likened	Buddhism	to	science	in	a	non-reductive	way	by	
																																																						81	Hodgson	(1829),	241.	See	also	Lopez	(2008),	165.	82	Alabaster	(1871),	xxi,	5,	and	16.	83	 Though	 Olcott	 did	 emphasize	 certain	 branches	 of	 the	 tradition,	 he	 represented	 them	 as	 ‘pure	Buddhism’	and	thus	as	the	core	of	Buddhism	at	large.	84	Oldmeadow	(2004),	64–67.	85	Quotes	in	Fields	(1992),	97;	and	McMahan	(2008),	101.	
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suggesting	that	Buddhism	and	science	are	in	agreement	with	core	doctrines	common	to	both.	He	deemphasized	“Charms,	incantations,	the	observance	of	lucky	hours	and	devil-dancing”	as	corrupt	manifestations	of	the	religion,	whereas	in	its	 ‘pure’	form,	Buddhism	was	characterized	as	empirical	and	rational.86	His	work	contributed	to	the	Buddhist	revival	in	Ceylon	(Sri	Lanka)	and	was	translated	and	disseminated	across	Europe	and	America	through	time	and	many	editions.87		We	see	much	of	the	same	in	the	examples	of	other	theosophists,	such	as	Helena	Petrovna	Blavatsky	(1831–1891)	and	Alfred	Percy	Sinnett	(1840–1921).	Co-founder	of	the	Theosophical	Society,	Blavatsky	wrote	about	the	relationship	between	Eastern	philosophies	and	Western	science,	 similar	 to	her	 friend	Olcott,	 in	her	 Isis	Unveiled	(1877),	among	other	influential	publications.	She	drew	heavily	upon	Buddhism	in	her	work.88	Blavatsky	formulated	Buddhism	as	“incomparably	higher,	more	noble,	more	philosophical	and	more	scientific	than	the	teaching	of	any	other	church	or	religion.”89			 A	few	years	later,	Sinnett,	an	acquaintance	of	Olcott	and	Blavatsky,	published	what	was	likely	the	first	book	to	discuss	the	topic	of	Buddhism	and	science	at	length:	




causes,”	rejecting	reduction.	Not	only	is	this	science	taken	as	the	best	manifestation	of	 science	 generally,	 no	 other	 approach	 is	 “more	 spiritual	 than	 those	 of	 occult	science,”	thus	maintaining	both	signifiers	of	religion	and	science	as	well.	It	is	thought	to	be	the	best	of	both:	“Esoteric	science,	though	the	most	spiritual	system	imaginable,	exhibits,	as	running	throughout	Nature,	the	most	exhaustive	system	of	evolution	that	the	human	mind	can	conceive.”			 The	 esoteric	 doctrine	 of	 Buddhism	was	 framed	 as	 “really	 the	missing	 link	between	 materialism	 and	 spirituality,”	 which	 in	 turn	 was	 translated	 to	 a	 non-reductive	link	between	science	and	religion.	Sinnett	stated:	As	it	cannot	be	too	frequently	or	earnestly	repeated—it	is	the	union	of	Science	with	Religion—the	bridge	by	which	the	most	acute	and	cautious	pursuers	of	experimental	knowledge	may	cross	over	to	the	most	enthusiastic	devotee,	by	means	of	which	the	most	enthusiastic	devotee	may	return	to	Earth	and	yet	keep	Heaven	still	around	him.		This	 is	exemplary	of	a	scientificity	of	Buddhism,	whereby	the	religion	is	 likened	to	science	without	reducing	one	to	the	other,	 instead	constructing	the	two	in	a	wider	context	 embracing	 both.	 We	 can	 see	 Sinnett’s	 further	 tendencies	 toward	 a	 non-reductive	alignment	when	he	stated	that	adopting	the	esoteric	science	of	Buddhism	constitutes	“no	sacrifice	in	any	direction	of	the	attributes	we	may	fairly	expect	of	a	true	religious	science.”92			 Cleather,	who	was	also	a	theosophist,	contributed	one	of	the	first	monographs	on	Buddhism	and	science,	entitled	Buddhism:	The	Science	of	Life	(1926),	which	was	circulated	in	English,	Chinese,	and	Russian.	Cleather	concluded	that	“Buddhism	gives	us	a	Science	of	Religion	and	a	Religious	Science,”	the	double	formulation	exhibiting	the	representation	construct	that	puts	religion	in	the	context	of	science	and	science	in	 religion	 without	 reducing	 one	 to	 the	 other.	 She	 also	 described	 Buddhism	 as	 a	“spiritual	science.”93	
																																																						92	Sinnett	(1883),	8,	22,	29,	184,	194,	and	196–197.	See	also	ibid.,	39	and	187.	The	importance	of	both	science	and	religion	was	also	emphasized	on	ibid.,	52–53.	93	Cleather	 (1928),	22	and	40.	The	 first	English	monograph	emerged	 in	1913,	 entitled	Buddhism	&	
Science,	 translated	 from	 the	 German	 Buddhismus	 als	 weltanschauung	 (1912),	 by	 physician	 and	Buddhist	convert	Paul	Dahlke	(1865–1928).	However,	this	work	constructed	Buddhism	as	superior	to	science.	Dahlke	(1913),	x,	21,	and	255–256.	
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Humphreys,	who	was	influenced	by	Theosophy	and	eventually	converted	to	Buddhism	and	founded	the	Buddhist	Lodge	of	 the	Theosophical	Society	 in	London	(est.	1924),	contributed	numerous	books	on	Buddhism	aimed	at	general	readers	from	the	1920s	through	the	1970s.94	He	contributed	to	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	when	he	defined	Buddhism	 in	one	of	his	most	popular	books	as	 “a	 system	of	 thought,	 a	religion,	a	spiritual	science	and	a	way	of	life,	which	is	reasonable,	practical	and	all-embracing.”95	 He	made	 the	 even	 stronger	 claim	 that	 “the	 Buddhist	 attitude	 to	 all	phenomena	and	to	all	teaching	about	it	has	ever	been	that	of	the	modern	scientist.”96			 Though	 these	 interpretations	 were	 more	 influenced	 by	 Theosophy	 than	Buddhism,	 through	 these	 works,	 many	 Europeans	 became	 convinced	 that	 such	theosophical	views,	including	a	scientificity	of	Buddhism,	accurately	represented	the	teachings	of	Buddhism.	Theosophists	had	an	“enormous	and	respectable	following”	and	 greatly	 increased	 Western	 interest	 in	 the	 religion,	 thereby	 contributing	significantly	 to	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 Buddhism	 as	 ‘scientific.’97	 Furthermore,	many	Asian	Buddhists	who	had	had	any	significant	engagement	with	the	West	during	the	 formative	 years	 of	 the	 scientificity	 of	 Buddhism	 were	 quite	 familiar	 with	Theosophy.	There	was	a	lot	of	personal	contact	between	the	two	communities,	as	in	the	case	of	Dharmapala,	whose	involvement	with	the	Theosophical	movement	greatly	influenced	his	emphasis	on	the	scientific	aspects	of	Buddhism.98			
2.3.3 The	Carus	Circle,	Buddhism,	&	Mainstream	Science	Despite	 theosophical	 influence,	 the	 restriction	 of	 Buddhism-science	 alignment	 to	‘esoteric	science’	was	never	total	and	was	eventually	cast	aside	in	favor	of	‘science’	more	generally	construed.	Already	many	Buddhist	societies	were	springing	up	across	Europe	and	America	around	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	praising	Buddhism	as	
																																																						94	On	his	background	and	influence,	see	Oldmeadow	(2004),	91–94,	261;	and	Baumann	(2002),	90.	95	Humphreys	(1951),	76.	See	also	Baumann	(2012),	119.	96	Humphreys	(1951),	222.	97	Batchelor	(2011),	270.	See	also	Baumann	(2002),	87.	98	McMahan	(2008),	77	and	97;	Lopez	(2008),	24	and	191–192;	and	Baumann	(2012),	117.	Still,	many	Buddhists	were	not	so	enthusiastic	about	 theosophy	or,	at	 times,	 their	 interpretation	of	Buddhism.	While	theosophical	works	and	figures	were	drawn	upon	when	it	suited,	some	Buddhists	were	at	the	same	time	critical	of	Theosophy.	See	Lopez	(2008),	190–191.	
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the	 “religion	of	 reason,”	drawing	upon	mainstream	science,	while	newly	emerging	specialist	 journals	 like	 The	 Buddhist	 Review,	 emphasized	 the	 rational	 aspects	 of	Buddhism,	 rather	 than	 the	 esoteric.99	 In	 fact,	 the	 rationalists	 were	 the	 prime	opponents	 of	 esotericism	 and	 constructed	 their	 views	 by	 way	 of	 contrast,	 as	 did	Carus.100	At	 the	same	time,	notions	of	a	scientificity	of	Buddhism	were	also	strong	among	this	group.101	And,	like	Olcott,	Carus	appealed	to	a	‘pure’	Buddhism,	which	to	both	men	meant	whatever	was	in	agreement	with	the	scientific	worldview	as	science	was	seen	as	the	arbiter	of	truth.102			 Carus	 aligned	 Buddhism	 specifically	 with	 mainstream	 science,	 making	 his	contributions	 particularly	 important	 for	 the	 endurance	 of	 Buddhism-science	likening.103	He	understood	this	as	a	step	in	the	direction	of	his	vision	for	the	future.	The	religion	of	the	future	cannot	be	a	creed	on	which	the	scientist	must	turn	his	back,	because	it	 is	 irreconcilable	with	 the	 principles	 of	 science.	 Religion	must	 be	 in	 perfect	 accord	with	science….[sic]	Science	is	divine,	and	the	truth	of	science	is	a	revelation	of	God.	Through	science	God	speaks	to	us;	by	science	he	shows	us	the	glory	of	his	works;	and	in	science	he	teaches	us	his	will.104		Carus	 defended	 several	 different	manifestations	 of	 such	 a	 religion	 of	 science	 (see	Chapter	 Six),	 however	 one	 in	 particular	was	 a	 Buddhist	 religion	 of	 science,	 or,	 in	relational	 terms,	 a	 scientificity	 of	 Buddhism.	 Drawing	 from	 the	 presentations	 of	Buddhism	as	 science-like	at	 the	World’s	Parliament,	Carus	became	convinced	 that	Buddhism	was	the	best	representative	for	his	scientific	religion,	with	the	Buddha	as	“the	first	prophet	of	the	Religion	of	Science.”105	Carus	argued,	“Buddhism	is	a	religion	which	 recognizes	 no	 other	 revelation	 except	 the	 truth	 that	 can	 be	 proved	 by	science.”106	Though	suffering	from	a	lack	of	academic	treatment	and	recognition	as	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 Carus	 was	 extremely	 influential,	 the	
																																																						99	Baumann	(2002),	88.	100	Tweed	(1992),	60;	and	McMahan	(2008),	102	and	106–107.	101	Tweed	(1992),	104.	102	McMahan	(2008),	99	and	104.	103	 Jackson	 (1968),	 74	 and	 86;	 McMahan	 (2008),	 102;	 and	 Verhoeven	 (1998).	 Carus	 not	 only	contributed	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 ideas,	 but	 also	 took	 action	 to	 promote	 dialogue	 through	 a	 series	 of	organizations.	104	Quoted	in	McMahan	(2008),	102.	105	McMahan	(2008),	103	and	106;	Lopez	(2002),	24;	[Carus]	P.	C.	(1896),	4845;	and	Carus	(1899),	309.	106	Carus	(1899),	114.	
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aforementioned	Gospel	being	 his	most	widely	 read	work,	 translated	 into	 over	 ten	Asian	and	European	 languages.	 Like	Olcott,	 his	 interpretation	of	 the	 tradition	was	even	 adopted	 by	 Asian	 Buddhists,	 employed	 at	 Tokyo	 Imperial	 University,	 in	 the	Ceylonese	Buddhist	revival,	and	used	to	train	priests	in	a	sect	of	Japanese	Pure	Land	Buddhism.107	Carus,	perhaps	more	than	any	other	American	at	this	time,	had	extensive	and	intimate	 contact	with	Easterners.108	At	 the	World’s	Parliament,	 he	became	 friends	with	several	Buddhist	delegates,	including	Dharmapala	and	Sōen,	both	men	of	which	contributed	greatly	to	the	spread	of	Buddhism	in	the	West	and	to	Buddhism-science	alignment.	 These	 men	 all	 influenced	 one	 another	 to	 a	 significant	 degree.109	 After	meeting	these	individuals,	Carus	came	to	the	conclusion	that	a	“new	orthodoxy”	of	“scientific	theology”	had	arrived	sooner	than	he	expected.110	While	he	reported	only	a	 few	 years	 before	 that	 he	 was	 terribly	 misunderstood	 and	 rejected	 in	 most	intellectual	circles,	he	found	kinship	in	the	Buddhism	and	science	movement,	which	relatively	speaking	was	much	more	successful	(and	continues	to	be	so)	than	Carus’	religion	of	science	ever	was	(see	Chapter	Six).		 Dharmapala,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Olcott	 and	 Carus	 who	 argued	 for	 a	 universal	religion	 based	 on	 scientifically	 founded	 truth,	 regarded	 Buddhism	 as	 the	 sole	representative	of	a	scientificity	of	religion.	Dharmapala	drew	heavily	from	Western	accounts	of	Buddhism	in	order	to	construct	Buddhism	as	rational	and	scientific,	with	great	 emphasis	 on	 the	 meditative	 and	 ethical	 features	 of	 the	 tradition.	 He	disassociated	Buddhism	with	superstition	and	ritual,	arguing	that	these	aspects	were	a	corruption	of	the	religion,	thereby	delegitimizing	‘religion’	that	excludes	science.111	Such	 a	 move	 has	 been	 interpreted	 relationally	 as	 a	 “strategic	 occidentalism,”	 a	‘reversal	 of	 Orientalism,’	 that	 aligns	 the	 tradition	 with	Western	 worldviews,	 thus	
																																																						107	Fields	(1992),	136;	McMahan	(2008),	103;	and	Jackson	(1968),	85.	108	Jackson	(1968),	89.	109	 Regarding	 Sōen,	 see	 Fields	 (1992),	 109–113,	 136,	 and	 139;	 and	 McMahan	 (2008),	 64	 and	 97.	Regarding	Dharmapala,	see	ibid.,	91–97.	Regarding	Carus,	see	ibid.,	103.	110	Carus	(1916),	v–vi.	111	McMahan	(2008),	95	and	112.	
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carving	 out	 a	 space	 for	 the	 religion	 that	 was	 both	 in	 contrast	 to	 Western	understandings	of	‘religion,’	while	speaking	to	Western	values.112			 Sōen	presented	Buddhism	as	intellectual	and	rational	and	“always	willing	to	stand	 before	 the	 bar	 of	 science.”113	 Sōen’s	 disciple	 D.	 T.	 Suzuki	 (1870–1966)—perhaps	 the	 biggest	 name	 in	 bringing	 Buddhism	 to	 the	 West	 and	 Westernizing	Buddhism—also	 later	 became	 close	 with	 Carus.114	 Suzuki	 was	 inspired	 by	 Carus’	work,	 including	 his	 The	 Religion	 of	 Science	 (1893).	 As	 Carl	 T.	 Jackson	 noted,	 “If	Suzuki’s	work	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 bridges	 to	 the	West’s	modern	understanding	of	Buddhism,	Carus	must	be	accounted	one	of	the	chief	engineers.”115	Suzuki,	in	turn,	impacted	the	thought	of	many	important	thinkers	including	Carus,	but	also	 American	 Buddhist	 Dwight	 Goddard	 (1861–1939),	 Carl	 Jung	 (1875–1961),	Aldous	Huxley	(1894–1963),	Erich	Fromm	(1900–1980),	and	Thomas	Merton	(1915–1968).	Suzuki	had	a	significant	impact	in	Japan	with	the	revitalization	of	Zen	and	the	Kyoto	School,	a	philosophical	community	drawing	upon	Buddhism	and	continental	philosophy.116	 Suzuki	 perpetuated	 a	 view	 of	 Buddhism	 as	 rational,	 modern,	 and	scientific,	and	advocated	a	reconciliation	of	religion	and	science.	He	also	contributed	to	the	Zen	boom	in	the	1950s	through	the	1970s,	during	which	Zen	was	suggested	to	confirm	emerging	theories	in	psychology,	psychotherapy,	and	philosophy.117			
2.3.4 Buddhism	&	Science	in	Dialogue		Thus	far,	the	construction	of	Buddhism	as	scientific	was	largely	restricted	to	texts—with	a	few	important	exceptions	 like	the	revitalizations	 in	Japanese	and	Ceylonese	Buddhism.	 However,	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 this	 discourse	 materialized	 in	unprecedented	ways.	During	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	Buddhists	in	Asia	
																																																						112	McMahan	(2008),	96.	113	Quoted	in	Fields	(1992),	173.	114	 Lopez	 (2002),	 24–25,	 35,	 54–55,	 and	 68;	 Borup	 (2013),	 292;	 Fields	 (1992),	 138–139	 and	 204;	McMahan	(2008),	122;	and	Jackson	(1968),	89–90.	115	Jackson	(1968),	90.	116	Verhoeven	(1998),	218;	Sharf	(2005),	8885–8886;	Lopez	(2008),	19–20;	and	McMahan	(2008),	122.	117	Fields	(1992),	196,	221,	248–249,	287,	294	and	passim;	Verhoeven	(1998),	218;	Baumann	(2002),	92;	 and	Baumann	 (2012),	 124.	 Later	 in	 Suzuki’s	 life,	 however,	 he	 came	 to	 question	 the	 ability	 for	science	to	serve	as	a	basis	for	religion.	Verhoeven	(1998),	223;	and	Verhoeven	(2001),	83–84.	
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World	 War	 II	 (1939–1945)	 and	 especially	 the	 1960s	 on	 through	 the	 1970s	 saw	rampant	exponential	growth	of	Eastern	religious	organizations	 in	 the	West	and	of	general	interest.126	And	by	the	1970s,	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	was	on	the	rise	again,	 with	 a	 number	 of	 books	 that	 described	 very	 particular	 points	 of	 contact	between	Buddhism	and	science,	such	as	Buddhist	metaphysics	and	quantum	physics,	in	contrast	to	earlier	times	when	alignments	were	often	more	vague,	drawing	very	general	comparisons	to	‘science,’	‘rationality,’	and	‘empiricism.’127		 While	prior	to	this	time	period,	the	Buddhism	in	Britain	was	largely	Theravada	and	in	the	US	was	primarily	Mahayana	and	Vajrayāna,	from	the	1970s	on,	a	plethora	of	Buddhist	schools	was	established	outside	of	Asia	and	across	the	rest	of	the	world,	including	 Europe,	 North	 and	 South	 America,	 Australia,	 and	 Africa.128	 Despite	 this	Buddhist	 pluralism,	 Tibetan	 Buddhism	 came	 to	 replace	 Zen	 as	 the	 central	representative	 of	 Buddhism	 and	 science.	 While	 the	 Zen	 era	 was	 on	 the	 decline,	Tibetan	 Buddhism	 saw	 a	 rise	 of	 popularity	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 a	 boom	 of	institutionalization	 in	 the	 1980s,	 with	 the	 rate	 of	 new	 establishments	 sometimes	outnumbering	 all	 other	 Buddhist	 traditions.129	 Publications,	 both	 academic	 and	popular,	dedicated	to	the	topic	of	Buddhism	and	science	greatly	increased	from	the	1990s	 on,	 dominated	 by	 discussions	 of	 and	 with	 the	 (current,	 14th)	 Dalai	 Lama	(Tenzin	Gyatso),	the	religious	leader	of	the	Gelug	sect	of	Tibetan	Buddhism.130	This	was	also	the	period	for	some	of	the	first	monographs	on	Buddhism	and	science	that	were	authored	by	scholars	of	Buddhism,	such	as	Joanna	Macy’s	Mutual	Causality	in	
Buddhism	 and	 General	 Systems	 Theory	 (1991).131	While	 critical	 scholarship	 on	 the	
																																																						126	 Baumann	 (2002),	 92–93;	 Oldmeadow	 (2004),	 245–269;	 Campbell	 (2007),	 14–15,	 25–28,	 40;	Batchelor	(2011),	275;	and	Baumann	(2012),	124.	127	McMahan	(2008),	169.	To	give	an	example	of	the	increased	level	of	sophistication	in	the	field	of	Buddhism	and	science	in	this	time	period,	one	publication	analyzed	subjective	experience	through	the	lens	 of	 cybernetics,	 cognitive	 science,	 psychology,	 and	 artificial	 intelligence	while	 utilizing	 Tibetan	Abhidharma	concepts	to	categorize	mental	functions.	See	Varela,	Thompson,	&	Rosch	(1991).	128	Borup	(2013),	292;	and	Baumann	(2002),	85.	129	Baumann	(2002),	92	and	94;	and	Baumann	(2012),	124.	On	earlier	encounters	between	Tibetan	Buddhism	and	science,	see	Jinpa	(2003);	and	Jinpa	(2010),	872–873.	130	 Lopez	 (2012),	 13–14.	 A	 few	 examples	 of	 the	many	 publications	 emerging	 at	 this	 time	 include,	Badiner	 (1990);	 Hayward	 &	 Varela	 (1992);	 Goleman	 (1997);	 Varela	 (1997);	 Austin	 (1998);	 and	Houshmand,	Livingston,	&	Wallace	(1999).	131	Macy	(1991);	and	Cho	&	Squier	(2016),	22	n.10.	
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contributed	so	much	to	the	discussion,	documented	in	numerous	publications,	some	of	which	were	 bestsellers,	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	 has	 created	 something	 of	 a	 Buddhism-science	 ‘canon,’	 as	 Lopez	 put	 it.139	 The	 doctrine	 of	 such	 a	 canon	 amounts	 to	 the	conviction	that	“Buddhist	explanations	can	contribute	to	scientific	research,	and	vice	versa,”	 a	 sentiment	 on	 non-reductive	 interdisciplinarity	 repeated	 elsewhere	 as	well.140	And	the	general	hope	in	this	and	similar	environments	is	that	a	science	based	on	Buddhism	might	lead	to	innovative	methods	of	observation,	experimentation,	and	theories	 of	 reality.141	 With	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	 strongly	 supporting	 religion-science	dialogue	via	the	Mind	&	Life	Institute,	for	example,	arguments	for	the	compatibility	between	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 have	 become	widely	 known	 and	 in	many	 circles,	widely	accepted.	This	includes	acceptance	at	the	level	of	prominent	scientific	research	institutes	and	medical	facilities.142			 The	Mind	&	Life	Institute	was	established	in	1987,	a	culmination	of	the	visions	of	 the	Dalai	Lama,	American	businessman	Adam	Engle,	and	Chilean	neuroscientist	Francisco	 Varela	 (1946–2001).	 The	 three	 men	 “were	 convinced	 that	 well-refined	contemplative	 practices	 and	 introspective	methods	 could,	 and	 should,	 be	 used	 as	equal	instruments	of	[scientific]	investigation.”	The	Institute	was	formed	“to	bridge	this	divide.”143	Their	vision	for	the	Institute	illustrates	the	equal,	inclusive,	and	non-reductive	standing	of	Buddhism	and	science:		To	establish	mutually	respectful	working	collaboration	and	research	partnerships	between	modern	science	and	Buddhism—two	of	the	world's	most	fruitful	traditions	for	understanding	the	nature	of	reality	and	promoting	human	well-being.144		
																																																						139	Lopez	(2008),	214.	See,	e.g.,	Dalai	Lama	(2005);	Harrington	&	Zajonc	(2008);	Dalai	Lama	(2011);	and	Singer	&	Ricard	(2015).	140	Dalai	Lama	(2002),	54.	See	also	Begley	(2007),	13:	“Buddhism	and	science	both	stand	to	benefit	from	the	interaction.”	141	Nakasone	(2003),	80.		142	E.g.,	Slone	(2013),	2096	and	2099.	That	this	is	the	case	can	also	be	deduced	from	the	overall	contents	of	this	chapter.	E.g.,	the	impact	of	the	Mind	&	Life	Institute	has	been	narrated	in	numerous	best-selling	books,	 the	 Institute’s	 support	 has	 led	 to	 dozens	 of	 significant	 studies,	 over	 two	hundred	 academic	publications,	 and	 over	 three	 hundred	 public	 talks.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Institute’s	 researchers	 have	acquired	 esteemed	 faculty	 positions,	 fellowships,	 and	 directorships	with	more	 than	 fifteen	million	dollars	in	funding.	See	Mind	&	Life	Institute	(n.d.).	143	Mind	&	Life	Institute	(n.d.),	s.v.	“Mission.”	144	Mind	&	 Life	 Institute	 (expired).	 This	webpage	 is	 no	 longer	 available	 and	 their	 present	mission	statement	has	been	revised.	
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human	meaning	and	on	the	rejection	of	reduction.	Such	sentiments	are	ubiquitous	in	the	 field	 of	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 and	 are	 echoed	 at	 all	 the	 Mind	 &	 Life	Conferences.155	For	instance,	the	Dalai	Lama	stated,	“I	have	argued	for	the	need	for	and	possibility	of	a	worldview	grounded	in	science,	yet	one	that	does	not	deny	the	richness	 of	 human	 nature	 and	 the	 validity	 of	 modes	 of	 knowing	 other	 than	 the	scientific.”156	 In	 other	 words,	 what	 is	 needed	 is	 inclusive	 and	 non-reductive,	 a	scientificity	of	religion.		Whether	fringe	or	mainstream	science,	whether	Zen	or	Tibetan	Buddhism,	the	terms	‘Buddhism’	 and	 ‘science’	 have	 been	 repeatedly	 likened	 to	 one	 another	 in	 a	 non-reductive	 way.	 This	 has	 been	 ongoing	 since	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 English	 term	‘Buddhism’	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	through	today.	Buddhism	as	containing	scientific	character—to	the	inclusion	of	religious	character—has	been	built	into	the	history	of	Buddhism,	presented	as	ever-present	in	many	cases.	When	science	was	not	constructed	as	a	historical	part	of	Buddhism,	it	was	built	into	the	story	of	Buddhism’s	development	nonetheless,	with	active	engagement	with	the	trends	of	modernity	and	emphasis	on	adaptation	and	progress.	Science	has	been	presented	as	contributing	to	Buddhism,	 Buddhism	 as	 aiding	 science,	 and	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 have	 been	presented	 as	 mutually	 informative.	 At	 every	 turn,	 we	 see	 the	 scientificity	 of	Buddhism.			




Enlightenment	 and	 its	 connotations	 of	 rationality,	 empiricism,	 emphasis	 on	individual	 observation	 over	 authority,	 and	 freedom	 of	 thought,	 for	 example.	 His	enormously	influential	interpretation	of	Buddhism	became	the	standard	not	only	in	the	West,	but	in	Asia	as	well.157	Following	this	motif,	one	Chinese	author	in	the	mid-twentieth	 century	 described	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 as	 “two	 brilliant	 lamps	 of	 the	world,”	with	“their	illuminating	power”	destroying	“ignorance	and	superstition”	and	“biased	 views	 and	 dogmatism.”158	 The	 Buddhist	 existential	 transformation	 of	‘enlightenment’	has	been	regularly	associated	with	ideas	of	scientific	enlightenment	or	‘illumination’	(see	Chapter	Three)	from	the	nineteenth	century	to	today.	In	 perhaps	 the	 single	 most	 influential	 text	 on	 the	 history	 of	 Buddhism,	








generally	scientific,	as	scientific	advances	were	suggested	to	be	nothing	new	to	the	Buddhist	worldview:	“Every	new	discovery	in	the	domain	of	science	helps	for	us	to	appreciate	the	sublime	teachings	of	the	Buddha	Gautama.”	He	argued,	“Buddhism	is	a	scientific	religion”	and	“Buddhism	is	tantamount	to	a	knowledge	of	other	sciences.”172	Humphreys	claimed,	the	Buddha	“produced	a	science	of	living	which	ranks	with	any	other	 science	 known	 to	man,”	 while	 Sōen	made	 the	 even	 stronger	 claim	 that	 the	“Buddha’s	teachings	are	in	exact	agreement	with	the	doctrines	of	modern	science.”173		In	contrast,	among	the	first	works	to	discuss	Buddhism,	Buddhists	are	said	to	give	priority	to	science	even	when	there	is	a	conflict	with	Buddhist	doctrine.174	Even	so,	for	many	this	is	not	to	negate	religious	knowledge	altogether.	One	scholar	argued	that	in	order	to	nurture	Buddhism-science	alignment,	we	“must	respect	the	values	of	modern	 science,	 yet	 avoid	 reducing	 all	 existences	 to	 material	 or	 mathematical	formulae.”	Buddhists	teach	that	to	have	knowledge	of	the	true	nature	of	things,	we	should	 not	 limit	 ourselves	 to	 a	 single	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	 world,	 which	contradicts	the	impermanent,	changing,	and	relative	nature	of	things.175	This	creates	a	 situation	 in	 which	 religious	 knowledge	 can	 be	 likened	 to	 scientific	 knowledge	without	being	reduced	to	science	and	without	excluding	other	ways	of	thinking	about	the	world.		Buddhist	 and	 scientific	 knowledge	 are	 also	 aligned	 by	 framing	 the	 two	 as	intellectual	enterprises.	Edwin	Arnold	(1832–1904),	author	of	the	popular	work	on	the	Buddha	The	Light	of	Asia	(1879)	and	perhaps	the	greatest	of	the	early	Western	popularizers	of	Buddhism	claimed,	 “between	Buddhism	and	modern	science	 there	exists	 a	 close	 intellectual	 bond.”176	 Philosophers,	 artists,	 and	 authors	 have	 all	contributed	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 Buddhism	 as	 a	 highly	 intellectual	 tradition,	including	 Arthur	 Schopenhauer	 (1788–1860),	 Nietzsche,	 and	 Martin	 Heidegger	(1889–1976).177	Buddhism	was	often	described	 in	early	Western	 literature	on	 the	
																																																						172	Quoted	in	Lopez	(2008),	191–192.	173	Humphreys	 (1951),	 80;	 and	 Sōen	quoted	 in	McMahan	 (2008),	 64.	Verhoeven	 (1998),	 325,	 n.20	credited	Sōen’s	statement	to	Carus.	174	Hardy	(1860),	23.		175	Nabeshima	(2003),	85–86.	See	also	Nakasone	(2003),	78.	176	Quoted	in	Tweed	(1992),	104.	177	Borup	(2013),	292	and	295.	
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topic,	and	in	some	Eastern	works	as	well,	as	intellectual.178	Moreover,	many	Western	converts	 have	historically	 been	highly	 educated.	 This	 expansive	 impact	 in	 various	intellectual	 circles	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 image,	 and	 thus	 the	 construction,	 of	Buddhism	 as	 intellectual.179	 And	 as	 an	 intellectual	 enterprise,	 Buddhism	 was	particularly	suited	to	the	non-reductive	likening	of	religious	and	scientific	knowledge.	Between	the	1950s	and	1960s,	the	idea	that	Buddhist	and	scientific	knowledge	were	 in	 an	 inclusive,	 non-reductive	 relation	 seems	 to	 have	 become	 the	 common	view.180	One	author	 from	the	1960s	 took	 the	 ‘fact’	 that	Buddhism	 is	 scientific	as	a	given,	particularly	regarding	“ideals	and	general	principles.”		Both	 advocate	 free	 and	 rational	 inquiry,	 empirical	 verification	 and	 freedom	 from	authoritarian	dogma.	Both	view	the	universe	as	regulated	by	impersonal	laws	of	cause	and	effect	operating	throughout	aeons	of	time.	Both	see	man	as	a	product	of	the	universe	rather	than	a	special	creation.181		Besides	 ‘general	 principles’	 specific	 tenets	 of	 Buddhist	 belief	 were	 said	 to	 have	scientific	 counterparts.	 For	 example,	 claims	 about	 the	 connections	 between	Buddhism	and	evolution—whether	as	compatible	or	with	the	former	anticipating	the	latter’s	discovery—were	also	common	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries,	put	forth	by	some	of	the	most	prominent	thinkers	in	Buddhist	studies	and	in	 the	 natural	 sciences.182	 For	 instance,	 one	 early	 pamphlet	 on	 “Buddhism	 and	Science”	 (1902)	 drew	 comparisons	 between	 Buddhist	 doctrine	 and	 evolution	 and	aligned	Buddhist	ethics	with	rationality.183	Regarding	evolutionary	ideas,	it	has	been	argued,	“As	science,	in	the	discovery	of	the	law	of	selection	[…]	so	in	Buddhism	we	find	the	same	general	conclusion.”184		
																																																						178	E.g.,	in	the	following	statement	from	1875:	“The	one	infallible	diagnostic	of	Buddhism	is	a	belief	in	the	infinite	capacity	of	the	human	intellect.”	Quoted	in	Lum	(1875a),	195.	He	cited	“Hodgson”	as	the	one	who	 spoke	 these	words,	 likely	 referring	 to	 Brian	Houghton	Hodgson	who,	we	 have	 seen,	was	instrumental	in	the	construction	of	a	scientificity	of	Buddhism.	See	also	Yiu	(1946),	65.	179	Borup	(2013),	295.	180	E.g.,	Burns	(1965).	See	also	Kovoor	(1980),	who	identified	this	common	theme	in	this	time	period	as	well,	offering	Egerton	C.	Baptist	(fl.	1950s–1970s)	and	Jayatilleke	as	examples.	181	Burns	(1965),	22.	182	Lopez	(2008),	146	and	244	n.38.	183	Description	of	the	pamphlet	is	available	in	Anon.	(1904),	xvi.	184	Lum	(1875a),	195.	
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increasingly	 embraced	 as	 a	 bridge	 between	 religion	 and	 science	 at	 this	 time,	 also	advocated	 by	 important	 thinkers	 like	 Jung.192	 The	 dynamism	 of	 matter	 in	 the	scientific	 worldview	 has	 been	 suggested	 to	 confirm	 the	 Buddhist	 view	 of	 the	fluctuating	and	impermanent	nature	of	things,	while	the	notion	of	relativity	has	been	likened	 to	 the	 contingent	 and	 relational	 nature	 of	 reality	 in	 the	 thought	 of	 the	important	Buddhist	philosopher	Nagarjuna	(ca.	150–250).	Gendün	Chöphel	(1903–1951)	believed	that	scientific	observations	confirmed	many	tenets	of	Buddhist	belief,	including	impermanence	and	the	dependent	origination	of	all	reality.193	The	 Buddha	 was	 said	 to	 be	 unsurpassed	 by	 his	 contemporaries	 in	 his	understanding	of	science.194	The	Buddha	(rather	 than	Buddhist	 thought	generally)	has	specifically	been	credited	with	the	discovery	of	the	law	of	cause	and	effect	and	with	anticipating	other	scientific	discoveries,	such	as	magnetism,	radioactivity,	 the	mechanical	nature	of	 things,	 evolution,	 relativity,	 psychology,	 and	 the	Big	Bang.195	Dharmapala	claimed,	“the	theory	of	evolution	was	one	of	the	ancient	teachings	of	the	Buddha.”196	While	many	 have	 challenged	 such	 claims,	 this	 has	 not	 led	 to	 a	 break	between	 Buddhism	 and	 science.	 One	 early	 author	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 Buddhism	 and	science	argued,	the	“Buddha,	even	if	he	did	not	teach	the	truths	of	modern	science,	taught	nothing	opposed	to	them.”197		Yet,	it	was	the	historical	discovery	of	the	Buddha	by	Western	scholars	“who	would	 become	 the	Buddha	we	 know	 today,	 and	who	would	 become	 the	 Scientific	Buddha.”198	In	other	words,	the	Buddha	as	scientist	was	particular	to	this	discourse.	As	early	as	the	1840s,	the	Buddha	has	been	characterized	as	receptive	to	“the	current	opinions	 of	 his	 day	 respecting	 natural	 philosophy”	 (on	 the	 close	 discursive	connection	 between	 science	 and	 natural	 philosophy,	 see	 Chapter	 Three)	 and	
																																																						192	 Quoted	 in	 Lopez	 (2008),	 23.	 See	 also	 Fields	 (1992),	 205;	 and	 Oldmeadow	 (2004),	 96–100.	 On	Buddhism	and	psychotherapy	 and	psychoanalysis,	 see	 also	McMahan	 (2008),	 192–194;	 and	Payne	(2012),	233–255.	193	Jinpa	(2010),	873.	194	Alabaster	(1871),	5,	16,	and	232.	195	Lopez	(2012),	xi,	14;	Alabaster	(1871),	5	and	16;	Kirthisinghe	(1984),	5;	Du	Pré	(1984b),	147;	and	Fields	(1992),	126.	196	Quoted	in	Verhoeven	(2001),	82–83.	197	Alabaster	(1871),	5,	16,	and	232.	198	Lopez	(2012),	17	
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day.210	Presently,	many	claim	the	intersection	of	Buddhist	meditation	and	cognitive	science	is	the	most	promising,	fruitful,	and	active	area	in	the	field	of	Buddhism	and	science.211	And	this	is	likely	not	to	subside	in	the	near	future,	as	meditation	has	been	constructed	 as	 the	 central	 activity	 of	 Buddhists—amounting	 to	 the	 Buddhist	enterprise	itself—in	the	discourse	on	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	and,	moreover,	it	has	produced	a	specialized	field	of	study	in	the	natural	sciences.		
4 The	Buddhist	Enterprise	as	‘Scientific’		Not	only	has	science	been	constructed	within	and	become	part	of	Buddhist	history,	science	has	also	been	instrumental	in	re-framing	the	goals	of	Buddhism.	It	is	not	an	exaggeration	to	say	that	meditation	is	more	or	less	tantamount	to	Buddhism	in	this	context	and	meditation	has	often	been	constructed	in	scientific	terms.212	For	example,	Jeremy	Hayward,	a	nuclear	physicist,	molecular	biologist,	and	Buddhist	sympathizer,	claimed	that	“the	Buddhist	tradition	is	based”	on	meditation	and	“the	grounds	for	the	validity	of	the	method	of	meditation	are	not	very	different	from	the	grounds	for	the	validity	of	the	scientific	method.”213	Even	though	historically	speaking	meditation	has	not	 been	 a	 central	Buddhist	 activity	 (but	 rather	 reserved	 for	 a	 specialist	 group	of	monks),	 meditation	 and	 science	 are	 also	 often	 positioned	 as	 bridging	 the	 divide	between	various	sects,	uniting	the	entire	Buddhist	enterprise	under	their	auspices.214	
																																																						210	Vollmer	&	von	Stuckrad	(2017).	211	 E.g.,	 Slone	 (2013),	 2096;	 Lopez	 (2012),	 104;	 and	 Batchelor	 (2011),	 363.	 Although	 a	 variety	 of	meditative	 techniques	 from	 diverse	 traditions	 are	 being	 studied	 in	 the	 field	 of	 cognitive	 science,	Buddhist	 approaches	 are	 the	most	 frequently	 examined.	 Another	 area	 of	 that	would	 have	made	 a	suitable	case	study	is	the	science	of	yoga,	which	has	a	strong	tradition	in	scientific	and	clinical	research.	Yoga,	a	broad	term	for	diverse	Indian	meditative	techniques	that	involves	manipulation	of	the	body	in	various	ways,	has	also	been	framed	as	a	‘spiritual	science’	and	a	‘scientific	religious	practice.’	See,	e.g.,	Kriyananda	(2002	[1985]).	Such	studies	add	to	the	main	the	thrust	of	the	argument	here	about	the	scientificity	of	religion.	212	Lopez	(2012),	14	and	92;	McMahan	(2008),	7,	183,	212,	and	217;	and	Batchelor	(2011),	351	and	364.	In	the	present	day,	the	type	of	meditation	usually	under	discussion	is	mindfulness.	‘Mindfulness’	is	 sometimes	 identified	with	 the	Sanskrit	vipaśyanā,	 i.e.,	 ‘insight,’	and	 sometimes	with	 the	Sanskrit	
smṛti,	 ‘memory’	or	 ‘the	remembered’	and	 is	generally	used	today	to	refer	 to	a	meditative,	attentive	engagement	 to	 any	 activity.	 See	McMahan	 (2008),	 215–240.	On	 the	 issue	 of	 identifying	meditative	experience	with	Buddhism,	see	Sharf	(1995).	213	Hayward	(1987),	2–3.	214	Fields	(1992),	369–370;	and	Batchelor	(2011),	344–351.	
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science	of	mind	that	draws	from	both	our	global	spiritual	heritage	and	our	scientific	heritage.”220	Wallace	elaborated:		This	 is	not	 to	suggest	 that	Western	science	be	discarded	 in	 favor	of	Eastern	contemplative	science	[…]	Nor	should	the	two	be	set	in	competition	with	each	other	[…]	At	present	we	are	in	a	position	to	draw	from	the	wisdom	of	the	East	and	the	West.221		The	reviews	of	his	Choosing	Reality	(1989),	in	which	he	first	developed	these	ideas,	were	 not	 unfavorable	 and	 in	 the	 1990s	meditation	was	 increasingly	 described	 in	terms	of	“contemplative	science”	or	“Asian	psychologies,”	understood	broadly	as	an	internal	 science.222	 Already	 in	 1991	 Larry	 Fahlberg	 and	 Lauri	 Fahlberg	 saw	 a	contemplative	approach	in	the	sciences	to	be	on	the	rise,	noting:	A	 type	 of	 scientist	 is	 emerging	 today	 who	 has	 studied	 and	 used	 both	 empirical	 and	phenomenological/hermeneutic,	or	descriptive	and	interpretive	sciences,	respectively,	and	is	now	studying	and	mastering	what	has	been	referred	to	as	contemplative	science.223		In	other	words,	scientists	began	to	both	practice	and	study	meditation,	conjoining	the	observations	of	both	approaches	in	analysis.	What	we	see	occurring	here	is	that	the	notion	 of	 meditation	 as	 science	 is	 being	 joined	 with	 the	 science	 of	 meditation.	 A	promotional	 poster	 for	 a	 research	 project	 at	 the	 Santa	 Barbara	 Institute	 for	Consciousness	 Studies	 (est.	 2003)	 provides	 a	 good	 example.	 The	 poster	 reads	“Meditate	to	Advance	Science,”	the	implication	being	that	meditation	has	something	to	 contribute	 to	 science	 in	 the	 scientific	 study	 of	meditation,	 positioning	 the	 two	perspectives	as	united.224	Buddhism	is	not	simply	an	object	of	study,	but	rather	the	claim	repeatedly	appears	that	Buddhism	can	also	advance	science.225	For	example,	neuroscientist	 Christopher	 DeCharms	 suggested	 that	 Buddhism	 can	 contribute	 to	
																																																						220	Wallace	(2000),	13.		221	 Wallace	 (1996),	 144.	 In	 2007,	 Wallace	 further	 developed	 his	 ideas	 of	 ‘contemplative	 science,’	dropping	the	label	(though	not	the	discussion)	of	‘Buddhism’	that	he	had	earlier	affixed	to	the	phrase.	He	proposed	a	new	discipline	under	that	name.	‘Contemplative	science’	is	understood	as	“a	science	of	the	world	of	experience,”	 including	“investigation	of	 the	causal	efficacy	of	consciousness	 […]	 in	 the	natural	 world.”	 Wallace	 (2007a),	 27.	 Similarly,	 Ken	 Wilber	 has	 sought	 to	 integrate	 the	 various	‘sciences’	 of	meditation	 and	 the	 science	of	meditation	 to	 get	 a	more	 complete	picture	of	 the	mind.	Wilber	(1983).	222	For	reviews,	see,	e.g.,	Taber	(1991);	and	Candy	(2004).	On	meditation	in	terms	of	contemplation	and	psychology	see,	e.g.,	Rockefeller	(1994);	Loizzo	&	Blackhall	(1998);	and	Walsh	(2010).	223	Fahlberg	&	Fahlberg	(1991).	224	 Buddhadharma	 (2011).	 See	 also,	 Santa	 Barbara	 Institute	 for	 Consciousness	 Studies	 (2005).	Description	of	the	poster	derived	from	my	personal	collection.	225	Cabezón	(2003),	54.	
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neuroscience	in	that	“the	observational	methods	of	Buddhism	are	what	the	present	science	 of	mind	 largely	 lacks	 in	 systematic	 form,	 and	 could	 almost	 certainly	 learn	from.”226	Indeed,	 the	 continued	 construction	 of	 the	 scientificity	 of	 Buddhism	 is	 now	often	in	the	lab,	creating	a	whole	new	level	of	legitimization	from	and	identification	with	the	scientific	community.	This	involves	the	study	of	meditating	monks	and	of	the	clinical	applications	of	Buddhist	meditation.	The	scientific	study	of	meditation	began	in	the	1960s	in	Japan	where	meditators’	brain	waves	were	documented,	which	was	also	the	time	that	meditation	became	very	popular	across	the	West.227	Since	this	time,	there	have	been	innumerable	studies	on	the	physical	manifestations	of	meditation,	including	 brain	 activity,	 hormonal	 levels,	 heart	 rate,	 attention	 levels,	 emotion	regulation,	 immune	 and	 central	 nervous	 systems	 functions,	 and	 neurological	structures.228	 At	 present,	 there	 are	 thousands	 of	 empirical	 studies	 on	 meditation	available.229	By	the	1980s,	a	“medicalized	understanding	of	meditation”	had	come	to	the	fore,	which	was	thought	to	be	common	across	religions	and	applicable	beyond	them.	 Though	 likened	 to	 science,	meditation	was	 not	 divorced	 from	 religion,	 and	monks	 and	 their	 interpretive	 commentary	became	 the	 central	 objects	 of	 scientific	study.230	 In	some	cases,	 the	monks	even	participated	 in	designing	the	experiments	and	the	conceptual	frameworks	for	interpreting	the	data.231	In	the	1990s,	significant	dialogue	was	 established	between	Eastern	 contemplatives	 and	Western	 scientists,	with	 the	 support	 of	 prestigious	 institutions	 and	 top	universities	worldwide,	while	
																																																						226	DeCharms	(1998),	46.	227	McMahan	(2008),	204;	Baumann	(2002),	92;	and	Campbell	(2007).		228	McMahan	(2008),	204.	For	a	brief	overview	of	the	history	of	meditation	in	Western	science	and	medicine,	see	Harrington	(2008),	205–242.	229	 Lutz,	 Dunne,	 &	 Davidson	 (2007),	 499–500.	 For	 a	 general	 survey	 of	 the	 empirical	 literature	 on	meditation	see	Pagano	&	Warrenburg	(1983);	Delmonte	(1984);	Holmes	(1984);	Delmonte	(1985);	Fenwick	 (1987);	 Murphy	 &	 Donovan	 (1997);	 Austin	 (1998);	 Cahn	 &	 Polich,	 (2006);	 Ospina	 et	 al	(2007);	Hussain	&	Bhushan	(2010);	Sedlmeier	et	al	(2012);	and	Eberth	&	Sedlmeier	(2012).	See	also	Fraser	(2013);	and	the	entire	special	issue	of	Kazak	(2015).	Despite	all	this,	many	of	the	details	about	the	 neurophysiological	 processes	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 long-term	 contemplative	 practice	 remain	unknown.	230	Harrington	(2008),	219–220,	230,	and	233–234.	Harrington	argued	that	there	was	a	phase	of	more	strictly	 medicalized	 understandings	 from	 the	 1960s	 through	 the	 1980s,	 followed	 by	 a	 period	 of	increased	 identification	with	Eastern	religions.	Yet,	 clearly	 the	1960s	and	1970s	was	a	 time	period	characterized	by	an	explosion	of	Buddhism-science	alignment	from	professional	to	popular	contexts.	231	Jinpa	(2010),	874.	
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There	is	a	perceivable	transition	from	marginal	to	mainstream,	as	there	was	a	lot	of	discussion	 about	 the	 ‘integration’	 of	 meditation	 into	 the	 sciences,	 as	 well	 as	 the	increased	acceptance	of	 ‘alternative	medicines’	as	a	legitimate	approach.240	“It’s	no	longer	 considered	 fringe,”	 National	 Institutes	 of	 Health	 senior	 scientist	 Esther	Sternberg	 stated.241	 Today,	 references	 to	 meditation	 can	 easily	 be	 found	 in	mainstream	 encyclopedias	 and	 handbooks	 of	 medicine,	 cognitive	 science,	 and	consciousness	studies,	for	example,	suggesting	that	it	is	indeed	becoming	recognized	at	the	professional	level.242	And	the	stance	taken	continues	to	be	non-reductive.	The	
Cambridge	 Handbook	 of	 Consciousness,	 for	 example,	 described	 the	 reason	 for	 the	selection	of	Buddhist	meditation	for	neuroscientific	research	to	be	because	Buddhist	understanding	“is	strongly	consistent	with	our	knowledge	of	the	neurosciences.”243	By	2003,	New	York	Times	was	asking	“Is	Buddhism	Good	for	Your	Health?”244	As	noted	in	Time	magazine,	“Scientists	study	it.	Doctors	recommend	it.	Millions	[…]	practice	it	every	day.	Why?	Because	meditation	works.”245	This	has	created	a	situation	in	 which	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 are	 strongly	 identified	 with	 one	 another,	 as	something	 that	 belongs	 to	mainstream	 science	 and	 academia	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 yet	having	maintained	its	 identity	as	 ‘religion’	 in	many	cases,	reflecting	a	robust	trend	toward	the	scientificity	of	religion.	In	2005,	the	Society	for	Neuroscience	invited	the	Dalai	Lama	to	speak	about	the	benefits	of	meditations,	demonstrating	the	continuing	role	 of	 religion	 even	 within	 scientific	 communities.	 Though	 there	 was	 some	
																																																						240	See,	e.g.,	Moodley	&	West	(2005);	and	Live	Science	Staff	(2011).	241	Gregoire	(2015).	That	this	is	not	so	marginal	any	longer	is	also	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	the	US	government	 has	 funded	 studies	 of	 integrative	medicine,	 in	 part	 involving	meditation,	 through	 the	National	Center	for	Complementary	and	Alternative	Medicine,	and,	in	the	UK,	we	have	the	example	of	The	Prince’s	Foundation	for	Integrated	Health	and	the	College	of	Medicine	where	the	integration	of	integrative	medicine	is	occurring	as	well.	Furthermore,	a	US	National	Health	Interview	survey	in	2007	concluded	 that	 thirty-eight	 percent	 of	 Americans	 used	 “complementary	 and	 alternative	medicine.”	This	 increase	from	2002	was	found	to	be	 largely	the	result	of	“mind-body	therapies,”	such	as	yoga,	meditation,	and	tai	chi,	constituting	seventy-five	percent	of	the	rise.	The	survey	found	more	than	6.3	million	Americans	used	mind-body	therapies	specifically	due	to	provider	referral,	which	also	indicates	an	 increasing	 level	 of	 acceptance	 and	marks	 a	 turn	 toward	 legitimization	 in	medical	 and	 scientific	fields.	Live	Science	Staff	(2011).	242	See,	e.g.,	Chrisman	&	Longe	(2011).	243	Lutz,	Dunne,	&	Davidson	(2007),	499–503.	244	Harrington	(2008),	241.	245	Quoted	in	Harrington	(2008),	205.	Still,	there	is	significant	debate	about	the	meaning	of	the	terms	‘Buddhist,’	‘meditation,’	and	not	insignificantly	‘works.’	Lopez	(2008),	207.	
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resistance,	with	certain	individuals	arguing	that	religious	perspectives	should	not	be	given	a	voice	in	scientific	venues	no	matter	what	contributions	might	be	made,	in	the	end	over	thirteen	thousand	neuroscientists	came	to	the	event.246	The	attendance,	as	well	as	the	standing	ovation	the	Dalai	Lama	received,	suggests	an	enormous	reception	to	 the	 idea	 that	 religion	might	have	some	scientific	 character,	 that	 there	may	be	a	scientificity	of	Buddhist	meditation.		The	traits	associated	with	meditation	also	greatly	contribute	to	the	retention	of	 religious	 signifiers.	 For	 example,	 one	 experiment	 found	 quantifiably	 that	 the	Buddhist	meditator	 studied	was	 “the	 happiest	man	 in	 the	 world”	 compared	with	previous	 test	 subjects	 based	 on	 brain	 activity	 and	 immune	 system	 response.	 The	empirical	 results	 are	 constructed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 speak	 to	 our	 inner	 lives,	frequently	understood	in	terms	of	religious	journeys.	For	example,	the	results	were	presented	as	 the	discovery	of	a	 “spiritual	 state”	 that	 is	 “beyond	 the	brain.”247	This	demonstrates	 that	 Buddhist	 practice	 produces	 scientific	 data	 that	 in	 turn	 impacts	religious	 outlooks,	 creating	 a	 circular	 influence.	 Religious	 sentiments,	 goals,	 and	practices	 are	 regarded	 as	 founded	 in	 scientific	 results.	 There	 are	 many	 other	examples	 as	well	 that	 have	 drawn	 upon	 scientific	 data	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	 address	existential,	spiritual,	and	religious	questions,	especially	in	popular	literature,	but	also	frequently	found	in	high	profile	newspaper	and	magazine	articles.248	Taking	an	overall	look	at	these	developments,	what	we	see	occur	is	that	these	two	movements	toward	understanding	meditation	as	scientific	and	developing	the	science	of	meditation	have	merged	in	many	ways.249	Some	have	claimed	a	“new	era”	for	 cognitive	 science,	 in	 which	 scientists	 are	 trained	 in	 both	 scientific	 and	contemplative	methods	of	inquiry	in	an	integrative	approach	to	investigation.250	In	fact,	 many	 and	 perhaps	 most	 scientists	 involved	 in	 this	 dialogue	 are	 Buddhist	
																																																						246	Harrington	(2008),	241–242.	247	Shreeve	(2005).	See	also	Vollmer	&	von	Stuckrad	(2017).	248	E.g.,	meditators	 featured	on	the	cover	of	Time	 (US)	magazine	 in	August	2003,	 the	cover	of	Time	(Europe)	 magazine	 in	 October	 2003,	 and	 the	 cover	 of	 Time	 (US,	 Asia,	 and	 Europe)	 magazine	 in	February	2014,	as	well	as	on	the	cover	of	Scientific	American	in	November	2014.	All	reports	addressed	the	‘science	of	meditation,’	extrapolated	to	a	larger	context	of	non-physical	(i.e.,	mental,	spiritual,	etc.)	well-being.	Vollmer	&	von	Stuckrad	(2017).	249	Borup	(2013),	296.	250	Desbordes	&	Negi	(2013).	
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as	 Lopez	 has	 observed.258	 And	 this	 discourse	 evolved	 as	 a	 result	 of	 inclusivity	structuring	the	changes	to	the	terms	 ‘Buddhism’	and	 ‘science.’	The	 ‘science’	 that	 is	being	 likened	 to	 religion	 is	 the	 ‘science’	 of	 inclusivity,	 whereby	 ‘religion’	 is	 not	excluded.	Because	 inclusivity	 set	 the	parameters	of	engagement,	when	similarities	are	drawn	upon,	the	result	is	a	non-reductive	relational	construct.	As	evidence	to	this,	this	form	of	Buddhism	continues	to	retain	its	“‘unscientific’	elements,”	as	McMahan	put	 it.259	 Though	 describing	 them	 as	 ‘unscientific’	 rests	 on	 notions	 of	 mutual	exclusivity,	 it	 still	 reorganizes	 the	 constellations	 of	 meaning	 surround	 ‘religion’	relative	 to	 ‘science.’	 This	 is	 because	 being	 ‘unscientific’—understood	 to	 signify	religion,	 which	 was	 a	 result	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity—is	 not	 treated	 as	 mutually	exclusive	 with	 science.	 And	 the	 role	 that	 mutual	 exclusivity	 continues	 to	 play	 is	further	evidence	to	my	central	claim	in	this	work	regarding	the	relational	nature	of	discursive	change.	Though	the	signifiers	and	the	concept	‘science’	are	taken	as	‘not	excluding	religion,’	many	of	the	signifiers	of	science	are	those	that	emerged	as	per	mutual	 exclusivity.	 Buddhism	 and	 science	 are	 said	 to	 hold	 in	 common	 critical	investigation,	 theoretical	 understandings,	 the	 psychologization	 of	 the	 mind,	empiricism,	and	an	emphasis	on	fact	and	rationality	over	belief,	for	instance.260		Despite	the	continuing	influence	of	this	relational	construct,	inclusivity	is	the	construct	that	is	structuring	the	interpretation	of	such	likenings.	We	can	see	this	in	that	similarities	are	not	taken	as	 identities.	The	non-reduction	of	similarities	often	involves	the	maintenance	of	differentiation,	but	in	such	cases	differences	are	treated	as	complementarities.	As	one	scholar	put	it,	“The	relationship	between	science	and	Buddhism	is	not	contradictory,	for	each	can	mutually	understand	the	knowledge	and	wisdom	of	the	other	[…].”261	We	have	also	seen	several	examples	in	which	the	two	are	framed	in	service	of	one	another,	as	mutually	supportive	in	various	ways,	such	as	in	terms	of	expanding	knowledge	in	both	spheres.	Such	an	exchange	between	Buddhism	
																																																						258	 Lopez	 (2012),	 5.	 To	 be	 clear,	 Lopez	 does	 not	 support	 the	 application	 of	 this	 interpretation	throughout	 Buddhist	 history.	 He	 merely	 noted	 this	 historical	 development	 in	 the	 perception	 and	reception	of	Buddhism	in	the	contemporary	period.	259	McMahan	(2011),	137.	260	Borup	(2013),	296;	Nabeshima	(2003),	85–86;	Nakasone	(2003),	76;	and	Cho	&	Squier	(2016),	25–48.	261	Nabeshima	(2003),	86.	
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understanding	 how	 and	 why	 these	 inaccuracies	 were	 taken	 to	 be	 accurate,	understanding	the	minds	and	motives	of	the	people	who	formed	movements	so	large	as	to	continue	to	inform	our	discussions	today.	As	McMahan	noted:		[T]he	many	modernist	scholarly	and	popular	constructions	of	Buddhism,	some	of	which	have	indeed	been	fantasies,	nevertheless	have	not	been	idle	fantasies.	They	have	been	productive,	fashioning	of	new	ways	of	being	Buddhist	practiced	by	 living,	breathing	people	around	the	globe.	Fantasy,	as	the	psychoanalysts	have	told	us,	is	not	something	easily	dismissed.	It	tells	us	 important	 things	about	 the	 fantasizer	and	can	transform	that	which	 is	 fantasized	about.	Modern	 representations	 of	 Buddhism,	 even	when	 they	 have	 been	 inadequate	 as	 historical	description,	have	conditioned	what	Buddhism	has	become.	Seeing	Buddhist	modernism	solely	in	terms	of	representations	and	scholarly	construction,	therefore,	neglects	the	most	important	thing	 to	 the	 historian	 of	 religions:	 that	 a	 novel,	 historically	 unique	 form	 of	 Buddhism	 has	emerged	[…].278		This	 form	 of	 Buddhism,	 I	 argue,	 came	 to	 be	 through	 a	 relationalization	 of	Buddhism	and	 science	 that	 culminated	 into	 a	 very	 real	 phenomenon	of	 historical,	discursive,	and	social	 interest.	Buddhism	has	come	to	be	 thought	of	as	compatible	with	science	to	a	greater	degree	than	any	other	religion.279	I	would	argue	it	has	indeed	
become	 compatible	 via	 it	 effective	 engagement	 with	 science.280	 As	 Kocku	 von	Stuckrad	has	observed,	a	key	element	of	the	contemporary	religious	landscape	is	the	explicit	use	of	scientific	frameworks	of	meaning	and	“Rather	than	constructing	a	clear	distinction	 between	 religion	 and	 science,	 these	 understandings	 of	 religion	incorporate	scientific	language	into	their	own	worldviews.”	This	includes	“a	blending	of	 domains	 rather	 than	 a	 simple	 differentiation	 and	 polemical	 disjunction	 of	knowledge	 systems,”	 producing	 “a	 whole	 new	 field	 of	 religious	 convictions	 and	practices.”281	The	scientificity	of	Buddhism	is	not	an	isolated	incident,	but	rather	is	demonstrative	of	a	larger	movement	toward	representation	constructs	applied	to	the	religion-science	relation	that	historians	cannot	ignore.	While	scholars	of	Buddhism	continue	to	debate	whether	the	religion	can	be	considered	 scientific,	 scientists	 and	Buddhists	 have	moved	 forward	with	 research	and	dialogue	in	utter	disregard	of	their	conclusions.	From	the	perspective	of	these	
																																																						278	 McMahan	 (2008),	 21.	 Emphasis	 original.	 See	 also	 ibid.,	 114–115	 where	 he	 reiterated	 this	conclusion.	279	Lopez	(2005),	2.	280	For	a	similar	argument,	see	McMahan	(2008),	116	and	211;	and	McMahan	(2011).	281	von	Stuckrad	(2015),	203	and	205.	
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either	 a	 scientific	 religion—as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 scientificity	 of	 Buddhism—or	 a	religious	science.	For	many,	quantum	physics	fit	the	latter	bill.	Still,	 there	were	deep	divisions	about	how	to	reconcile	 religion	and	science	that	 often	 led	 the	 scientific	 community,	 among	 others,	 to	 formulate	 scientific	practices,	 goals,	 and	 beliefs	 in	 terms	 of	 some	 generalized	 religious	 culture,	 like	‘spiritualism’	 and	 ‘mysticism.’7	 Constructing	 a	 universal	 religion	 allowed,	conceptually	speaking,	the	likening	of	science	to	religion	across	the	board,	without	being	caught	up	on	the	details	of	differing	dogmas.	As	David	McMahan	noted,	“these	universalist	articulations	of	mysticism	and	spirituality	[…]	stem	from	the	same	desire	[…]	to	establish	universal	truth	by	direct	encounter,	thereby	establishing	a	language	of	truth	that	transcends	the	plural	and	parochial	truth	claims	of	the	religions.”8	This	universalization	 is	 also	 effective	 because	 both	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘spirituality’	 and	‘mysticism’	have	also	been	typically	used	to	refer	to	a	generalized	concept	of	‘religious	experience,’	which	is	considered	separate	from	specific	tenets	of	belief	(see	Chapter	Four).	 For	 instance,	 the	 scholar	 of	 religion	 Rudolf	 Otto	 (1869–1937)	 described	“spiritual	experience”	as	having	“an	ultimate	inward	hidden	similarity	of	the	human	spirit,	and	justifies	us	in	speaking	of	a	uniform	nature	of	mysticism.”9	As	in	the	case	of	Otto,	mysticism,	spirituality,	and	religion	are	often	conflated	in	this	discourse,	with	no	clear	delineation	between	them	from	academic	to	popular	literature.10	Focusing	on	a	generalized	experience	and	deemphasizing	the	variety	among	the	various	religions	makes	the	 ‘religion’	of	mysticism	and	spirituality	particularly	 inclusive,	whether	 in	relation	to	other	religions	or	other	knowledge	systems,	like	science.11		
																																																						7	Gilbert	(1997),	274;	and	Sharf	(2000),	267.	8	McMahan	(2008),	206.	9	Otto	(1932),	v.	Radhakrishnan	(1940),	viii–ix,	58,	and	60–61	also	exhibited	similar	conceptualization.	See	also	Restivo	(1983),	55–56;	Routh	(1937),	360–363;	and	Gallagher	(1970).	10	 Sharf	 (2000),	 268.	 Some	 examples—specifically	 in	 the	 context	 of	 likening	 physics	 to	 religion—include,	Capra	(2000	[1975]),	19;	Josephson	(1987),	15	and	18;	and	Goswami	(2000),	xii–xiii.	11	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	Four,	the	notion	of	religion	as	a	social	unifier	necessitated	the	identification	of	religion	with	the	domain	of	subjectivity	in	order	to	avoid	the	problem	of	differing	dogmas.	This	also	put	religion	within	the	framework	of	science,	as	a	symbol	of	society.	In	the	case	of	scientification,	this	led	to	the	reduction	of	religion	to	social	and	psychological	 factors.	However,	 the	 formulation	of	 the	essence	of	religion	in	terms	of	experience	also	lent	itself	to	the	likening	of	religion	and	science,	as	“the	notion	of	religious	experience	provided	new	grounds	upon	which	to	defend	religion	against	secular	and	scientific	critique.”	Sharf	(2000),	271.	Since	one	of	the	main	critiques	of	religion	in	conversation	with	science	was	institutionalized	dogma,	the	emphasis	on	experience	and	feeling	resolved	the	issue.	
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Many	distinguished	professionals	and	scientists	have	argued	for	the	functional	vitality	 of	 mysticism	 in	 comprehending	 the	 world.	 For	 example,	 philosopher	 of	science	 Job	 Kozhamthadam	 stated,	 “A	 healthy	 partnership	 between	 science	 and	mysticism	 is	 the	 best	 course	 of	 action	 for	 any	 serious,	 in-depth	 apprehension	 of	reality.”12	Similarly,	historian	and	philosopher	of	religion	Richard	H.	Jones	argued	that	
alone	mysticism	and	science	are	lame,	but	together	“give	cognitive	insights	into	the	nature	 of	 reality.”	 Reductionism	 is	 avoided	 and	 differences	 are	 treated	 as	complementary	because	“Both	enterprises	are	accepted	as	separate	and	necessary	for	a	fuller	understanding	of	reality.”13	As	discussed	in	the	previous	two	chapters,	this	is	a	conceptual	consequence	of	the	interplay	between	inclusivity	and	religion-science	likening	because	similarities	are	not	identities	and	thus	differentiation	is	maintained.	According	to	the	popular	astrophysicist	Carl	Sagan	(1934–1996),	“Science	is	not	only	compatible	with	spirituality;	it	is	a	profound	source	of	spirituality.	[…]	The	notion	that	science	and	spirituality	are	somehow	mutually	exclusive	does	a	disservice	to	both.”14	These	types	of	resolutions	for	religion	and	science,	drawing	upon	the	inclusivity	and	representation	constructs,	 found	 fertile	ground	 in	 the	science	of	quantum	physics.	This	 field	 proved	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	most	 successful	 venues	 for	 likening	 science	 to	religion,	present	from	the	birth	of	quantum	theory	to	today.15	For	example,	physicist	Lawrence	 Beynam	 argued	 that	 with	 the	 discovery	 of	 quantum	 physics	 “we	 have	stumbled	 upon	 a	 comprehensive	 model	 for	 mystical	 experiences,	 which	 has	 the	additional	 advantage	 of	 deriving	 from	 the	 forefront	 of	 contemporary	 physics.”16	“[T]he	 new	 physics	 is	 offering	 us	 a	 scientific	 basis	 for	 religion,”	 another	 author	remarked,	reflecting	a	wide	discursive	and	intellectual	trend	that	has	been	going	on	for	nearly	a	century.17		
																																																						12	Quoted	in	Das	(2011),	102.		13	Jones	(2008),	211	and	213–214.	14	Quoted	in	Nanda	(2012).	15	 While	 physics	 is	 most	 typically	 aligned	 with	 Eastern	 religious	 traditions,	 including	 Buddhism,	Hinduism,	and	Daoism,	for	a	discussion	relative	to	other	religious	traditions	(primarily	Christianity)	see	Polkinghorne	(2007b).	16	Quoted	in	Wilber	(1982),	157.	17	Talbot	(1980),	161.	
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transformation	 of	 signifiers	 of	 ‘religion,’	 fluctuating	 between	 supernaturalism	 and	naturalism	and	superstition	and	rationality,	for	instance.	In	this	case	study,	something	very	different	occurred,	making	quantum	physics	particularly	suited	for	exemplifying	the	religiosity	of	science.		
	
2 History	of	‘Religion’	in	Quantum	Physics		Quantum	theory	developed	in	the	first	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	in	response	to	 some	 increasingly	 persistent	 problems	 unresolved	 by	 classical	 physics.21	 As	 a	solution	to	some	of	these	problems,	Planck—who	ended	up	receiving	the	Nobel	Prize	for	his	work—suggested	that	energy	exists	as	discrete	units,	or	‘quanta,’	rather	than	continuous	ones	as	 in	 the	classical	view.22	Niels	Bohr	(1885–1962),	another	Nobel	Laureate	in	physics,	applied	similar	principles	to	other	problems	of	classical	physics	and	put	forth	his	hypothesis	that	when	an	electron	moves	from	one	discrete	orbit	to	another,	it	does	not	pass	the	space	in	between—rather	it	instantaneously	disappears	and	reappears.23	This	discontinuous	movement	is	referred	to	as	‘jumping	orbit’	or	as	a	 ‘quantum	 leap.’	 Quantum	 leaps	 violate	 the	 classical	 mechanical	 view	 that	 all	particles	must	follow	continuous	trajectories	through	space,	which	had	allowed	for	clear,	deterministic	outcomes	that	could	be	accurately	predicted.	The	search	for	an	alternative	to	classical	physics	was	on.		Two	 theories	 of	 quantum	 phenomena	 had	 emerged	 by	 1926:	 Werner	Heisenberg’s	(1901–1976)	matrix	mechanics	and	Erwin	Schrödinger’s	(1887–1961)	wave	mechanics.	Max	Born	(1882–1970)	and	Paul	Dirac	(1902–1984)	found	that	the	two	theories	expressed	the	same	general	principles	and	John	von	Neumann	(1903–1957)	 mathematically	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 two	 theories	 are	 experimentally	equivalent.	Furthermore,	both	theories	give	rise	to	the	‘uncertainty	principle.’24	The	
																																																						21	Polkinghorne	(2002),	6–8;	Dickson	(2003),	670–671;	and	Baggott	(2004),	9–12.		22	Polkinghorne	(2002),	6–8;	Dickson	(2003),	671;	and	Baggott	(2004),	15–18.	23	 Bohr’s	 ideas	 of	 discontinuity	were	 influenced	 by	 his	mentor	 and	 friend,	 the	Danish	 philosopher	Harald	Høffding,	which	may	account	for	some	of	his	‘mystical’	leanings.	On	the	social	and	philosophical	sources	of	Bohr’s	quantum	theory,	see	Feuer	(1974),	109–157.	24	Dickson	(2003),	671–672.	
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uncertainty	principle	states	that	it	is	not	possible	to	simultaneously	and	accurately	measure	 both	 position	 and	 momentum,	 or	 other	 ‘canonical	 conjugate	 quantities’	(observables	 that	 exclude	 observation	 of	 its	 pair),	 something	 that	 “the	 classical	physicist	 would	 regard	 as	 half-knowledge.”25	 Uncertainty,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	‘indeterminacy,’	is	the	notion	that	quantum	events	are	not	caused	deterministically	as	in	the	classical	view,	but	rather	probabilistically.26		In	1964,	John	Bell	(1928–1990)	found	that	no	matter	what	interpretation	of	quantum	physics	is	adopted	it	must	account	for	nonlocality.27	‘Nonlocality’	is	the	term	applied	 to	 the	 experimentally	 confirmed	 principle	 that	 pairs	 of	 particles	 are	correlated	without	any	common	cause.28	Put	differently,	while	the	pairs	of	particles	act	in	concert,	a	cause	cannot	be	identified	that	is	common	to	both.	Even	though	there	is	 no	 physical	 exchange	 of	 cause	 and	 effect	 and	 no	 local	 contact	 (hence	 the	terminology),	 the	 state	of	 one	particle	 instantaneously	 affects	 the	 state	of	 its	pair.	Again,	the	classical	view	fails	here.		As	 the	 field	 developed,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 reality	 at	 the	 quantum	 level	displayed	discontinuity,	indeterminism,	and	nonlocality,	as	well	as	superposition,	and	strongly	suggests	a	role	for	subjectivity	and	immaterialism	(the	latter	three	discussed	below).	None	of	this	was	permitted	in	the	classical	worldview,	which	was	part	and	parcel	 to	 religion-science	 differentiation	 to	 begin	with.	 As	 such,	 the	 contrast	with	classical	physics	made	quantum	physics	religion-like	in	terms	of	 its	signifiers.	This	was	not	lost	on	the	founders	of	the	field	and	quantum	physics	was	regularly	likened	to	religion	in	the	community	and	beyond.		
																																																						25	Polkinghorne	(2002),	33.	See	also	Baggott	(2004),	36–39.		26	 ‘Uncertainty’	and	 ‘indeterminacy’	are	often	used	 interchangeably	 in	 the	relevant	 literature.	Some	differentiate	between	the	two,	suggesting	the	former	refers	to	the	absence	of	the	subjective	knowledge	of	the	precise	values	of	the	observables,	while	the	latter	refers	to	the	objective	absence	of	the	precise	values	 of	 the	 observables.	 Jammer	 (1974),	 61.	 See	 also	 ibid.,	 79–84,	 which	 also	 includes	 several	relevant	references;	and	Hilgevoord	(2015).	27	Bell	(1964).	See	also	Seager	(2002),	230.	28	On	experimental	data,	see,	e.g.,	Hensen	et	al	(2015).	
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Not	 only	 is	 interconnectedness	 associated	 with	 religion	 via	 general	metaphysical	considerations,	it	is	also	suggested	to	be	the	mechanism	by	which	psi	phenomena	 and	 Jungian	 ‘synchronicity’	might	 occur—the	 latter	 term	 referring	 to	acausal,	meaningful	coincidences.45	Due	to	the	implications	of	quantum	physics,	Bell	himself	 expressed	 open-mindedness	 toward	 parapsychology,	 psi	 phenomena,	 and	mystical	interpretations	of	quantum	physics.46	Theoretical	physicist	Pascual	Jordan	(1902–1980),	who	also	contributed	to	the	developments	of	quantum	physics	and	was	a	 collaborator	 of	 von	Neumann’s,	 even	 dedicated	 a	 book	 to	 the	 topic	 of	 quantum	physics	and	parapsychology,	concluding	quantum	theory	could	account	for	telepathy	and	clairvoyance.47	Theoretical	physicist	and	Nobel	laureate	Wolfgang	Pauli	(1900–1958),	 another	 founder,	 also	 delved	 into	 the	 intersection	 of	 quantum	physics	 and	parapsychology.48	 Bohm,	 too,	 contributed	 to	 laboratory	 investigations	 of	 psi	phenomena,	discussing	the	results	in	the	top	scientific	journal	Nature.49		The	 question	 has	 repeatedly	 come	 up,	 “Was	 action	 at	 a	 distance	 really	 so	different	 from	 clairvoyance,	 psychokinesis,	 or	 the	 Eastern	 mystics’	 emphasis	 on	holism?”	 Further	 demonstrating	 the	 mainstream	 level	 of	 this	 discourse,	 such	inquiries	have	even	occupied	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	of	the	United	States	and	the	 military	 and	 defense	 laboratories	 in	 America	 and	 Soviet	 Russia.50	 From	 the	founders,	 to	 academics,	 to	 popular	 authors,	 to	 governmental	 agencies,	 nonlocality	and	 entanglement	 have	 been	 interpreted,	 to	 a	 significant	 degree,	 as	 religiously	significant	without	reducing	the	science	to	religion.			
																																																						45	Radin	(2006);	von	Lucado	&	Romer	(2007);	Kaiser	(2011),	65–95;	Peat	(1987);	Asprem	(2014),	144–146	and	371;	and	Koestler	(1972),	94–101.	Others	have	suggested	that	quantum	physics	can	account	for	 parapsychological	 phenomena	 in	 other	ways	 as	well.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Koestler	 (1972),	 70–81;	 LeShan	(1974),	82–95;	Toben	(1975),	63–84	and	151–157;	and	Beynam	(1977).	46	Kaiser	(2011),	167–168.	47	Discussed	in	Kaiser	(2011),	68;	and	Asprem	(2014),	140–141	and	144.	See	also	Jordan	(1955).	48	Asprem	(2014),	146–147;	and	Koestler	(1972),	90–91.	49	Discussed	in	Kaiser	(2011),	72.	For	the	article	in	Nature,	see	Hasted	et	al	(1975).	See	also	Hasted	et	al	(2016).	50	Kaiser	(2011),	xxiv,	65,	and	90.	See	also	Koestler	(1972),	16–18.	
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2.2 Indeterminism	as	‘Religious’	The	 failure	 of	 the	 causal	 worldview	 at	 the	 quantum	 level	 and	 the	 rise	 of	indeterminism	 resulted	 in	 a	 widespread	 “revolt	 against	 determinism,”	 as	 this	worldview	 is	 “in	 no	 way	 operative	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 scientists,”	 according	 to	philosopher	 Julius	Weinberg	 (1908–1971).51	Though	 this	 statement	 is	not	entirely	accurate	in	regard	to	the	macro	level	of	classical	physics,	there	has	been	widespread	acceptance	of	indeterminism	at	the	micro	level	in	the	scientific	community.52	And	this	legitimated	a	renewed	and	serious	consideration	of	religious	 ideas	of	 free	will	and	divine	 action,	 which	 is	 typically	 thought	 to	 require	 some	 indeterminism	 in	 the	workings	of	nature.53	This	is	because	determinism,	which	accompanies	any	general	law	 of	 causation	 described	 by	 classical	 physics,	 has	 often	 been	 constructed	 as	mutually	 exclusive	 with	 all	 types	 of	 agency,	 from	 the	 individual	 to	 the	 divine.54	Though	there	were	exceptions	to	this	view,	many	upheld	this	position	of	exclusivity,	including	Einstein.55		In	short,	the	intellectual	rejection	of	free	will	could	be	found	in	the	“apparently	uninterrupted	 causal	 chain”	 of	 physical	 processes,	 as	 Bohr	 noted.56	 And	 yet,	 as	Heisenberg	 pointed	 out,	 “the	 incorrectness	 of	 the	 law	 of	 causality	 is	 a	 definitely	established	 consequence	 of	 quantum	 mechanics	 itself.”57	 “Causality	 is	 no	 longer	
applicable,	 it	 is	 true.”58	 Causal	 laws	 are	 “meaningless”	 in	 the	 context	 of	 quantum	physics,	 Bohm	 added.59	 As	 such,	 the	 indeterministic	 quantum	world	 is	 thought	 to	possibly	 suggest	 or,	 for	 some,	 confirm	 free	 will.60	 As	 precise	 predictability	 for	 a	
																																																						51	First	quote	Feuer	(1974),	177–199.	See	also	ibid.,	158.	Second	quote	Weinberg	(1973–1974),	278.	52	Some	eminent	physicists	have	also	argued	for	indeterminism	at	the	macro	level,	demonstrated	by	the	thought	experiment	known	as	Schrödinger’s	cat.	There	is	experimental	evidence	supporting	this	view	with	relatively	large	(compared	to	the	scales	of	quantum	physics)	objects.	See	Wang	et	al	(2016).	However,	further	discussion	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	53	E.g.,	Weinberg	(1992),	77.	Other	examples	will	be	provided	in	the	following	discussion.	54	Bochner	(1973–1974),	495–496.	55	 Jaeger	 (2010),	94–96.	On	how	 free	will	 is	 thought	 to	be	negated	by	determinism,	 see	Murphy	&	Brown	(2007),	267–272	and	passim;	and	Stapp	(2011),	154.	See	also	Stanley	(2015),	194–241	on	this	issue	in	combination	with	a	discussion	in	the	historical	context	of	religion	and	science.	56	Quoted	in	Feuer	(1974),	137.	57	Quoted	in	Jammer	(1974),	75.	58	London	&	Bauer	(1983),	220.	Emphasis	original.	59	Bohm	(1951),	625.	60	For	a	discussion	on	likening	religion	and	science	in	the	context	of	free	will	and	indeterminism,	see	Davies	(1983),	135–143.	
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certain	particle	 is	 limited,	 free	will	 is	suggested	to	 function	 in	 these	 indeterminate	workings	 of	 nature,	 as	 discussed	 by	 scholar	 of	 religion	 Christopher	 Mooney	 and	theoretical	biologist	Stuart	A.	Kauffman,	for	example.61	Bohr	observed,	“We	are	so	far	removed	from	a	causal	description	that	an	atom	in	a	stationary	state	may	in	general	even	be	said	to	possess	a	free	choice	between	various	possible	transitions	to	other	stationary	states.”62	This	is	also	partly	due	to	the	role	of	the	observer	in	the	transition	from	 an	 indeterminate	 to	 determinate	 state,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 further	 below.	However,	here	it	is	important	to	note	that	for	Bohr,	“the	impossibility	in	introspection	of	 sharply	distinguishing	between	subject	and	object	as	 is	essential	 to	 the	 ideal	of	causality	would	 seem	 to	provide	 the	natural	play	 for	 the	 feeling	of	 free	will.”63	As	physicist	 Henry	 P.	 Stapp	 interpreted	 it,	 “mental	 intent”	 is	 incorporated	 into	 the	quantum	laws	themselves.64	Sociologist	Lewis	S.	Feuer	(1912–2002)	aptly	noted,	this	“seemed	 to	 dissolve	 the	 tormenting	 anxiety	 of	 determinism	 counterposed	 to	 free	will,”	or,	in	other	words,	it	dissolved	the	relational	opposition,	as	determinism	at	the	macro	level	does	not	interfere	with	indeterminism	at	the	micro	level.65		 As	stated,	classical	physics	was	also	thought	to	negate	a	purposeful	God.66	By	the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	 even	 religious	 people	 increasingly	 understood	 “God’s	powers	as	locked	into	nature’s	laws.	Even	with	God’s	help	men	could	not	leap	over	nature	or	culture	to	challenge	the	‘realities’	of	life	as	it	is.”67	With	the	development	of	indeterminism,	this	premise	too	was	thrown	into	question.	Outside	of	their	scientific	research	papers,	Einstein,	Bohr,	and	many	others	discussed	here	spoke	and	wrote	
																																																						61	Harris	(2002),	225;	and	Kauffman	(2008),	198–200	and	227–229.	There	is	also	a	significant	body	of	literature	on	this	topic	in	philosophy	journals	as	well.	See,	e.g.,	Margenau	(1967).	62	Quoted	in	Feuer	(1974),	137.	Cf.	Bohr	(1998),	88:	“I	am	far	from	sharing,	however,	the	widespread	opinion	 that	 the	 recent	 development	 in	 the	 field	 of	 atomic	 physics	 could	 help	 us	 in	 deciding	 such	questions	as	 ‘mechanism	or	vitalism’	and	 ‘free	will	or	causal	necessity’	 in	 favor	of	one	or	 the	other	alternative.	 Just	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 paradoxes	 of	 atomic	 physics	 could	 be	 solved	 not	 by	 a	 one-sided	attitude	 towards	 the	 old	 problem	 of	 ‘determinism	 or	 indeterminism,’	 but	 only	 by	 examining	 the	possibilities	of	observation	and	definition,	should	rather	stimulate	us	to	a	renewed	examination	of	the	position	in	this	respect	in	the	biological	and	psychological	problems	at	issue.”	63	Bohr	(1998),	90.	64	Stapp	(2011),	155.	65	Feuer	(1974),	143–144.	66	On	how	divine	action	is	thought	to	be	negated	by	determinism,	see,	e.g.,	Alston	(1999),	187–188;	and	Stenger	(2009),	209	and	214.	67	McLoughlin	(1978),	156.	
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freely	and	prolifically	about	God,	design,	and	creation	and	the	relevancy	of	quantum	physics	 to	 these	 views.	 As	 physicist,	 theologian,	 and	 Anglican	 priest	 John	Polkinghorne	noted:	The	widespread	presence	of	intrinsic	unpredictabilities	[…]	meant	that	the	processes	of	the	world	 were	 not	 as	 tame	 and	 controllable	 as	 classical	 Newtonian	 thinking	 had	 seemed	 to	suggest.	[…]	it	has	become	clear	that	the	‘defeaters’	(those	who	claimed	that	science	had	ruled	out	 divine	 providence)	 have	 been	 defeated.	 To	make	 the	 assertion	 that	 divine	 action	was	excluded	by	physics	was,	 in	 fact,	 to	make	a	metaphysical	claim	open	to	rational	refutation.	Given	philosophical	perplexities	about	the	nature	of	causality,	general	argument	could	hardly	be	expected	to	 lead	to	a	more	specific	result.	After	all,	science	 is	currently	unable	to	give	a	detailed	account	of	how	it	is	possible	for	human	beings	to	act	as	intentional	agents.	Yet	if	we	can	influence	the	future	 in	this	way,	 it	would	be	highly	surprising	 if	God	were	to	be	totally	bereft	of	a	similar	capacity.68	 	Others	have	 likened	 indeterminism	 to	divine	 action	 as	well,	 such	 as	physicist	 and	priest	William	Pollard	(1911–1989),	who	maintained	that	uncertainty	allows	God	to	interact	with	 the	world	 through	natural	means,	without	 contravening	 any	natural	laws.69	Science	writer	Jim	Baggott	also	noted	that	since	the	emergence	of	quantum	theory,	 many	 have	 argued	 the	 explanatory	 need	 for	 a	 “substance	 with	 infinite	attributes.”	He	then	likened	the	scientific	idea	of	this	infinite	substance	to	religious	understandings,	interpreted	as	something	akin	to	‘God.’	Baggott	further	put	forth	the	possible	 interpretation	 of	 indeterminacy	 as	 “God’s	 guiding	 hand”	 and	 wondered	whether	we	have	“finally	run	up	against	nature’s	grand	architect.”70		Still,	just	because	indeterminism	is	likened	to	free	will	and	divine	action	does	not	mean	that	the	science	is	thought	to	be	just	religion	or	the	religion	just	science.	There	is	room	for	both	because	determinism	and	agency	are	not	mutually	exclusive—determinism	resides	at	the	macro	level,	while	agency—or	at	least	indeterminism—can	be	found	at	the	micro	level.	Classical	physics	remains	viable,	with	the	end	result	being,	 for	many,	 that	 such	views	do	not	 exclude	other	ways	of	 thinking	 about	 the	world,	making	the	stance	non-reductive.			
																																																						68	Polkinghorne	(2007a),	14–15.	69	Harris	(2002),	225.	Harris	cited	“Willard	Pollard,”	but	this	is	a	typo.	Other	examples	include	Alston	(1999),	 188–189;	Ellis	 (1995),	 389;	 and	Russell	 (1998),	 203.	 See	 also	 Stenger	 (2009),	 213–220,	 in	which	further	examples	are	provided.	70	Baggott	(2004),	256–257	and	260.	
Religiosity	
	 320	
2.3 Superposition	as	‘Religious’	Indeterminacy	 has	 further	 implications	 in	 quantum	 physics	 that	 distance	 it	 from	exclusive	science.	In	the	case	of	canonical	conjugate	quantities,	if	one	of	the	pair	of	observables	is	observed	and	shown	to	have	a	definite	value,	then	the	other	one	of	the	pair	that	is	excluded	from	observation	will	be	in	a	‘superposition’	of	many	states.	In	this	state,	a	particle	is	here,	there,	and	at	the	same	time	many	other	places,	with	a	bit	here	and	bit	there	as	well.	In	the	classical	view,	this	superposition	is	impossible,	as	the	condition	of	being	here	is	seen	as	mutually	exclusive	with	being	somewhere	else,	which	is	intuitive	based	on	our	daily	experiences	of	which	things	have	a	definite	place	and	position.	In	contrast,	superposition	demonstrates	that	the	laws	of	nature	produce	statistical	probabilities—not	actualities—for	a	given	event	to	occur.	The	probabilistic	nature	of	quantum	physics	was	an	observation	that	won	Born	the	Noble	Prize	in	1954,	despite	the	fact	that	many	scientists	were	resistant	to	this	notion	that	is	incompatible	with	the	worldview	of	classical	physics.71		A	 physically	 observable	 manifestation	 of	 the	 superposition	 principle	 is	demonstrated	 by	 the	 double-slit	 experiment,	 as	 developed	 by	 polymath	 Thomas	Young	 (1773–1829).	 The	 double-slit	 experiment	 shows	 that	 a	 particle	 acts	 as	 a	particle	or	a	wave	depending	on	whether	or	not	 the	observer	attempts	 to	 identify	where	the	particle	is.	If	the	particle’s	position	is	tracked,	it	will	pass	through	only	one	slot,	A	or	B,	and	create	a	pattern	as	a	particle	would.	If	the	observer	does	not	try	to	identify	whether	the	particle	travels	through	slot	A	or	B,	the	end	pattern	produced	by	the	traveling	electron	indicates	the	particle	has	passed	through	both	slits	A	and	B,	as	if	it	were	a	wave	(in	superposition).	If	you	look	for	a	particle,	you	get	a	particle;	if	you	look	for	a	wave,	you	get	a	wave,	which	for	many	suggests	a	role	for	consciousness—or	 at	 least	 the	 observer—in	 physical	 outcomes.	While	 the	 double-slit	 experiment	originated	as	a	 thought	experiment,	 it	has	now	been	experimentally	demonstrated	that	both	the	wave	and	particle	manifestations	of	a	particle	are	‘physically	real.’72	
																																																						71	Polkinghorne	(2002),	25.	See	also	Jammer	(1974),	39;	and	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	303.	72	 Jammer	 (1974),	 44.	 See	 also	 Jönsson	 (1974);	Merli,	Missiroli,	 &	 Pozzi	 (1976);	 Rosa	 (2012);	 and	Rodgers	(2002),	the	latter	of	which	refers	to	several	important	experiments.	The	implications	are	so	profound	 and	moving	 that	 the	 2002	 readers	 of	Physics	World	 magazine	 voted	 Young’s	 double-slit	
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	 One	way	this	has	been	interpreted	is	that	the	wave	is	the	physical	reality	of	the	potential	of	a	particle	to	be	in	various	determinate	states.	Heisenberg,	for	example,	conceived	 of	 these	 probability	waves	 as	 physically	 real	 in	 a	way	 he	 compared	 to	Aristotle’s	notion	of	potentia.	Heisenberg	elaborated:		The	concept	that	events	are	not	determined	in	a	peremptory	manner,	but	that	the	possibility	or	‘tendency’	for	an	event	to	take	place	has	a	kind	of	reality—a	certain	intermediate	layer	of	reality,	halfway	between	the	massive	reality	of	matter	and	the	intellectual	reality	of	the	idea	or	the	image	[…]	In	modern	quantum	theory	[…]	it	is	formulated	quantitatively	as	probability	and	subject	to	mathematically	expressible	laws	of	nature.73		Here	 we	 see	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 wave	 as	 expressing	 immaterial	 (‘intermediate,’	‘intellectual,’	etc.)	potentiality	as	physically	real.	This	is	why	wave-particle	nature	is	often	described	as	a	‘duality,’	as	wave	and	particle	physics	give	what	appear	to	be	two	mutually	exclusive	accounts	of	physical	reality.74		Observations	resulting	in	definite	outcomes	(like	the	location	of	the	particle)	are	 accompanied	 by	 moments	 of	 instantaneous	 and	 discontinuous	 change	 from	superposition	to	specific	position.	This	immediate	change	is	referred	to	as	‘collapse,’	counter	to	the	classical	notion	of	a	gradual,	continuous	flow	of	physical	systems.	This	discontinuity	 has	 also	 been	 systematically	 related	 to	 religious	 thought.75	 Bohr’s	notion	of	discontinuity	has	been	suggested	to	be	derived	from	Søren	Kierkegaard’s	(1813–1855)	 conception	 of	 discontinuous	 leaps	 between	 three	 stages	 of	 life:	 the	aesthetic,	the	ethical,	and	the	religious.		[Kierkegaard’s	 idea]	became	part	of	Niels	Bohr’s	deepest	emotional-intellectual	standpoint.	The	atom	in	its	‘stationary	state’	was	later	like	one	of	Kierkegaard’s	stadia	of	existence.	And	the	leap	of	the	electrons	from	one	orbit	to	another	was	like	the	abrupt,	inexplicable	transitions	of	the	self.		
																																																						experiment	as	 “the	most	beautiful	 experiment”	 in	physics	of	 all	 time.	Crease	 (2002).	 See	also	Rosa	(2012),	178.	73	Quoted	in	Jammer	(1974),	44.	74	Jammer	(1974),	67–69.	This,	according	to	Bohr,	was	the	foundation	of	the	entire	theory	of	quantum	physics;	whereas	Heisenberg	was	for	long	convinced	that	“the	particle	picture	and	the	wave	picture	are	merely	two	different	aspects	of	one	and	the	same	physical	reality.”	Heisenberg	eventually	came	to	cede	Bohr’s	argument,	as	indeterminacy	is	always	based	in	the	Einstein-de	Broglie	equations,	which	demonstrate	a	connection	between	wave	and	particle	descriptions,	of	which	wave-particle	duality	is	implicit.	75	 For	 a	 brief	 history	 of	 discontinuity	 in	 religion	 and	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 in	 the	 context	 of	discontinuity	in	science	and	the	general	history	of	thought,	see	Bochner	(1973–1974),	495–497.	
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in	 the	middle	way	of	Madhyamaka	 teachings	of	Buddhism,	which	has	 indeed	been	likened	 to	 wave-particle	 duality	 by	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	 and	 those	 in	 the	 physics	community.79	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 how	we	 experience	 things	 and	 the	 way	 things	 are	independent	 of	 that	 experience	 are	 very	 different	 in	 nature—though	 each	 are	typically	regarded	as	‘real.’	Indeed,	subatomic	scale	entities	act	in	one	way	when	not	experienced	and	another	when	experienced	(i.e.,	observed).		However,	 this	 seeming	 paradox	 of	 dual	 natures	 has	 been	 explained	 by	 the	findings	of	quantum	field	theory.	A	field	is	spread	out	in	space	and	time,	giving	it	a	wavelike	 nature,	 but	 properties	 such	 as	 energy	 and	 momentum	 exhibit	 discrete,	countable	quanta,	like	what	is	expected	from	a	particle.	Thus,	we	have	an	identifiable	state	 in	which	both	 the	wave	and	particle	properties	can	be	clearly	accounted	 for,	making	 dual	 quantum	 phenomena	monistic.80	 And	 yet,	 this	monism	 too	 has	 been	interpreted	as	similar	to	religious	philosophies,	even	influencing	the	formation	of	the	very	idea.	Pauli,	among	the	first	to	develop	a	comprehensive	account	of	quantum	field	theory,	 and	 theoretical	 physicist	 Hermann	 Klaus	 Hugo	 Weyl	 (1885–1955)	 both	conceived	of	‘field’	in	terms	of	a	mystical	union	between	mind	and	physics	(though	each	with	 their	 distinct	 ideas	 of	 what	 this	 ‘mysticism’	 entailed).81	 Pauli	 proposed	“physics	and	psyche	could	be	seen	as	complementary	aspects	of	the	same	reality”	and	argued	 for	 the	 need	 to	 bring	 together	 “rational	 understanding”	 with	 “the	 mystic	experience	of	one-ness.”82	Thus,	whether	in	terms	of	dualism	or	monism,	quantum	physics	was	conceptualized	in	terms	of	a	non-reductive	likening	to	religion.	
	
2.4 Consciousness	as	‘Religious’	This	union	of	physical	reality	and	the	world	of	 the	mind	is	due	to	the	fact	 that	the	double-slit	experiment,	the	delayed	choice	experiment	and	replication	studies,	along	with	the	Aspect	experiment,	among	others,	suggests	according	to	the	researchers	that	truly	 reality	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 a	 determinate	 state	 until	 it	 is	 observed,	 that	 “the	
																																																						79	Oberhaus	(2015).	Other	aspects	of	Buddhism	have	been	compared	to	the	new	physics	as	well.	See	also	 Anon.	 (2015b);	 Zajonc	 &	 Houshmand	 (2004);	Wallace	 (2007b);	 Mansfield	 (2008);	 and	 Capra	(2000	[1975]),	passim.	80	Polkinghorne	(2002),	73–75.		81	Zyga	(2009);	and	Marin	(2009),	810.	82	First	quote	Pruett	(2013b);	and	latter	two	quoted	in	Kaiser	(2011),	68.	
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behaviour	of	the	atom	can	indeed	be	induced	by	our	choice	of	measurement.”83	This	was	a	common	proposition	among	the	founders	of	quantum	physics	and	was	used	to	address	many	paradoxes	in	quantum	theory.		The	use	of	 the	mind	 to	 solve	 issues	 in	quantum	physics	was	not	 limited	 to	theory,	 however.	 Von	 Neumann	 is	 often	 credited	 with	 applying	 consciousness	 to	quantum	equations,	specifically	 in	order	to	solve	the	measurement	problem.84	The	‘measurement’	 of	 the	 measurement	 problem	 refers	 to	 the	 act	 of	 observing	 an	objective	state.	The	 ‘problem’	 is	 that	 the	objective	state	does	not	come	about	until	observed,	 accompanied	 by	 collapse,	 leading	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	 the	 act	 of	measuring	affects	the	physical	state	and	what,	if	any,	is	the	role	of	the	observer	and/or	consciousness	 in	 determining	 physical	 reality.	 As	 physicist	 and	 philosopher	 Max	Jammer	(1915–2010)	noted,	“Thus	measurement,	the	scientist’s	ultimate	appeal	to	nature,	 becomes	 in	 quantum	 mechanics	 the	 most	 problematic	 and	 controversial	notion	because	of	its	key	position.”85	It	is	a	problem	because	classical	physics	does	not	admit	 subjective	causes.	Yet,	 von	Neumann,	among	many	others,	 argued,	 “it	 is	inherently	 entirely	 correct	 that	 the	 measurement	 or	 the	 related	 process	 of	 the	subjective	perception	is	a	new	entity	relative	to	the	physical	environment	and	is	not	reducible	to	the	latter.”86		As	the	objective	state	does	not	come	about	until	observed,	collapse	came	to	be	associated	with	the	immaterial	consciousness	and	its	role	as	observer—though	it	was	hotly	debated	 in	 the	physics	community.	Certainly,	not	everyone	agreed	about	 the	religious	 or	mystical	 implications	 either,	 though	many	did	 see	 challenges	 to	 strict	materialism.	 This	 led	 to	 theories	 of	 observer-induced	 collapse,	 also	 known	 as	 the	consciousness	 hypothesis	 or	 the	 idealist	 interpretation.	 Many	 have	 interpreted	quantum	 physics	 to	 implicate	 “the	 [classical]	 idea	 of	 an	 observable	world,	 totally	
																																																						83	Manning	et	al	(2015).	See	also	Wheeler	(1978);	Aspect,	Grangier,	&	Roger	(1982);	Aspect,	Dalibard,	&	Roger	(1982);	Jacques	et	al	(2007);	Baggott	(2004),	182–184;	and	Kaiser	(2011),	178.	84	 Zyga	 (2009);	 Goswami	 (1997),	 527;	 Faye	 (2015);	 and	McFarlane	 (2000),	 575–576.	 It	 has	 been	suggested,	however,	that	von	Neumann	deliberately	used	ambiguous	terminology	in	the	discussions	at	hand,	so	that	he	left	open	the	possibility	that	he	could	be	interpreted	from	either	side	of	the	debate.	Zyga	(2009).	85	Jammer	(1974),	7.	86	von	Neumann	(1955),	418.	
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The	 ‘complementarity’	 interpretation	was	 a	metaphysical	 duality	 that	Bohr	applied	 to	 the	 further	 development	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 interpretation,	 which	 also	boosted	 parallelism.98	 In	 1926,	 Bohr	 put	 forth	 the	 notion	 that	 quantum	 physics	demonstrates	 a	 complementary	 nature	 of	 ultimate	 reality,	 which	 he	 saw	 in	indeterminacy,	 wave-particle	 duality,	 in	 the	 role	 of	 both	 subject	 and	 object	 in	quantum	 measurement,	 and	 in	 mind-body	 relations.	 Bohr	 argued	 that	 the	 dual	aspects	did	not	contradict	one	another,	but	rather	complemented	each	other	and	thus	must	be	taken	equally	seriously—as	would	be	expected	in	a	religiosity	of	science.99	Because	the	wave-particle	duality	corresponds	to	different	experimental	settings	that	could	not	be	used	simultaneously	and	because	experimental	settings	are	determined	by	the	observer,	Bohr	concluded	the	‘individuality’	of	a	single	atomic	process	was	a	fiction.	And	the	incompatible	information	produced	from	these	settings	indicates	that	the	 settings	 cannot	 be	 connected	 to	 one	 another	 in	 the	 usual	 way	 of	 causality,	requiring	a	replacement	of	the	notion	of	causality	with	the	more	general	category	of	complementarity.100	 “For	 Bohr	 the	 renunciation	 of	 strict	 causality,	 despite	 the	hardship	it	entailed,	was	the	essential	step	to	the	higher	truth	of	complementarity.”101		The	 complementarity	 that	 Bohr	 saw	 in	 the	 workings	 of	 quantum	 physics	brought	to	light	the	problem	of	binary	thinking	in	conceptualization,	which	he	saw	as	an	impediment	to	understanding.	For	example,	Bohr	argued	for	“the	impossibility	of	a	strict	separation	of	phenomena	and	means	of	observation,	and	the	general	limits	of	man’s	 capacity	 to	 create	 concepts,	 which	 have	 their	 roots	 in	 our	 differentiation	between	subject	and	object.”102	Thus,	his	notion	of	complementarity	was	more	than	a	
																																																						98	Baggott	(2004),	106–109	and	181.	See	also	Bohr	(1934);	and	Bohr	(1998).	99	 Polkinghorne	 (2002),	 36.	 Bohr	 never	 clearly	 defined	 ‘complementarity.’	 The	 most	 precise	explanation	of	 the	principle	by	Bohr	 is	 the	 following:	 “[Quantum	physics]	 forces	us	 to	adopt	a	new	mode	of	description	designated	as	complementarity	in	the	sense	that	any	given	application	of	classical	concepts	precludes	the	simultaneous	use	of	the	other	classical	concepts	which	in	a	different	connection	are	equally	necessary	for	the	elucidation	of	phenomena.”	Quoted	in	Jammer	(1974),	89–90.	See	also	Restivo	(1983),	28;	and	Feuer	(1974),	141–146.	On	Bohr’s	application	of	complementarity	to	mind-body	relations,	with	a	discussion,	see	Bedau	(1974),	210–213.	100	Bohr	(1998),	84–85.	101	Feuer	(1974),	141.	102	Quoted	in	Feuer	(1974),	143.	However,	at	another	time,	Bohr	treated	quantum	physics	as	a	model	only	and	suggested	it	did	not	necessarily	tell	us	the	nature	of	reality,	a	question	beyond	the	scope	of	physicists	in	his	view.	Polkinghorne	(2002),	83.	
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quantum	 theory,	 but	 was	 thought	 to	 be	 applicable	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 relational	cognizance.	 In	 this	 way,	 his	 complementarity	 might	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 akin	 to	 the	inclusivity	construct—not	necessarily	 in	 terms	of	 the	religion-science	relation,	but	more	generally	in	terms	of	treating	concepts	as	differentiated,	but	non-oppositional.	After	all,	he	chose	a	yin-yang	symbol—representative	of	a	oneness	in	duality—for	his	coat	 of	 arms	when	 he	was	 knighted	 in	 1947,	with	 the	 inscription	 “Contraria	 sunt	complementa”	(‘opposites	are	complementary’).103	Bohr	applied	the	notion	of	complementarity	beyond	physics	to	biology	and	the	study	of	culture.	Others	have	applied	Bohr’s	idea	to	many	fields	as	well	and	this	has	even	 been	 extended	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 religion-science	 relationship.104	 This	analysis	 reflects	 the	 representation	 construct,	 as	 religion	 and	 science	 are	 seen	 as	“equally	necessary,”	but	at	the	same	time	“neither	can	substitute	for	or	supplant	the	other,”	making	 it	 specifically	 inclusive	and	non-reductive.	Both	are	 “necessary	and	true	 even	 though	 they	 appear	 to	 be	 in	 conflict	with	 each	 other,”	 allowing	 for	 the	maintenance	of	dichotomies.	The	relation	between	Bohr’s	complementarity	and	that	of	religion	and	science	is	more	direct	than	might	appear	in	the	above	parallels	as	“the	belief	[…]	quantum	mechanics	requires	complementarity	has	encouraged	the	belief	in	 the	 complementarity	 of	 science	 and	 religion,”	 thus	 bringing	 together	 the	reconceptualization	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	religiosity	of	science	and	broader	notions	about	the	religion-science	relation.105		 Though	clearly	Bohr	did	not	favor	the	‘mysticism’	label,	at	least	publically	or	in	certain	publics,	he	did	sympathize	with	some	ideas	in	Eastern	philosophy.106	He	admired	 the	messages	of	 the	Buddha	and	 the	Daoist	 sage	Laozi	as	 “parallel	 to	 the	lesson	 of	 atomic	 theory”	 and	 thought	 of	 them	 as	 relevant	 to	 the	 philosophical	implications	of	physics.	At	 the	 same	 time,	Bohr	argued	 that	 the	 “recognition	of	 an	
																																																						103	Crease	(1993),	133;	Restivo	(1983),	8;	Arntz,	Chasse,	&	Vicente	(2005),	60;	and	Feuer	(1974),	145.	As	a	matter	of	interest,	I	also	found	the	yin-yang	symbol	at	the	beginning	of	each	chapter	in	Wheeler	&	Zurek	 (1983),	 a	work	on	quantum	 theory.	Note	 this	 is	not	a	popular	 publication,	 but	 an	 esteemed	university	press	publication,	which	is	indicative	of	the	discursive	impact.		104	Jammer	(1974),	87–89;	Restivo	(1983),	28;	and	Feuer	(1974),	119–130.	105	 Bedau	 (1974),	 205–207.	 For	 another	 example	 of	 religion-science	 complementarity	 inspired	 by	Bohr’s	views,	specifically	on	paradoxes	in	theology,	see	Austin	(1967).	106	On	Bohr’s	selectivity	of	audiences	for	speaking	of	mystical	interpretations,	see	Asprem	(2014),	261.	
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with	the	opposition	between	scientific	and	religious	truth?”	Heisenberg	followed	this	up	with	a	discussion	of	how	typically	science	is	assigned	the	realm	of	the	objective	and	 the	 subject	 has	 been	 “the	 guiding	 image	 of	 Asian	mysticism.”	With	 quantum	physics,	“Our	thinking	moves	somewhere	in	the	middle.”	He	concluded	by	arguing	for	“the	right	balance	between	the	two	kinds	of	truths.”111	In	fact,	Heisenberg	thought	of	his	contact	with	Indian	philosophy	as	exceedingly	helpful	in	the	development	of	his	work	as	a	physicist	and	argued	that	Eastern	philosophy	may	make	it	easier	for	one	to	adapt	to	the	implications	of	quantum	theory.112	The	seeming	duality	of	subject	and	object	are	one	in	the	same,	as	London	and	Bauer	argued:		Quantum	 physics	 has	 brought	 an	 essential	 advance	 to	 science,	 the	 finding	 that	 in	 every	experiment	or	measurement	there	inescapably	enters	the	duality	between	subject	and	object,	the	action	and	reaction	of	observer	and	system	observed,	 the	observer	and	 the	measuring	apparatus	being	viewable	as	one	entity.113	Pauli	unambiguously	described	his	perspective	on	this	as	“lucid	Platonic	mysticism,”	a	“synthesis	embracing	both	rational	understanding	and	the	mystical	experience	of	unity,”	with	consciousness	as	the	contact	point	of	synthesis.114	He	spoke	of	various	syntheses,	 demonstrating	his	non-reduction,	 including	 those	between	 religion	and	rationality,	psychology	and	philosophy,	and	science	and	mysticism,	in	a	clear	embrace	of	 the	 representation	 construct.115	 Pauli	 was	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 philosopher	Arthur	 Schopenhauer’s	 (1788–1860)	 support	 of	 Eastern	 mysticism,	 as	 in	 his	 The	
World	 as	 Will	 and	 Representation	 (1818).	 Pauli	 adapted	 Schopenhauer’s	 ideas	 to	suggest	that	quantum	physics	creates	a	situation	that	transcends	natural	science	and	may	have	a	“religious	function.”116	He	is	very	explicit	about	his	aims:	to	reconcile	the	scientific	“‘idea	of	material	objects	that	are	completely	independent	of	the	manner	in	which	we	observe”	with	“Asiatic	philosophy	and	Eastern	religions	[in	which]	we	find	the	 complementary	 idea	 of	 a	 pure	 subject	 of	 knowledge.”117	 And	 he	 argued,	 “I	 do	
																																																						111	Heisenberg	(1974),	227–229.	112	Wilber	(1982),	218;	Heisenberg	(1958),	202;	and	Capra	(1988),	42–43.	113	London	&	Bauer	(1983).		114	 Quoted	 in	 Marin	 (2009),	 810.	 Pauli	 also	 collaborated	 with	 Carl	 Jung	 on	 the	 relations	 between	physics	 and	 psychology,	 regarding	 the	 relevance	 of	 consciousness,	 as	 did	 Jordan.	 See	 Pauli	&	 Jung	(1955);	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	52–53;	and	Asprem	(2014),	144–146.	115	Zyga	(2009).	116	Marin	(2009),	810.	117	Quoted	in	Marin	(2009),	812.	
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believe	that	the	natural	sciences	will	out	of	themselves	bring	forth	a	counter	pole	in	their	 adherents,	 which	 connects	 to	 the	 old	mystic	 elements.”118	 This	 suggests	 his	notion	of	religion-science	relationality	is	one	of	which	religion	and	science	constitute	two	 ends	 of	 a	 pole,	 but	 are	 nonetheless	 connected.	 It	 is	 a	 view	 of	 difference	 and	similarity,	a	non-reductive	likening,	a	religiosity	of	science.		 Schrödinger	 made	 a	 quite	 similar	 conclusion	 to	 that	 of	 Pauli.	 While	Schrödinger	had	also	admired	Schopenhauer	and	Eastern	mysticism	as	a	young	man,	and	even	gave	lectures	on	the	Upanishads,	he	renounced	these	views	in	his	mid-life,	but	accepted	mysticism	once	more	when	his	scientific	observations	led	him	to	such	conclusions.119	 He	 then	 dedicated	 himself	 to	 understanding	 Eastern	mysticism.120	Schrödinger	argued,	“the	world	of	science	has	become	so	horribly	objective	as	to	leave	no	 room	 for	 the	 mind”	 and	 suggested	 not	 to	 “lose	 the	 logical	 precision	 that	 our	scientific	thought	has	achieved,”	which	could	be	maintained	with	the	consciousness	hypothesis.	Schrödinger	stated:	To	Western	thought	this	doctrine	[…]	is	unpalatable,	[…]	fantastic,	unscientific.	Well,	so	it	is	because	our	science—Greek	science—is	based	on	objectivation,	whereby	it	has	cut	itself	off	from	an	adequate	understanding	of	the	Subject	of	Cognizance,	of	the	mind.	But	I	do	believe	that	this	is	precisely	the	point	where	our	present	way	of	thinking	does	need	to	be	amended,	perhaps	by	a	bit	of	blood	transfusion	from	Eastern	thought.		In	this	way,	he	centered	the	issue	on	the	understanding	of	‘science,’	which	excluded	the	mind	and	the	subjective.	He	recognized,	“But	some	of	you,	I	am	sure,	will	call	this	mysticism.”121	 He	 saw	 the	 division	 as	 one	 between	 religion	 and	 science	 that	 put	unnecessary	 and	 unacceptable	 constraints	 on	 the	 scientific	 enterprise.	 Thus,	Schrödinger	found	fault	in	“our	science,”	suggesting	the	solution	to	the	problem	is	to	amend	the	meaning	of	‘science.’	If	this	is	labeled	‘mysticism,’	so	be	it,	he	seems	to	have	suggested.	 He	 rejected	 the	 dichotomy	 and	 embraced	 what	 likening	 may	 come	between	 religion	 and	 science,	 even	 suggesting	 a	 universal	 consciousness	 as	 an	answer	to	the	discrepancy	between	mechanistic	determinism	and	free	will.122	
																																																						118	Marin	(2009),	810.	119	 Arntz,	 Chasse,	 &	 Vicente	 (2005),	 60;	 Wilber	 (2001),	 92–95;	 and	 Marin	 (2009),	 819.	 See	 also	Schrödinger	(1951);	Schrödinger	(1964a);	and	Schrödinger	(1964b),	18–22.	120	Kaiser	(2011),	67.	121	Quoted	in	Marin	(2009),	819–820.	122	Asprem	(2014),	148.	
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As	 mentioned,	 the	 consciousness	 hypothesis	 has	 also	 been	 supported	 by	Wigner,	 among	 others.123	 Wigner	 argued	 that	 “consciousness	 evidently	 plays	 an	indispensable	 role,”	 as	 “it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	 formulate	 the	 laws	 of	 quantum	mechanics	 in	 a	 fully	 consistent	 way	 without	 reference	 to	 the	 consciousness”	 and	concluded	 materialism	 of	 the	 classical	 worldview	 is	 incompatible	 with	 quantum	physics.124	Quantum	physics	challenges	the	classical	view	that	only	the	objective	is	real—as	 this	 science	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 act	 of	 knowing	 necessitates	 an	 entity	conform	 to	 its	 nature,	 while	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 entity	 is	 revealed	 through	 our	knowledge	of	 it.125	As	Wigner	noted,	 “physicists	have	 found	 it	 impossible	 to	give	a	satisfactory	 description	 of	 atomic	 phenomena	 without	 reference	 to	 the	consciousness.”126	Bell	made	the	stronger	claim	that	the	mind	“has	a	central	place	in	the	 ultimate	 nature	 of	 reality,”	 though	 he	 elsewhere	 emphasized	 that	 he	 saw	 “no	evidence”	linking	the	observer	to	the	success	of	quantum	physics	(while	at	the	same	time	stating	he	was	“inclined	to	hope”	for	the	“central	role	for	conscious	mind”).127	Some	have	interpreted	quantum	physics	as	suggesting	that	reality	is	observer-induced,	not	 just	observer-influenced.	The	acceptance	of	 the	 role	of	 the	 subject	 in	quantum	physics	“was	only	a	short	step	[…]	to	the	conclusion	that	the	existence	of	the	world	depends	on	consciousness—that,	indeed,	reality	is	our	creation.”128	Yet,	there	is	no	common	factor	of	that	role	among	the	different	theories.	It	is	clear	that	we	can	speak	 of	 a	 ‘observer-influenced	 reality,’	 or	 in	 theoretical	 physicist	 John	Wheeler’s	(1911–2008)	terms	a	“participatory	universe,”	but	much	more	difficult	to	defend	an	‘observer-created	 reality.’129	 However,	 influence	 is	 enough	 for	 many	 to	 liken	 the	science	to	religious	notions.	As	philosopher	and	historian	of	science	Robert	P.	Crease	noted:	
																																																						123	Bohm	also	 found	a	place	 for	consciousness	 in	his	metaphysics.	Bohm	(1983).	Cf.	Bohm,	Hiley,	&	Kaloyerou	(1987).	124	Wigner	(1995),	34	and	252;	and	Wigner	(1967),	172.	See	also	ibid.,	186;	Wigner	(1995),	68;	Marin	(2009),	807;	and	Kaiser	(2011),	73–74.	125	Polkinghorne	(2002),	85	and	87.	126	Wigner	(1995),	34.	127	First	quoted	in	Conner	(2006),	284;	latter	quotes	in	Bell	(2004	[1987]),	170.		128	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	306.	129	See,	e.g.,	Patton	&	Wheeler	(1975),	562.	See	also	Polkinghorne	(2002),	91;	Dickson	(2003),	674;	Grim	(1990),	267;	Zukav	(1979),	53–54;	Herbert	(1985),	17–18;	and	Kaiser	(2011),	75–76.	
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of	consciousness	in	quantum	theory	was	one	between	what	they	called	‘scientific’	and	‘mystical’	 viewpoints,”	 demonstrating	 the	 widespread	 understanding	 of	consciousness	 in	 terms	 of	 religious	 discourse	 from	 supporters	 to	 critics.137	 The	mysticism	controversy	continued	to	escalate	and	by	1936,	the	time	of	the	Copenhagen	Congress	 for	 the	Unity	of	Science,	 it	had	 found	 its	way	 into	 international	media.138	Einstein,	as	well	as	Planck,	publically	addressed	the	controversy	for	over	a	decade,	which	 is	 indicative	 of	 its	 impact.	 Einstein	 and	 Planck’s	 solution	 to	 the	 ‘spooky’	workings	 of	 quantum	 mechanics	 was	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 quantum	 mechanical	description	of	reality	must	be	incomplete,	as	“No	reasonable	definition	of	reality	could	be	expected	to	permit	this.”139	Marin	aptly	remarked	that	this	statement	“discloses	much	of	the	controversy	haunting	the	physics	community	at	that	time.”140	Quantum	physics	simply	did	not	fit	into	the	classical	worldview	and,	as	such,	it	was	understood	as	indicative	of	religion.			 Einstein	 stated,	 regarding	 the	 mystical	 view,	 “No	 physicist	 believes	 that.	Otherwise	he	wouldn’t	be	a	physicist.”	This	seeming	unequivocal	statement	must	be	taken	with	a	grain	of	salt	however,	as	he	goes	on	to	say,	“Neither	do	[Eddington	and	Jeans].	[…]	These	men	are	genuine	scientists	and	their	literary	formulations	must	not	be	taken	as	expressive	of	their	scientific	convictions.”141	Einstein	was	quite	aware	that	both	Eddington	and	Jeans	assigned	a	role	to	consciousness	in	physics,	in	addition	to	their	 mystical	 leanings.142	 Though	 the	 men	 were	 also	 clear	 on	 a	 line	 they	 drew	between	science,	on	the	one	hand,	and	philosophy	and	mysticism,	on	the	other,	they	
																																																						137	Marin	(2009),	811.	Marin	added	“not	one	between	scientific	and	religious	attitudes.”	I	do	not	think	he	 is	 suggesting	 that	 there	 was	 no	 connection	 to	 religion	 here,	 but	 rather	 that	worldviews	 were	emphasized	over	attitudes.	See	also	ibid.,	807–808.	138	Marin	(2009),	807–808.	139	Einstein,	Podolsky,	&	Rosen	(1935),	780.	Even	though	Einstein	fought	against	the	incorporation	of	mysticism	into	physics,	he	still	found	a	place	for	both	religion	and	science	in	his	worldview.	He	even	compared	 the	 feeling	 of	 scientific	 work	 to	 religious	 worship,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 representation	relational	 construction	 was	 applied.	 Holton	 (1973),	 378.	 Furthermore,	 he	 promoted	 a	 religion	 of	science.	Holton	 (2005),	9–15.	See	also	Einstein	 (1949),	27–28;	Einstein	 (1950),	26	and	29–30;	and	Jaeger	(2010),	83–130.	Einstein	also	believed	that	the	orderliness	and	beauty	of	the	workings	of	the	universe	were	perhaps	indicative	of	a	higher	intelligence	that	took	form	in	the	“harmony	of	natural	laws.”	Edis	(2002),	103.	See	also	Einstein	(1954),	40;	and	Jammer	(1999).	140	Marin	(2009),	817.	141	Quoted	in	Marin	(2009),	815.	142	Wilber	(2001),	135–158	and	181–223.	
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	 Just	as	we	have	seen	elsewhere	in	this	book,	scientific	assumptions	can	shape	the	content	and	presentation	of	the	facts	and,	similarly,	attitudes	toward	the	role	of	consciousness	“shaped	the	way	physicists	understood	quantum	mechanics	even	at	the	level	of	fundamental	equations.”171	This	includes	the	examples	of	von	Neumann’s	equations	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 quantum	 field	 theory,	 discussed	 earlier.	 Even	Schrödinger’s	 cat,	 and	 the	 indeterminacy	 at	 the	macro	 scale	 it	 demonstrates,	was	inspired	by	Eastern	philosophical	observations.172	There	is	also	the	example	of	Bohm	who,	responding	to	the	concern	that	quantum	physics	does	not	follow	the	workings	of	 classical	 physics,	 rewrote	 the	 equations	 of	 quantum	mechanics	 to	more	 closely	resemble	Newtonian	equations.	There	was	one	exception	 to	 the	resemblance	with	classical	physics	however—an	additional	force	that	produces	quantum	effects.	“The	additional	force,	however,	was	unusual.	It	did	not	fall	off	with	distance,	and	it	was	not	calculable	 from	any	sources	analogous	 to	charges	or	masses.”173	Bohm	 later	noted	that	 these	 properties	 reflect	 an	 “implicate	 order”	 of	 reality,	 a	 “mystical	 union”	according	to	some	interpretations	since	Bohm	suggested	“consciousness	and	matter	in	general	are	basically	the	same	order.”174	According	to	Bohm,	“That	is	exactly	what	is	 implied	 by	 quantum	 mechanical	 field	 theory.”	 This	 is	 not	 peripheral,	 as	“conventional	 physicists”	 “have	 accepted	 it.”175	 And	 Bohm	 did	 see	 consonance	between	 his	 views	 on	 wholeness	 and	 Eastern	 religious	 philosophies.176	 The	interpretation	of	Bohm’s	hidden	variable	postulate	is	a	good	example	of	the	depth	of	influence	mysticism	has	had	in	quantum	physics,	to	the	point	that	we	cannot	separate	it	 from	 some	 mathematical	 equations.177	 Scientific	 knowledge	 becomes	 non-reductively	similar	to	religious	knowledge,	from	this	perspective.	Though	some	have	declared	an	end	to	the	mysticism	controversy,	as	well	as	the	 consciousness	 hypothesis,	 philosopher	 Daniel	 Athearn	 noted	 that	 those	 who	
																																																						171	Marin	(2009),	808.	172	Harrison	(1979a),	781.	173	Edis	(2002),	101.	174	Bohm	(1983),	208.	Edis	(2002),	101,	interpreted	this	as	a	“mystical	union.”	See	also	Scerri	(1989),	690;	Campbell	(2007),	310;	and	Weber	(1986),	23–49.	175	Quoted	in	Weber	(1986),	34.	Emphasis	original.	176	Bohm	(1983),	19	and	23.	177	 Mystical	 understandings	 also	 influenced	 interpretation	 of	 Einstein’s	 field	 equations.	 See	 Marin	(2009),	812–814.	
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support	the	consciousness	hypothesis	are	“Far	from	being	isolated	and	unbalanced	eccentrics”	 and	 “the	 quantum	 ontologists	 currently	 dominate	 philosophical	discussion	 in	 the	 field,	 and	 constitute	 a	 genuine	 speculative	 branch	 of	 quantum	theory.”178	Furthermore,	parallelism	has	even	featured	as	the	basis	of	physics	courses	and	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	has	become	standard	in	quantum	physics	(indeed,	often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘standard	 interpretation	 of	 quantum	 physics’).	 This	interpretation	 is	 part	 of	 the	 broader	 consciousness	 hypothesis,	 which	 has	 the	strongest	 discursive	 connection	 with	 religious	 philosophies	 among	 the	 parallels	drawn	in	quantum	physics.179	As	such,	this	trend	is	hardly	on	the	outs.	Today,	there	certainly	continues	to	be	many	examples	of	physicists	who	show	support,	to	various	degrees,	 for	 parallels	 with	 mysticism,	 as	 well	 as	 Eastern	 religion,	 and	 the	consciousness	hypothesis	endures.180	Though	the	popularity	of	quantum	mysticism	has	waxed	and	waned,	these	ideas	never	really	went	away.	Physicist	 Roger	 Penrose	 has	 been	 among	 those	 arguing	 for	 “some	 kind	 of	active	 role	 [in	physics]	 for	 consciousness,	 and	 indeed	a	powerful	one	 […].”181	As	a	variant	 from	 the	notion	 that	 consciousness	 induces	 collapse,	Penrose	 and	medical	doctor	and	consciousness	researcher	Stuart	Hameroff,	suggested	that	consciousness	is	 collapse,	 attributed	 to	 quantum	 computations	 occurring	 in	microtubules	within	neurons.182	 Hameroff	 argued	 that	 observer-induced	 collapse	 “puts	 consciousness	
																																																						178	Marin	(2009),	820;	Overbye	(2006);	and	Athearn	(1994),	40–41.	179	Herbert	(1985),	xiii;	Scerri	(1989),	688;	and	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	306.	180	Scerri	 (1989),	688,	which	contains	several	relevant	references.	For	example,	research	 into	what	role	 consciousness	 plays	 in	 the	 shaping	 of	 reality	 has	 been	 conducted	 at	 Princeton	 Engineering	Anomalies	Research	program,	which	is	now	incorporated	in	the	broader	International	Consciousness	Research	 Laboratories.	 The	 research	 emphasizes,	 in	 part,	 “spiritual	 implications.”	 Princeton	Engineering	Anomalies	Research	(2010).	See	also	International	Consciousness	Research	Laboratories	(n.d.).	Other	examples	 include	d’Espagnat	 (1979),	158;	Lanza	&	Berman	(2009);	and	Stapp	(2011).	Ibid.,	13:	“We,	and	in	particular	our	mental	aspects,	have	entered	into	the	structure	of	basic	physical	theory.”	For	a	similar	position,	see	Pagels	(1982),	145.	Goswami,	a	strong	supporter	of	what	he	refers	to	as	 ‘science	within	 consciousness,’	 reported	on	 the	 concurrent	development	of	his	version	of	 the	consciousness	 hypothesis	 by	 several	 others	 and	 with	 many	 supporters.	 Moser	 (2013).	 After	 one	conference,	he	and	his	like-minded	colleagues	even	signed	a	joint	communiqué	declaring	the	need	for	a	recognition	that	consciousness	is	primary	and	that	this	perspective	makes	science	more	effective.	Goswami	(2000),	157.	See	also	Center	for	Quantum	Activism	(n.d.),	s.v.	“About.”	181	Quoted	in	Pruett	(2013b).	See	this	argument	unfold	in	Penrose	(1989).	182	Hameroff	(2005);	and	Baggott	(2004),	254–255.	For	the	original	research,	see	Hameroff	(1994);	and	Penrose	 (1994).	 For	 a	 rebuff,	 see	Grush	&	Churchland	 (1995).	And	 for	 a	 reply,	 see	Penrose	&	Hameroff	(1995).		
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outside	science.”	In	contrast,	in	the	Penrose-Hameroff	model,	known	as	‘orchestrated	objective	reduction’	(Orch	OR)	“consciousness	IS	collapse,	a	self-organizing	process	on	the	edge	between	quantum	and	classical	realms.	Orch	OR	places	consciousness	in	science,	and	is	completely	opposite	to	the	observer	effect.”183	Here	‘consciousness’	is	specifically	constructed	as	“in	science,”	a	relational	move	that	confers	it	a	status	that	is	being	denied	to	alternative	consciousness	hypotheses	by	some	in	the	community.	While	the	Penrose-Hameroff	model	of	consciousness	has	generated	a	 lot	of	debate	and	skepticism,	the	model	has	continued	to	produce	testable	predictions	that	have	held	true.184	And	even	some	skeptics	of	quantum	mysticism	have	granted	there	may	be	some	value	to	this	model,	demonstrating	how	the	consciousness	interpretation	is	constructed	in	terms	of	scientific	knowledge	even	within	the	discourse	that	rejects	religion-science	 likenings	 and	 rejects	 the	 consciousness	 hypothesis	 due	 to	 its	signification	 of	 religion.185	 For	 example,	 Edis,	 who	 denied	 the	 mysticism-physics	connection,	 noted	 that	 indeed	work	 in	 the	 field	 “even	by	 very	 eminent	 physicists,	were	mystical	in	tone”	and	recognized	the	“idea	of	tying	consciousness	to	quantum	physics	 occasionally	 emerges	 as	 a	 legitimate	 proposal,”	 providing	 Penrose	 as	 an	example.186	While	Penrose	rejected	mysticism	“in	its	negation	of	scientific	criteria,”	Hameroff	has	engaged	 in	 likening,	even	referring	to	himself	as	akin	to	a	“quantum	Buddhist.”187	Hameroff	also	drew	a	correspondence	between	 the	challenges	 to	 the	naturalistic	 paradigm	 and	 the	 incorporation	 of	 consciousness	 into	 science.	 He	suggested	 that	 the	 negation	 of	 physicalism	 in	 quantum	 physics	 opens	 up	 such	possibilities.188		Like	other	interpretations	of	quantum	physics,	the	consciousness	hypothesis,	no	matter	the	variant,	faces	some	major	issues.	One	question	that	arises	is	how	can	collapse	be	 accounted	 for	prior	 to	 the	 emergence	of	 consciousness,	 assuming	 that	
																																																						183	Hameroff	(2012).	Emphasis	original.	184	Baggott	(2004),	255.	185	 Shermer	 (2005)	 lumped	 this	 approach	 in	 with	 “quantum	 quackery.”	 Regarding	 a	 response	 to	Shermer’s	 critiques,	 see	 Hameroff	 (2005).	 Seife	 (2000)	 treated	 the	 consciousness	 hypothesis	 as	peripheral	in	the	scientific	community,	but	as	having	attracted	a	“large	number	of	mystics.”	186	Edis	(2006),	49	and	117.	See	also	Edis	(2002),	117.	187	First	quoted	in	Greg	(2005);	second	in	Penrose	(1994),	12.	188	Hameroff	(1998a).	
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version	of	panentheism,	as	did	Jeans	and	Jordan.194	Thus,	this	parallelism	also	has	its	roots	in	the	founders	of	quantum	physics.	And	though	Seager	does	not	feel	kinship	with	his	contemporaries,	Goswami,	for	one,	does	see	a	correspondence	between	quantum	physics	and	panpsychism.	He	argued	 the	 non-locality	 of	 quantum	 physics	 indicates	 ‘quantum	 consciousness’	extends	beyond	the	locale	of	individual	brains	and	interconnects	all	of	humanity.	He	stated	“Traditionally	we	call	this	source	God,	but	we	don’t	have	to.	We	can	equally	well	call	it	quantum	consciousness.”195	He	argued,	though	it	is	a	nonmaterial	causal	source,	“It’s	objective	and	it’s	scientific.”196	Similarly,	physicist	Paul	Davies	observed	in	 the	 context	 of	 quantum	 physics,	 “it	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 science	 does	 have	something	to	say	about	religious	matters,”	concluding,	“science	offers	a	surer	path	to	God	than	religion.”197	Goswami	asked,	“Are	the	universe	and	life	created	by	God?”	He	answered,	 “Yes,	 if	 you	 think	 of	 God	 as	 the	 creative	 principle	 that	 we	 call	consciousness.”198	 This	 makes	 religion	 a	 potential	 narrative	 of	 science	 without	reductively	 identifying	 the	 two.	 Though	 the	 naturalistic	 paradigm	 for	 scientific	knowledge	was	challenged,	that	was	not	thought	to	exclude	the	idea	altogether.	As	we	would	 expect	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 representation	 construct,	 “materialist	cosmology	is	not	wrong,	but	it’s	not	the	complete	story.	In	the	completion	of	the	story	the	cosmological	struggles	of	both	science	and	religion	are	 found	to	converge,	and	integration	becomes	possible.”199		
4 Scientific	Enterprise	as	‘Religious’		
																																																						194	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	52;	and	Asprem	(2014),	261–263	and	284.	195	Moser	(2013).	See	also	Stewart	&	Slade	(2009).	A	similar	position	is	explored	in	Babu	Joseph	(2002),	93–94.	And	theoretical	physicist	Brian	Josephson	also	made	an	argument	for	vitalism.	See	Josephson	(1987),	17.	196	Stewart	&	Slade	(2009).		197	Davies	(1983),	front	matter	and	218.	198	 Goswami	 (2000),	 100.	 Goswami	 has	 also	 said	 ‘God	 is	 consciousness	 in	 its	 creative	 aspect,’	 to	paraphrase.	See	Stewart	&	Slade	(2009).	199	Goswami	 (2000),	 18.	 For	 some	of	Goswami’s	 scientific	publications	on	 the	 issues,	 see	Goswami	(1989);	and	Grinberg-Zylberbaum	et	al.	(1994).	
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yourself,”	‘really’	the	“same	method	all	along.”202	Moreover,	in	both	methodologies	he	identified	components	of	rationalism	and	“nonrationalism,”	since	science	involves	the	creative	investigation	of	the	outer	world	and	spirituality	the	same	of	the	inner	world,	making	the	religious	and	scientific	enterprise	much	the	same.203			 Goswami	further	united	scientific	and	mystical	practices	with	his	development	of	 a	 movement	 known	 as	 ‘Quantum	 Activism.’	 Quantum	 Activism	 is	 “the	 idea	 of	changing	ourselves	and	our	societies	 in	accordance	with	 the	principles	of	quantum	physics.”204	 Quantum	 Activism	 includes	 prescribed	 practices,	 ethics,	 institutions,	educational	programs,	research,	and	political	movements.205	His	worldview	has	even	incorporated	 notions	 of	 heaven,	 hell,	 sin,	 and	 redemption.	 For	 example,	 Goswami	stated:	The	reward	for	moral	action	is	indeed	heaven,	but	not	in	the	afterlife.	Heaven	is	in	this	life;	it	is	not	a	place	but	an	experience	of	 living	 in	quantum	nonlocality.	 […]	What	 is	sin?	 […]	 In	a	quantum	 view	 of	 ethics,	 the	 only	 sin	 is	 that	 of	 completely	 fossilizing	 the	 self	 or	 others	 in	classical	functioning,	to	block	one’s	own	or	another’s	access	to	the	quantum	modality	and	to	the	manifestation	of	freedom	and	creativity.	[…]	For	condoning	this	stasis,	we	do	end	up	in	hell—the	hell-on-earth	of	ego-bondage	[…].206		He	also	described	quantum	activism	as	“the	moral	compass”	of	science	and	so	we	see	that	the	ethics	is	not	reduced	to	science,	but	rather	‘guides’	science	and	so	also	exists	outside	of	its	domain.207	Science,	Goswami	argued,	can	even	demonstrate	the	efficacy	 of	 spiritual	 practices,	 situating	 science	 as	 religiously	 productive.	Furthermore,	scientific	knowledge	has	been	positioned	as	a	means	to	religious	self-actualization.208	At	 the	same	time,	science	cannot	succeed	without	spiritual	 truths,	
																																																						202	Goswami	(2000),	18–19.	Though	this	‘faith’	he	assigned	to	esoteric	religious	traditions	specifically	and	disassociated	it	with	‘dogma.’	203	Goswami	(2000),	19.		204	Center	for	Quantum	Activism	(n.d.),	s.v.	“Home.”	See	also	Moser	(2013).	205	Quantum	activism	has	been	promoted	by	a	political	movement	“based	on	conscious	awareness	of	the	 truth	 of	 life	 on	 this	 planet,”	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Awareness	 Party.	 See	 Goswami	 (n.d.);	 and	 The	Awareness	 Party	 (2010–2016),	 s.v.	 “Home.”	 A	 code	 of	 ethics	 is	 derived	 from	 quantum	 physics	 in	Goswami	(2012).	206	Goswami	(1993),	263.	207	Center	for	Quantum	Activism	(n.d.),	s.v.	“Home.”	208	E.g.,	Goswami	 stated,	quantum	physics	 “can	give	you	 faith	 in	 sudden	discontinuous	change	 [i.e.,	“spiritual	transformation,”	in	his	words].	Then	one	day,	when	you	least	expect	it,	you	arrive	at	certain	knowledge—a	sudden	insight,	a	samadhi,	a	satori.”	Goswami	(2000),	274.	Samadhi	is	a	Sanskrit	term	that	refers	to	a	divine	union	or	a	higher	state	of	consciousness	in	Indian	religion,	whereas	satori	is	a	Japanese	word	 referring	 to	 intuitive	wisdom	 or	 sudden	 enlightenment	 in	 Zen	 Buddhism.	 Through	science,	it	is	claimed,	“heaven	will	be	manifested	on	earth.”	Stewart	&	Slade	2009.	
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according	 to	 his	 perspective,	 which	 makes	 religion-science	 inclusivity	 key.209	Goswami	has	been	careful	not	to	pair	religion-science	likening	with	religion-science	conflation.	When	harmony	between	religion	and	quantum	physics	was	discussed,	he	repeatedly	 emphasized	 that	 the	 science	 need	 not	 be	 interpreted	 in	 this	way,	 thus	keeping	the	‘science	as	science.’210	Still,	 ‘good’	 scientific	 education	 will	 increase	 our	 spiritual	 connectedness,	which	will	in	turn	manifest	in	how	we	interact	with	society	via	the	ability	“to	express	Good,	Beauty,	Truth,	Justice,	and	Love.”	In	this	way,	scientific	education	is	framed	as	the	 source	 of	 spiritual	 ideals.211	 Quantum	 Activism	 has	 made	 other	 normative	prescriptions	 as	 well,	 including	 “right	 thinking,”	 “right	 living,”	 and	 “right	livelihood.”212	 ‘Right	 thinking’	 involves	 a	 worldview	 based	 on	 Goswami’s	 ‘science	within	consciousness’	and	all	its	implications	of	interconnectedness.213	‘Right	living’	is	also	 “empowered	by	right	 thinking”	and	 involves	adopting	 the	new	science	as	a	guide	 in	 understanding	 the	workings	 of	 the	world	 and	 how	 to	 act	 accordingly.214	‘Right	livelihood’	involves	earning	a	living	in	accordance	with	this	mode	of	thinking,	with	considerations	of	the	mutual	impact	between	the	individual	and	the	whole.215	In	recognizing	the	interconnectedness	of	humanity,	it	is	argued	that	the	first	thing	to	do	is	start	with	reforming	oneself.	Because	interconnectedness	suggests	that	by	hurting	others,	 oneself	 is	 harmed	 as	 well,	 forgiveness,	 kindness,	 and	 compassion	 are	emphasized.216	The	thought	of	a	quantum	activist	 is	 if	we	change	the	self,	 then	the	world	can	change	simultaneously:	by	cultivating	positive	emotions	and	creative	acts,	
																																																						209	Goswami	(2000),	xvi.	210	Goswami	(2000).	See	also	Goswami	(1993).	211	Pittman	(2012).	212	See	Pittman	(2012);	and	Goswami	(n.d.).	Notably,	these	are	very	similar	to	particular	elements	of	the	Buddhist	doctrine	of	the	Eightfold	Path.	213	Pittman	(2012).	See	also	Goswami	(2011),	esp.	37–104.	214	Pittman	(2012).	See	also	Goswami	(2011),	esp.	113–163.	215	Goswami	(n.d.).	See	also	Goswami	(2011),	esp.	171–265.	216	 Pittman	 (2012).	 See	 also	 Goswami	 (n.d.).	 One	 blog	 offers	 fourteen	 ways	 to	 practice	 Quantum	Activism,	 which	 all	 include	 either	 cultivating	 a	 sense	 of	 oneness,	 by	 connecting	 with	 like-minded	people	and	getting	involved	in	one’s	community	for	instance,	or	engaging	in	creative	activities,	which	is	thought	to	connect	one	to	the	quantum	consciousness.	Donworth	(2011a);	and	Donworth	(2011b).	
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specifically	argued	for	non-reductive	likening	such	as	when	he	stated,	“Let	religious	organizations	 get	 information	 from	 the	 new	 science,	 and	 let	 the	 new	 scientist	complement	 his	 or	 her	 personal	 spiritual	 search	 and	 research	 by	 sharing	 with	spiritual	communities—the	religions.”229		Systems	theorist	and	physicist	Fritjof	Capra	provides	another	example	of	the	non-reductive	likening	of	the	scientific	and	religious	enterprises.	Even	more	so	than	Goswami,	he	is	regularly	cited	as	distorting	science	in	favor	of	religious	worldviews,	used	 as	 an	 example	 of	 religion-science	 conflation.230	 For	 instance,	 one	 author	characterized	Capra’s	best-selling	book	The	Tao	of	Physics	(1975)	as	“superficial	and	profoundly	 misleading.”231	 However,	 like	 Goswami,	 he	 specifically	 constructs	religion-science	likening	in	a	non-reductive	way	and	this	was	exceedingly	popular.232	While	 he	 tentatively	 (and	 enthusiastically)	 suggested	 there	 are	 some	 parallels	between	 physics	 and	 mysticism,	 he	 admitted	 there	 is	 not	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	establish	a	fact	of	the	matter	and	instead	emphasized	a	subjective	appreciation	of	the	parallelism.	Furthermore,	he	argued,	“science	and	mysticism	are	two	complementary	manifestations	of	the	human	mind;	of	its	rational	and	intuitive	faculties.”	In	this	way,	we	see	the	signifiers	of	religion	and	science	are	held	intact.	In	other	words,	both	are	treated	as	distinct	and	in	no	need	of	transformation,	all	the	while	these	distinctions	are	specifically	constructed	as	similar	in	a	wider	framework	of	meaning.	For	instance,	Capra	stated,	“Science	does	not	need	mysticism	and	mysticism	does	not	need	science;	but	men	and	women	need	both.”233	Furthermore,	Capra	argued	science	could	be	a	path	to	spirituality,	a	“path	with	a	heart”	that	could	give	rise	to	self-realization	and	
																																																						229	Goswami	(2000),	158	and	290.	230	E.g.,	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	308;	and	Restivo	(1983),	8.	Though	I	limit	myself	to	these	and	a	few	examples	discussed	below,	nearly	every	academic	publication	on	quantum	mysticism	described	Capra	in	this	way.	In	contrast,	Capra	reported	that	the	physics	portion	of	his	book	was	well	received	in	the	physics	community	and	that	many	physicists	even	came	around	to	the	mystical	interpretation	as	well.	Heisenberg,	for	one,	was	“very	interested	and	very	open”	to	Capra’s	book.	Wilber	(1982),	216–217.	He	told	Capra,	 “Basically,	 I	am	in	complete	agreement	with	you.”	Capra	(1988),	49.	Kaiser	(2011),	162	concurred	 that	Capra	 “got	 the	physics	 right”	 and	 that	 the	mystical	portion	was	accepted	 in	 certain	academic	communities.	231	Bernstein	(1979),	340.		232	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	88.	The	reach	of	 influence	is	 implicated	by	the	fact	that	his	book	has	gone	through	forty-three	editions	and	translated	into	twenty-three	languages.	233	Capra	(2000	[1975]),	306.	See	also	Capra	(1982),	38,	47–48,	and	78;	and	Restivo	(1983),	9–10	and	passim.	
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other	spiritual	knowledge.234	Capra	claimed,	 “the	scientific	discoveries	of	men	and	women	can	be	in	perfect	harmony	with	their	spiritual	aims	and	religious	beliefs.”235	Capra’s	publication	was	part	of	a	larger	movement	beginning	in	the	1960s	and	continuing	through	today.	Wigner’s	1961	paper	on	the	role	of	the	conscious	observer	in	wave	 function	 collapse	 inspired	 a	 very	 successful	 pop	 genre	 of	mystic-physics,	followed	by	a	 large	popular	movement	 toward	 the	 fusion	of	quantum	physics	and	spirituality	 and/or	mysticism.236	Along	with	Capra’s	work,	 there	 is	 the	example	of	Gary	 Zukav’s	 award-winning	The	 Dancing	Wu	 Li	 Masters	 (1979).237	 Though	 often	polemically	 separated	 as	 strictly	 ‘pop,’	 these	 works	 have	 appeared	 on	 university	physics	courses’	syllabi	on	and	off	throughout	the	years.238	Moreover,	according	to	philosopher	of	science	Eric	R.	Scerri,	“Anyone	involved	in	physics	education	is	likely	to	be	asked	to	comment	on	parallelism	at	some	stage.”239	So	while	some	have	seen	a	decline	of	quantum	mysticism	in	the	mid-twentieth	century,	there	certainly	seems	to	be	arguments	against	this.240	Others	claim	that	quantum	mysticism	did	not	even	reach	full	bloom	until	the	1970s	and	1980s,	while	in	the	1990s	it	has	also	been	suggested	that	 it	was	 “on	 the	 verge	 of	 becoming	 as	 firmly	 entrenched	 in	 popular	 culture	 as	astrology.”241	 Certainly	 the	 public	 has	 showed	 a	 large	 interest,	 with	 the	 award-winning	 quantum	 mystical	 documentary	 What	 the	 Bleep	 Do	 We	 Know?!	 (2004)	launching	a	new	Hollywood	genre	and	with	some	popular	science	books	on	physics	and	 religion	 enjoying	 more	 success	 than	 novels.242	 The	 popularity	 of	 connecting	physics	and	religion	is	partly	due	to,	Margaret	Wertheim	surmised,	“an	assumption	









are	often	evaluated	as	reducibly	religious.244	And	in	a	larger	context,	the	entire	history	and	 significance	 of	 quantum	 mysticism	 is	 typically	 hand-waved	 away	 based	 on	general	arguments	that	because	it	contains	religious	elements,	it	cannot	be	science—the	classic	view	of	exclusivity.	In	other	words,	the	likening	involved	in	religiosity	is	structuring	changes	back	to	mutual	exclusivity,	similar	to	what	we	saw	occur	in	the	case	of	the	scientificity	of	Buddhism	conceptualized	as	not	‘really’	religion.	As	scholar	of	 religion	 Kocku	 von	 Stuckrad	 noted	 in	 a	 general	 context,	 but	 using	 Capra	 as	 an	example:		Interestingly	enough,	many	of	 the	authors	writing	 in	 the	 field	of	NEW	AGE	SCIENCE	had	been	distinguished	scholars	in	their	disciplines	before	they	turned	to	theories	that	lack	the	approval	of	the	majority	of	their	peers;	it	is	this	social	aspect,	rather	than	the	empirical	status	of	their	adopted	theories,	that	allows	scientists	to	transmutate	into	pseudo-scientists.		This	is	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	terminology	‘New	Age	science’	“participates	in	a	discourse	 of	 separating	 ‘real	 science’	 from	 ‘pseudo-science’	 and	 ‘professional’	knowledge	about	nature	from	‘amateur	knowledge.’”245		In	 light	 of	 the	 findings	 regarding	 the	mutual	 exclusivity	 construct,	 it	 is	 not	difficult	 to	 understand	 why:	 if	 a	 hypothesis	 is	 not	 materialist,	 then	 it	 must	 be	pseudoscientific	 and	 religious;	 if	 it	 is	 religious,	 then	 it	must	 not	 be	 scientific.	 For	instance,	the	consciousness	hypothesis	has	been	labeled	“pseudoscientific	nonsense”	and	“cult	science”	and	equated	to	“magical	shortcuts.”246	It	has	been	suggested	that	consciousness	hypotheses	are	“radical”	and	“idiosyncratic,”	thus	making	what	was	a	central	 issue	 peripheral—though	 certainly	 these	 views	 have	 fallen	 in	 and	 out	 of	fashion	since	the	early	days	of	quantum	physics.247	Some	have	denied	the	presence	of	the	consciousness	hypothesis	altogether.	Physicist	and	philosopher	Marshall	Spector	claimed,	in	the	context	of	quantum	mysticism,	“mind	is	not	brought	within	the	ambit	of	the	new	theory	[i.e.,	quantum	theory]	any	more	than	it	was	in	classical	physics.”248	
																																																						244	Examples	of	such	views	in	scientific	journals	apart	from	the	founders	and	the	other	contemporary	scientists	discussed	already	(of	which	refer	to	other	citations	herein)	include	Capra	(1974);	Harrison	(1978);	Harrison	(1979a);	and	Harrison	(1979b).	Capra’s	physical	models	were	even	popular	in	the	1970s	among	physicists.	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	308.	245	von	Stuckrad	(2014),	88.	Emphasis	original.	246	Woit	(2011);	Mone	(2004);	and	Edis	(2002),	99.	247	Scerri	(1989),	690;	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	308;	and	Kaiser	(2011),	xiv.	248	 Spector	 (1990),	 342.	 Indeed,	 most	 physicists	 today	 avoid	 speaking	 of	 ‘consciousness’	 in	 their	analyses,	preferring	to	use	the	terminology	‘observer,’	probably	to	avoid	mystical	interpretations,	as	
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Parallels	between	the	consciousness	hypothesis	and	religion	have	been	constructed	as	 “religious	 arguments,”	 ignoring	 or	 unknowing	 of	 the	 important	 role	 they	 have	played	and	continue	to	play	as	‘scientific	arguments.’249	Another	author	referred	to	this	 theory	 as	 “a	 mystical	 misinterpretation	 of	 quantum	 mechanics,”	 while	 those	drawing	parallels	between	physics	and	religion	have	been	said	to	be	“misguided”	and	“led	astray,”	who	“misrepresent	science.”250	Similarly,	the	broader	‘quantum	mystical’	worldview	has	been	described	as	“distorting	both	science	and	Eastern	mysticism,”	reduced	to	“a	network	of	occult	correspondences.”251	Parallelism	has	been	regarded	as	“superficial”	and	a	“contamination.”252	Alternatives	to	materialistic	interpretation	of	 quantum	 physics	 have	 often	 been	 constructed	 as	 ‘religious	 nonsense’	 and	nonscientific,	which	is	“doomed	to	retreat	as	science	advances.”253		The	 notions	 that	 this	 is	 ‘not	 science’	 and	 just	 ‘religion’	 are	 frequently	discursively	entangled.	One	problem	with	these	perspectives—which	unfortunately	constitute	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 accounts	 of	 ‘quantum	mysticism’	 in	 contemporary	scholarly	analyses—is	that	the	main	criticism	of	the	consciousness	hypothesis	seems	to	be	that	it	is	‘mystical’	and	this	association	is	considered	to	be	a	complete	argument	for	 its	exclusion	 from	consideration.	Attentive	readers	will	quickly	realize	 this	 is	a	result	of	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct.	Thus,	it	is	the	association	with	‘religion’	that	is	used	as	the	point	of	demarcation	as	‘not	science,’	with	little	focus	on	the	theory’s	empirical	 viability	 or	 anything	 else	 for	 that	 matter.	 Put	 differently,	 it	 is	 a	 purely	relational	 conceptualization	 of	 consciousness	 and	 religion	 that	 results	 in	 its	demarcation	 as	 ‘not	 science.’	 To	 drive	 the	 point	 home,	 let	 us	 think	 about	 a	
																																																						to	 invoke	 the	 ‘observer’	 is	 regarded	 as	 distinct	 from	 consciousness,	 though	 I	 have	 not	 found	 an	articulated	 differentiation.	 E.g.,	 Scerri	 (1989),	 689.	 Likely,	 the	 observer	 is	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 physical	system,	whereas	consciousness	 is	not.	Still,	 the	answer	might	not	even	be	so	sophisticated,	 instead	resting	on	a	religion-science	dichotomy	with	no	further	reflection.	In	support	of	this	interpretation	is	the	 fact	 that	 the	 consciousness	 hypothesis	 alone	 is	 regarded	 as	 ‘mystical’	 even	 when	 there	 is	 no	reference	to	the	mystical	by	those	putting	it	forth,	as	noted	elsewhere.	249	Edis	(2006),	52.	250	Stenger	(2007),	384;	and	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	307,	312–313.	251	On	distortion,	see	Crease	(1993),	136;	Crease	&	Mann	(1990),	310;	and	Hammer	&	Lewis	(2010),	6–8.	On	occult,	see	Edis	(2002),	97.	See	also	ibid.,	49;	and	Grim	(1990),	353–384,	in	which	‘quantum	mysticism’	features	in	the	wider	context	of	science	and	the	occult.	252	Edis	(2002),	86;	and	Restivo	(1983),	24.	253	Edis	(2002),	97.	
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according	to	one	theoretical	physicist.256	Even	though	religion	and	classical	physics	continue	to	be	regarded	as	mutually	exclusive	in	many	cases,	there	is	no	conflict	with	the	Newtonian	paradigm	of	science	so	 long	as	 it	 is	properly	applied	to	 its	range	of	applicability	from	this	perspective.257		Quantum	 mysticism	 has	 also	 been	 dismissed	 by	 scholars	 due	 to	 the	essentialization	 and	 conflation	 of	 all	 religions,	 the	 piecemeal	 treatment	 of	 physics	when	drawing	parallels,	and	the	confusion	of	religious	and	scientific	terminology,	and	how	 these	 issues	 result	 in	 associations	 between	 physics	 and	 religion	 where	historically	there	may	be	none.258	Besides	the	last	point,	these	are	really	arguments	against	the	accuracy	of	the	conceptualization	of	parallelism,	which	is	irrelevant	to	the	social	 and	 historical	 facts	 (and	 which	 conceptualization	 is	 taken	 as	 ‘correct’	 is	 a	relational	 matter	 anyway).	 Put	 differently,	 even	 if	 we	 grant	 that	 the	 religion	 and	physics	are	‘distorted’—which	I	do	not,	since	concepts	are	fluid—or	that	the	parallels	are	 unconvincing,	 this	 does	 not	 make	 the	 construct	 historically	 and	 socially	unimportant.	Marin	recognized	this	point	when	he	argued	for	the	need	to	gain	some	historical	 perspective	 on	 quantum	mysticism,	 as	 “Becoming	 aware	 of	 this	 subject	would	help	general	audiences	realize	that	there	are	many	other	alternatives	besides	the	ones	offered	by	 the	disjunction	between	science	and	religion.”259	This	was	 the	general	sentiment	surrounding	a	religiosity	of	science	upon	its	founding	in	quantum	physics.	We	need	to	expand	our	understanding	about	relational	constructs	and	the	forms	they	take	on.	
																																																						256	Goswami	(2000),	xi–xiv	and	3.	257	E.g.,	Goswami	(2000),	59.	258	 Crease	 (1993),	 134–135.	On	 the	 conflation	 of	 all	 Eastern	 religions,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Scerri	 (1989),	 688.	Indeed,	 there	 is	 some	 ‘conflation’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 mysticism	 and	 spirituality	 are	 treated	 as	 the	essential	aspects	of	religion	(though,	‘conflation’	is,	of	course,	a	matter	of	relationality	and	the	evolving	meaning	 of	 concepts).	However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 secondary	 literature	 repeatedly	 emphasizes	conflation,	indicating	that	actually	there	is	more	emphasis	on	the	differences	of	the	religious	traditions.	Moreover,	 most	 authors	 in	 the	 primary	 readings	 do	 recognize	 differences	 between	 the	 religious	traditions,	 to	 warn	 the	 reader	 of	 the	 caveats,	 and	 then	 go	 on	 to	 argue	 for	 some	 possible	generalizations—something	 that	 religious	 scholars	 have	 also	 done	 time	 and	 again,	 particularly	dominant	in	the	past	century.	This	is	not	to	say	that	generalities	are	‘right,’	but	only	to	point	out	that	the	problem	seems	blown	out	of	proportion	in	this	context.	259	Marin	(2009),	819.	
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2.1 Postmodernism	and	Relationalism	Arguing	 for	 an	 underlying	 structure	 of	meaning	making	 is	 not	 new.	 Structuralists	have	 tended	 to	 emphasize	 a	 deep-level	 structure	 that	 maintains	 the	 world	 as	 is.	Structuralism,	 though,	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 its	 inattention	 to	 historical	contingencies,	 as	 no	 structure	 could	 be	 separable	 from	 time	 or	 circumstance.	Structuralism	 has	 also	 been	 critiqued	 because	 it	 overlooked	 the	 ambiguity	 of	language	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 even	 structures	 are	 mutable.	 This	 gave	 rise	 to	deconstructionism,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 schools	 of	 thought	 associated	 with	 the	postmodern	world.4		The	philosopher	Jacques	Derrida	(1930–2004)	argued	that	structure	too	is	a	metaphor,	an	 idea	 in	 the	attempt	 to	organize	reality.	To	argue	 for	structure	 is	 like	arguing	for	any	other	metaphysical	presence,	like	‘forms,’	‘reason,’	or	‘God.’	Structures	are	 impermanent	 historical	 products.	 Derrida	 regarded	 structures	 as	 “convenient	fictions,”	 in	 the	words	of	philosopher	William	D.	Gairdner.	There	 is	no	unchanging	object	to	speak	of,	making	these	mutable	structures	incapable	of	accounting	for	other	processes	 of	 change.	 “[N]o	 discourse	 has	 the	 objective	 capacity	 to	 analyze	 another	




of	relations	or	from	our	ability	to	utilize	them	for	analysis.	On	the	contrary,	it	confirms	it	as	the	lack	of	objectivity	is	a	reflection	of	the	co-constitution	of	concepts	and	the	interrelations	of	all	things.		 	Though	 Derrida	 was	 against	 the	 notion	 of	 structure,	 I	 believe	 his	poststructural	 observations	 actually	 lend	 themselves	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	structure	nonetheless,	but	one	that	accounts	for	dynamism.7	Taking	dynamism	as	a	departure	point	is	a	break	from	the	structuralist	assumption	of	totality	or	universality	since	there	is	no	maintenance	of	the	world	as	is,	only	maintenance	of	mutability.	To	borrow	another	Buddhist	phrase,	‘the	only	constant	is	change.’	Then	what	we	need	is	to	 find	 the	 structure	 of	 change.	 And	 change	 is	 always	 relational,	 arising	 in	 co-dependence	on	preceding	causes	and	conditions.	Rather	than	reject	foundationalist	claims	 due	 to	 observations	 of	 the	 continuous,	 evolving	 flow	 of	 ideas,	 reality,	 and	existence,	how	would	it	be	if	we	instead	treated	that	flow	as	the	foundation?		This	 is	 what	 I	 have	 proposed	 and	 as	 such	my	 theory	might	 be	 positioned	between	structuralism	and	deconstructionism.	The	structure	is	dynamic	(the	constant	is	change;	being	is	becoming)	and	the	structure	is	an	account	of	dynamism	(change	is	relational;	 relations	 structure	 change).	 For	 instance,	we	 have	 seen	 the	 concept	 of	‘science’	evolve	from	‘not	religion’	to	reductively	accounting	for	religion	and	then	to	being	 reduced	 to	 religion.	 The	 relational	 construct	 changed	 and	 this	 changed	 the	relata.	 There	were	 no	 specific	 points—relational	 constructs,	 relational	 content,	 or	signifiers—that	 went	 uncontested,	 but	 the	 changes	 were	 not	 random.	 ‘Science’	constructed	 as	 ‘not	 religion’	 led	 to	 the	 association	 of	 science	 with	 naturalism,	naturalism	was	 then	used	 to	explain	away	religion,	 this	reductive	stance	was	 then	associated	 with	 dogma	 and	 framed	 science	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘religion.’	 So,	 as	 the	deconstructionists	would	have	it,	‘science’	is	not	a	static	entity	and	the	relations	that	structured	the	changes	were	not	constant.	Yet,	in	agreement	with	structuralism,	the	discursive	changes	followed	a	sort	of	logic,	giving	us	an	account	of	the	structure	of	change.	Each	relational	construct	was	a	structured	response	to	pre-existing	ideas.	You	
																																																						7	 To	 clarify,	 Derrida’s	 observations	 exhibited	 a	 structured	 response	 relative	 to	 structuralism.	Furthermore,	 he	 argued	 for	 the	 constancy	 of	 change,	 meaning	 there	 is	 a	 constant	 nonetheless.	Constancy	suggests	structure.	
Reflections	
	 365	












colors	 themselves.	 The	 relations	 of	 the	 colors	 are	 the	 objects	 of	 analysis	 because	colors	vary	and	we	want	to	look	at	something	more	enduring.		Nonetheless	 the	 relation	 still	 tells	 us	 something	 about	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	deviating	 definitions,	 thus	 providing	 contextual	 insight.	 If	 we	 are	 discussing	 the	complementary	 color	 of	 blue,	 we	 know	 we	 are	 talking	 about	 orange;	 if	 we	 are	discussing	the	opposite	of	natural	as	per	mutual	exclusivity,	we	know	we	are	talking	about	the	supernatural.	 In	this	way,	relationality	analysis	also	helps	clarify	what	is	meant	 by	 the	 individual	 words	 of	 the	 definition.	 As	 the	 research	 has	 shown,	 the	naturalism-supernaturalism	 opposition	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 the	 religion-science	relation	is	not	constant.	If	religion	and	science	are	mutually	exclusive,	science	defined	in	terms	of	naturalism	means	naturalism	opposes	religion;	if	the	identity	construct	is	applied,	 religion	 will	 be	 wholly	 natural;	 if	 inclusive,	 naturalism	 will	 not	 oppose	religion;	if	representative,	naturalism	cannot	be	reductively	identified	with	religion	or	science.	A	relational	perspective	reveals	many	different	meanings	of	‘naturalism’	here,	depending	on	the	construct	applied.	In	this	way,	relationality	analysis	allows	for	generality	(the	relational	construct),	as	well	as	specificity	(the	particular	signifiers	and	 their	 relational	 content).	 It	 allows	 for	 both	 historical	 comparison	 and	contextualization.	And	even	within	this	comparison,	mutual	exclusivity	is	regarded	as	one	manifestation	of	relationalization	and	the	oppositional	content	of	the	signifiers	are	 identified	 as	 one	 possible	 consequence	 of	 mutual	 exclusivity.	 The	 essentially	relational	 nature	 of	 concepts	 provides	 the	 continuity	 of	 which	 to	 draw	 historical	comparisons,	 while	 also	 highlighting	 the	 dynamism	 of	 the	 processes	 involved	 in	concept	formation	and	those	processes,	in	turn,	give	us	stability	and	singular	accounts	in	the	particulars.	However,	the	essentialism	of	relationalism	is	of	a	distinctive	kind.	From	this	perspective,	 a	 discussion	 of	 universals	 is	 misleading,	 since	 being	 is	 becoming,	meaning	entities	are	a	set	of	relations,	not	individual	units.	Thus,	relations	become	the	 essence,	 however	 by	 its	 very	 nature	 this	 precludes	 an	 essence	 to	 individual	entities	 (as	 in	nominalism),	as	a	relational	essence	 indicates	co-dependent	arising.	Against	 the	 grain,	 scholar	 of	 religion	 Jeppe	 Sinding	 Jensen	 has	 argued	 for	 the	importance	 and	 inescapability	 of	 universals,	 but	 for	 him	 universals	 imply	
Reflections	
	 369	
“comparability”	not	“identity.”	One	consequence	of	Jensen’s	position	is	that	we	can	step	away	from	the	argument	on	the	precision	of	definitions,	as	if	they	could	possibly	be	real	or	true,	and	instead	treat	definitions	as	“shorthand	theories	which	rely	[…]	upon	complexes	of	concepts	and	assemblages	of	universals.”	This	Jensen	described	as	a	middle	way	between	essentialism	and	nominalism—labeled	‘conceptualism’:		[T]he	 idea	 that	 we	 have	 universals	 in	 the	 form	 of	 concepts	 (as	 thoughts)	 with	 which	 we	perform	and	grasp	actions,	events	and	things,	and	by	the	help	of	which	we	are	able	to	classify	by	means	of	names	and	to	compare	things	that	may	have	something	in	common	according	to	our	concepts.		And,	 in	 the	 study	of	 religion,	 the	 central	 concepts	 of	 academic	 interest	 tend	 to	 be	general	and	abstract,	or	specifically	tend	to	be	universals,	making	the	issue	of	central	concern.	Being	that	these	universals	do	not	refer	directly	to	an	empirical	object,	“They	are	 only	 meaningful	 in	 sets	 of	 relations	 of	 other	 terms,	 models,	 definitions,	generalizations,	etc.	in	a	more	holistic	system	or	paradigm.”15	Taking	 relations	 as	 the	 essence	 gives	 us	 insight	 into	 the	 delusiveness	 of	definitional	 precision.	 Definitions	 are	 the	 coming	 into	 being	 of	 new	 networks	 of	meaning;	they	are	not	the	identification	of	things.	We	actually	lose	precision	with	the	burgeoning	of	ever	more	and	varying	definitions	because	it	exponentially	expands	the	relational	 dynamics	 involved.	 It	 is	 a	 particularly	 persistent	 illusion	 as	 detailed	explanations	obviously	seem	to	create	a	more	vivid	picture,	but	this	picture,	in	turn,	could	be	further	explained,	making	that	initial	depiction	broad	in	comparison	to	its	conception	prior	to	that	explanation.	Put	differently,	each	level	of	explanation	makes	the	network	of	meaning	surrounding	the	explanandum	more	broad	and	thus	more	complex,	not	more	precise.	‘Precision’	has	actually	made	analytical	categories	more	








‘relation.’	Entities	 “are	not	assumed	as	 independent	existences	present	anterior	 to	any	relation,	but…gain	their	whole	being…first	 in	and	with	the	relations	which	are	predicated	of	them.	Such	‘things’	are	terms	of	relations	[…].”19	The	same	is	true	for	concepts:	“[C]oncepts	cannot	be	defined	on	their	own	as	single	ontological	entities;	rather,	the	meaning	of	one	concept	can	be	deciphered	only	in	terms	of	its	‘place’	in	relation	 to	 the	 other	 concepts	 in	 its	 web.”20	 This	 means	 two	 things:	 (1)	 being	 is	ontologically	 multiple—to	 be	 is	 to	 be	 in	 a	 relation;	 existence	 is	 characterized	 by	networks,	not	nodes;	and	(2)	nodes	derive	from	networks	and	there	are	many,	such	that	there	are	other	ontologies	for	‘units’	like	‘religion’	and	‘science’	depending	on	the	relation.	So,	the	ontology	for	the	‘units’	are	multiple	and	there	are	multiple	ontologies	for	these	ontologically	multiple	‘units.’	I	think	the	idea	that	‘relation’	implies	ontological	multiplicity	is	clear	enough,	however	regarding	the	point	that	there	are	multiple	ontologies	for	the	relata	might	need	further	explanation.	Here,	it	might	be	of	some	help	to	mention	Mario	Blaser,	who	argued,	 “ontology	 is	 a	 way	 of	 worlding.”	 Simplifying	 his	 complex	 argument,	 he	maintained	that	ontology	should	be	understood	as	a	category	“in	which	the	heuristic	device	contributes	to	enact	the	fact.”	Ontology	is	“a	form	of	enacting	a	reality”	and	this	is	multifarious.21	Similarly	a	discursive	perspective	contends	 that	 “if	 the	discourse	changes,	the	object	not	only	changes	its	meaning,	but	it	becomes	a	different	object;	it	loses	 its	previous	 identity.”22	As	stated	 in	Chapter	Two,	 I	have	taken	a	perspective	akin	to	historical	ontology,	which	focuses	on	the	coming	into	being	of	objects.	When	we	 apply	 Blaser’s	 understanding	 of	multiple	 ontologies	 to	 the	 historical	 ontology	perspective,	we	can	conceive	of	the	coming	into	beings	of	objects	as	varied	as	well.	And	 the	 relational	 analysis	 herein	 has	 shown	 that	 this	 is	 indeed	 the	 case—the	historical	 ontology	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 is	 really	 a	 story	 of	 ontologies.	 Which	
																																																						19	Quoted	in	Emirbayer	(1997),	287.	See	also	Cherwitz	&	Darwin	(1995),	19:	“[E]ntities	themselves	are	not	self-contained	or	monadic;	relationally	conceived,	entities	are	constituted	by	and	given	integrity	through	 their	 intersection	 and	 coalescence	 with	 other	 entities.”	 Emphasis	 original.	 Though	 I	 think	readers	will	 get	 the	 point	 that	 there	 are	 no	 individual	 entities,	 still	 language	 is	 inhibiting	 here,	 as	‘intersection’	and	‘coalescence’	both	imply	a	‘coming	together’	of	distinct	units.	20	Quoted	in	Emirbayer	(1997),	300.	21	Blaser	(2013),	551.	22	Jäger	(2001),	43.	
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consider	 its	 position	 relative	 to	 other	 dominant	 modes	 of	 intellectual	 thought	following	 the	 postmodern	 turn,	 further	 highlighting	 the	 construction	 of	‘relationalism’	in	a	relational	way.		




than	 our	 definitions.	 In	 many	 ways,	 I	 found	 this	 a	 loathsome	 project,	 but	 it	 was	something	that	needed	to	be	done.	The	main	thrust	and	motivation	of	this	work	was	to	liberate	words	from	this	nihilistic	cesspool.	As	sociologist	Pierpaolo	Donati	noted,	“The	problem	of	relativism	is	resolved	by	specifying	the	relations	among	the	different	systems	of	reference,	or	by	specifying	the	variables	characteristic	of	nontrivial	states	of	the	system,	which	are	used	for	analysis	[…].”27	Interpretation	may	be	constructed,	but	it	is	not	arbitrary,	at	least,	not	in	entirety.	Interpretation	is	structured,	structured	by	 relational	 constructs,	 signifiers,	 and	 relational	 content	 of	 signifiers.	 Though	meaning	for	any	given	term	is	innumerable	(we	can	always	entangle	new	discourses)	and	constitutes	a	socially	contingent	fact,	one	must	follow	the	rules	of	construction	or	otherwise	 be	 incomprehensible.	 If	 meaning	 making	 were	 completely	 arbitrary	 I	daresay	that	we	would	not	be	able	to	communicate	at	all!	A	postmodern	perspective	might	uphold	that	 indeed	we	cannot,	but	then	how	could	we	even	understand	this	claim	to	incomprehensibility?	There	must	be	some	grounds	for	discernment.	Furthermore,	because	there	are	multiple	ontologies	enacting	the	fact	of	many	objects	so	labeled	‘religion’	and	‘science,’	these	‘units’	are	not	fallacious,	but	nor	are	they	 reflections	 of	 ‘ultimate	 reality.’	 Rather,	 Blaser	 argued,	 “they	 partake	 in	 the	performance	of	that	which	they	narrate,”	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	enactment	of	the	fact	of	mutually	exclusivity	in	the	conflict	thesis.28	As	such,	relational	constructs	are	contingently	stabilized,	an	observation	applied	to	category	formation	by	sociologist	Margaret	 R.	 Somers.29	 This	 is	 both	 an	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 claim,	 as	relationality	“determines	the	possibilities	for	‘things’	in	the	world,”	as	well	as	“what	




And	related	to	this	consequence	is	that	reductionist	view	of	language	is	avoided—the	view	of	a	static	process	of	referentiality	to	a	world	‘out	there.’	In	rhetorical	theories	of	meaning,	there	is	typically	a	categorical	distinction	between	language	and	objects.	A	 relational	 view,	 in	 contrast,	 emphasizes	 co-arising	 and	mutual	 definition.32	 This	means	 that	 reality	 “constrains	 rhetoric,”	 while	 meanings	 simultaneously	 “shape	reality.”33	 And	 this	 is	 exactly	 what	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 dialogic	 development	 of	relational	 constructs.	 Meaning	 making	 is	 a	 process	 “where	 a	 term	 is	 created	 or	




relationalism,	 following	 the	 line	of	 thinking	 to	 the	next	 level,	 is	 also	affirmative	of	something	 non-relational,	 but	 this	 affirmation	 is	 not	 a	 ‘positive’	 philosophy,	 but	affirms	what	is	beyond	the	distinction	of	positive	and	negative,	foundational	and	anti-foundational,	the	relational	and	non-relational.	Recall,	emptiness	is	itself	empty.	This	is	like	how	the	philosopher	John	Caputo	interpreted	the	late	Derrida,	after	his	turn	toward	 the	 undeconstructibles,	 as	 even	 though	 deconstruction	 is	 a	 negative	philosophy,	 the	negative	must	 be	 relative	 to	 something,	which	 affirms	 a	 structure	pervading	such	binaries.38	I	have	thought	of	my	work	as	a	reaction	against	postmodernism,	particularly	because	I	found	its	claims	of	the	incomprehensibility	of	human	communication	to	be	(ironically)	nonsense.	Throughout	my	work	on	this	project,	I	began	to	think	of	it	as	a	post-postmodern	manifesto,	 though	 I	had	yet	 to	 realize	 that	 ‘post-postmodernism’	was	 a	 term	 already	 in	 somewhat	 regular	 use.	 Despite	 the	 hegemony	 of	postmodernism	 in	our	present	 academic	 fad,	many	 scholars	of	 intellectual	history	agree	that	postmodernism	is	an	age	of	the	past.	What	era	has	replaced	it,	though,	has	been	labeled	many	things.39	Alternatives	asides,	the	unsavory	‘post-postmodernism’	seems	 to	 be	 the	most	 often	used	 label,	which	often	 involves	 a	 sprinkling	 of	 ‘post-poststructuralism’	 and	 ‘post-deconstructionism.’	 Though,	 as	 with	 any	 intellectual	movement,	post-postmodernism	refers	 to	a	wide	span	of	more	specific	 systems	of	thought	 and	 cultural	 practices,	 what	 is	 of	 interest	 here	 are	 notions	 of	 knowledge	formation,	the	(in)comprehensibility	of	language,	and	the	ontology	of	concepts.	Cultural	 theorists	 Timotheus	 Vermeulen	 and	 Robin	 van	 der	 Akker	characterized	this	phase,	‘metamodernism,’	as	ontologically	between	modernism	and	postmodernism.40	They	described	an	oscillation	between	“modern	enthusiasm	and	postmodern	 irony,	 between	 hope	 and	 melancholy,	 between	 naïveté	 and	knowingness,	empathy	and	apathy,	unity	and	plurality,	 totality	and	 fragmentation,	purity	and	ambiguity.”	This	is	conceptualized	as	a	“‘both-neither’	dynamic,”	“at	once	
																																																						38	Discussed	in	Gairdner	(2008),	267.	See	also	Caputo	(1997),	128–129.	39	 E.g.,	 ‘metamodernism,’	 ‘postmillennialism,’	 ‘pseudomodernism,’	 and	 ‘hypermodernism,’	‘altermodernism’—all	identified	with	a	turn	away	from	postmodernism.	All	terms	vary	as	to	whether	a	hyphen	is	present	or	whether	the	prefix	constitutes	a	separate	word.	40	Vermeulen	&	van	den	Akker	(2010).	
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both	here	and	there	and	nowhere.”	This	resonates	with	the	relationalism	perspective	in	 its	 embrace	of	 a	multiplicity	of	narratives	 including	accounts	of	 solely	 standing	narratives,	making	it	here,	there,	and	nowhere.	Vermeulen	and	van	der	Akker	insisted	that	this	oscillation	is	a	pendulum	swing	and	not	a	balance,	as	the	“unification	of	two	opposed	poles”	 “will	 not,	 can	never,	 and	 should	never”	 be	 realized.	 This	 seems	 to	reflect	the	mood	of	the	age,	as	seen	in	the	inclusivity,	representation,	and	relational	perspectives,	 which	 involve	 a	 reconciliation	 of	 the	 deep	 dichotomies	 of	 human	existence	without	a	reductive	identity	between	the	‘opposed’	poles.	But	contrary	to	Vermeulen	 and	 van	 der	 Akker,	 I	 think	 this	 is	 a	 rejection	 that	 dichotomies	 are	oppositional,	 which	 is	 exactly	 what	 allows	 them,	 conceptually	 speaking,	 to	 be	simultaneously	maintained.	 It	 leaves	 the	dichotomies	 intact,	but	 rejects	 the	notion	that	this	 leaves	us	with	an	either-or	choice.	 It	 is,	 indeed,	 ‘both-neither,’	while	even	‘and-or’	 is	 acceptable.	 From	 a	 relational	 perspective,	 there	 is	 no	 exclusion,	 even	exclusion	 is	 included.	 As	 the	 artist	 Luke	 Turner	 stated	 in	 his	 “Metamodernist	Manifesto,”	“All	information	is	grounds	for	knowledge	[…]	no	matter	its	truth-value.”	The	manifesto	is	“in	pursuit	of	a	plurality	of	disparate	and	elusive	horizons.”41	Though	my	 comments	 on	 the	 ‘mood	 of	 the	 age’	 are	 in	 part	 speculative,	 as	evidence	we	can	look	again	to	the	current	status	of	the	religion-science	relation.	I	do	not	think	it	 is	an	exaggeration	to	say	the	religion	and	science	constitute	two	of	the	main—if	 not	 the	 two	 main—knowledge	 systems	 that	 impact	 human	 meaning	making.42	As	such,	the	religion-science	relation	can	tell	us	a	lot	about	our	intellectual	era	and,	as	I	have	discussed	thoroughly,	inclusivity	and	representation	constitute	two	particularly	salient	relational	constructs	in	the	present	age.	The	apathy,	skepticism,	and	militant	agnosticism	of	the	postmodern	condition—as	well	as	the	hubris	in	the	sciences	of	the	modern	condition—remain	prevalent	as	well,	but	there	has	continued	to	be	a	structured	response	to	these	positions	in	the	attempt	to	offer	alternatives.	In	this	way,	I	agree	with	Vermeulen	and	van	der	Akker	that	our	present	day	and	age	can	be	described	in	terms	of	a	reaction	to	both	modernism	and	postmodernism,	finding	a	
																																																						41	Turner	(2011).	42	 Although	 all	 views	 require	 some	 philosophical	 premises,	 perhaps	 making	 philosophy	 the	 most	influential.	And	yet	religion	and	science	are	often	the	sources	of	these	philosophical	premises.	
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constructed	relative	 to	non-relational	models	and	 in	specific	 contrast	 to	 the	solely	standing	perspectives	embodied	in	the	individual	relational	constructs	discussed.		As	 such,	 applying	 relationalism	 to	 the	 study	of	 the	 religion-science	 relation	also	 creates	 another	 relational	 construct—one	 that	 levels	 the	 playing	 field	 for	 all	relational	constructs.	What	we	might	call	the	‘relationalism	construct’	is	a	construct	that	encompasses	all	constructs,	but	constructed	in	contrast	to	taking	a	sole	construct.	Still,	relationalism	takes	an	inclusive	and	representational	view	(in	the	sense	of	the	constructs—that	 is,	 non-oppositional	 and	 non-reductive)	 toward	 all	 relational	constructs,	as	well	as	non-relational	models,	meaning	it	does	not	take	solely	standing	narratives	as	negated	in	this	view.	In	this	way,	inclusivity	and	representation	created	the	parameters	for	a	relational	view,	taking	their	presumptions	toward	religion	and	science,	 but	 applying	 them	 to	 all	 relational	 constructs.	 There	 is	 no	 opposition	 or	reduction	between	any	of	the	constructs,	only	complementarity,	with	relationalism	constituting	 the	whole.	 It	 is	 an	 account	 of	 solely	 standing	narratives,	 but	 one	 that	rejects	 the	 position	 of	 one	 or	 the	 other	 as	 a	 misunderstanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	concepts.	That	does	not	make	the	solely	standing	narratives	wrong—they	cannot	be,	since	concepts	are	mutable.	Each	relational	construct	is	valid	as	an	expression	of	the	data.	But	 it	does	position	solely	standing	narratives	 to	 the	exclusion	of	alternative	narratives	as	analytically	weak	because	by	committing	to	a	sole	stance,	they	do	not	recognize	this	mutability.	The	problem	for	relationalism,	then,	is	to	justify	a	theoretical	commitment	to	
this	 stance.	 In	 this	 work,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 our	 definitions	 implicitly	 affirm	presumptions	 of	 relations	 and	 relations	 construct	words.	No	 one	 has	 a	 privileged	position	 and	 knowledge	 cannot	 be	 stigmatized	 because	 it	 does	 not	 follow	 one’s	compartmentalization	 of	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science.’	 Yet,	 this	 is	 not	 about	 eliminating	justified	 belief;	 it	 is	 about	 justifying	 the	 plurality	 of	 belief.	 Such	 an	 argument	 for	pluralism,	though,	might	seem	to	undermine	this	commitment	to	relationalism	as	the	most	adequate	framework.	However,	since	the	theory	of	relationalism	is	constructed	relationally,	as	with	all	things,	it	is	one	perspective	on	a	bi-perspectival	viewing	and	thus	 is	 not	 a	 complete	 concept	 on	 its	 own.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 because	 of	 the	 self-reflective	 perspective	 that	 accommodates	 the	 two	 poles	 of	 bifurcation,	 the	
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‘incompleteness’	is	enfolded	in	the	theory	nonetheless.	The	exposition	of	the	theory	itself	 acknowledges	 the	 presence	 of	 and	 relation	 to	 alternate	 theories—reflexivity	and	plurality	are	built	into	a	relational	view.	In	this	way,	relationalism	“accounts	for	itself	 as	 a	 theory”	 as	 a	 product	 of	 relationalization.	 As	 such,	 “the	 theory’s	 own	situatedness	can	be	revealed	and	critiqued.”47	This	is	similar	to	the	critical	reflection	found	 in	 discourse	 analysis,	 which	 accounts	 for	 the	 discursive	 position	 itself	 as	 a	product	of	discourse.48	As	Kocku	von	Stuckrad	stated:	In	a	critical	dialogue	we	have	to	lay	open	the	conditions	that	gave	birth	to	our	meanings	and	subsequent	propositions.	Only	then	will	it	be	possible	to	show	that	those	conditions	are	more	than	the	discourse	of	the	day.	They	are	shaped	by	customary	patterns	of	thought	or	habit	and	by	persistent	traditions	that	are	anything	but	random.49		The	relationality	of	relationalism	might	be	considered	‘post-deconstructionist’	because	 it	 accepts	 the	 variety	 and	 veracity	 of	 interpretation,	 but	 rejects	 the	conclusion	that	this	involves	a	move	away	from	structuralism.	Still,	structure	must	be	thought	of	anew,	in	terms	of	relations,	thus	securing	“the	possibility	of	both	multiple	meanings/interpretations,	 as	well	 as	 objectively	 accessible	ways	of	 accounting	 for	such	interrelations,”	including	non-relational	models,	which	have	a	place	in	this	meta-model.	In	contrast	to	deconstructionism,	though	interpretation	is	multiple,	it	is	at	the	same	 time	 “limited	 by	 the	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 constraints	 relational	possibility	 affords.”50	 Still,	 I	 have	 yet	 to	 find	 any	 systematic	 treatment	 of	 post-poststructuralism	 or	 post-deconstructionism.	 Richard	 Cherwitz	 and	 James	 Hikins	touched	 on	 the	 subject,	 and,	 indeed,	 they	 did	 describe	 post-deconstructionism	 in	terms	of	a	turn	toward	a	relational	view	of	meaning.	From	their	perspective,	meaning	is	 a	 function	 of	 relations,	 they	 embody	 relations,	 and	 language	 identifies	
																																																						47	First	quote,	Cherwitz	&	Darwin	(1995),	27;	second,	Cherwitz	&	Darwin	(1994),	316.	48	von	Stuckrad	(2010),	157–158;	and	von	Stuckrad	(2016b),	216.	49	von	Stuckrad	(2003),	261.	50	Cherwitz	&	Hikins	(1995),	84.	Though,	I	would	favor	the	term	‘bounded’	over	‘limited.’	Cherwitz	and	Hikins	argued	that	relational	impossibilities	are	not	permissible	subjects	of	interpretation—there	are	no	square	circles	to	speak	of,	for	instance.	See	ibid.,	85.	But,	speaking	of	the	absence	of	square	circles	is	to	speak	of	them.	It	creates	a	discourse.	But	the	discourse	is	only	permissible	because	the	concept	of	‘relational	 impossibilities’	 is	 relative	 to	 ‘relational	 possibilities’	 after	 all.	 Just	 because	 relations	structure	meaning	making	does	not	 lead	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 interpretation	 is	 limited.	By	way	of	analogy,	we	can	think	of	the	flow	of	a	river,	bounded	by	the	structure	of	terrain,	but	growth	is,	at	least	in	principle,	endless.	Structure	does	not	necessitate	finitude.	
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interrelationships.51	 I	 too	 anticipate	 that	 the	 post-deconstructionist	 age	 will	 be	 a	critical	theory	not	unlike	relationalism,	a	theory	of	structured	dynamism,	bounded	ambiguity,	 and	 contextualized	 universals—‘ontologically	 between	modernism	 and	postmodernism.’	Relationally	speaking,	this	is	the	natural	outgrowth	of	the	discourse,	a	 structured	 response	 to	 the	 pre-established	 systems	 of	 meaning	 in	 relative	perspective.		 	
3 Future	Directions	for	Research	








manipulated	to	produce	new	views	of	the	world.	For	example,	the	East	has	historically	been	interpreted	in	the	West	as	the	 ‘Other,’	opening	up	all	sorts	of	possibilities	for	relational	construction.55	Sociologist	Colin	Campbell,	for	one,	argued,	“one	can	think	of	the	West	as	containing	the	East	within	itself	[…]	as	a	purely	logical	counterpoint,	but	 also	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 ever-present	 alter	 ego.”56	While	 this	 played	 into	colonialism,	 the	 rhetoric	 was	 turned	 back	 against	 the	 European	 suppressors,	 as	Asians	 actively	 presented	 their	 traditions	 “as	more	 intuitive,	more	mystical,	more	experiential,	and	thus	 ‘purer’	than	the	discursive	faiths	of	the	West.	 In	short,	 if	 the	West	excelled	materially,	the	East	excelled	spiritually.”	Buddhologist	Robert	H.	Sharf	concluded,	 “This	 strategy	had	 the	 felicitous	 result	 of	 thwarting	 the	Enlightenment	critique	of	religion	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	threat	of	Western	cultural	hegemony	on	the	other.”57	As	such,	we	see	how	pre-existing	relational	constructs	structured	 the	emergence	of	novel	conceptualizations	once	again.	Using	a	relational	perspective	as	a	guide,	we	can	account	for	the	conceptual	transformations	from	East-West	mutual	exclusivity,	to	notions	of	Westernization	and	Easternization—a	likening	that	exhibits	the	identity	construct—to	ideas	of	globalization—akin	to	inclusivity—and	even	the	‘glocal’—not	unlike	representation,	which	takes	into	account	the	extreme	poles	of	the	global	and	the	local.	Future	work	 in	 relationality	 analysis	 need	 not	 be	 limited	 by	 the	 relational	constructs	 proposed.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 these	 constructs	 are	 not	exhaustive.	Relationality	analysis	could	also	 look	at	 triadic	relations,	which	 I	 think	would	be	particularly	relevant	in	the	study	of	religion,	science,	and	magic,	since	magic	has	 frequently	 been	 analyzed	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 middle	 ground	 between	 religion	 and	science.	 There	 is	 also	 the	 role	 of	 super-	 and	 sub-ordinated	 concepts	 to	 consider.	Looking	 to	 the	 example	 of	 religion	 and	 science	 once	 again,	 this	 brings	 to	mind	 a	particularly	salient	super-ordinated	concept—‘knowledge	systems.’	Placing	religion	
																																																						55	Batchelor	(2011),	275–276.	56	Campbell	(2007),	146.	See	also	McMahan	(2008),	77.	The	construction	of	the	East	as	the	‘Other’	of	the	West	 is	a	 topic	covered	extensively	 in	 the	 literature.	For	one	key	 text,	 see	Said	(1978).	Though	Edward	 Said	 focused	 on	 the	 Middle	 East,	 his	 thesis	 has	 been	 applied	 across	 Asia	 in	 numerous	publications.	57	Sharf	(2000),	275.	See	also	McMahan	(2011),	138.	
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and	science	as	under	the	category	of	knowledge	systems	creates	a	unique	relational	construct,	whereby	the	two	are	differentiated,	but	could	be	likened	or	not,	opposed	or	not,	reduced	to	one	another	or	not,	and	still	maintain	the	relational	structure.	This	is	 unlike	 any	 of	 the	 other	 relational	 constructs	 discussed	 herein,	 aside	 from	 the	relationalism	construct.	Religion	and	science	have	also	historically	been	treated	as	sub-ordinated	concepts	under	a	larger	‘family’	of	meaning,	like	‘ethics’	and	‘morality,’	making	 the	 two	 differentiated	 at	 the	 first	 level	 and	 likened	 to	 the	 degree	 of	identification	at	a	meta-level.	This,	too,	constitutes	a	unique	construct.	Though	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 defining	 ‘religion’	 and	 ‘science’	 in	 relative	perspective	has	been	a	major	carrier	of	meaning	making	for	the	terms,	there	are,	of	course,	additional	influential	terms	that	deserve	consideration.	The	relationalization	of	 ‘science’	 and	 ‘technology’	 has	 been	 particularly	 important;	 and	 on	 the	 side	 of	‘religion,’	the	relationalization	with	‘spirituality’	makes	for	one	of	the	most	important	identity	markers	of	our	age.		Regarding	religion	and	science,	there	is	another	central	concept	in	the	making	of	the	religion-science	relation	that	deserves	consideration:	the	term	‘secular.’	Future	work	on	the	relationality	of	religion	and	science	could	greatly	benefit	from	further	investigation	of	this	network	of	meaning.	This	is	because	by	the	twentieth	century,	scientific	 knowledge	 production	 had	 become	 practically	 synonymous	 with	secularism.58	This	influential	version	of	the	secularization	thesis	can	be	analyzed	as	a	manifestation	of	the	mutual	exclusivity	construct,	of	‘science	as	not	religion.’59	This	is	apparent	 in	the	particular	aspect	of	the	thesis’	notion	that	religion	and	science	are	inversely	related—as	one	waxes	the	other	wanes—which	was	for	a	time	the	master	model	of	sociology.60	However,	just	as	we	have	seen	elsewhere	regarding	the	religion-
																																																						58	Little	Hersh	(2010),	523.	See	also,	Berger	(1967),	158,	 in	which	 ‘science’	 is	described	as	 ‘secular	reason.’	Cf.	Bruce	(1996),	48–52	and	Bruce	(2002),	106–117,	who	offered	many	counterexamples	and	references,	 though	still	 recognized	a	 connection	between	science	and	secularization.	Bruce	 (1996),	106–117	argued	against,	but	noted	its	theoretical	prevalence.	See	also	Aechtner	(2015),	218–219.	59	Though	this	is	not	necessary.	There	are	other	strands	of	secularization	that	do	not	necessarily	appeal	to	the	authority	of	science.	See	Evans	&	Evans	(2008),	99,	which	also	includes	several	references.	60	E.g.,	Stark	&	Finke	(2000),	61.	See	also	Norris	&	Inglehart	(2004),	3.	Conceptualizing	both	secularism	and	 the	 progression	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 in	 terms	 of	 religious	 decline	was	 expressed	 by	many	seminal	 social	 thinkers	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries,	 including	 Auguste	 Comte	(1798–1857),	Karl	Marx	(1818–1883),	Spencer,	Émile	Durkheim	(1858–1917),	Sigmund	Freud	(1856–
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science	relation,	the	relational	construct	is	malleable.	Secularization	theory	has	been	suggested	to	be	simply	disguised	militant	secularism.61	Such	a	view	has	been	treated	as	 a	 counter-religious	 ideology,	 reminiscent	 of	 religionization	 as	 this	 ‘religion’	 is	treated	 as	 an	 inadequate	 and	 false	 science,	 an	 agenda-based	 sociological	 theory.62	This	can	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	it	is	not	‘science’	or	‘sociology,’	but	reductively	religious	as	in	the	identity	construct.	The	inclusivity	and	representation	constructs	have	also	been	applied	to	the	secular-religion	relation.	Sociologists	Rodney	Stark	and	William	 Sims	 Bainbridge	 assert	 that	 secularization	 can	 produce	 religious	 change,	taking	the	form	of	revival	or	innovation.63	Secularism	itself	has	even	been	shown	to	be	religious	productive.64	Secularism	can	participate	“where	religious	organizations	are	not	effectively	providing	services	to	meet	this	demand	[for	religion].”65	Secular	knowledge,	 like	 science,	 can	 also	 produce	 religious	 knowledge.	 Indeed,	 notions	 of	‘secular	 religion’	 have	 emerged.66	 The	 secular	 has	 also	 been	 analyzed	 in	 terms	 of	‘irreligion’	and	‘non-religion,’	emphasizing	a	relational	construction	that	struggles	to	deal	with	its	identity	and	difference	relative	to	religion.67	With	this	complexity,	the	‘secular’	has	become	a	notoriously	difficult	conceptual	category,	which	could	benefit	from	 an	 in	 depth	 relational	 analysis.	 ‘Secularization’	 is	 already	 understood	 as	 a	relational	term	after	all—it	is	always	accompanied	by	a	complementary	explanation	of	the	decreasing	possibility	of	the	alternatives	it	is	thought	to	displace.	As	such,	it	is	already	primed	for	such	analysis.		 The	theme	of	secularization	as	both	a	product	and	producer	of	religion-science	relationality	is	so	large	and	influential	that	much,	much	more	could	be	said,	of	which	
																																																						1939),	and	Max	Weber	(1864–1920).	Norris	&	Inglehart	(2004),	3.	See	also	Aldridge	(2000),	56–88;	and	Wallace	 (1966),	 264–265	 on	 the	 view	 of	 the	 decreasing	 significance	 of	 religion	 in	 an	 age	 of	secularization	and	the	notion	that	as	science	advances,	religion	declines.	61	E.g.,	Aldridge	(2000),	86.	See	also	ibid.,	60–62.	This	charge	is	particularly	leveled	at	Comte	and	Marx.	Comte’s	sentiments	toward	religion	and	science,	however,	are	much	more	complex	and	changed	over	his	lifetime.	See	Chapter	Five.	62	See,	e.g.,	Aldridge	(2000),	86.	63	Stark	&	Bainbridge	(1985),	429–439.	64	von	Stuckrad	(2013b);	and	Hanegraaff	(1999).	65	Evans	&	Evans	(2008),	99.	66	E.g.,	Milbank	(1992),	37	and	42.		67	Lee	(2012),	130	and	passim;	and	Balagangadhara	(2014).	
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there	is	not	sufficient	space	here	to	do	it	justice.68	I	only	hint	at	it	here	to	point	to	the	prevalence	of	religion-science	relationality	in	the	wider	area	of	sociology	and	history	of	religion	and	to	exemplify	the	wider	applicability	of	relationality	analysis.	Though	many	have	proclaimed	the	secularization	thesis	a	failed	theory,	while	others	argue	for	its	resilience,	the	truth	or	falsity	is	beside	the	point.69	Secularization	theory	has	been	central	to	the	making	of	the	meaning	of	‘religion,’	particularly	in	academia.	However,	this	 has	 repercussions	 for	 society	 and	 culture	 as	 well.	 The	 independence	 of	 the	secular	 from	 religion	 is	 oft	 seen	 as	 a	 defining	 parameter	 of	 modern	 Western	democratic	societies.	It	is	both	the	founding	value	and	institution	of	these	societies.	Religion-science	 relationality	 is	 so	 deeply	 ingrained	 as	 to	 constitute	 the	 way	 we	understand	 the	 self,	 society,	 and	 the	 individual-to-society	 relationship.	 Future	research	 could	 reveal	 the	 central	 role	 of	 relationalization	 at,	 between,	 and	 among	these	 various	 levels,	 expose	 the	 spectrum	 of	 views,	 and	 contribute	 to	 a	 greater	understanding	of	these	significant	identity	markers	in	our	contemporary	day	and	age.		








can	really	love	them,	because	you	love	them	without	attachment.”73	By	appreciating	their	fluidity	and	focusing	on	the	processes	of	which	the	particulars	emerge,	we	can	begin	to	love	our	concepts	once	again	and	use	them	without	the	fear	that	we	have	not	qualified	their	use	in	every	possible	way.		Since	the	central	question	of	this	research	has	been	about	the	nature	of	the	religion-science	relation,	it	only	seems	fair	that	I	give	my	own	view	about	this,	despite	the	fact	that	I	have	attempted	to	be	as	neutral	as	possible.	Neutrality	is	implied	in	my	theoretical	stance	because	if	we	think	of	conceptualization	as	a	relational	process	this	involves	some	relativism	in	what	constitutes	the	meaning	of	the	terms.	But,	again,	I	am	not	a	relativist;	I	am	a	relationalist	and	neutrality	is	the	stance	I	am	arguing	for.	At	the	same	time,	I	think	taking	a	position	is	perfectly	acceptable	so	long	as	we	make	transparent	our	own	 relational	presumptions,	 and	 thus	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	making	of	the	religion-science	relation.		 Neutrality,	 though,	 does	 not	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 what	 is	 the	 religion-science	relation.	None	of	the	meanings	for	religion	or	science	have	held	true	to	any	degree	as	to	warrant	such	claims	for	one	particular	relation,	as	every	major	signifier	has	been	shown	to	change	in	certain	contexts.	My	answer	then	is,	as	the	academic	and	poet	 Poul	 Møller	 (1794–1838)	 put	 it,	 “the	 knowledge	 that	 these	 questions	themselves,	 since	 they	are	based	on	untrue	concepts	must	vanish	away.”74	We	are	asking	the	wrong	question.	We	should	not	be	asking	what	the	relation	is,	but	how	it	is	made.	This	is	because	the	‘how’	is	the	‘what’—being	is	becoming.	But	does	this	then	mean	that	because	the	relation	is	constructed	there	is	nothing	to	it	all?	Certainly	not,	any	more	than	a	building,	as	a	constructed	object,	fails	to	be	perfectly	and	evidently	real.	Instead,	what	this	tells	us	is	that	there	are	many	possibilities	for	religion-science	relations.	As	such,	 there	 is	nothing	stopping	us	 from	constructing	 the	relation	 in	a	beneficial	way,	whether	for	academic	analyses	or	social	values.	The	relationality	of	religion	and	science	is	in	our	hands.
																																																						73	Quoted	in	Wilber	(1982),	223.	74	Quoted	in	Feuer	(1974),	115.	
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